Boundaries of the relation between conscious recollection and source memory for perceptual details

The relation between conscious recollection and source memory for perceptual details was investigated in three experiments that combined the remember-know paradigm with a multidimensional source monitoring test. Experiment 1 replicated that source memory for perceptual details is better in the case of "remember" than "know" judgments. Experiment 2 showed that the relation between "remember" judgments and source memory for perceptual details is diminished by a semantic orienting task during encoding. Experiment 3 demonstrated that "remember" judgments are related to enhanced source memory for specific and unique kinds of perceptual source information, whereas memory for incomplete and global perceptual source information does not differentiate between "remember" and "know" judgments. The results show that the attentional focus during encoding and the specificity of retrieved source information form boundary conditions for the use of source memory for perceptual details as a basis of "remember" judgments.     

On predicting the future states of awareness for recognition of unrecallable items

Two experiments were conducted that examined people's predictive accuracy for their future states of awareness. In both experiments, participants learned word pairs and were tested with a cued recall test. When recall failed, predictive judgments were obtained. In Experiment 1, feeling of knowing judgments predicted not only future recognition but also the state of awareness as remembered or known that was associated with that recognition. In Experiment 2, predictive remember-know judgments were found to be accurately diagnostic of future states of awareness as well. One conclusion to be drawn from these data is that recollective details are among the partial knowledge that is retrieved in the absence of successful cued recall. General implications for theories of feeling of knowing are discussed.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

Confidence–accuracy resolution in the misinformation paradigm is influenced by the availability of source cues

After witnessing an event, people often report having seen details that were merely suggested to them. Evidence is mixed regarding how well participants can use confidence judgments to discriminate between their correct and misled memory reports. We tested the prediction that the confidence–accuracy relationship for misled details depends upon the availability of source cues at retrieval. In Experiment 1, participants (N = 77) viewed a videotaped staged crime before reading a misleading narrative. After seven minutes or one week, the participants completed a cued recall test for the details of the original event. Prior to completing the test, all participants were warned that the narrative contained misleading details to encourage source monitoring. The results showed that the strength of the confidence–accuracy relationship declined significantly over the delay. We interpret our results in the source monitoring framework. After an extended delay, fewer diagnostic source details were available to participants, increasing reliance on retrieval fluency as a basis for memory and metamemory decisions. We tested this interpretation in a second experiment, in which participants (N = 42) completed a source monitoring test instead of a cued recall test. We observed a large effect of retention interval on source monitoring, and no significant effect on item memory. This research emphasizes the importance of securing eyewitness statements as soon as possible after an event, when witnesses are most able to discriminate between information that was personally seen and information obtained from secondary sources.     

Emotion enhances the subjective feeling of remembering, despite lower accuracy for contextual details

Emotion strengthens the subjective experience of recollection. However, these vivid and confidently remembered emotional memories may not necessarily be more accurate. We investigated whether the subjective sense of recollection for negative stimuli is coupled with enhanced memory accuracy for contextual details using the remember/know paradigm. Our results indicate a double-dissociation between the subjective feeling of remembering, and the objective memory accuracy for details of negative and neutral scenes. "Remember" judgments were boosted for negative relative to neutral scenes. In contrast, memory for contextual details and associative binding was worse for negative compared to neutral scenes given a "remember" response. These findings show that the enhanced subjective recollective experience for negative stimuli does not reliably indicate greater objective recollection, at least of the details tested, and thus may be driven by a different mechanism than the subjective recollective experience for neutral stimuli.     

