Dignity in Context,and Out: Discussion of Lynne Jacobs’ “On Dignity,a Sense of Dignity,and Inspirational Shame”

ABSTRACT

Dr. Lynne Jacobs’ “On Dignity, a Sense of Dignity, and Inspirational Shame” is an interdisciplinary integration of a priori ethics and a phenomenology of dignity. She contends that the human person’s engagement with other people—writ large in the therapeutic encounter—is inherently ethically situated. Moreover, she avers an inherent content to this ethics, namely, mutual respect for distinctively human value—dignity—between and among people. Her ethics of dignity informs her psychoanalytic exploration of experiences of dignity, indignity, and her notion of inspirational shame, among others. I join in Jacobs’ advocacy for therapeutic facilitation of a person’s sense of inherent worth, as well as her opposition to relational contexts of devaluation and degradation. However, the primordiality Jacobs grants to her ethics of dignity often obscures the constitutively cultural, familial, and personal contextuality of, first, her—and in my view, any—ethical conviction; second, what she describes as the experience of being human; third, the alleged indignity of human vulnerability; and finally, the claim that shame is the natural reaction to one’s failure to live up to personal ideals. In the end, and subject to certain clinical concerns, Jacobs’ article integrates into psychoanalysis primordial ethical duties that she and others claim inhere in us as human beings.     

The Forward Edge of Resistance: Toward the Dignity of Human Agency

Psychoanalysts have traditionally viewed the patient’s resistance as an obstacle to treatment progress. In this paper, I will view resistance in relation to the primary asymmetry built into the treatment relationship with regard to help seeking – patients are help seekers and analysts are designated helpers. More specifically, since there is an ethical privilege and power derived from the self-confidence in providing help to another person, there is a subtle hierarchical subject-object relationship that emerges from the relative dignity or indignity with regard to help-seeking. In this view, resistance is seen as the patient’s attempt to reclaim the dignity of his/her agency as a human subject. Since the patient often feels stymied by a fatalistic inertia in living his/her life, the patient’s resistance of “I Won’t,” instead of a fatalistic “I Can’t,” provides a pathway for the analyst to respect the patient’s resistance as a manifestation of the patient’s need for self-determination.     

Consciousness, the Vegetative State, and the Intrinsic Value of Life

Using the controversy surrounding the views of the Princeton University ethicist Peter Singer as a foil, the authors address the commonly held view that the appropriate time to terminate the life of a human being is when the individual has lost consciousness and there is no hope that he or she will regain it. They make an admittedly dubious case for the vegetative state, with which loss of consciousness is commonly equated, in order to clear the way for a more defensible basis for the termination of a human life, that of the person’s own personal, even if idiosyncratic view of when his or her life is no longer worth living.     

How Chesterton read history

Chesterton was a serious and even excellent philosopher, whose reputation has suffered because his style was so striking, and his conversion to Catholicism so unpopular with Whiggish Britons. He had many ‘politically incorrect’ opinions, but those ‘faults’ were symptoms of a greater virtue, his insistence that ‘the whole object of history is to make us realize that humanity can be great and glorious, under conditions quite different and even contrary to our own’. His desire for a United Europe was not for a larger, self‐willed State, but for a continent of peasant proprietors, workers owning their own tools, citizens alive to their own local heritage. What he distrusted was the Laodicean mood that best defines modernity, that nothing is worth dying for but life is not worth living. What he consistently opposed was the power of businessmen and aristocrats, and their Whiggish supporters’ habit of supposing that the actual course of history was inevitable. Speculation about might‐have‐beens (including the great might‐have‐been of medieval Christendom) is a way to subvert the oppressive weight of the present. His hope was for a revolution ('we may or may not see the New Jerusalem rebuilt. .. on our fields, but in the flesh we shall see Babylon fall'), one made easier by the realization that Babylon need never have been built.     

