THE HEART OF MY CONCERN

Abstract. This brief piece summarizes the author's lifelong personal credo, particularly his attempt to translate traditional religious wisdom into modern scientific concepts. Contemporary science reveals to us the vast system of natural processes that has brought the universe, our planet, and our species into existence. This natural system is in fact a "more-than-human 'Lord of History,'" corresponding to traditional ideas of God. This Lord of History not only has created us but also sustains us—not just externally but also our interior psychic and spiritual nature. We are challenged to discern the requirements that this system of natural processes places upon us; if we conform to these requirements, we shall be blessed, and we will be enabled as co-creators of our future evolution.     

THE NATURE OF PERSONAL FREEDOM

For there is a struggle for human freedom to be waged not only against external centers of irresponsible power but against those equally irresponsible internal forces which in varying degrees dominate the mind and heart of every man. Because of them, man may be free politically and economically, yet deeply enslaved. He can be free of all arbitrary external controls, yet live under the power ol internal compulsions which make of him an automaton: insatiable in his needs, inflexible in his methods, and incapable of learning intellectually or of maturing emotionally through experience. Because of these inner processes, man may be an absolute monarch or a constitutionally elected president, an abstract artist or a precise scientist, a criminal or a clergyman, yet not possess the greatest of all freedoms–the freedom to change.¹     

A Challenge to Divine Psychologism

Alvin Plantinga proposes that mathematical objects and propositions are divine thoughts. This position, which I call divine psychologism, resonates with some remarks by contemporary thinkers. Plantinga claims several advantages for his position, and I add another: it helps to explain the glory of mathematics. But my main purpose is to issue a challenge to divine psychologism. I argue that it has an implausible consequence: it identifies an entity with God's relation to that entity. I consider and rebut several ways in which a divine psychologist might argue that this is not really a consequence, or that the identification is plausible.     

UNIQUENESS,THE IMAGE OF GOD,AND THE PROBLEM OF METHOD: ENGAGING VAN HUYSSTEEN

Wentzel van Huyssteen's book Alone in the World? provides a thoughtful and nuanced account of human evolution from a theological perspective. Not only does his work provide what is perhaps the only sustained theological reflection specifically on human evolution, but his working through of many of the issues, particularly on the image of God literature in theology, has few parallels. Despite this, I focus on what I consider to be several weaknesses of the text, including areas of theological method, theological interpretation, and the central topic of human uniqueness. Addressing these weaknesses will, I propose, improve van Huyssteen's argument and lead in new and fruitful directions.     

THE DEEP CONDITIONS OF SECULARITY

In modern societies and cultures today, religion is widely perceived as basically even if not merely trivially “optional.” This is a contention strongly advocated by Charles Taylor, most notably in his monumental A Secular Age. Throughout his career, Taylor has made the question of religion in modernity the core of his interests. In his most recent work, A Secular Age, Taylor addresses challenging issues of what he calls the “contemporary spiritual experience” and speaks to “the spiritual hungers and tensions of secular modernity.” I critically consider three aspects of this immensely suggestive if not uncontroversial work: (1) I examine whether there is in fact a possible reversibility or revisability to the so‐called ‘optional’ nature of belief that Taylor thinks is characteristic of the secular age; (2) I scrutinize Taylor's notion of “immediacy” of belief in the same milieu; (3) I interrogate his use of the term “fullness” in delineating the temper of the secular age.     

The psychiatrist in national emergency

But Jehoshaphat said, “Is there not here another prophet of the Lord whom we may inquire?” And Ahab, the king of Israel, said to Jehoshaphat, “There is yet one man by whom we may inquire of the Lord, Micaiah the son of Imlah, but I hate him for he never prophesies good concerning me, but evil.” (1 Kings, Ch. 22)     

Self-defence Against the Innocent

Do we have the right to defend ourselves against innocent aggressors? If I amattacked in a lift by a knife-wielding lunatic, may I kill or maim him to protect my own life? On one view the insane man’s plight is his bad luck and I am under no obligation to let it be transferred to me. On the opposing view it is my bad luck to be under attack and I have no right to transfer it to an innocent man by killing him to protect myself. It is perhaps becauseneither of these opposing viewpoints is obviously preferable to the other that there is no consensus about the question. Nevertheless we can find considerations for favouring the first view over the second.     

The ministry of counseling

Conclusion Somewhere in religion there is the awareness of and reach toward a divine agency beyond the purely human, whether the divine activity is conceived to be found in Holy Scripture, or a divinely guided Church, or in the stilling of creaturely thoughts in a Friends meeting. All religion asks of psychotherapy is that God be given a chance to will and to do of his good pleasure in us. Religion may fearlessly ally itself with a therapeutic spirit in which the role of man is the humble one of providing the field of action for the Holy Spirit. The therapist is a Christ-bearer, as we are all called to be Christ-bearers in our measure, confirming the intimation of the Spirit that we are sons of God and capable of growing into his image from glory to glory.     