Stereotypes and retrieval-provoked illusory source recollections

When expectations and stereotypes are activated at retrieval, they spontaneously create distorted and illusory recollections that are consistent with these expectations. Participants studied doctor (physician)-related and lawyer-related statements that were presented by 2 different people. When informed, on a subsequent source memory test, (i.e., of who presented what) that one of the study sources was actually a doctor and the other source was a lawyer, there was a strong tendency to attribute the test items in a stereotype-consistent manner. In 3 experiments, participants frequently reported recollecting specific details, such as via "remember" judgments, to justify their stereotype-consistent but incorrect responses. These experiments rule out explanations involving either the misattribution of strong familiarity or differences in the bias to making remember responses as accounts for the illusory source attributions. Instead, the illusory recollections are consistent with the notion that recollective experience is manufactured from both the information in the memory trace and information in the retrieval environment, such as an individual's expectations, stereotypes, and general knowledge.     

Metacognitive illusions can be reduced by monitoring recollection during study

Prior work has shown that judgments of learning (JOLs) are prone to an auditory metacognitive illusion such that loud words are given higher predictions than quiet words despite no differences in recall as a function of auditory intensity. The current study investigated whether judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs)—judgments that focus participants on whether or not recollective details will be remembered—are less susceptible to such an illusion. In Experiment 1, participants studied single words, making item-by-item JOLs or JORKs immediately after study. Indeed, although increased volume elevated judgement magnitude for both JOLs and JORKs, the effect was significantly attenuated when JORKs were elicited. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and additionally demonstrated that participants making JORKs were less likely than participants making JOLs to choose to restudy quiet words relative to loud words. Taken together, these results suggest that JORKs are impacted less—in terms of both metacognitive monitoring and control—by irrelevant perceptual information than JOLs. More generally, these data support the contention that metacognitive illusions can be attenuated by simply changing the way metacognitive judgments are solicited, an important finding given that subjective experiences guide self-regulated learning.     

Stereotypes as Source-Monitoring Cues: On the Interaction Between Episodic and Semantic Memory

This research examined the use of stereotypic expectancies as source cues for biographical memories. Participants were more likely to misattribute stereotypical than counterstereotypical behaviors to a target person. However, this was true only when the original source of the behaviors was difficult to assess (there was source confusion) and recollective processes were impaired. Thus, when recollection of episodic details is disrupted, perceivers may still rely on semantic knowledge to interpret memories. These results demonstrate that stereotype use is efficient not only during the encoding of social information, but also during its retrieval. However, there are also significant costs associated with using stereotypes as source cues. Implications of these findings for social perception and eyewitness testimony are discussed.     

The effects of free recall testing on subsequent source memory

The testing effect is the finding that prior retrieval of information from memory will result in better subsequent memory for that material. One explanation for these effects is that initial free recall testing increases the recollective details for tested information, which then becomes more available during a subsequent test phase. In three experiments we explored this hypothesis using a source-monitoring test phase after the initial free recall tests. We discovered that memory is differentially enhanced for certain recollective details depending on the nature of the free recall task. Thus further research needs to be conducted to specify how different kinds of memorial details are enhanced by free recall testing.     

Evaluating models of remember-know judgments: Complexity, mimicry, and discriminability

Remember-know judgments provide additional information in recognition memory tests, but the nature of this information and the attendant decision process are in dispute. Competing models have proposed that remember judgments reflect a sum of familiarity and recollective information (the one-dimensional model), are based on a difference between these strengths (STREAK), or are purely recollective (the dual-process model). A choice among these accounts is sometimes made by comparing the precision of their fits to data, but this strategy may be muddied by differences in model complexity: Some models that appear to provide good fits may simply be better able to mimic the data produced by other models. To evaluate this possibility, we simulated data with each of the models in each of three popular remember-know paradigms, then fit those data to each of the models. We found that the one-dimensional model is generally less complex than the others, but despite this handicap, it dominates the others as the best-fitting model. For both reasons, the one-dimensional model should be preferred. In addition, we found that some empirical paradigms are ill-suited for distinguishing among models. For example, data collected by soliciting remember/know/new judgments--that is, the trinary task--provide a particularly weak ground for distinguishing models. Additional tables and figures may be downloaded from the Psychonomic Society's Archive of Norms, Stimuli, and Data, at www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Getting at the source of distinctive encoding effects in the DRM paradigm: evidence from signal-detection measures and source judgments

