The role of contrast in causal and explanatory claims

Following Dretske (1977), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in causal claims. Following van Fraassen (1980), there has been a considerable body of literature on the role of contrastive stress in explanations and explanation-requesting why-questions. Amazingly, the two bodies of literature have remained almost entirely disjoint. With an understanding of the contrastive nature of ordinary causal claims, and of the linguistic roles of contrastive stress, it is possible to provide a unified account of both phenomena. I provide such an account from within the framework of a probabilistic theory of causation. Relations of screening-off, long familiar to researchers in probabilistic causality, play a central role in this account.I would like to thank the following people for comments upon earlier drafts of this paper: Frank Arntzenius, Eric Barnes, Nuel Belnap, Alex Byrne, John Carroll, Fiona Cowie, Alan Hájek, David Hilbert, Carl Hoefer, Marc Lange, Wes Salmon, Cindy Stern, Nigel Thomas, and Jim Woodward.     

The role of planning for intention-behavior consistency

Two studies investigated how planning affects intention-behavior consistency. In Study 1 an experimental group and control group which each consisted of 14 undergraduates were requested in computerized interviews to indicate which activities they intended to perform on the following day. Subjects in the experimental group were also requested in a second phase of the interviews to specify when and where they intended to perform the activities. The results showed that activities for which time and place had been specified were more likely to be performed. In Study 2 another 75 undergraduates volunteered to participate in an experiment in which they were requested to perform an activity (reporting mood effects of reading a prose excerpt) by themselves on one of three following days. One group of subjects only agreed to perform the activity, another group agreed to perform the activity as well as indicated when and where they would do it, and a third group in addition to this indicated which other activities they would perform on the same day. In support of the hypothesis that planning an activity increases the likelihood that it will be performed, the results showed that subjects who indicated other activities more frequently performed the target activity. More efficient time management resulting from planning may account for the findings, although further research is needed to show this conclusively.     

Conflicting intentions: rectifying the consistency requirements

Philosophical Studies - Many philosophers are convinced that rationality dictates that one’s overall set of intentions be consistent. The starting point and inspiration for our study is...     

Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content

Conclusion I've tried to argue that there is more to representational content than CRS can acknowledge. CRS is attractive, I think, because of its rejection of atomism, and because it is a plausible theory of targets. But those are philosopher's concerns. Someone interested in building a person needs to understand representation, because, as AI researchers have urged for some time, good representation is the secret of good performance. I have just gestured in the direction I think a viable theory of representation must take. I hope, however, to have created some advance sympathy for the gesture by distinguishing the problem of representation from the problem of targets on the one hand, and from the problem truth-conditions for the attitudes on the other.     

Grounding and the explanatory role of generalizations

According to Hempel’s (Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays. The Free Press, New York, 1965) influential theory of explanation, explaining why some a is G consists in showing that the truth that a is G follows from a law-like generalization to the effect that all Fs are G together with the initial condition that a is F. While Hempel’s overall account is now widely considered to be deeply flawed, the idea that some generalizations play the explanatory role that the account predicts is still often endorsed by contemporary philosophers of science. This idea, however, conflicts with widely shared views in metaphysics according to which the generalization that all Fs are G is partially explained by the fact that a is G. I discuss two solutions to this conflict that have been proposed recently, argue that they are unsatisfactory, and offer an alternative.     

The relationship of explanatory flexibility to explanatory style

Traditional cognitive vulnerability-stress models regarding the etiology of depression emphasize the content of the depressed individual’s thoughts. One important cognitive content index, explanatory style, represents the habitual way that individuals assign causes to events that occur in their lives. A more contemporary model, however, emphasizes the cognitive process by which these attributions are made and to what extent the individual can make different attributions depending on the particular context of the event. This process is referred to as explanatory flexibility. Given that both indices of causal explanation are derived from the same assessment instrument, the Attributional Style Questionnaire, the current investigation sought to examine the extent to which the two variables can be differentiated from one another. Results indicated that explanatory style (a measure of cognitive content) and explanatory flexibility (a cognitive process measure) are empirically related, but distinct, constructs.     

The explanatory power of theism

Special thanks to Alvin Plantinga, Michael Detlefsen and William Alston for many helpful suggestions.     

The explanatory dispensability of idealizations

Enhanced indispensability arguments seek to establish realism about mathematics based on the explanatory role that mathematics plays in science. Idealizations pose a problem for such arguments. Idealizations, in a similar way to mathematics, boost the explanatory credentials of our best scientific theories. And yet, idealizations are not the sorts of things that are supposed to attract a realist attitude. I argue that the explanatory symmetry between idealizations and mathematics can potentially be broken as follows: although idealizations contribute to the explanatory power of our best theories, they do not carry the explanatory load. It is at least open however that mathematics is load-carrying. To give this idea substance, I offer an analysis of what it is to carry the explanatory load in terms of difference-making and counterfactuals.     