Protection of Life and Human Dignity: The German Debate between Christian Norms and Secular Expectations

The German debate on bioethics and medical ethics turns on achange in the meaning of human dignity. Such dignity is increasinglyrendered contingent upon a person's empirically assessable qualityof life. In contrast to such dignity-endowed human life, a merelybiological human life is taken to disqualify its bearer fromsuch dignity, depriving his life of the protection "respectfor human dignity" would otherwise guarantee. The idea of a"life not worth living" or "undignified life" evokes categories,which were developed at the beginning of the 20th century, andlater informed the crimes of National Socialist medicine inGermany. Against this secular development, this article analysesthe theological and church-based discussion of basic bioethicalquestions in Germany, especially the controversy among Protestants:once Protestant ethicists abandon an explicitly theologicalbasis for their arguments, their conclusions come to closelyresemble those of the secular participants in the debate. Asa result, such Protestants relativize fundamental ethical norms.They subordinate, along with their secular environment, theprotection of life to respect for autonomy. They thus preparethe ground for a revival of the risky concepts of the past.     

The uncomfortable truth about wrongful life cases

Our ambivalent attitudes toward the notion of ‘a life worth living’ present a philosophical puzzle: Why are we of two minds about the birth of a severely disabled child? Is the child’s life worth living or not worth living? Between these two apparently incompatible evaluative judgments, which is true? If one judgment is true and the other false, what makes us continue to find both evaluations appealing? Indeed, how can we manage to hold these inconsistent judgments simultaneously at all? I critically examine two solutions to this puzzle: the hidden-indexical account and Velleman’s anti-realist account. I propose an alternative explanation which appeals to (a) state-given, as opposed to object-given, reasons for belief and (b) the distinction between belief and acceptance. I argue that (1) the fact that a severely disabled life is not worth living provides object-given reason to believe that that life is not worth living, but (2) after the birth of a severely disabled child, the psychological utility of positive evaluation gives us a state-given reason to believe that that child’s life is worth living, and a reason to accept that, in our relation with the child, her life is worth living. I conclude by drawing a practical lesson about wrongful life suits.     

The emotional geographies of the ‘livingdying’

This paper engages with Madge's (2016; 2018) notion of the ‘livingdying’ through an analysis of three recent autobiographies of death and dying. Dying: A Memoir by Australian author, Cory Taylor (2016), In Gratitude by British writer, Jenny Diski (2016), and The Bright Hour by American memoirist, Nina Riggs (2017), provide insight into the sometimes contradictory emotional responses to the different spaces traversed by the ‘livingdying’. We identify how the emotions of fear and anxiety, sadness and grief, anger and frustration, and isolation and loneliness infuse the liminal spaces that the ‘livingdying’ occupy. In doing so we highlight how the normative dualism of ‘the living’ and ‘the dying’ shapes emotional vulnerabilities. Finally, hoping to further advance Madge's (2016; 2018) provocation to acknowledge, account for and honour the intrinsic entanglement of living and dying and life and death, we propose a reframing of her notion of ‘livingdying’ that includes the ‘ordinary’ living, that is, those not dealing with a terminal illness.     

‘Wholeness,Dignity and the Ageing Self’: A Conversation Between Philosophy and Theology

SUMMARY

Winifred Wing Han Lamb: My philosophical interest straddles the areas of education, religion and theology. As a teacher involved in school philosophy programs, I have also been interested in the philosophy of childhood and particularly in the recurring notion of the ‘whole child’ in education. In considering what ‘wholeness’ could mean for children's education, I have also been led to consider what meaning it holds for the self through the ‘changing scenes’ of life, especially in the face of the challenges of ageing.

The notion of ‘wholeness’ holds an intuitive appeal and invites articulation of the deep truths of our faith with respect to persons in all ‘sorts and conditions.’ In section one of this chapter, I attempt that articulation. But this conversation needs to be complementary. Our chapter is the beginning of a dialogue between philosophy and theology in which both affirm the ageing self in the light of the human search for wholeness and dignity.

Heather Thomson: My theological research into humanity as an image of God led me to inquire about the way in which we could speak meaningfully of ageing and dying in terms of imaging God. This challenged how God-likeness was to be understood in relation to glory, honour and power, terms associated with imaging God and exerting dominion. In searching for a theological view of the self that would confer dignity on the ageing, I was led into conversation with various philosophies of the self, some very helpful for my task.

It seems to me that, if ageing people are to be counted as having dignity and worth, and not discounted, then one's theory of the human person was significant. In pondering the issue, it appeared that a conversation between philosophy and theology would be fruitful. Hence, this joint paper. We each speak from our own discipline but find resonance with each other's work. We see this as a first step in a constructive conversation.     