Studying Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists using a distinctive encoding task can reduce the DRM false memory illusion. Reductions for both distinctively encoded lists and non-distinctively encoded lists in a within-group design have been ascribed to use of a distinctiveness heuristic by which participants monitor their memories at test for distinctive-task details. Alternatively, participants might simply set a more conservative response criterion, which would be exceeded by distinctive list items more often than all other test items, including the critical non-studied items. To evaluate these alternatives, we compared a within-group who studied 5 lists by reading, 5 by anagram generation, and 5 by imagery, relative to a control group who studied all 15 lists by reading. Generation and imagery improved recognition accuracy by impairing relational encoding, but the within group did not show greater memory monitoring at test relative to the read control group. Critically, the within group’s pattern of list-based source judgments provided new evidence that participants successfully monitored for distinctive-task details at test. Thus, source judgments revealed evidence of qualitative, recollection-based monitoring in the within group, to which our quantitative signal-detection measure of monitoring was blind.     

Children's metamemorial judgments in an event recall task

Two studies were conducted in which two different indicators of metacognitive monitoring were investigated in a complex everyday memory task. In the first phase of each experiment, 8- and 10-year-olds as well as adults were shown a short event (video) and gave judgments of learning, that is, rated their certainty that they would later be able to recall specific details correctly. In the second phase of the experiments, participants underwent a memory interview about the event and in Study 2 also gave confidence judgments, that is, rated their certainty that the provided answers to the memory questions were correct. Results revealed significant influences of memory characteristics on monitoring in that delaying judgments and monitoring judgments concerning irretrievable information affected judgments of learning. From 8 years of age onward, there were relatively appropriate metamemorial monitoring abilities in both indicators. Moderate intraindividual consistency was found across the two measures of metacognitive monitoring, with a tendency toward higher consistency in older age groups. The results are discussed in terms of the adequacy of the underlying theoretical construct.     

Distinguishing states of awareness from confidence during retrieval: evidence from amnesia

Two experiments were conducted to determine whether recollective experience is distinguishable from confidence. In Experiment 1, we tested college participants in a within-subjects design and replicated Gardiner and Java's (1990) findings from a between-subjects design. We observed higher remember judgments for words than for nonwords, but higher know judgments for nonwords than for words. For confidence judgments, we obtained greater sure than unsure responses for both words and nonwords. In Experiment 2, we tested amnesic participants and matched control participants. Control participants produced the same pattern of results as college participants, but the results of amnesic participants diverged in an important way. For confidence judgments, the amnesic participants, like the control and college participants, made more sure than unsure judgments to both words and nonwords. But for recollective judgments, amnesic participants did not produce the crossover interaction for words and nonwords. This striking difference between the performance of memory-intact and amnesic participants demonstrates that recollective judgments and confidence that accompany retrieval are not isomorphic psychological experiences.     

Implicit person theories influence memory judgments: the circumstances under which metacognitive knowledge is used

This work focuses on the influence of implicit theories on recognition judgments. We argue that to understand how a recognition task is solved, it is necessary to study inferential processes because individuals might use their metamnestic knowledge (‘I would have known that!’) as a basis for replacing missing recollective experiences with inferential processes (Strack & Bless, 1994 ). In the present study, individuals' preexisting implicit personality theory (Dweck, 1996 ) was measured and was identified as a moderating variable for the use of metamnestic knowledge. After participants had studied word lists their metamnestic knowledge concerning these lists was manipulated. The results of a subsequent recognition task revealed that individuals used these metacognitively based inferences only when they assumed personal stability (‘entity theory’). Participants who believed in personal variability (‘incremental theory’) did not draw similar inferences when recollective experiences were missing. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The<Emphasis Type="Italic">remember</Emphasis> response: Subject to bias,graded, and not a process-pure indicator of recollection

Recognition memory judgments have long been assumed to depend on the contributions of two underlying processes: recollection and familiarity. We measured recollection with receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) data and remember-know judgments. Under standard remember-know instructions, the two estimates of recollection diverged. When subjects were told they might need to justify theirremember responses to the experimenter, the two estimates were more likely to agree. The data support the conclusion thatremember responses are generally based on a continuous underlying process but that specific task instructions can produce data that appear consistent with a high-threshold recollective process. Models based on signal detection theory provide a better account of these data than does the dual-process model (Yonelinas, 1994) or process-pure interpretations.     