Mechanisms of eyewitness suggestibility: tests of the explanatory role hypothesis

In a recent paper, Chrobak and Zaragoza (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(3), 827–844, 2013) proposed the explanatory role hypothesis, which posits that the likelihood of developing false memories for post-event suggestions is a function of the explanatory function the suggestion serves. In support of this hypothesis, they provided evidence that participant-witnesses were especially likely to develop false memories for their forced fabrications when their fabrications helped to explain outcomes they had witnessed. In three experiments, we test the generality of the explanatory role hypothesis as a mechanism of eyewitness suggestibility by assessing whether this hypothesis can predict suggestibility errors in (a) situations where the post-event suggestions are provided by the experimenter (as opposed to fabricated by the participant), and (b) across a variety of memory measures and measures of recollective experience. In support of the explanatory role hypothesis, participants were more likely to subsequently freely report (E1) and recollect the suggestions as part of the witnessed event (E2, source test) when the post-event suggestion helped to provide a causal explanation for a witnessed outcome than when it did not serve this explanatory role. Participants were also less likely to recollect the suggestions as part of the witnessed event (on measures of subjective experience) when their explanatory strength had been reduced by the presence of an alternative explanation that could explain the same outcome (E3, source test + warning). Collectively, the results provide strong evidence that the search for explanatory coherence influences people’s tendency to misremember witnessing events that were only suggested to them.     

The explanatory potential of artificial societies

It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Despite that, many feel that such simulations somehow contribute to our understanding. This paper tries to clarify this intuition by investigating whether artificial societies provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds explanatory strategies differ, and how potential functional explanations can be appraised.     

The role of explanatory context for racial disparities in predicting sociopolitical attitudes during COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic placed preexisting racial health disparities in stark relief. Recent studies have already established that, among prejudiced Whites, exposure to such racial disparities reduced concern about the pandemic and support for mitigation policies (Harrel & Lieberman, 2021; Stephens-Dougan, 2022). In response to such results, one cautionary line of reasoning argues that communicating the disparity figures without explanatory context can perpetuate (or at least not undermine) myths that African Americans are more likely to contract COVID-19 due to genetic predispositions or maladaptive behavioral tendencies (Chowkwanyun & Reed, 2020). In two studies, we test the claims that (a) explanatory context mitigates the tendency to attribute racial disparities to essential racial differences and (b) that perceptions of racial disparities are attuned to specific racial inequalities in the U.S., and not merely expressions of outgroup bias. In Study 1, we found that exposure to racial disparities with explanatory context (vs. without explanatory context) did not reduce racial essentialism or stereotyping, but did promote support for healthcare equity. In Study 2, we found that black disadvantage frames (vs. white vs. Hispanic) uniquely promoted support for equitable healthcare and multicultural inclusion. Importantly, and contrary to other recent findings, exposure to black disadvantage did not preclude support for equity.     

Woman and athlete: Toward role consistency

The purpose of this study was to examine the attitudes of a general population toward female participation in sports and to replicate a previous study. The two areas investigated were (1) the perception of enhancement or detraction of femininity by girls' participation in athletics, and (2) whether different sports elicited different attitudes towards female participation in athletics. A town in Iowa was sampled. The results indicated that, in general, participation in sports neither detracted from nor enhanced femininity. Furthermore, most of the people wanted their daughters to play basketball, even though it neither detracted from nor enhanced femininity. The data suggest that traditional, rigid sex-role stereotypes were transcended and the opportunity set was dominant.This study was partially funded by a grant from the University of Iowa Graduate School. Appreciation is expressed to Dr. Eldon Snyder for graciously sharing his instrument and recent work.     

The role of structural consistency between categories and attributes in hierarchical category learning

This study investigated how consistency between categories and attributes determines attribute selection in hierarchical category learning. Participants learned six categories for which number and color were equally relevant attributes, followed by a transfer task, to test which attribute was used. Before that, half of them learned embedding higher-level categories for which numbers were likely to be used. Orthogonal to this factor, the hierarchical structure was made explicit for half of them by category labels. The results showed that participants used numbers in the prior learning, but that the use of numbers was inhibited in the subsequent six-category learning task. However, this inhibitory effect was reduced when the hierarchical structure was explicit. The pattern of results suggests that attribute selection is determined by structural consistency between categories and attributes, not by a prior use of an attribute.     

Need for closure and compensatory rule-based perception: The role of information consistency

When making comparisons, people tend to use routinized standards, rules, and knowledge structures. Compensatory rules (e.g., “if competent, then cold”, “if incompetent, then warm”) allow for the quick and easy evaluation of groups when they are compared. We claim that the application of these rules is especially attractive for people who are motivated to seek quick and firm answers (people high in the need for closure—NFC). However, we assume that when people are confronted with expectancy-inconsistent information, higher levels of NFC lead to a lower reliance on these rules. This is because the inconsistency may serve as a signal that the rules no longer provide guidance on how to act. We demonstrated these effects in three studies set in different group contexts, where we manipulated expectancy-consistent and expectancy-inconsistent information. These findings allow for a more comprehensive view of the dynamic and diverse effects of NFC.     

The causal explanatory functions of medical diagnoses

Diagnoses in medicine are often taken to serve as explanations of patients’ symptoms and signs. This article examines how they do so. I begin by arguing that although some instances of diagnostic explanation can be formulated as covering law arguments, they are explanatory neither in virtue of their argumentative structures nor in virtue of general regularities between diagnoses and clinical presentations. I then consider the theory that medical diagnoses explain symptoms and signs by identifying their actual causes in particular cases. While I take this to be largely correct, I argue that for a diagnosis to function as a satisfactory causal explanation of a patient’s symptoms and signs, it also needs to be supplemented by understanding the mechanisms by which the identified cause produces the symptoms and signs. This mechanistic understanding comes not from the diagnosis itself, but rather from the theoretical framework within which the physician operates.