Is happiness having what you want, wanting what you have, or both?

Rabbi Hyman Schachtel (1954) proposed that "happiness is not having what you want, but wanting what you have" (p. 37). In two studies, we tested Schachtel's maxim by asking participants whether or not they had and the extent to which they wanted each of 52 material items. To quantify how much people wanted what they had, we identified what they had and the extent to which they wanted those things. To quantify how much people had what they wanted, we identified how much they wanted and whether or not they had each item. Both variables accounted for unique variance in happiness. Moreover, the extent to which people wanted what they had partially mediated effects of gratitude and maximization on happiness, and the extent to which they had what they wanted partially mediated the effect of maximization. Results indicate that happiness is both wanting what you have and having what you want.     

Children’s reasoning about norms and traits as motives for behavior

Two important sources of information for social judgments are personality dispositions (traits) and social norms. Existing research suggests that young children do not find traits salient. To what extent might they rely on a different source of information? Two experiments explored how information about preferences (what someone likes) and rules (what is allowed or forbidden) affected social judgments. Five-year-olds predicted people’s future behavior would be consistent with rules, but appeared insensitive to information about preferences. Preferences were better predictors than rules for 8-year-olds. Older children and adults consistently judged that actors would want to, and be happy to, satisfy preferences rather than rules. Younger children were more likely to use rules to infer people’s psychological states. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that deontic relations, such as rules and norms play a central role in young children’s social cognition, with ideas of individual psychological dispositions emerging in middle childhood.     

Nonconscious goals can shape what people want to feel

Goals can determine what people want to feel (e.g., Tamir et al., 2008), but can they do so even when they are primed outside of conscious awareness? In two studies, participants wanted to feel significantly less angry after they were implicitly primed with a collaboration goal, compared to a neutral prime. These effects were found with different implicit priming manipulations, direct and indirect measures of emotional preferences, and when controlling for concurrent emotional experiences. The effects were obtained in social contexts in which the potential for collaboration was relatively higher (Study 1) and lower (Study 2). Also, similar effects were found when collaboration was activated nonconsciously (Studies 1–2) and consciously (Study 2). By showing that nonconscious goals can shape emotional preferences, we demonstrate that what people want to feel can be determined by factors they are unaware of.     

Happiness, Economics and Public Policy: A Critique

If politicians and their advisers want to promote the well-being or happiness of citizens they have three ways to find out what they should do. (1) They can analyse the behaviour and the decisions of citizens to find out what they want, in other words: they can try to identify their “revealed preferences”. This is common practice in economics. (2) They can analyse the “stated preferences” of people as they express them explicitly in inquiries, referenda, polls and elections. (3) They can analyse the conditions that make people happy by comparing the conditions of people at different levels of happiness. Economists, like Helen Johns and Paul Ormerod, have an outspoken preference for the first option and they are sceptical about the third. Their argument is unbalanced because they are too critical about the authenticity and complexity of self-reported happiness and not critical enough about the authenticity and complexity of revealed preferences. Economists should appreciate the comparative advantages and additional value of each option and try to find optimal combinations with synergistic effects. Economists should appreciate happiness research as an option to assess the nature and magnitude of “externalities” within their own discipline.     

Personality and Mate Preferences: Five Factors In Mate Selection and Marital Satisfaction

ABSTRACT Although personality characteristics figure prominently in what people want in a mate, little is known about precisely which personality characteristics are most important, whether men and women differ in their personality preferences, whether individual women or men differ in what they want, and whether individuals actually get what they want. To explore these issues, two parallel studies were conducted, one using a sample of dating couples (N= 118) and one using a sample of married couples (N= 216). The five-factor model, operationalized in adjectival form, was used to assess personality characteristics via three data sources—self-report, partner report, and independent interviewer reports. Participants evaluated on a parallel 40-item instrument their preferences for the ideal personality characteristics of their mates. Results were consistent across both studies. Women expressed a greater preference than men for a wide array of socially desirable personality traits. Individuals differed in which characteristics they desired, preferring mates who were similar to themselves and actually obtaining mates who embodied what they desired. Finally, the personality characteristics of one's partner significantly predicted marital and sexual dissatisfaction, most notably when the partner was lower on Agreeableness, Emotional Stability, and Intellect-Openness than desired.     

