The function of value in self‐regulation

This commentary argues for a functional perspective of the value–engagement relationship, proposing that evaluation determines engagement. I compare this causal direction—from value to engagement—to regulatory engagement theory, which proposes that engagement determines evaluation. I demonstrate the functional view in self-control research, which finds that people overcome obstacles for goal pursuit, including low probabilities of success, by increasing the value of adhering to an overriding goal. I further suggest that whereas both causal directions—from value to engagement and from engagement to value—are theoretically plausible, empirical studies should provide better ways to distinguish between these conceptually different underlying models.     

On Distinguishing Epistemic from Pragmatic Action

We present data and argument to show that in Tetris—a real-time, interactive video game—certain cognitive and perceptual problems are more quickly, easily, and reliably solved by performing actions in the world than by performing computational actions in the head alone. We have found that some of the translations and rotations made by players of this video game are best understood as actions that use the world to improve cognition. These actions are not used to implement a plan, or to implement a reaction; they are used to change the world in order to simplify the problem-solving task. Thus, we distinguish pragmatic actions—actions performed to bring one physically closer to a goal—from epistemic actions—actions performed to uncover informatioan that is hidden or hard to compute mentally. To illustrate the need for epistemic actions, we first develop a standard information-processing model of Tetris cognition and show that it cannot explain performance data from human players of the game—even when we relax the assumption of fully sequential processing. Standard models disregard many actions taken by players because they appear unmotivated or superfluous. However, we show that such actions are actually far from superfluous; they play a valuable role in improving human performance. We argue that traditional accounts are limited because they regard action as having a single function: to change the world. By recognizing a second function of action—an epistemic function—we can explain many of the actions that a traditional model cannot. Although our argument is supported by numerous examples specifically from Tetris, we outline how the new category of epistemic action can be incorporated into theories of action more generally.     

Do Common Factors Account for Counseling Outcome?

This study drew from common factors as an explanatory model for how counseling produces client change. Client self‐report measures for 3 common factors—client factors, client–counselor relationship factors, and client expectancy factors—were examined at a counseling training clinic. Regression analyses revealed that 2 factors significantly predicted treatment outcome: client expectancy and the therapeutic alliance. One variable from client factors—abuse history—had a nonsignificant but modest relationship with outcome.     

KNOWLEDGE HAPPENS: WHY ZAGZEBSKI HAS NOT SOLVED THE MENO PROBLEM

I argue that Linda Zagzebski's proposed solution to the Meno Problem faces serious challenges. The Meno Problem, roughly, is how to explain the value that knowledge, as such, has over mere true belief. Her proposed solution is that believings—when thought of more like actions—can have value in virtue of their motivations. This meshes nicely with her theory that knowledge is, essentially, virtuously motivated true belief. Her solution fails because it entails that, necessarily, all knowledge is motivated in a way that resembles the motivation of actions. Crucially, Zagzebski says the value derived from motivation comes from certain laudable feelings—like love of truth (she is explicit that love is a feeling). But there are possible cases of knowledge—probably some of which are actual—in which subjects do not or cannot experience these feelings.     

It's not you,it's them: Social influences on trust propensity and trust dynamics

Scholars agree that trust primarily has two bases: trustworthiness—the extent to which a trustee is competent, honest, and has goodwill toward the trustor—and trust propensity—a stable trait reflecting the trustor's generalized belief that others can be trusted. Due to this trait characterization, the literature has largely reached a consensus that trust propensity is only an important base of trust in the earliest stage of a relationship—before information on trustworthiness has been gathered. Additionally, the trait conceptualization of trust propensity inhibits it from being modeled as an explanatory mechanism. Drawing on accessibility theory, a theory of trait activation, we argue that trust propensity has state‐like characteristics that are “activated” by the daily treatment an employee receives from coworkers. Our model highlights that the social context—predominantly ignored in prior trust research because of its lack of relevance to dyadic perceptions of trustworthiness—can have a substantial impact on dyadic trust. Across two multisource experience sampling methodology studies, we provide evidence that state trust propensity transmits the effects of citizenship and deviance received to trust in a focal coworker, whether that focal coworker is a source of that treatment or not. We also address how general levels of workplace unfairness—a between‐person construct—influence these dynamics. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these within‐person dynamics for fostering trust within organizations.     

Constructing a theory of the triple typology: Some (second) thoughts on nomothetic and idiographic approaches to personality

Our fundamental scientific task is to convert observations of particular persons behaving in particular ways in particular situations into assertions that certain kinds of persons will behave in certain kinds of ways in certain kinds of situations, that is, to construct triple typologies or equivalence classes—of persons, of behaviors, and of situations—and to fashion theories of personality that relate these equivalence classes to one another. It is argued that the different approaches to the study of personality are distinguished from one another not by whether they are idiographic or nomothetic but by the strategies they employ for constructing—or ignoring—each of these three types of equivalence classes. The likely attributes of a successful interactional theory of personality—one that would embrace the entire triple typology—are proposed and discussed.     

