Can fast and slow intelligence be differentiated?

Responses to items from an intelligence test may be fast or slow. The research issue dealt with in this paper is whether the intelligence involved in fast correct responses differs in nature from the intelligence involved in slow correct responses. There are two questions related to this issue: 1. Are the processes involved different? 2. Are the abilities involved different? An answer to these questions is provided making use of data from a Raven-like matrices test and a verbal analogies test, and the use of a psychometric branching model. The branching model is based on three latent traits: speed, fast accuracy and slow accuracy, and item parameters corresponding to each of these. The pattern of item difficulties is used to draw conclusions on the cognitive processes involved. The results are as follows: 1. The processes involved in fast and slow responses can be differentiated, as can be derived from qualitative differences in the patterns of item difficulty, and fast responses lead to a larger differentiation between items than slow responses do. 2. The abilities underlying fast and slow responses can also be differentiated, and fast responses allow for a better differentiation between the respondents.     

Can generic expertise explain special processing for faces?

Does face recognition involve face-specific cognitive and neural processes ('domain specificity') or do faces only seem special because people have had more experience of individuating them than they have of individuating members of other homogeneous object categories ('the expertise hypothesis')? Here, we summarize new data that test these hypotheses by assessing whether classic face-selective effects - holistic processing, recognition impairments in prosopagnosia and fusiform face area activation - remain face selective in comparison with objects of expertise. We argue that evidence strongly supports domain specificity rather than the expertise hypothesis. We conclude that the crucial social function of face recognition does not reflect merely a general practice phenomenon and that it might be supported by evolved mechanisms (visual or nonvisual) and/or a sensitive period in infancy.     

Can longitudinal changes in processing speed explain longitudinal age changes in fluid intelligence?

The processing-speed theory of cognitive aging contends tha age-related declines in intellectual function reflect the consequences of age-related slowing of processing speed. Cross-sectional data support this assumption. The association between 4-year changes in processing speed and 4-year changes in fluid intelligence was examined with a sample of 417 older adults. Changes in processing speed correlated .53 with changes in fluid intelligence. The difference in the explanatory power of processing speed regarding age-related differences and age-related changes is discussed with reference to other longitudinal studies and methodological considerations.     

Can you do this? Extremely difficult interbodypart coordination tasks and implications for central limitations on control of coordination

We have recently noticed our own inability to perform a number of interbodypart coordination tasks. The inability to perform these tasks indicates an intriguing central processing limitation on movement control, and study of these tasks should be helpful in understanding the neural mechanisms of motor control.     

Can the REBT theory explain loneliness? Theoretical and clinical applications

Loneliness is a common psychological experience affecting a significant minority of the general population. Loneliness may in part be related to the existence of dysfunctional cognitive evaluations. To date, however, loneliness has yet to be explicitly assessed within a cognitive-behavioural theoretical framework. The current study sought to determine the association between negative cognitions, within the context of Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy (REBT), and the experience of loneliness. A multinational sample of university students (n = 397) completed self-report assessments of rational and irrational beliefs, and loneliness. Structural equation modelling results found that the REBT model of psychopathology, and the REBT model of psychological health, provided satisfactory representations of loneliness, explaining 36% and 23% of variance in loneliness, respectively. Several dysfunctional (“Demandingness”, “Catastrophising” and “Self-Downing” beliefs) and functional (“Preferences” and “Self-Acceptance” beliefs) cognitions were directly and indirectly associated with loneliness. These results highlight that cognitions and loneliness are meaningfully related, and indicate that cognitive-behavioural models may be useful in understanding loneliness. More specifically, current results suggest that REBT may offer a viable psychotherapeutic approach to treating loneliness.     

Can semantic relatedness explain the enhancement of memory for emotional words?

Memory for emotional items is often better than memory for neutral items. In three experiments, we examined whether this typical finding is due to the higher semantic relatedness inherent to emotional items, a confound in previous studies. We also controlled for other possible confounding variables, such as imagery. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants encoded lists of emotional and categorized neutral words equivalent in semantic relatedness, as well as lists of random neutral words with lower semantic relatedness. In Experiment 3, the lists were mixed, containing words from all the conditions. Surprise free recall was tested after a 40- to 55-min retention interval. Free recall of emotional words was better than that of random neutral words, replicating the classic effect. Importantly, categorized words were recalled better than random neutral words, and not worse than emotional words. These results emphasize the important role of semantic relatedness in the classic effect and suggest that organizational processes operate alongside arousal-related ones to enhance memory for emotional material.     