The Struggle for a Blessing. Reflections on Genesis 32:24–31

Jacob was left alone; and a man wrestled with him until daybreak. When the man saw that he did not prevail against Jacob, he struck him on the hip socket; and Jacob's hip was put out of joint as he wrestled with him. Then he said, “Let me go, for the day is breaking.” But Jacob said, “I will not let you go, unless you bless me.” So he said to him, “What is your name?” And he said, “Jacob.” Then the man said, “You shall no longer be called Jacob, but Israel, for you have striven with God and with humans, and have prevailed.” Then Jacob asked him, “Please tell me your name.” But he said, “Why is it that you ask my name?” And there he blessed him. So Jacob called the place Peniel, saying, “For I have seen God face to face, and yet my life is preserved.” Then sun rose upon him as he passed Penuel, limping because of his hip. (Gen. 32:24–31, NRSV)     

What to Do in an Unjust State?: On Confucius’s and Socrates’s Views on Political Duty

Confucius argued for the centrality of the superior man’s political duty to his fellow human beings and to the state, while Socrates suggested that the superior man (the philosopher) may have no such political duty. However, Confucius also suggested that one not enter or stay—let alone save—a troubled state, while Socrates stayed in an unjust state, apparently fulfilling his political duty to the state by accepting an unjust verdict. In this essay, I will try to show how Confucius could solve these apparent contradictions. I will then examine the reasons Socrates directly and indirectly offers to resolve his seemingly conflicting positions in light of the discussion of the Confucian case. This article is a first step toward a deeper understanding of both Confucius and Socrates (Plato) by way of comparative studies, and of the general issue of a superior man’s political duty to a bad state.     

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH MARGOLIS

Abstract: In this article I focus on some of Joseph Margolis's contributions to medical ethics. I first discuss some of Margolis's normative and metaphysical views on death and abortion, particularly in his early work Negativities , as well as some of his metaphysical assumptions. Then these views and assumptions are related to his theory of persons and, by implication, his theory of culture, set forth in a number of later works. In the course of the discussion, I call attention to some controversial issues of today, such as embryonic stem cell research and the creation of embryos for the sole purpose of research, and ask for Margolis's views on them, given his earlier contributions and assumptions. Finally, I comment on his relativism and his program for research in aesthetics and ethics.     

I.P. Pavlov and W. B. Cannon: Founders of modern physiological thought relative to behavior and the autonomic nervous system

It was almost a half century ago that I last attended an International Congress in Moscow and Leningrad—the IUPS Congress of 1935. My wife and I traveled far and saw the majesty of this land and its peoples. Here I met the great Pavlov and heard him present his thoughts concerning the conditioning of behavior. Cannon presented his concepts of transmitters and receptors. There were many other famous physiologists present, A. V. Hill and Lord Adrian; Kato of Japan demonstrated single nerve fiber studies. Someone talked of conditioned diuresis; I read a paper on hypothalamic control of the hypophysis. That was the dawn of neuroendocrinology, studies of hypothalamic function, sensory receptors, and the transmitter-receptor era. It was, like now, a time of great scientific endeavor, but there were clouds in the sky—Stalin and Hitler were coming to power, but the U.S.S.R. and America were friends, and in science it is still so. I wonder what some young man here will be able to report 50 years from now.     

VAN FRAASSEN ON THE NATURE OF EMPIRICISM

Abstract: A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his arguments for this claim in detail. I will argue that they do not succeed and that empiricism is, contrary to van Fraassen's claim, better thought of as a truth‐evaluable doctrine than as a stance.     

REALIZING PLEASANT GROVE: THE REAL PRESENCE OF THE ESCHATON IN THE LIFE OF STANLEY HAUERWAS

Taking my cue from Hannah's Child: A Theologian's Memoir, I discuss the struggles Stanley Hauerwas experiences in trying to identify a place he can call home. The memoir suggests that his academic endeavours have taken Hauerwas far from his hometown, Pleasant Grove, Texas. The book shows, however, that places such as Pleasant Grove function for Hauerwas as anticipations of the heavenly eschaton. To suggest that Christians have no home here on earth does not take into account sufficiently the “real presence” of the heavenly future in everyday realities, such as Stanley's love of Paula Gilbert and a person's appropriate affection of his country.     

THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES AND THE CO-LOCATION PROBLEM

Abstract:  The Identity of Indiscernibles is the principle that there cannot be two individual things in nature that are qualitatively identical. The principle is not exactly popular. Michael Della Rocca tries to resurrect it by arguing that we must accept this principle, for otherwise we cannot explain the impossibility of completely overlapping indiscernible objects of the same kind that share all their parts and exist in the same place at the same time. I try to show that his argument goes wrong: we need not embrace the identity of indiscernibles to deal with the co-location problem.     

THEODICY: A RESPONSE TO CHRISTOPHER SOUTHGATE

This article is a critical and appreciative interaction with Christopher Southgate's theodicy and theology of glory. I critique in particular his rejection of all dualist moves in theodicy. I question why Southgate can ascribe evil to some human actions, many of which are automatic and unconscious, but not to any other level or form of consciousness. I argue that he may rely too heavily on rational scientific categories, which are not sufficient in themselves to carry the weight of key theological concepts. His use of poetry is powerful and suggestive, but in the end, he may not give it enough epistemic weight.     

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ON THE POSSIBILITY OF INQUIRY

Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus’ response to the dogmatists’ objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus’ arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists’ inquiry, we should conclude either that it is impossible or that it does not supply the skeptics with satisfactory starting‐points for further inquiry.     

THE MIRACLE OF MOSES

In this paper, I draw out a tension between miracles, prophecy, and Spinoza's assertions about Moses in the Theological-Political Treatise (TTP). The three seem to constitute an inconsistent triad. Spinoza's account of miracles requires a naturalistic interpretation of all events. This categorical claim must therefore apply to prophecy; specifically, Moses' hearing God's voice in a manner which does not seem to invoke the imagination or natural phenomena. Thus, Spinoza seemingly cannot maintain both Moses' exalted status and his account of miracles. I consider some possible solutions, but find that they are either untrue to Spinoza's position, or would undercut his categorical argument against miracles. I therefore conclude that Spinoza leaves an unresolved tension in the TTP.