MINDS AND MORALS

In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first—that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism—concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. The second—that between reasons internalism and reasons externalism—concerns the relationship between moral reasons and an agent's subjective motivational set. The resolutions essentially stem from the externalist claim that concepts can be grasped partially, and a new moral theory, which I call ‘moral externalism’, emerges.     

What Do We Do With This Jesus? A Reading of Matthew 15:21–28 through the Lens of Psychoanalytic Theory

This paper interprets the story of the Canaanite woman in Matthew 15 using the lens of psychoanalytic theory—Winnicott’s concept of True Self and Stolorow/Atwood’s model of intersubjectivity—arguing that, for modern readers, the Canaanite woman and Jesus suggest new possibilities for being human. This full humanity results from both of them moving from False Self to True Self and from the mutuality that characterizes their interaction. This reader-response interpretation leads to new understandings of: (1) loving self—seeing ourselves as empowered, refusing compliance as a response to oppression; (2) loving other—overturning the self/other paradigm to regard all individuals in terms of their humanity; and (3) loving God—learning to be in mutual and authentic relationship with God.     

Kant on the Ontological Argument

The article examines Kant's various criticisms of the broadly Cartesian ontological argument as they are developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is argued that each of these criticisms is effective against its intended target, and that these targets include—in addition to Descartes himself—Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten. It is argued that Kant's most famous criticism—the charge that being is not a real predicate—is directed exclusively against Leibniz. Kant's argument for this thesis—the argument proceeding from his example of a hundred thalers—although it may seem to beg the question, in fact succeeds against Leibniz. It does so because the charge of begging the question can be rebutted if one makes certain Leibnizian assumptions.     

Galton and the birth of differential psychology and eugenics: Social,political, and economic forces

The social, political, and economic forces operative in nineteenth century Britain are briefly described. This permits tracing the birth of both the scientific study of individual differences and the field of eugenics to the infrastructure of society at that time. The distinction is made between the normative doctrine of individualism and the factual study of individual differences. It is argued that democratic—liberal—capitalistic—individualism, in part, conditioned the beginning of differential psychology and eugenics. In this process, Galton's liberal views concerning individual freedom and opportunity for full development became transformed into their dialectic—totalitarian—collectivism—a vision of an ideal state which did not come into being. It is paradoxically concluded that those same social forces which helped bring about the birth of differential psychology and the entailing eugenics ideology prevented the latter from being accepted and implemented.     

Logical recoding of S-R rules can reverse the effects of spatial S-R correspondence

Two experiments investigated competing explanations for the reversal of spatial stimulus—response (S—R) correspondence effects (i.e., Simon effects) with an incompatible S—R mapping on the relevant, nonspatial dimension. Competing explanations were based on generalized S—R rules (logical-recoding account) or referred to display—control arrangement correspondence or to S—S congruity. In Experiment 1, compatible responses to finger—name stimuli presented at left/right locations produced normal Simon effects, whereas incompatible responses to finger—name stimuli produced an inverted Simon effect. This finding supports the logical-recoding account. In Experiment 2, spatial S—R correspondence and color S—R correspondence were varied independently, and main effects of these variables were observed. The lack of an interaction between these variables, however, disconfirms a prediction of the display—control arrangement correspondence account. Together, the results provide converging evidence for the logical-recoding account. This account claims that participants derive generalized response selection rules (e.g., the identity or reversal rule) from specific S—R rules and inadvertently apply the generalized rules to the irrelevant (spatial) S—R dimension when selecting their response.     

Comparative Religious Ethics and the Politics of Christian Identity

I present a brief historical narrative of the legacy of Christian ethics in comparative religious ethics (CRE) that attempts to make sense of the tensions within the field from the perspective of the politics of identity with reference to its changing content and practices—its internal history—and what might be called the background conditions—its external history—that shaped not only the content and methods of CRE but also its self‐understanding. Given the politics of Christian identity and the historical development of religious ethics within the American academy, I recommend that scholars of CRE adopt a more confessional mode of inquiry that makes explicit their ultimate commitments.     

Masculinity and farming-related accidents

Survey data collected from 450 male farmers in Canada revealed that three variables — conservative farming, willingness to risk life and limb to make a profit, and safe equipment operation — directly predicted the rate of serious farming-related accidents. Three dimensions of masculinity — suppression of emotions, “men in charge,” and recklessness — had strong indirect effects. Masculine recklessness tended to increase profit-oriented personal risk taking and to decrease the safe operation of farm equipment. Suppression of emotions also increased risk taking.     