Can emotion regulation explain the association between age and driving styles?

Numerous studies have sought to explain why young drivers tend to engage in maladaptive driving styles more than older drivers. The current study seeks to further this line of inquiry by examining the mediating role of emotion regulation in the association between age and driving style. The sample consisted of 287 drivers aged 18 to 72 who completed scales assessing their driving style and emotion regulation difficulties. Results show that the younger the drivers, the more they tended to report difficulties in regulating emotion, which, in turn, was positively related to the maladaptive driving styles: reckless and careless; angry and hostile; and anxious. Understanding the role of emotion regulation in the choice of driving style is crucial for promoting the substantial efforts invested in attempts to reduce traffic crashes.     

Teaching children with autism to explain how: A case for problem solving?

Few studies have applied Skinner's (1953) conceptualization of problem solving to teach socially significant behaviors to individuals with developmental disabilities. The current study used a multiple probe design across behavior (sets) to evaluate the effects of problem‐solving strategy training (PSST) on the target behavior of explaining how to complete familiar activities. During baseline, none of the three participants with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) could respond to the problems presented to them (i.e., explain how to do the activities). Tact training of the actions in each activity alone was ineffective; however, all participants demonstrated independent explaining‐how following PSST. Further, following PSST with Set 1, tact training alone was sufficient for at least one scenario in sets 2 and 3 for all 3 participants. Results have implications for generative responding for individuals with ASD and further the discussion regarding the role of problem solving in complex verbal behavior.     

Alertness and cognitive control: Is there a spatial attention constraint?

Congruency effects in arrow flanker tasks are often larger when subjects are more alert, suggesting an unusual connection between alertness and cognitive control. Theoretical accounts of the alerting–congruency interaction differ with respect to whether and how spatial attention is involved. In the present study, the author conducted eight experiments to determine whether there is a spatial attention constraint linking alertness to cognitive control. Alertness was manipulated in color-word Stroop tasks involving stimuli that were spatially integrated (Experiments 1–3) or separated (Experiments 4 and 5), as well as in Stroop-like tasks involving spatially separated stimuli for which the irrelevant stimulus features were spatial words (Experiments 6 and 7) or arrows (Experiment 8). All experiments yielded effects of alerting and congruency, but none produced the alerting–congruency interaction typically found with arrow flanker tasks. The results suggest that there is a spatial attention constraint on the relationship between alertness and cognitive control, part of which might involve having a task goal associated with spatial information processing.     

Sequential compatibility effects and cognitive control: does conflict really matter?

Although it is widely accepted that control mechanisms are necessary for human behavior to be adapted, very little is known about how such mechanisms are recruited. A suggestion to fill the gap was put forward by M. M. Botvinick, T. S. Braver, C. S. Carter, D. M. Barch, and J. D. Cohen (2001), who proposed the conflict-loop theory. This theory has been successful in accounting for the reduction of compatibility effects after an incompatible trial: The level of conflict being, on average, higher during an incompatible trial, more control occurs after such a trial. The authors have tested this prediction by sorting the trials on the basis of amount of conflict (quantified by the electromyographic activity) they presented. A reduction of the compatibility effect was observed after incompatible trials, but it was independent of the level of conflict on previous trials, suggesting that the conflict does not trigger changes in executive control. Consequences for the conflict monitoring model are discussed.     

How similar are fluid cognition and general intelligence? A developmental neuroscience perspective on fluid cognition as an aspect of human cognitive ability

This target article considers the relation of fluid cognitive functioning to general intelligence. A neurobiological model differentiating working memory/executive function cognitive processes of the prefrontal cortex from aspects of psychometrically defined general intelligence is presented. Work examining the rise in mean intelligence-test performance between normative cohorts, the neuropsychology and neuroscience of cognitive function in typically and atypically developing human populations, and stress, brain development, and corticolimbic connectivity in human and nonhuman animal models is reviewed and found to provide evidence of mechanisms through which early experience affects the development of an aspect of cognition closely related to, but distinct from, general intelligence. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of emotion in fluid cognition and on research indicating fluid cognitive deficits associated with early hippocampal pathology and with dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis stress-response system. Findings are seen to be consistent with the idea of an independent fluid cognitive construct and to assist with the interpretation of findings from the study of early compensatory education for children facing psychosocial adversity and from behavior genetic research on intelligence. It is concluded that ongoing development of neurobiologically grounded measures of fluid cognitive skills appropriate for young children will play a key role in understanding early mental development and the adaptive success to which it is related, particularly for young children facing social and economic disadvantage. Specifically, in the evaluation of the efficacy of compensatory education efforts such as Head Start and the readiness for school of children from diverse backgrounds, it is important to distinguish fluid cognition from psychometrically defined general intelligence.     