Long-term memory for performed and observed actions: Retrieval awareness and source monitoring

The self-performed task (SPT) paradigm was employed to investigate incidental memory for action events, focusing on states of awareness at retrieval (Remembering–Knowing) and source monitoring in performed and observed actions, at delays of 1 and 2 weeks. Recognition was better for performed than observed actions, but this effect was visible only after 1 week of retention. Conversely, observed actions were associated with better source memory at both delays. When the source was correctly identified, performed and observed actions were accompanied by equal proportions of Remember judgements. However, when source monitoring was incorrect, performed actions were more frequently associated with a feeling of re-experiencing the original event, thus suggesting an enactment-related recollective superiority, although secondary to the availability of reliable contextual information.     

Long-term memory for performed and observed actions: retrieval awareness and source monitoring

The self-performed task (SPT) paradigm was employed to investigate incidental memory for action events, focusing on states of awareness at retrieval (Remembering-Knowing) and source monitoring in performed and observed actions, at delays of 1 and 2 weeks. Recognition was better for performed than observed actions, but this effect was visible only after 1 week of retention. Conversely, observed actions were associated with better source memory at both delays. When the source was correctly identified, performed and observed actions were accompanied by equal proportions of Remember judgements. However, when source monitoring was incorrect, performed actions were more frequently associated with a feeling of re-experiencing the original event, thus suggesting an enactment-related recollective superiority, although secondary to the availability of reliable contextual information.     

Schematic knowledge changes what judgments of learning predict in a source memory task

Source monitoring can be influenced by information that is external to the study context, such as beliefs and general knowledge (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). We investigated the extent to which metamnemonic judgments predict memory for items and sources when schematic information about the sources is or is not provided at encoding. Participants made judgments of learning (JOLs) to statements presented by two speakers and were informed of the occupation of each speaker either before or after the encoding session. Replicating earlier work, prior knowledge decreased participants’ tendency to erroneously attribute statements to schematically consistent but episodically incorrect speakers. The origin of this effect can be understood by examining the relationship between JOLs and performance: JOLs were equally predictive of item and source memory in the absence of prior knowledge, but were exclusively predictive of source memory when participants knew of the relationship between speakers and statements during study. Background knowledge determines the information that people solicit in service of metamnemonic judgments, suggesting that these judgments reflect control processes during encoding that reduce schematic errors.     

Conceptual fluency selectively influences knowing

Research shows that Remember and Know judgments are effective measures of recollective experience. This article shows that Know responses can be selectively affected by fluency of processing that is created using a conceptual manipulation. In a recognition test, studied and nonstudied words were preceded by semantically related or unrelated primes. Participants gave significantly more Know judgments to items with related primes than unrelated primes but Remember responses were unaffected. Know responses are discussed in terms of familiarity assumed to arise from fluency of processing which, in turn, may be created through various sources including conceptual processes.     

Test modality affects source monitoring and event-related potentials

Two experiments investigated the effect of test modality (visual or auditory) on source memory and event-related potentials (ERPs). Test modality influenced source monitoring such that source memory was better when the source and test modalities were congruent. Test modality had less of an influence when alternative information (i.e., cognitive operations) could be used to inform source judgments in Experiment 2. Test modality also affected ERP activity. Variation in parietal ERPs suggested that this activity reflects activation of sensory information, which can be attenuated when the sensory information is misleading. Changes in frontal ERPs support the hypothesis that frontal systems are used to evaluate source-specifying information present in the memory trace.