Pronounced inferences: A study on inferential conditionals

An experimental study is reported which investigates the differences in interpretation between content conditionals (of various pragmatic types) and inferential conditionals. In a content conditional, the antecedent represents a requirement for the consequent to become true. In an inferential conditional, the antecedent functions as a premise and the consequent as the inferred conclusion from that premise. The linguistic difference between content and inferential conditionals is often neglected in reasoning experiments. This turns out to be unjustified, since we adduced evidence on the basis of a quantitative and a qualitative analysis that this difference has a manifest psychological relevance. For the inferential conditionals, participants appear to retrieve the order of events of the original content conditional on which it was based, before they start reasoning with it. The implications of this finding for reasoning research and linguistics will be discussed.     

Inferential and Non-Inferential Reasoning

It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this answer can help to resolve some disagreements in which the difference between inferential and non-inferential reasoning plays a role.     

Argumentation Without Arguments

A well-known ambiguity in the term ‘argument’ is that of argument as an inferential structure and argument as a kind of dialogue. In the first sense, an argument is a structure with a conclusion supported by one or more grounds, which may or may not be supported by further grounds. Rules for the construction and criteria for the quality of arguments in this sense are a matter of logic. In the second sense, arguments have been studied as a form of dialogical interaction, in which human or artificial agents aim to resolve a conflict of opinion by verbal means. Rules for conducting such dialogues and criteria for their quality are part of dialogue theory. Usually, formal accounts of argumentation dialogues in logic and artificial intelligence presuppose an argument-based logic. That is, the ways in which dialogue participants support and attack claims are modelled as the construction of explicit arguments and counterarguments (in the inferential sense). However, in this paper formal models of argumentation dialogues are discussed that do not presuppose arguments as inferential structures. The motivation for such models is that there are forms of inference that are not most naturally cast in the form of arguments (such as abduction, statistical reasoning and coherence-based reasoning) but that can still be the subject of argumentative dialogue. Some recent work in artificial intelligence is discussed which embeds non-argumentative inference in an argumentative dialogue system, and some general observations are drawn from this discussion.     

Context Matters,but How Much? Latent state–trait analysis of cognitive ability assessments

Cognitive abilities are thought to represent temporally stable constructs, however, accumulating evidence suggests that effects of the measurement situation could affect its measurement (e.g., effects of test motivation, stress level). The present study modeled these effects explicitly in a latent variables approach. In contrast to previous studies, we investigated participants (job candidates) in repeated high‐stakes settings (N = 188). We found that cognitive ability measurements in high‐stakes settings not only reflect a stable latent trait and random measurement error, but also systematic effects of the test setting. Our results support the application of cognitive ability tests in organizational contexts but have implications for its use in applied settings such as personnel selection.     

Are preventive and generative causal reasoning symmetrical? Extinction and competition

We tested whether preventive and generative reasoning processes are symmetrical by keeping the training and testing of preventive (inhibitory) and generative (excitatory) causal cues as similar as possible. In Experiment 1, we extinguished excitors and inhibitors in a blocking design, in which each extinguished cause was presented in compound with a novel cause, with the same outcome occurring following the compound and following the novel cause alone. With this novel extinction procedure, the inhibitory cues seemed more likely to lose their properties than the excitatory cues. In Experiment 2, we investigated blocking of excitatory and inhibitory causes and found similar blocking effects. Taken together, these results suggest that acquisition of excitation and inhibition is similar, but that inhibition is more liable to extinguish with our extinction procedure. In addition, we used a variable outcome, and this enabled us to test the predictions of an inferential reasoning account about what happens when the outcome level is at its minimum or maximum (De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002). We discuss the predictions of this inferential account, Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) model, and a connectionist model-the auto-associator.     

