There is an ‘I’ in truth: How salient identities shape dynamic perceptions of truth

This research examined the hypothesis that people judge as true those claims aligned with the normative content of their salient social identities. In Experiment 1a, participants’ social identities were manipulated by assigning them to ‘inductive-thinker’ and ‘intuitive-thinker’ groups. Participants subsequently made truth judgements about aphorisms randomly associated with ‘science’ and ‘popular wisdom’. Those with salient inductive-thinker social identities judged science-based claims as more truthful than popular wisdom-based claims to a greater extent than those with salient intuitive-thinker social identities. Experiment 1b was a preregistered replication, with additional conditions eliminating an alternative semantic-priming explanation. In Experiment 2, American Conservatives and Liberals judged as more true claims associated with the ideological content of their social identities. This difference was attenuated through a manipulation that framed participants as more moderate than they had originally indicated. Overall, these experiments suggest an identity-truth malleability, such that making salient specific social identities can lead to related perceptions of truth normatively aligned with those identities.     

Nuclear Boundaries: Material and Discursive Containment at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation

Abstract

Current controversies in the field of genetics are provoking a reassessment of claims that race is socially constructed. Drawing upon Bruno Latour's model of how to analyse scientific controversy, this article argues that race is ‘gaining in reality’ in such a way that renders claims about its social construction tenuous and uncertain. Such claims can be seen as failing in two key regards. The first relates to changes in the way genetics is practised and promoted, which are undermining the stability of fundamental assertions that there is ‘no biological basis for race’ or that ‘race does not exist’. The second involves the confusion of analytical domains in making assertions about race. This problem stems from investing genetics research with hopes that it would reveal the ‘truth’ about race. This confidence has led to equating the ‘cultural’ with ‘bias’, while ignoring the cultural dynamics which shape race. Subsequently, I argue for making a domain claim for the primacy of cultural analysis that does not simply dismiss the possible relevance of biology or genetics to racial issues.     

Free Thinking for Expressivists

Abstract

This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist ‘internal reading’ of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only ‘external reading’ available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a ‘commitment-theoretic’ account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.     

BOOK REVIEWS

The storming of the Golden Temple complex in 1984 is central to the imagination of both a Sikh ‘nation’ and a specifically Sikh ‘diaspora’. Both ‘derivative discourses’ construct Sikhs as ‘victims’ of a ghallughara which forced them into a physical or emotional exile from India. Translated as ‘genocide’, the term ghallughara resonates deeply with earlier pogroms in Sikh history, and is memorialized through the image of the desecrated Akal Takht. Mediated through Information and Communications Technologies, this on-line lieux de mémoire provides testimony to the attempt by the ‘secular’ Indian state to violently wrench the temporal from the spiritual dimensions of Sikh sovereignty as embodied in the Khalsa, thus leaving Sikhs ‘mute and absolutely alone’ in a world of nation-states. In contrast to the nationalist imaginary, it is suggested that Sikh claims to sovereignty should be grounded not in territorial claims to an imagined homeland of Khalistan, but in a reconceptualization of the Khalsa as a distinct de-territorialized religio-political community, one better able to articulate the universal values of the Gurus in an increasingly ‘post-western’ world.     

II. A reply to Siegel on Kuhnian relativism

Siegel argues that the Kuhnian relativism presented in ‘Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism’ fails because it neglects the possibility of rational choice in science between rival paradigms’ own incommensurable standards on the basis of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’. In reply, it is argued (1) that Siegel has given no reason to believe that there are such external standards in science, (2) that the mere ‘possibility’ of such standards in scientific debate is not sufficient to vitiate Kuhn's relativism, (3) that the actual existence of rational debate concerning the internal standards of rival paradigms does not entail (as Siegel claims) the existence of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’, and finally (4) that Kuhn's relativism concerning standards in science does not lead (as Siegel claims) to a ‘reductio’ which undermines the philosophical standards implicit in Kuhn's argument.     