Human Dignity and the Ethics and Aesthetics of Pain and Suffering

Inasmuch as unmitigated pain and suffering areoften thought to rob human beings of theirdignity, physicians and other care providersincur a special duty to relieve pain andsuffering when they encounter it. When pain andsuffering cannot be controlled it is sometimesthought that human dignity is compromised.Death, it is sometimes argued, would bepreferred to a life without dignity.Reasoning such as this trades on certainpreconceptions of the nature of pain andsuffering, and of their relationships todignity. The purpose of this paper is to laybare these preconceptions. The duties torelieve pain and suffering are clearly mattersof moral obligation, as is the duty to respondappropriately to the dignity of other persons.However, it is argued that our understanding ofthe phenomena of pain and suffering and theirrelationships to human dignity will be expandedwhen we explore the aesthetic dimensions ofthese various concepts. On the view presentedhere the life worth living is both morally goodand aesthetically beautiful. Appropriate``suffering with' another can help to maintainand restore the dignity of the relationshipsinvolved, even as it preserves and enhances thedignity of patient and caregiver alike.     

Looking after Iris: John Bayley’s Elegy for the Living

John Bayley’s Elegy for Iris, his memoir about living with Iris Murdoch after the onset of dementia, unsettles models of mind and agency that ignore human relationship, dependency, and the vulnerabilities of the cared for and the carer. Experiencing Iris as ambiguously absent and present while he attentively cares for her, Bayley frames his memoir as an elegy, a reflection on love and loss that conventionally represents two subjects—the author and the one he lost. Bayley’s acts of care and his stories about his wife, both as she was and as she has become, sustain her moral worth as a person. Writing as an elegist, a survivor entitled to be heard, Bayley moves his experience of caring and loss from personal to social realms, from speaker to listener, opening ethical space for consolation and for social responsibility for the vulnerable.     

Compassion and purity: the ethics and boundary-making of Christian evangelicals

The paper explores the ethical attitude of Christian evangelicals in a church in Britain and how it affects boundary-making of their community. Evangelicals in the case study seek to be accepting of the person and to refrain from being judgemental. The paper distinguishes between the person-centred ‘ethic of compassion’ and the norm-centred ‘ethic of purity’. The ethic of compassion consists in accepting another and recognising the dignity of another based on shared humanity. It is a frame of mind that combines moral intention with the emotions of empathy and sympathy. In contrast, the ethic of purity privileges adherence to the moral order of the group over considerations for the person. The ‘compassionate’ frame of mind weakens boundaries, while the ‘pure’ frame of mind reinforces them. The boundaries of a community result from the interplay of the two ethics.     

Memories of Donald Winnicott

Barbara Dockar-Drysdale, founder and original therapeutic adviser to the Mulberry Bush School, is now in her eighties, and living in retirement. Her writings make frequent reference to her indebtedness to Winnicott, whom she used to meet monthly over the last seventeen years of his life to discuss their ideas and work. Winnicott wrote of her: ‘Here was someone who knew’.     

THE BLOOD CRISIS: <Emphasis Type="Italic">A CHOICE BETWEEN DYING AND REARRANGING?</Emphasis>

I began my Ferenczi studies in the fall of 1987, a year before the English translation of his Clinical Diary was published. Since then, I have demonstrated in writing, teaching, working, and living that there is scarcely a passage in this “laboratory notebook of psychoanalysis” that fails to illuminate the clinical and the personal. And above all is Ferenczi’s late awareness that his personality had been constructed upon false assumptions. This is a reckoning of thirty years’ conscious and unconscious usage of Ferenczi’s experience to illustrate, to interpret, and to expose the clinical and personal dimensions of my own life lived as “the will of another person.” What constitutes, what allows, a choice between dying and rearranging? Now that I am long past Ferenczi’s fifty-nine years, I take the risk every day, and I know it.     

