Entailments are Cancellable

Several philosophers have recently claimed that if a proposition is cancellable from an uttered sentence then that proposition is not entailed by that uttered sentence. The claim should be a familiar one. It has become a standard device in the philosopher's tool‐kit. I argue that this claim is false. There is a kind of entailment—which I call “modal entailment”—that is context‐sensitive and, because of this, cancellable. So cancellability does not show that a proposition is not entailed by an uttered sentence. I close the paper by describing an implication this has for a disagreement between J. L. Austin and Grice concerning the relation between felicity and truth. 1     

Not Propositions

Current computational accounts of meaning in the cognitive sciences are based on abstract, amodal symbols (e.g., nodes, links, propositions) that are arbitrarily related to their referents. We argue that such accounts lack convincing empirical support and that they do not provide a satisfactory account for linguistic meaning. One historic set of results supporting the abstract symbol view has come from investigation into comprehension of negated sentences, such as “The buttons are not black.” These sentences are presumed to be understood as two propositions composed of abstract symbols. One proposition corresponds to “the buttons are black,” and it is embedded in another proposition corresponding to “it is not true.” Thus, the propositional account predicts (a) that comprehension of negated sentences should take longer than comprehension of the corresponding positive sentence (because of the time needed to construct the embedding), but (b) that the resulting embedded propositions are informationally equivalent (but of opposite valence) to the simple proposition underlying the positive sentence. Contrary to these predictions, Experiment 1 demonstrates that negated sentences out of context are interpreted as situationally ambiguous, that is, as conveying less specific information than positive sentences. Furthermore, Experiment 2 demonstrates that when negated sentences are used in an appropriate context, readers do not take longer to understand them. Thus, difficulty with negation is demonstrated to be an artifact of presentation out of context. After discussing other serious problems with the use of abstract symbols, we describe the Indexical Hypothesis. This embodied account of meaning does not depend on abstract symbols, and hence it provides a more satisfactory account of meaning.     

Tests of a holistic chunking model of sentence memory through analyses of noun intrusions

A holistic chunking model of sentence acquisition and retrieval is described and tested by a prompted sentence recall procedure. In this procedure, subjects first study a list of unrelated sentences and later receive single-word prompts to cue sentence recall. The model assumes that (1) words in sentences are grouped into propositions during acquisition, (2) the propositions are encoded holistically and later retrieved as units, and (3) the retrieval of one proposition does not automatically lead to recovery of other propositions in a sentence. The model was tested by patterns of intrusion errors. Noun intrusions for elements within a recovered proposition were always related conceptually to the presented nouns, even when a noun violated the co-occurrence restrictions of the verb (e.g., the tray loved the house). In contrast, noun intrusions for elements outside of the scope of a recovered proposition were often unrelated to presented nouns. It was argued that patterns of intrusion errors provide more appropriate tests for sentence structure than do quantitative patterns of correct recall, at least from the framework of the holistic chunking model.     

Zero tolerance for pragmatics

The proposition expressed by a sentence is relative to a context. But what determines the content of the context? Many theorists would include among these determinants aspects of the speaker’s intention in speaking. My thesis is that, on the contrary, the determinants of the context never include the speaker’s intention. My argument for this thesis turns on a consideration of the role that the concept of proposition expressed in context is supposed to play in a theory of linguistic communication. To illustrate an alternative approach, I present an original theory of the reference of demonstratives according to which the referent of a demonstrative is the object that adequately and best satisfies certain accessibility criteria. Although I call my thesis zero tolerance for pragmatics, it is not an expression of intolerance for everything that might be called “pragmatics.”     

Multiple propositions, contextual variability, and the semantics/pragmatics interface

A ‘multiple-proposition (MP) phenomenon’ is a putative counterexample to the widespread implicit assumption that a simple indicative sentence (relative to a context of utterance) semantically expresses at most one proposition. Several philosophers and linguists (including Stephen Neale and Chris Potts) have recently developed hypotheses concerning this notion. The guiding questions motivating this research are: (1) Is there an interesting and homogenous semantic category of MP phenomena? (2) If so, what is the import? Do MP theories have any relevance to important current questions in the study of language? I motivate an affirmative answer to (1), and then argue that MP theorizing is quite relevant to debates at the semantics/pragmatics interface.     

