Sosa on epistemic value: a Kantian obstacle

In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa’s account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa’s competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects’ beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief’s fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa’s competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.

     

Correction to: Safety in Sosa

Synthese - Shortly after the publication of this paper, I had the opportunity to discuss related issues with Thomas Grundmann, who convinced me that the final section contains a demonstrable mistake.     

Similarity and acquaintance: a dilemma

There is an interesting and instructive problem with Richard Fumerton’s acquaintance theory of noninferential justification. Fumerton’s explicit account requires acquaintance with the truth-maker of one’s belief and yet he admits that one can have noninferential justification when one is not acquainted with the truth-maker of one’s belief but instead acquainted with a very similar truth-maker. On the face of it this problem calls for clarification. However, there are skeptical issues lurking in the background. This paper explores these issues by developing a dilemma for an acquaintance theory.     

Sosa on knowledge,judgment and guessing

Synthese - In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Sosa (Judgment and Agency, 2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of...     

Dimensional models for research and diagnosis: a current dilemma

This commentary focuses on the current dilemma regarding the application of dimensional models for research and diagnosis. Four articles are used to review the positive contributions of dimensional approaches. Although categorical approaches are integral in deciding the characteristics of the group to be studied (i.e., development of inclusion/exclusion criteria), the generation of cutpoints for categorical classification is, in reality, working with dimensional data. Ultimately, new methodological strategies need to be incorporated that address both categorical and dimensional aspects of the overall diagnostic framework. These refinements will be vital in determining the extent and reality of co-occurrence of disorder and the determination of boundaries across specific disorders.     

Ernest Sosa, Knowledge, and Understanding

This paper offers and analysis of Ernest Sosa's Virtue Perspectivism.Although Sosa has been credited with fathering the influentialcontemporary movement known as Virtue Epistemology, I argue that Sosaimprudently abandons the reliabilist-based insights of VirtueEpistemology in favor of a reflection-based, ``perspectival' view.Sosa's mixed allegiance to reliabilist-based and reflection-based viewsof knowledge, in fact, leads to an unwelcome tension in his thoughtwhich can be relieved by recognizing that his reflection-based view isin fact an account of the cognitive state of understanding,rather than an account of knowledge. Sosa makes mattersdifficult for himself because he expects too much, as it were, from theconcept of knowledge, and in the process burdens his view with elementsof reflection it does not require. To solve the problem, I suggest thatSosa needs to develop a two-tiered epistemology whichrecognizes that knowledge, on the one hand, and understanding, on theother, both have necessary and sufficient conditions unique tothemselves.     

Sosa on knowledge,justification, and aptness

Presented in an author meets critics symposium on Ernest Sosa'sKnowledge in Perspective at the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, March 26, 1993. The other critic was Jonathan Dancy, and Sosa responded.     

FISH: a commons dilemma simulation

A local-area-network-based commons dilemma (CD) simulation is described. The program usesfishing as its CD metaphor; research participants experience the metaphor through both graphics (fish may be seen in an ocean) and text (CD terms such as “resource regeneration” are translated to fishing terms such as “spawning”). Common CD parameters, such as the availability of the resource, payoff values, the number of harvesters, the rate of regeneration, knowledge about the state of the resource, and awareness of other harvesters’ actions may be varied Other CD parameters that are not yet widely studied may also be varied, such as variability in regeneration rate, uncertainty in the amount of the resource, operating costs necessary to harvest the resource, length of time for the resource to regenerate (spawn), and whether the resource is visible to harvesters. The program worked well in pilot testing and in a study in progress.     

The give-or-take-some dilemma: An empirical investigation of a hybrid social dilemma

We describe and empirically investigate a hybrid social dilemma that merges give-some and take-some dilemmas by allowing individuals to choose to either give or to take resources from a shared resource pool. Study 1 finds that (a) group size increases the inequality among group members and the likelihood of creating the public good, while reducing the amount of wasted resources; (b) larger bonuses increase provision rates; and (c) asymmetry in the wealth distribution of the group members induces higher levels of inequality of the final outcomes. Following the logic of appropriateness, players with high (low) endowments were more likely to give toward (take from) the shared resource. Study 2 finds that the tendency of the players with high (low) endowments to give (take) is amplified as the difference between endowment levels increased, and the players’ behavior is correlated with, and predictable from, independent judgments of what is perceived as appropriate.     

The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies

Perhaps the concept of knowledge, prior to its being fashioned and molded by certain philosophical traditions, never offered any stable negative verdict in the original fake barn case.     

Juggling Through Hoops: Implementing Ethics Policies in Applied Language Studies

This article reports on a collective effort to position ethics policies within the context of a specific discipline – Applied Language Studies (ALS). Through a discussion of challenges to ALS-specific pedagogical and research practices, this article highlights (1) the need for consistency across institutional Research Ethics Boards in the application of general principles of ethics review, and (2) the recognition of local considerations that are informed by disciplinary approaches not envisioned in current ethics policies. Ethics policies that are driven by substantive ethical intent will recognize pedagogical practices, research methodologies, and epistemological values and traditions that mark a discipline.