解读成语中的他人心理与互动心理：来自眼动和ERP的证据

为了探查理解单个他人心理与解读互动心理的差异机制, 在实验一和实验二中分别采用眼动和事件相关电位技术来测评个体解读中文四字成语中的单个他人心理和互动心理的加工过程。眼动实验发现, 单人成语第二个字的总阅读时间显著长于物理成语; 随后, 互动成语前三字的凝视时间显著长于单人和物理成语。脑电实验发现, 在成语呈现后500~700ms, 解读单人和互动成语诱发的额区晚期正成分(LPC)平均波幅显著大于解读物理成语; 之后在700~800ms, 解读互动成语诱发的额中区LPC平均波幅显著大于解读单人和物理成语。眼动注视模式和脑电证据共同印证了理解单个他人的心理与理解多人的互动心理存在时间和强度上的差异。相对于物理表征和单人心理的加工, 理解更为复杂的互动心理需要更长的加工时间和更强的神经活动。     

Theorizing the Temporal Aspect of Ikigai or Life Worth Living among Japanese University Students: a Mixed-Methods Approach

Although cross-cultural and non-Western studies have advanced our knowledge on well-being, many studies have adopted English words including ‘happiness’ as their guiding concepts, which may have limited and biased their insight. The current study is part of a larger mixed-methods project that theorizes how Japanese university students pursue ikigai or a life worth living. The first qualitative study, based on 27 photo-elicitation interviews, generated a grounded theory of houkousei, or life directionality. Our qualitative findings suggested that when students formed explicit associations among the past, present, and future, they gained strong ikigai feelings. These associations were developed either cognitively by mentally associating existing present experiences with the past or future, or behaviourally by strategically choosing current experiences more pertinent to the past or future than alternatives. These actions resulted in two subjective states: life legacy and life momentum. Life legacy was the perception that one’s past had meaningfully contributed to his or her present experiences, life, and self. Life momentum meant the belief that one’s present experiences were helping him or her achieve the desired future. Lastly, having defining past experiences and setting clear goals both facilitated the associative actions. To further validate this theory, we collected online survey data from a national sample of 672 Japanese students. Our quantitative results, based on partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM), largely supported our theoretical model. Our findings are discussed in light of the ikigai and eudaimonic well-being literatures.

     

What Do Happiness Studies Study?

What do, or should, happiness studies study? Everything to which we refer with the word ‘‘happiness’’ is worth some study. But the study of subjective states covers only part of the ground covered by the word ‘‘happiness’’ and by no means all the ground central to understanding happiness. On the central use of ‘‘happiness,’’ to be happy is to be glad or satisfied or content, which suggests subjectivity, with having a good measure of what is important in life, which suggests objectivity. We find the same suggestion of both subjectivity and objectivity in the list of what enhances the quality of life. There are strong arguments in favour both of the subjectivity of what enhances life and of its objectivity. I argue that neither is right, that the story is more complicated. The conclusion of the story is that there is a list of several non-reducible features that contribute to the quality of a characteristic human life, and that anything that contributes to the quality of any human life will be one or other of these features. But there is a problem. When we speak of the quality of a human life, there may be no one thing we have in mind. Perhaps some of us are not disagreeing with one another over the nature of a ‘‘happy’’ life but speaking of different things.     

Voices from the Dark

While visiting the severely ill in the West Vir inia mountains, the author came to know two people, Dennis Hal f and Elizabeth Wright. Dennis has battled multiple sclerosis for a third of his life and is now living his last days in a nursing home. Elizabeth, despite the amyotropic lateral sclerosis that had deteriorated her muscles and eventually caused her death, discovered a richness in her suffering. In their struggles against suffering and dying, these people reveal something about that which endures.     

Reiman on Labor,Value, and the Difference Principle

In As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism, Jeffrey Reiman proposes to develop a theory of “Marxian Liberalism.” ‘Liberalism’ here is defined by the principle that “sane adult human beings should be free in the sense of free from coercion that would block their ability to act on the choices they make.” While the idea of coercion could use some glossing, it is not obvious that poverty, unemployment, racism, and sexism are as such coercive. In this book, it is, very broadly, economic inequality that is the focus, and the argument is that a previously insufficiently appreciated idea that is broadly Marxian shows us that we need a Rawlsian Difference Principle to counteract inherent coercion in the system of free enterprise capitalism. I argue that the book wrongly places the component of labor in the system of economic exchange. We do not as such exchange labor: we exchange services; and because of this there is no normative pull toward his thesis that there is something fundamentally wrong—some people are being unjustly exploited—when several hours of one person’s labor are required to purchase the output of just one of another person’s. Liberalism, I argue, rejects Marxism.