3～6岁儿童信念理解能力的发展研究

研究设计了冲突真实信念任务,用于考察儿童对真实信念的理解;并利用区分信念、冲突真实信念和意外地点的错误信念任务,考察儿童理解信念推理基本规则、真实信念和错误信念的发展顺序。97名3~6岁儿童完成了测试。结果显示,3岁儿童能理解信念推理的基本规则,5岁儿童能理解真实信念,6岁儿童能理解错误信念。结果支持了儿童先理解真实信念,后理解错误信念的发展模式;也说明在理解信念以前儿童已能掌握信念推理的基本规则。     

当代民众信仰状况及其相关因素的心理学研究

为研究当代民众的信仰状况及其相关因素,采用自行设计的调查问卷对745名天津市民进行测量。结果显示:不同类别人群在信仰追求上存在非常显著的差异。物质信仰、伦理信仰与年龄有显著的正相关,精神信仰基本上不存在年龄差异。精神信仰和国家社会信仰与文化程度存在非常显著的正相关,而物质信仰、伦理信仰和宗教信仰均与文化程度存在非常显著的负相关。精神信仰和国家社会信仰与社会安定意识呈正相关,物质信仰和宗教信仰与社会安定意识呈负相关。     

Infinitary Belief Revision

This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state.     

Revocable Belief Revision

Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result.     

中学生精神信仰及其与生活满意度的关系

运用问卷法对431名中学生的精神信仰和生活满意度进行研究,结果表明：中学生精神信仰的总体状况呈现出社会信仰最强、实用信仰次之、超自然信仰最弱的特点。在社会信仰上更注重国家民族信仰,在实用信仰上更注重家庭信仰,在超自然信仰上更注重宗教信仰;精神信仰各维度对不同领域生活满意度的预测作用各不相同。不同生活满意度水平的学生在社会信仰和实用信仰的所有构成维度上的得分均存在显著差异。     

Religion and Paranormal Belief

This article uses a Canadian national sample to examine the relationship between conventional religious belief, church attendance, and belief in paranormal phenomena. Greater religious belief is strongly associated with greater paranormal belief. Church attendance (and other measures of religious participation) are only weakly associated with paranormal belief until conventional religious belief is statistically controlled; once this is done, greater church attendance is strongly associated with lowered paranormal belief. Together, these two religious variables explain about one-quarter of the variance in paranormal belief, making them the strongest predictors that have yet to be identified.     

Inquiry and Belief

In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an inquiry or question settled.     

Return of the Candy Witch: Individual differences in acceptance and stability of belief in a novel fantastical being

Recent research indicates that preschoolers make sophisticated choices in accepting testimony as a source of knowledge. Nonetheless, many children accept fantastical beings as real based on misleading testimony. The present study probes factors associated with belief in a novel fantastical figure, the Candy Witch, that 3‐ to 7‐year‐olds heard about at school. Short‐term belief was predicted by an interaction of age, existing beliefs in fantastical figures, and whether the child was ‘visited’ by the Candy Witch. Stability of belief was assessed over the course of 3 weeks and again 1‐year later. First year results revealed three patterns of belief: stable belief, wavering belief and stable non‐belief. First year belief status was not related to age, but older children from the stable belief group were more likely than younger children to disbelieve 1‐year later. The discussion presents a new proposal for the trajectory from belief to disbelief and an updated perspective on the role of individual differences in belief.     

初中生精神信仰现状研究

用问卷法对431名初中生的精神信仰状况进行调查,发现初中生的精神信仰特点如下:(1)总体状况表现为社会信仰最强、实用信仰次之、超自然信仰最弱。在7个信仰维度上的信仰程度由强到弱依次为国家民族、政治信仰、家庭主义、生命崇拜、宗教信仰、金钱物质、神灵崇拜;(2)男生比女生更看重政治信仰和金钱物质,女生比男生具有更高的宗教信仰;(3)初三年级学生的金钱物质和生命崇拜的信仰程度最高,初二年级次之,初一年级最弱;(4)非学生干部比学生干部具有更强的金钱物质信仰;(5)团员的政治信仰程度高于非团员;(6)学习成绩为上等的学生对国家民族的信仰程度高于学习成绩为中等和下等的学生,学习成绩为下等的学生对金钱物质的信仰程度高于学习成绩为上等和中等的学生。     

Iterative and fixed point common belief

We define infinitary extensions to classical epistemic logic systems, and add also a common belief modality, axiomatized in a finitary, fixed-point manner. In the infinitary K system, common belief turns to be provably equivalent to the conjunction of all the finite levels of mutual belief. In contrast, in the infinitary monotonic system, common belief implies every transfinite level of mutual belief but is never implied by it. We conclude that the fixed- point notion of common belief is more powerful than the iterative notion of common belief.     

Memory belief is weak

Recently there has been extensive debate over whether “belief is weak”, viz, whether the epistemic standard for belief is lower than for assertion or knowledge. While most current studies focus on notions such as “ordinary belief” and “outright belief”, this paper purports to advance this debate by investigating a specific type of belief; memory belief. It is argued that (outright) beliefs formed on the basis of episodic memories are “weak” due to two forms of “entitlement inequality”. My key argument is thus twofold. First, by rejecting the epistemic theory of memory, I argue that one can be entitled to belief but not to knowledge. Second, by scrutinising a recent defence of the belief norm of assertion, it will be demonstrated that belief is weaker than assertion, as long as we expect one to match words with deeds.     