Unenriched Subsentential Illocutions*

In this paper I challenge the common wisdom (see Dummett and Davidson) that sentences are the minimal units with which one can perform a speech act or make a move in the language game. I thus sit with Perry and Stainton in arguing that subsentences can be used to perform full‐fledged speech acts. In my discussion I assume the traditional framework which distinguishes between the proposition expressed and the thought or mental state (possibly a sentence in Mentalese) one comes to grasp when using/understanding an utterance (or sentence‐in‐a‐context) expressing a proposition. Unlike Stainton, I will argue that the proposition expressed by a subsentential assertion and its corresponding thought are not the end product of a pragmatic process of free enrichment. I shall defend the view that a thought may concern something without the thinker having to represent that very thing. This should help us to resist the view that with the utterance of a subsentence enrichment is mandatory. I will further argue that subsentences and their corresponding thoughts are situated. Because of that we can successfully interact and engage in joint ventures using subsentences and be guided by thoughts without having to enrich them. The fact that the actors’ unenriched thoughts are co‐situated may suffice to explain the positive outcome of their joint project. Last but not least, I will also show how the picture I propose gains further support by taking on board Perry’s distinction between reflexive truth conditions and incremental truth conditions (or official content). Since competent speakers can grasp an utterance’s reflexive truth conditions without having to grasp its official content (roughly, the proposition expressed) they can successfully interact without their thoughts having to undergo a process of free enrichment. Moreover, if I’m right in arguing that an utterance’s reflexive truth conditions are the best tool to classify the semantic features of one’s mental state (or sentence in Mentalese), we can further explain mental causation and linguistic communication without appealing to free enrichment.     

Sentence context modifies compound word recognition: Evidence from eye movements

Two eye movement experiments are reported that examine the influence of sentence context on morphological processing. English compound words which vary in beginning lexeme frequency (Experiment 1) and ending lexeme frequency (Experiment 2) were embedded into sentence contexts that were either predictive of the compound word or were neutral with respect to the compound. A predictable sentence context reduced the effect of beginning lexeme frequency on first fixation and single fixation durations. However, sentence context did not modify effects of beginning and ending lexeme frequency in later fixation measures. These results further support the theoretical position that morphology plays a role at multiple levels within readers' mental lexicons. In addition, these results suggest that access to early morpho-orthographic processes can be influenced by sentence context, a finding that suggests an interactive relationship between sentence context and word recognition.     

The representation of time and location in memory for sentences

Two theoretical approaches to the representation of Time and Location Markers in Memory were contrasted. According to predictions derived from one approach, the amount of forgetting will be the same for two-proposition sentences and sentences with a single proposition and a Time or a Location marker. According to the other approach, the amount of forgetting will be the same for one-proposition sentences and sentences with a Time or a Location Marker. Propositional structure and the level of within-sentence associations were orthogonally varied to create eight within-subject experimental conditions. Ninety subjects studied 40 sentences and were required to recall then. Four dependent variables were used: number of sentences completely recalled, number of sentences partially recalled, number of sentences where information was lost from within the proposition, and number of sentences where a complete proposition was lost. The results suggest that Time and Location markers are represented in memory as arguments in a proposition rather than as separate propositions. Level of associations within the sentence seems to have a different effect when the sentence is composed of one or two propositions. The results also suggest that there may be differences between the representations of Time and Location markers.     

Against Stepping Back: A Critique of Contextualist Approaches to the Semantic Paradoxes

A number of philosophers have argued that the key to understanding the semantic paradoxes is to recognize that truth is essentially relative to context. All of these philosophers have been motivated by the idea that once a liar sentence has been uttered we can ‘step back’ and, from the point of view of a different context, judge that the liar sentence is true. This paper argues that this ‘stepping back’ idea is a mistake that results from failing to relativize truth to context in the first place. Moreover, context-relative liar sentences, such as ‘This sentence is not true in any context’ present a paradox even after truth has been relativized to context. Nonetheless, the relativization of truth to context may offer us the means to avoid paradox, if we can justifiably deny that a sentence about a context can be true in the very context it is about.     

Why horizontalism

Philosophical Studies - Horizontalism is the thesis that what a speaker asserts in literally and sincerely uttering an indicative sentence is some horizontal proposition of her utterance;...     

Semantic activation of noun concepts in context

A modified Stoop procedure was used to examine the role that context plays in guiding semantic access of unambiguous nouns in sentence contexts. The sentences either emphasized a high- or a low-dominant property of a noun that was the last word in the sentence or were control sentences. Each sentence was followed by the relevant high- or low-dominant property either immediately or after a 300-or 600-ms delay. There was significant color-naming interference (relative to control) for high-dominant properties regardless of biasing context in the immediate and delayed conditions. There was also significant color-naming interference for low-dominant properties in the immediate condition regardless of context. However, in the delayed conditions, the low-dominant properties led to color-naming interference only when preceded by sentence contexts biasing interpretation toward the low-dominant property. It was concluded that high-dominant properties function as core, or invariant, aspects of meaning and that initial semantic access is context independent.     

Sentence-final word completion norms for European Portuguese children and adolescents

This study presents a set of sentence contexts and their cloze probabilities for European Portuguese children and adolescents. Seventy-three sentence contexts (35 low- and 38 high-constraint sentence stems) were presented to 90 children and 102 adolescents. Participants were asked to complete the sentence contexts with the first word that came to mind. For each sentence context, responses were listed and cloze probabilities of the words that were chosen to complete the sentence context were computed. Additionally, idiosyncratic and invalid responses (structural and semantic errors) were analyzed. A high degree of consistency in responses among the two age samples (children and adolescents) was found, along with a decrease of idiosyncratic and invalid responses in older participants. These results shed light on age-related changes in the effects of linguistic context on word production, and also in knowledge’s representation. The full set of norms may be downloaded from http://brm.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.     