Pragmatic Schemas and the Selection Task: To Reason or Not to Reason

Cheng and Holyoak (1985) have proposed that people possess classes of linguistically based schemas that have an internal structure that is determined by pragmatic considerations. They found that when permission schemas (“If you want to do P, then you must do Q”) are used in the selection task, the success rate is much superior to what is usually observed. According to Cheng and Holyoak, this is due to the fact that the permission schema is defined by a set of production rules that give the same answers to problems of conditional inference as those of formal logic. In order to test this hypothesis specifically, 160 university students were given one of two tests. The first contained two sets of inferential reasoning tasks, one using a permission schema, the second using a relation of multiple causality. The second test employed the same two conditional relations, but in an appropriate context. The results indicated that subjects did better on the reasoning task with the schema of multiple causality when presented in context, but, as predicted, their performance was much worse on the inferential reasoning task with the permission schema, which generated a higher proportion of logically incorrect responses. These results suggest that contrary to what has been affirmed, permission schemas might not have a logical structure that is equivalent to conditional logic. A second experiment examined selection task performance using the same two relations in context. Performance on the permission schema was superior to that found with the relation of multiple causality. This confirmed previous results indicating that permission schemas do improve selection task performance, but also suggests that this effect is not related to understanding of conditional reasoning.     

Inferentialism,degrees of commitment,and ampliative reasoning

Our purpose in this paper is to contribute to a practice-based characterization of scientific inference. We want to explore whether Brandom’s pragmatist–inferentialist framework can suitably accommodate several types of ampliative inference common in scientific reasoning and explanation (probabilistic reasoning, abduction and idealisation). First, we argue that Brandom’s view of induction in terms of merely permissive inferences is inadequate; in order to overcome the shortcoming of Brandom’s proposal, we put forward an alternative conception of inductive, probabilistic reasoning by appeal to the notion of degrees of commitment. Moreover, we examine the sorts of inferential commitments operative in other types of ampliative inferences, such as abduction or reasoning involving idealizations and assumptions. We suggest that agents engaging in these forms of reasoning often undertake restricted inferential commitments, whose scope and reach are more limited that in the case of the commitments associated with full beliefs.

     

Univocal Reasoning and Inferential Presuppositions

I pursue an answer to the psychological question “what is it for S to presuppose that p?” I will not attempt a general answer. Rather, I will explore a particular kind of presuppositions that are constituted by the mental act of reasoning: Inferential presuppositions. Indeed, I will consider a specific kind of inferential presuppositions—one that is constituted by a specific reasoning competence: The univocality competence. Roughly, this is the competence that reliably governs the univocal thought-components’ operation as univocal in a line of reasoning. I will argue that the exercise of this reasoning competence constitutes certain inferential presuppositions. More specifically, I outline a conception of an inferential presupposition as a non-attitudinal but genuinely psychological and rationally committing relation that holds between a reasoner and a proposition. Thus, inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from tacit or standing attitudes that function as premise-beliefs in reasoning. Likewise inferential presuppositions may be distinguished from other kinds of presuppositions. In conclusion, I note some features of inferential presuppositions that bear on the epistemology of inference.     

Contingency bias in probability judgement may arise from ambiguity regarding additional causes

We tested whether preventive and generative reasoning processes are symmetrical by keeping the training and testing of preventive (inhibitory) and generative (excitatory) causal cues as similar as possible. In Experiment 1, we extinguished excitors and inhibitors in a blocking design, in which each extinguished cause was presented in compound with a novel cause, with the same outcome occurring following the compound and following the novel cause alone. With this novel extinction procedure, the inhibitory cues seemed more likely to lose their properties than the excitatory cues. In Experiment 2, we investigated blocking of excitatory and inhibitory causes and found similar blocking effects. Taken together, these results suggest that acquisition of excitation and inhibition is similar, but that inhibition is more liable to extinguish with our extinction procedure. In addition, we used a variable outcome, and this enabled us to test the predictions of an inferential reasoning account about what happens when the outcome level is at its minimum or maximum (De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002). We discuss the predictions of this inferential account, Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) model, and a connectionist model—the auto-associator.     