Preferences,Welfare, and the Status-Quo Bias

Preferences play a role in well-being that is difficult to escape, but whatever authority one grants to preferences, their malleability seems to cause problems for any theory of well-being that employs them. Most importantly, preferences appear to display a status-quo bias: people come to prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get. I try to do two things here. The first is to provide a more precise characterization of the status-quo bias, how it functions, and how it infects commonly accepted theories of well-being. The second is to give an alternative characterization of an agent's preferences that succeeds in avoiding the status-quo bias.     

Counselling, support and advice: The adolescent viewpoint

Few discussions on counselling pay more than lip service to what adolescents actually want. Data presented on the preferences of adolescents with regard to helping services show that no one method of providing help would be adequate. An indication of the number of relatively Isolated and unsupported adolescents is given, suggesting that 20-40% of young people lack a regular source of advice or understanding. Professional and official sources of advice are rarely used, and are not likely to be until they improve both their accessibility and image in the eyes of youth.     

Should Versus Want: On the Relative Contribution of Injunctive Norms and Preferences on Trust Decisions

Despite much research on the determinants of trust among strangers, its mechanisms are understood only rudimentarily. Recently, it has been proposed that people trust strangers because they believe they should, thus complying with an injunctive norm even if it conflicts with their preferences. However, given the boldness of this claim and in light of independent arguments and earlier findings that suggest otherwise, the hypothesis requires critical scrutiny. Thus, we tested whether the decision to trust (in the trust game) is indeed more strongly driven by what people think they should entrust rather than what they want to entrust in two studies. We consistently found a stronger influence of “want” than of “should” on trust decisions even when controlling for the fairness aspect inherent in the trust game. Thus, our findings speak against a predominant role of injunctive norms for trust behavior and confirm that the latter is mostly driven by preferences. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

DOUGHNUTS AND DICKIE

In this paper, I assess Dickie's institutional theory of art. I compare the earlier and later forms of the theory, and I point to various problems of detail with these accounts. I then proceed by arguing that Dickie's definition excludes Krispy Kreme doughnut boxes from possessing the status of being works of art, and it excludes those who made them from possessing the status of being artists. The intention is not to offer a counter example to Dickie's account. Rather, the complaint is that there could be no philosophical point or interest in a concept of art which excludes these doughnut boxes. The best way to see this is by contrast with a concept of art that includes them. Thus I outline what I call a ‘creative’ account. What we want is a concept of art which helps us understand a certain phenomenon in the world – the phenomenon that we call ‘art’. In this light, I argue that Dickie's institutional theory tells us nothing about why people want to make art and nothing about why they want to experience it. By contrast, the creative theory, which embraces both doughnut boxes and things in galleries, is more explanatory.     

Being Religious: Working at Self-Maintenance and Self-Transformation

We see religion in the things people treat as crucial to what they are and to what they aspire to become, things that make the biggest difference in how people feel about themselves. They may be social aspects or personal (behavioral or characterological) aspects of the self. The things people are militant about, the practices in regard to which they are most scrupulous, and the things about themselves that distress them are indicators of where their religious concerns lie, whatever the subject matter. People work to maintain themselves as they want to see themselves and as they want others to see them; they seek ways to repair damage to their selves. They seek also to transform themselves so as to escape present unhappy definitions of self and to achieve ideal states of being. What needs to be changed may be perceived as aspects of personal self, as attitudes other people have toward otherwise unchangeable aspects of self, or as the entire socio-political system in which people feel trapped. The process by which people manage successfully to transform themselves includes social cooperation, including the formation of groups to provide mutual reinforcement.     

The experiential problem for petitionary prayer

Sometimes people petition God for things through prayer. This is puzzling, because if God always does what is best, it is not clear how these prayers can make a difference to what God does. Difference-Making accounts of petitionary prayer attempt to explain how these prayers can nonetheless influence what God does. I argue that, insofar as one is motivated to endorse a Difference-Making Account because they want to respect widespread intuitions about this feature of petitionary prayer, they should also be motivated to endorse an account of prayer that respects widespread intuitions about other central features of petitionary prayer. I describe three problematic cases and the intuitions we have about them, and show how these intuitions restrict any Difference-Making account of petitionary prayer.     