Future Contradictions

A common and much-explored thought is ?ukasiewicz's idea that the future is ‘indeterminate’—i.e., ‘gappy’ with respect to some claims—and that such indeterminacy bleeds back into the present in the form of gappy ‘future contingent’ claims. What is uncommon, and to my knowledge unexplored, is the dual idea of an overdeterminate future—one which is ‘glutty’ with respect to some claims. While the direct dual, with future gluts bleeding back into the present, is worth noting, my central aim is simply to sketch and briefly explore an alternative glutty-future view, one that is conservative—indeed, entirely classical—with respect to the present.

The structure of the paper runs as follows. §1 briefly sketches the target gap picture of an indeterminate future yielding gappy claims at the present. §2 presents the direct dual idea—a glut picture of an overdeterminate future yielding glutty claims at present. §3 sketches the central idea, a more interesting glut picture in which the future contains contradictory states but the present remains entirely classical. §4 contains a general defence of the idea, leaving it open as to whether the gappy-future view enjoys substantive virtues over the proposed glutty-future view of §3.     

Heidegger on Assertion,Method and Metaphysics

In Sein und Zeit Heidegger makes several claims about the nature of ‘assertion’ [Aussage]. These claims are of particular philosophical interest: they illustrate, for example, important points of contact and divergence between Heidegger's work and philosophical movements including Kantianism, the early Analytic tradition and contemporary pragmatism. This article provides a new assessment of one of these claims: that assertion is connected to a ‘present‐at‐hand’ ontology. I also indicate how my analysis sets the stage for a new reading of Heidegger's further claim that assertion is an explanatorily derivative phenomenon. I begin with a loose overview of Heidegger's position and then develop a sharper formulation of the key premises. I go on to argue that existing treatments of the supposed link between assertion and the ‘present‐at‐hand’ are unsatisfactory, and advance a new, ‘methodological’, interpretation of that link. Finally, I sketch the implications of my interpretation for the further claim that assertion is explanatorily derivative.     

A note on ‘knowledge,certainty, and probability'∗

In ‘Knowledge, Certainty and Probability’, Dr. Heidelberger claims to have shown ‘that it is a mistake to assimilate probability and rational belief to knowledge’. The conclusion may be true but his argument is faulty.     

“Stand Up Straight”: Notes Toward a History of Posture

The essay presents a set of interlinked claims about posture in modern culture. Over the past two centuries it has come to define a wide range of assumptions in the West from what makes human beings human (from Lamarck to Darwin and beyond) to the efficacy of the body in warfare (from Dutch drill manuals in the 17th century to German military medical studies of soldiers in the 19th century). Dance and sport both are forms of posture training in terms of their own claims. Posture separates ‘primitive’ from ‘advanced’ peoples and the ‘ill’ from the ‘healthy.’ Indeed an entire medical sub-specialty developed in which gymnastics defined and recuperated the body. But all of these claims were also part of a Western attempt to use posture (and the means of altering it) as the litmus test for the healthy modern body of the perfect citizen. Focusing on the centrality of posture in two oddly linked moments of modern thought—modern Zionist thought and Nationalism in early 20th century China—in terms of bodily reform, we show how “posture” brings all of the earlier debates together to reform the body.     

Not quite dead yet: a liberal response to Van Heerden

In this article I challenge Derick van Heerden's prediction of ‘the demise of liberal political theory’. I point out several misinterpretations and misunderstandings of liberal theory in his article and take issue in particular with his claims regarding ‘embedded individuality’.     

The Sexualisation of Culture?

This article examines contemporary debates about the ‘sexualisation of culture’. It sets out the context for claims that Western societies are becoming more sexualised and it explores a number of competing perspectives about sexualisation. It then looks in more detail at the nature of claims about sexualisation as they emerge from the different disciplinary perspectives of Psychology and Media and Cultural Studies, contrasting the strengths and weaknesses of each, and raising criticisms of both. In a final discussion section, the article considers the usefulness or otherwise of the notion of ‘sexualisation’ as analytic category and points to the need to go beyond polarised positions. It advocates a psychosocial approach that takes seriously differences and power in considering the contemporary proliferation of ‘sexualised’ images, practices and media.     