Evaluating Practical Reasoning

In this paper, the defeasible argumentation scheme for practical reasoning (Walton 1990) is revised. To replace the old scheme, two new schemes are presented, each with a matching set of critical questions. One is a purely instrumental scheme, while the other is a more complex scheme that takes values into account. It is argued that a given instance of practical reasoning can be evaluated, using schemes and sets of critical questions, in three ways: by attacking one or more premises of the argument, by attacking the inferential link between the premises and conclusion, or by mounting a counter-argument. It is argued that such an evaluation can be carried out in many cases using an argument diagram structure in which all components of the practical reasoning in the case are represented as premises, conclusions, and inferential links between them that can be labeled as argumentation schemes. This system works if every critical question can be classified as a assumption of or an exception to the original argument. However, it is also argued that this system does not work in all cases, namely those where epistemic closure is problematic because of intractable disputes about burden of proof.     

Reasoning ability in older adults measured through letter and number series

Letter series and number series tests, consisting of items based on identical rules, were administered in a counterbalanced design to 58 persons (46 women and 12 men) between the ages of 61 and 88 years to determine their relative efficacy (relative difficulty and acceptability) as measures of inductive/deductive reasoning ability. Results indicated that letter and number series tests, in which each item in one has a same-rule counterpart in the other, were not equivalent in regard to their relative difficulty or popularity among the elderly. The number series test was significantly (p 0001) easier and more popular than its letter series counterpart. Some of the implications of these findings for assessing reasoning ability in the elderly were specified.     

Reasoning ability in older adults measured through letter and number series

Letter series and number series tests, consisting of items based on identical rules, were administered in a counterbalanced design to 58 persons (46 women and 12 men) between the ages of 61 and 88 years to determine their relative efficacy (relative difficulty and acceptability) as measures of inductive/deductive reasoning ability. Results indicated that letter and number series tests, in which each item in one has a same-rule counterpart in the other, were not equivalent in regard to their relative difficulty or popularity among the elderly. The number series test was significantly (p 0001) easier and more popular than its letter series counterpart. Some of the implications of these findings for assessing reasoning ability in the elderly were specified.     

Development of Conditional Reasoning: A Longitudinal Study

This study examines the development of conditional reasoning within a longitudinal design. Two age cohorts were assessed each year for 3 years. One cohort began the investigation as 6th-grade students (M = 11 years, 6 months of age); the other cohort began as 8th-grade students (M =13 years, 8 months of age). At each measurement point, each participant completed 5 reasoning problems consisting of modified versions of the Wason Selection Task (Overton, 1990). Results demonstrated a significant improvement in reasoning performance for each cohort. Furthermore, participants performed better when "if-then" propositions were formulated with the antecedent phrase specifying an action and the consequent specifying a condition, than they did when the antecedent specified a condition and the consequent an action. The results are consistent with the position that the development of logical thinking moves toward the integration of inferential schemes into a systematic network, and that this network is not consistently available before adolescence.     

The logic of social exchange: has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason selection task

In order to successfully engage in social exchange--cooperation between two or more individuals for mutual benefit--humans must be able to solve a number of complex computational problems, and do so with special efficiency. Following Marr (1982), Cosmides (1985) and Cosmides and Tooby (1989) used evolutionary principles to develop a computational theory of these adaptive problems. Specific hypotheses concerning the structure of the algorithms that govern how humans reason about social exchange were derived from this computational theory. This article presents a series of experiments designed to test these hypotheses, using the Wason selection task, a test of logical reasoning. Part I reports experiments testing social exchange theory against the availability theories of reasoning; Part II reports experiments testing it against Cheng and Holyoak's (1985) permission schema theory. The experimental design included eight critical tests designed to choose between social exchange theory and these other two families of theories; the results of all eight tests support social exchange theory. The hypothesis that the human mind includes cognitive processes specialized for reasoning about social exchange predicts the content effects found in these experiments, and parsimoniously explains those that have already been reported in the literature. The implications of this line of research for a modular view of human reasoning are discussed, as well as the utility of evolutionary biology in the development of computational theories.     

