Against relativism

Recent years have brought relativistic accounts of knowledge, first-person belief, and future contingents to prominence. I discuss these views, distinguish non-trivial from trivial forms of relativism, and then argue against relativism in all of its substantive varieties.     

Conditionals and indexical relativism

I set out and defend a view on indicative conditionals that I call “indexical relativism”. The core of the view is that which proposition is (semantically) expressed by an utterance of a conditional is a function of (among other things) the speaker’s context and the assessor’s context. This implies a kind of relativism, namely that a single utterance may be correctly assessed as true by one assessor and false by another.     

Defusing epistemic relativism

This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being.     

On ethical relativism

The Journal of Value Inquiry -     

Linguistic relativism and colour cognition

Native speakers of two languages (English and Ndonga) were compared on three colour cognition tasks (sorting, triads and visual search) in a test of the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Whorf, 1956). The colour lexicons of these two languages differ because Ndonga has no basic terms for ORANGE, PINK and PURPLE, and stimuli were chosen to exploit this difference. On the sorting task (sorting into similarity‐groups) for each language, nominally similar colours were grouped together more often than nominally dissimilar colours. On the triads task (choosing the most different of three colours), when the most nominally isolated colour differed for the two language‐groups, each group tended to choose their nominal isolate. On the search task (scanning for target colours among distractors), targets were either in a different English category than distractors (cross‐category), or some distractors were in the same English category as distractors (within‐category). The ‘cost’ in speed of having within‐category distractors was much greater for the English than for the Ndonga. Overall, these data suggest that a core universal component is modulated by a small relativist influence. The differences in the visual search task are consistent with language affecting pre‐attentive processes (an indirect language effect) as well as exerting on‐line influences (a direct effect).