A common whore and her relations

This paper engages in a critical discussion of Wouter Hanegraaff's book Western Esotericism and the Academy (2012), acknowledging its importance but also focusing on some points that appear problematic. Particular attention is given to the concept of ‘Platonic Orientalism,’ the concept of ‘form of thought,’ and the theoretical basis for a satisfactory etic definition of ‘Western esotericism.’ Hanegraaff claims that his book offers a solid argument for understanding Western esotericism ‘ultimately’ as a ‘historiographical concept,’ rather than as a ‘form of thought.’ This claim is questioned in the paper.     

Regulating damage claims for emotional injuries before the First World War

During the late 19th century, as a result of litigation following railway accidents, damage claims for emotional injuries became a medico-legal issue. Efforts to find fair and socially acceptable means of settling such claims involved an interaction between medical theory and legal rules. Between 1866 and 1890 doctors debated the significance of ‘nervous’ symptoms, which resulted from accidents in which Little or no physical damage occurred. They rejected a strictly somatic interpretation of these symptoms and replaced it with a psychosomatic interpretation. Hoping to prevent a fiood of ‘false claims’, Anglo-American courts initially rejected this psychosomatic interpretation, and ruled against damages in cases where fear without physical impact was the cause of the plaintiffs symptoms. Later, common law courts accepted the psychosomatic perspective and granted damages for physical illnesses in which fear was ‘one link in the chain of causation’. While early appeals under workers' compensation laws followed these later courts, worries about the social consequences ofthese rulings were also evident in the years before the First World War.     

Was Merleau-Ponty a ‘transcendental’ phenomenologist?

Whether or not Merleau-Ponty’s version of phenomenology should be considered a form of ‘transcendental’ philosophy is open to debate. Although the Phenomenology of Perception presents his position as a transcendental one, many of its features—such as its exploitation of empirical science—might lead to doubt that it can be. This paper considers whether Merleau-Ponty meets what I call the ‘transcendentalist challenge’ of defining and grounding claims of a distinctive transcendental kind. It begins by highlighting three features—the absolute ego, the pure phenomenal field, and the reduction—that Husserl had used to justify claims of a specifically transcendental kind within a phenomenological framework. It then examines how Merleau-Ponty modifies each of these features to focus on the lived body and a factically conditioned phenomenal field, while remaining ambivalent about the reduction. Finally, it assesses whether Merleau-Ponty’s modified position can still legitimately be considered transcendental. I argue that—despite his own rhetoric—this modified position shapes the modality of Merleau-Ponty’s claims in such a way that his phenomenology cannot meet the transcendentalist challenge and therefore should not be considered ‘transcendental.’     

Dorr on the language of ontology

Philosophical Studies - In the ‘ordinary business of life’, everyone makes claims about what there is. For instance, we say things like: ‘There are some beautiful chairs in my...     

‘God,the Father Almighty’: A Theological Excursus

The confession of ‘God, the Father almighty’ in the Apostles’ and Nicene Creeds can be interpreted as offering a progressively more focused characterization of the First Person of the Trinity, such that ‘Father’ clarifies the meaning of ‘God’, and the force of ‘almighty’ is controlled by the meaning of ‘Father’. The results of such an exegesis accentuate divine transcendence in a way that raises questions about theological claims to natural knowledge of God. More specifically, they suggest that the very comprehensiveness of God's relationship to the world implied by divine almightiness blocks any direct line of inference from creation to Creator.     

Avner Baz on the ‘Point’ of a Question

Abstract

Avner Baz claims that questions philosophers ask about hypothetical cases lack the kind of ‘point’ possessed by ‘everyday’ questions. He concludes from this that there is something wrong with the philosophical practice of asking questions about hypothetical cases. This paper defends the practice from Baz’s criticism.     

Shared intentions,public reason,and political autonomy

John Rawls claims that public reasoning is the reasoning of ‘equal citizens who as a corporate body impose rules on one another backed by sanctions of state power’. Drawing upon an amended version of Michael Bratman’s theory of shared intentions, I flesh out this claim by developing the ‘civic people’ account of public reason. Citizens realize ‘full’ political autonomy as members of a civic people. Full political autonomy, though, cannot be realised by citizens in societies governed by a ‘constrained proceduralist’ account of democratic self-government, or the ‘convergence’ account of public justification formulated recently by Gerald Gaus and Kevin Vallier.