Group Differences in Regression Intercepts: Implications for Factorial Invariance

Studies of differential prediction typically examine group differences in linear regression slopes or intercepts for predicting criterion scores from one or more test scores. When there are no group differences in slopes, what are the implications of differences in regression intercepts for the measurement equivalence of the tests or criterion across groups? Measurement equivalence is here defined as factorial invariance under a single-factor model for the tests and criterion. Two theorems are given that describe conditions under which intercept differences can exist under factorial invariance. In such cases, intercept differences do not result from measurement bias in either the tests or criterion. The conditions of the theorems are testable using multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis. These test procedures are illustrated in real data. The implications of the theorems and the test procedures for studies of differential prediction are discussed.     

等效性检验——结构方程模型评价和测量不变性分析的新视角

常用的结构方程模型拟合指数存在一定局限, 如χ ²以传统零假设为目标假设, 无法验证模型, 而RMSEA和CFI等描述性的拟合指数不具备推断统计性质, 等效性检验有效弥补了这些问题。首先说明等效性检验如何评价单个模型的拟合, 并解释其与零假设检验的不同, 然后介绍等效性检验如何分析测量不变性, 接着用实证数据展示了等效性检验在单个模型评价和测量不变性检验中的效果, 并与传统模型评价方法比较。     

Building and solving odd-one-out classification problems: A systematic approach

Classification problems (“find the odd-one-out”) are frequently used as tests of inductive reasoning to evaluate human or animal intelligence. This paper introduces a systematic method for building the set of all possible classification problems, followed by a simple algorithm for solving the problems of the R-ASCM, a psychometric test derived from this method. The average Hamming distance finds repetitions of features between and within the problems' sets; it manages to solve 97% of such problems. This performance is equaled only by superior human adults. Finally, these results demonstrate that a simple two-step algorithm can improve categorical case-based reasoning and k-NN algorithms while clarifying the cognitive basis of classification.     

Working memory, text comprehension, and propositional reasoning: a new Semantic Anaphora WM test

The aim of this study was to present a new working memory test following the line of work started by García-Madruga et al. (2007) and to examine its relation to reading comprehension and propositional reasoning measures. In that study we designed a new working memory span test--based on Daneman & Carpenter's (1980) Reading Span Test (RST)--in which the processing task called for an inferential decision--to resolve a pronominal anaphora based on Morpho-Syntactic cues and had people recall the result of this inference. In the current study, besides the RST and the Morpho-Syntactic Anaphora test, we presented a new Semantic Anaphora measure. In order to check the validity of this new Working Memory (WM) task, we used the same reasoning task used in the previous study as well as a new reading comprehension test. The results show the tight relationship amongst working memory, reading comprehension and reasoning, and confirm the validity of the new WM measure.     

A Generalized Proof-Theoretic Approach to Logical Argumentation Based on Hypersequents

Studia Logica - In this paper we introduce hypersequent-based frameworks for the modelling of defeasible reasoning by means of logic-based argumentation and the induced entailment relations. These...     

Reasoning by exclusion in the kea (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Nestor notabilis</Emphasis>)

Reasoning by exclusion, i.e. the ability to understand that if there are only two possibilities and if it is not A, it must be B, has been a topic of great interest in recent comparative cognition research. Many studies have investigated this ability, employing different methods, but rarely exploring concurrent decision processes underlying choice behaviour of non-human animals encountering inconsistent or incomplete information. Here, we employed a novel training and test method in order to perform an in-depth analysis of the underlying processes. Importantly, to discourage the explorative behaviour of the kea, a highly neophilic species, the training included a large amount of novel, unrewarded stimuli. The subsequent test consisted of 30 sessions with different sequences of four test trials. In these test trials, we confronted the kea with novel stimuli that were paired with either the rewarded or unrewarded training stimuli or with the novel stimuli of previous test trials. Once habituated to novelty, eight out of fourteen kea tested responded to novel stimuli by inferring their contingency via logical exclusion of the alternative. One individual inferred predominantly in this way, while other response strategies, such as one trial learning, stimulus preferences and avoiding the negative stimulus also guided the responses of the remaining individuals. Interestingly, the difficulty of the task had no influence on the test performance. We discuss the implications of these findings for the current hypotheses about the emergence of inferential reasoning in some avian species, considering causal links to brain size, feeding ecology and social complexity.