Morality: An Evolutionary Account

ABSTRACT— Refinements in Darwin's theory of the origin of a moral sense create a framework equipped to organize and integrate contemporary theory and research on morality. Morality originated in deferential, cooperative, and altruistic "social instincts," or decision-making strategies, that enabled early humans to maximize their gains from social living and resolve their conflicts of interest in adaptive ways. Moral judgments, moral norms, and conscience originated from strategic interactions among members of groups who experienced confluences and conflicts of interest. Moral argumentation buttressed by moral reasoning is equipped to generate universal and impartial moral standards. Moral beliefs and standards are products of automatic and controlled information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. To understand how people make moral decisions, we must understand how early evolved mechanisms in the old brain and recently evolved mechanisms in the new brain are activated and how they interact. Understanding what a sense of morality is for helps us understand what it is.     

The Significance of the Concept of Disease for Justice in Health Care

In this paper, I want to scrutinise the value of utilising the concept of disease for a theory of distributive justice in health care. Although many people believe that the presence of a disease-related condition is a prerequisite of a justified claim on health care resources, the impact of the philosophical debate on the concept of disease is still relatively minor. This is surprising, because how we conceive of disease determines the amount of justified claims on health care resources. Therefore, the severity of scarcity depends on our interpretation of the concept of disease. I want to defend a specific combination of a theory of disease with a theory of distributive justice. A naturalist account of disease, together with sufficientarianism, is able to perform a gate-keeping function regarding entitlements to medical treatment. Although this combination cannot solve all problems of justice in health care, it may inform rationing decisions as well.     

Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination

In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Orthodox game theory cannot explain such intuitively obvious forms of coordination as the selection of an outcome that is best for all in a common-interest game. Theories of team reasoning provide a convincing solution by proposing that people are sometimes motivated to maximize the collective payoff of a group and that they adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. This also offers a compelling explanation of cooperation in social dilemmas. A review of team reasoning and related theories suggests how team reasoning could be incorporated into psychological theories of group identification and social value orientation theory to provide a deeper understanding of these phenomena.     

You can do it if you really try: The effects of motivation on thinking for pleasure

People find it difficult to enjoy their own thoughts when asked to do so, but what happens when they are asked to think about whatever they want? Do they find thinking more or less enjoyable? In the present studies, we show that people are more successful in enjoying their thoughts when instructed to do so. We present evidence in support of four reasons why this is: without instructions people do not realize how enjoyable it will be to think for pleasure, they do not realize how personally meaningful it will be to do so, they believe that thinking for pleasure will be effortful, and they believe it would be more worthwhile to engage in planning than to try to enjoy their thoughts. We discuss the practical implications of thinking for pleasure for promoting alternatives to the use of technology.     

Feature frequency in concept learning: What is counted?

Frequency theories of concept learning assume that people count how often features occur among instances of a concept, but different versions make various assumptions about what features they count. According to the basic feature model, only basic features are counted, whereas according to the configural model, basic features and configural features (all combinations of basic features) are counted. Two experiments assessed the predictions of both versions of frequency theory. Subjects viewed schematic human faces, which included both positive and negative instances of the concept to be learned, and then provided typicality ratings, classification responses, and frequency estimates of configural features, basic features, and whole exemplars. Because both models assume that basic features are counted, they make the same predictions in many situations. Here, the basic feature estimation and whole exemplar tests were designed such that both models make the same predictions, whereas the typicality rating, classification, and confignral feature estimation tests were designed to distinguish between the models. The pattern of results clearly supported the basic feature version of frequency theory.     

The Roles of Personality Traits and Vocational Interests in Explaining What People Want Out of Life

Life goals reflect people’s aspirations of what they want to become and what kind of life they want to live. In two student samples from the United States (N = 385) and Iceland (N = 1338), we used hierarchical regression and relative weights analyses to first replicate Roberts and Robins (2000) finding that Big Five personality traits predict major life goals, and then to test whether vocational interests have incremental validity in explaining major life goals over and above personality traits. Overall, vocational interests explained larger amounts of variance in major life goals than personality traits, and added incremental validity above and beyond personality traits. Expectations about specific linkages were largely confirmed across the two samples, providing implications for theory and practice.     

What we want to do versus what we think we should do: an empirical investigation of intrapersonal conflict

People often feel torn between what they want to do and what they believe they should do. As a result, they experience intrapersonal conflict. For example, people know that they should avoid credit card debt, but they want to splurge on just one more purchase. Following Loewenstein's ( 1996 ) temporal perspective to understanding internal conflict and inconsistency, we offer three studies that empirically demonstrate (1) a distinction between the want self and the should self, (2) that behavior is more closely linked to the want self, (3) that the want self is the self that is temporally inconsistent, and (4) that adopting a want versus should perspective can have a significant impact on actual behavior. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.