`She' and `He': Politically Correct Pronouns

It is argued that the pronouns `she' and `he' are disguised complexdemonstratives of the form `that female/male'. Three theories ofcomplex demonstratives are examined and shown to be committed to theview that `s/he' turns out to be an empty term when used to refer toa hermaphrodite. A fourth theory of complex demonstratives, one thatis hermaphrodite friendly, is proposed. It maintains that complexdemonstratives such as `that female/male' and the pronoun `s/he' can succeed in referring to someone independently of his or her gender.This theory incorporates: (i) a multiple proposition view, i.e., theview that an utterance of a sentence containing a complex demonstrativeexpresses two (or more) propositions, namely the background proposition(s)and the official one; (ii) that the referent of a complex demonstrativeis a component of the official proposition expressed whether it satisfiesthe nominal part of the demonstrative expression or not; (iii) that thenominal part of a complex demonstrative only affect the background proposition(s) and (iv) that the utterance inherits its truth-value onlyfrom the official proposition.     

Unity and the Frege–Geach problem

The problem of the unity of the proposition asks what binds together the constituents of a proposition into a fully formed proposition that provides truth conditions for the assertoric sentence that expresses it, rather than merely a set of objects. Hanks’ solution is to reject the traditional distinction between content and force. If his theory is successful, then there is a plausible extension of it that readily solves the Frege–Geach problem for normative propositions. Unfortunately Hanks’ theory isn’t successful, but it does point to significant connections between expressivism, unity, and embedding.     

Relative truth and the first person

In recent work on context-dependency, it has been argued that certain types of sentences give rise to a notion of relative truth. In particular, sentences containing predicates of personal taste and moral or aesthetic evaluation as well as epistemic modals are held to express a proposition (relative to a context of use) which is true or false not only relative to a world of evaluation, but other parameters as well, such as standards of taste or knowledge or an agent. I will argue that the sentences that apparently give rise to relative truth should be understood by relating them in a certain way to the first person. More precisely, such sentences express what I will call ‘first-person-based genericity’, a form of generalization that is based on an essential first-person application of the predicate. The account differs from standard relative truth account in crucial respects: it is not the truth of the proposition expressed that is relative to the first person; the proposition expressed by a sentence with a predicate of taste rather has absolute truth conditions. Instead it is the propositional content itself that requires a first-personal cognitive access whenever it is entertained. This account, I will argue, avoids a range of problems that standard relative truth theories of the sentences in question face and explains a number of further peculiarities that such sentences display.     

Strategic control of sentence context effects in a naming task

This paper reports an experiment that demonstrates strategic influences on sentence context effects in a naming task. The size of the sentence context effect is shown to be influenced by the validity of the contextual information. A similar result is obtained simply by changing the proportion of validly completed sentences in the practice session without altering the composition of the experimental trials themselves. The manipulation of context validity was found to have its effect largely on the facilitatory component of the context effect. This dissociation of facilitation and inhibition is shown to be contrary to the predictions of attentional accounts of priming but in line with an explanation of contexts effects based on a mechanism that has evolved primarily to resolve lexical and perceptual ambiguity (Norris, 1986). In a further experiment it is shown that the facilitatory effects of sentence context observed in Experiment 1 are not dependent on the particular baseline condition employed.     

The Trouble with Tarski

As a result of thinking ( pace Tarski, wrongly) that it is propositions, not sentences, that are true or false, it has been supposed (also wrongly) that propositions such as that 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white are necessarily true. But changing the rules for the use of the words in a sentence has no effect on the truth of the proposition, only on what proposition it formulates. Many similar statements, e.g., that 'plus' does not mean plus, are only pragmatically contradictory: if this were true, it would be impossible to say so in these words. One should distinguish between sentences that express necessary truths, and sentences that necessarily express truths. It follows that many well known accounts of necessity are wrong, that the truth of an analytic proposition does not follow from the definitions of the words in the sentence that expresses it, that it is not helpful to define meaning in terms of truth, that truth is not relative to language, and that conventionalism is false. This paper is a move in the direction of establishing the eternity of truth.     

Expectancy,integration, and interactional processes: Age differences in the nature of words affected by sentence context

Two experiments investigated sentence context effects on the naming times of sentence completion words by third-grade children and college students. Across both experiments, the largest age difference in contextual facilitation was obtained for highly predictable, best completion words. Pronounced age differences in facilitation effects were also present for semantically acceptable target words which were much less predictable in the sentence context than the best completion words. However, age differences in contextual facilitation were negligible for target words which were associatively related to the best completion word, but which were not also semantically acceptable in the sentence context. Thus, the semantic acceptability of the word in the sentence context had a much greater influence on children's as compared to adults' word identification times, both when the word was highly predictable, as well as when it was much less predictable in the sentence context.