The force and the content of judgment

This essay explores what it means to reject Frege's distinction of force and content: the rejection completes Frege's anti‐psychologism as it leaves no space for a psychological concept of judgment distinct from the logical concept, which is the concern of no empirical science, but of logic. It emerges that logic, as the science of judgement, is — not a metaphysics of judgement, but — metaphysics. And it emerges that the opposition of subject to subject — the elementary nexus of thinker to thinker in dialogue — is contained within the logical concept of judgment.     

In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity

According to epistemic instrumentalists the normativity of evidence for belief is best explained in terms of the practical utility of forming evidentially supported beliefs. Traditional arguments for instrumentalism—arguments based on naturalism and motivation—lack suasive force against opponents. A new argument for the view—the Argument from Coincidence—is presented. The argument shows that only instrumentalists can avoid positing an embarrassing coincidence between the practical value of believing in accordance with one’s evidence, and the existence of reasons so to believe. Responses are considered and shown to be inadequate.     

Should We All be Scientists? Re-thinking Laboratory Research as a Calling

In recent years there have been major shifts in how the role of science—and scientists—are understood. The critical examination of scientific expertise within the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS) are increasingly eroding notions of the “otherness” of scientists. It would seem to suggest that anyone can be a scientist—when provided with the appropriate training and access to data. In contrast, however, ethnographic evidence from the scientific community tells a different story. Scientists are quick to recognize that not everyone can—or should—be a scientist. Appealing to notions such as “good hands” or “gut feelings”, scientists narrate a distinction between good and bad scientists that cannot be reduced to education, access, or opportunity. The key to good science requires scientists to express an intuitive feeling for their discipline, but also that individuals derive considerable personal satisfaction from their work. Discussing this personal joy in—and “fittingness” of—scientific occupations using the fields of STS, ethics and science policy is highly problematic. In this paper we turn to theology discourse to analyze the notion of “callings” as a means of understanding this issue. Callings highlight the identification and examination of individual talents to determine fit occupations for specific persons. Framing science as a calling represents a novel view of research that places the talents and dispositions of individuals and their relationship to the community at the center of flourishing practices.     

How to Prove Hume’s Law

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper proves a precisification of Hume’s Law—the thesis that one cannot get an ought from an is—as an instance of a more general theorem...     

From Here to Eternity Children's Acquisition of Understanding of Projective Size on Television

This study attempts to trace children's acquisition of understanding of projective size (e.g., getting closer to and farther away from an object) as depicted on television through two distinctive techniques—zooming in/out and multiple edits. Unlike previous research in this area, this investigation applied aspects of cognitive processing that have been identified as untapped through gross Piagetian measures—Level 1 and Level 2 knowledge of visual perception (Pillow & Flavell, 1986). Findings suggest that children classified as “preoperational” by Piagetian standards, but possessing Level 1 knowledge of visual perception—the ability to infer what objects can or cannot be seen from another person's viewpoint—are capable of understanding the more simple form of projective size; children possessing Level 2 knowledge—the ability to infer the nature, as well as the content, of another person's visual experience—have a better comprehension of the more complex, edited presentation of projective size. Level of television consumption plays a role in children's acquisition of understanding of television information.     

Item-specific effects in recognition failure: Reasons for rejection of the Tulving-Wiseman function

The present paper addresses the problems of whether recognition failure of recallable words is a function of both recognition and recall, and whether recognition failure is restricted to a small and specifiable subset of study items. A meta-analysis of the Nilsson—Gardiner database (Nilsson & Gardiner, 1993) showed that recognition given recall was positively correlated with recognition and negatively correlated with recall. Two new experiments are reported, the first one using 48 word pairs for which recognition failure was found in previous studies. An item analysis of the data demonstrated that recognition failure occurred primarily with noun—adjective pairs. The second experiment compared Norwegian—American and American—Norwegian name pairs. Wide deviation from the Tulving—Wiseman function (Tulving & Wiseman, 1975) was observed for the latter condition. In both conditions, recognition failure occurred with only the items for which the beginnings of names shared three or more letters. It is concluded that recognition failure occurs when there exists a relationship between the members of an A—B pair that is independent of their pairing in the study context. The Tulving—Wiseman function is the result of collapsing across items in the analysis of previous studies.     

Metaphor and Thinking in Science and Religion

Excerpts from Chapters 1 and 3 of New Maps for Old: Explorations in Science and Religion (Gerhart and Russell 2001) explore the ramifications of metaphoric process for changes in thinking, especially those changes that lead to a new understanding of our world. Examples are provided from science, from religion, and from science and religion together. In excerpts from Chapter 8, a double analogy—theology is to science as science is to mathematics—is proposed for better understanding the contemporary relationship between science and religion. A conservation of epistemological sufficiency is disclosed as one moves from mathematics to empirical science to theology—a move from one discipline to another that involves a sacrifice of one aspect of thought to gain another.