初中生学业错误的实然观与应然观关系研究

运用《初中生学业错误实然观问卷》和《初中生学业错误应然观问卷》调查了453名初中生的学业错误观,结果表明：（1）初中生学业错误的实然观与应然观均表现出显著的年级特征和性别差异;（2）初中生学业错误的应然观对实然观具有显著正向预测效用。     

Taking aim at the truth

One prominent feature of belief is that a belief cannot be formed at will. This paper argues that the best explanation of this fact is that belief formation is a process that takes aim at the truth. Taking aim at the truth is to be understood as causal responsiveness of the processes constituting belief formation to what facilitates achieving true beliefs. The requirement for this responsiveness precludes the possibility of belief formation responding to intentions in a way that would count as forming a belief at will.     

Gricean Belief Change

One of the standard principles of rationality guiding traditional accounts of belief change is the principle of minimal change: a reasoner's belief corpus should be modified in a minimal fashion when assimilating new information. This rationality principle has stood belief change in good stead. However, it does not deal properly with all belief change scenarios. We introduce a novel account of belief change motivated by one of Grice's maxims of conversational implicature: the reasoner's belief corpus is modified in a minimal fashion to assimilate exactly the new information. In this form of belief change, when the reasoner revises by new information p ∨ q their belief corpus is modified so that p∨q is believed but stronger propositions like p∧q are not, no matter what beliefs are in the reasoner's initial corpus. We term this conservative belief change since the revised belief corpus is a conservative extension of the original belief corpus given the new information.     

Hume on Miracles: Would It Take a Miracle to Believe in a Miracle?

Given Hume's theory of belief and belief production it is no small task to explain how it is possible for a belief in a miracle to be produced. I argue that belief in a miracle cannot be produced through Hume's standard causal mechanisms and that although education, passion, and testimony initially seem to be promising mechanisms for producing belief in a miracle, none of these is able to produce the belief in a miracle. I conclude by explaining how this poses a problem for Hume's theory of belief and I briefly investigate the alternatives available for solving this problem.     

范畴三段论推理中信念偏差效应的实验研究

本研究利用三段论评价任务,分析了已有信念与三段论逻辑状态间的交互影响,探讨了三段论推理判断中信念偏差的存在与作用机制,同时从信念偏差角度对心理模型理论进行了初步验证。结果发现：1．范畴三段论推理的逻辑判断过程中存在信念偏差效应;2．信念偏差效应以逻辑状态与结论可信性交互作用的方式存在;3当逻辑结果与信念相一致时,信念会促进逻辑反应,反之则妨碍逻辑反应;4．信念偏差效应对逻辑有效、结论不可信的单模型三段论问题影响最大,而对逻辑有效、结论不可信的多模型三段论问题相对影响最小。     

A March to a Better World? Religiosity and the Existential Function of Belief in Social-Moral Progress

This article reports an investigation of the existential function of belief in progress, specifically faith in social and moral advancement. We argue that for belief in progress to provide a sense of purpose and significance in our world, it must concern humanity and society and not merely the technological advances humankind accomplishes. We observed an effect of mortality salience on belief in social-moral (but not scientific-technological) progress, which was moderated by strength of religious belief. Participants low in religious belief showed an increase in belief in social-moral progress, while those high in religious belief did not. Follow-up analyses revealed that the latter finding was primarily due to Protestant participants, who scored highest on strength of religious faith and belief in inherent sin, and were the least optimistic about the future of humanity.     

The role of the counterfactually satisfied desire in the lag between false‐belief and false‐emotion attributions in children aged 4–7

A robust lag was evidenced between the attribution to an individual of a false belief about the world and the attribution of the false emotion associated with this false belief (Bradmetz & Schneider, 1999). This lag was unexpected in the frame of current theories of mind which consider that emotion has a rational cognitive basis. The present paper refers to the theory of appraisal which links emotion to the belief about desire satisfaction rather than the belief concerning the state of the world. The authors claim that, even if counterfactual belief is understood, the associated emotion and belief about counterfactual satisfaction of desire are not automatically understood because they depend on the success of an action. Two experiments conducted on happiness, fear, and anger confirmed this view: Attributing false belief about counterfactual desire satisfaction is much more difficult than attributing false belief about a current state of affairs, and the emotion attributed to the individual is more closely linked to a belief about desire than to a belief about the world. A four‐step developmental sequence is proposed, and the link between action and realist bias is discussed.     

Gender and family therapy: Adding a bi-level belief systems component to assessment

This article proposes that most couples requesting therapy describe gender socialized patterns as part of their relationship issues. Adding a component to assessment derived from principles of strategic and systemic family therapies and post-modernist feminist psychology which examines the couple's gendered belief system context is described. The belief system context is identified as the family's epistemology about gendering at the family belief system and sociocultural belief system level contexts. Three dimensions of the gendered belief system and a method for assessing the functionality of the belief system are discussed.     

道德信仰的两重规定及其限度

道德必须以信仰为基础 ,道德信仰既是对道德的信仰 ,又是对善的终极追求。两者合为一体 ,统一于道德信仰这一主体的道德意识之中的 ,它们从不同的角度与层面反映了人对道德的态度与意愿。这是研究道德信仰应有的理论视点。