Can probability theory explain why closure is both intuitive and prone to counterexamples?

Epistemic closure under known implication is the principle that knowledge of \(\varphi\) and knowledge of \(\varphi \rightarrow \psi\), together, imply knowledge of \(\psi\). This principle is intuitive, yet several putative counterexamples have been formulated against it. This paper addresses the question, why is epistemic closure both intuitive and prone to counterexamples? In particular, the paper examines whether probability theory can offer an answer to this question based on four strategies. The first probability-based strategy rests on the accumulation of risks. The problem with this strategy is that risk accumulation cannot accommodate certain counterexamples to epistemic closure. The second strategy is based on the idea of evidential support, that is, a piece of evidence supports a proposition whenever it increases the probability of the proposition. This strategy makes progress and can accommodate certain putative counterexamples to closure. However, this strategy also gives rise to a number of counterintuitive results. Finally, there are two broadly probabilistic strategies, one based on the idea of resilient probability and the other on the idea of assumptions that are taken for granted. These strategies are promising but are prone to some of the shortcomings of the second strategy. All in all, I conclude that each strategy fails. Probability theory, then, is unlikely to offer the account we need.     

Can the relationship between tangential velocity and radius of curvature explain motor constancy?

To address contributions of speed, efficiency, radius of curvature and joint complexity to the strength of the lawful relationship between tangential velocity and radius of curvature (power law), an experiment considered the strength of the power law when participants were instructed to perform circling movements using the elbow, finger, shoulder, or wrist. Five participants performed circling motions in a vertical plane upon a Smartboard that sampled finger tip position at 200Hz. Page's L tested whether the strength of the power law could be predicted by: (1) speed; (2) submovements; (3) joint complexity; (4) radius of curvature. A second experiment considered the strength of the power law when six participants were instructed to perform circling movements of different sizes (large, medium, and small) using their shoulders. Movement speed or efficiency could not explain the strength of the power law, instead the power law was stronger for movements with a smaller radius of curvature or fewer joints. The strength of the power law varied with effector, questioning the role of the power law in motor constancy.     

Do endogenous and exogenous action control compete for perception?

Human actions are guided either by endogenous action plans or by external stimuli in the environment. These two types of action control seem to be mediated by neurophysiologically and functionally distinct systems that interfere if an endogenously planned action suddenly has to be performed in response to an exogenous stimulus. In this case, the endogenous representation has to be deactivated first to give way to the exogenous system. Here we show that interference of endogenous and exogenous action control is not limited to motor-related aspects but also affects the perception of action-related stimuli. Participants associated two actions with contingent sensory effects in learning blocks. In subsequent test blocks, preparing one of these actions specifically impaired responding to the associated effect in an exogenous speeded detection task, yielding a blindness-like effect for arbitrary, learned action effects. In accordance with the theory of event coding, this finding suggests that action planning influences perception even in the absence of any physical similarities between action and to-be-perceived stimuli.     

Flexibility and security? ‘Flexicurity’ and its implications for lifelong guidance

This article sets out to trigger research and policy attention among the career guidance community to the increasingly important notion of ‘flexicurity’. It first explores the different meanings of the term, particularly as these have evolved in discussions across the European Union. It then goes on to consider why ‘flexicurity’ has attracted so much policy interest, particularly in its promise to both support labour market competitiveness and increase economic efficiency on the one hand, while protecting the interests of workers on the other. Next, the article documents some of the key debates around the notion of flexicurity, highlighting the fact that any consideration of ‘flexicure’ arrangements needs to be empirically grounded in time and space, and carefully contextualised. The article concludes by making a series of critical reflections on the need to ‘insert’ career guidance in the European discourse on ‘flexicurity’.     

Personality and music: Can traits explain how people use music in everyday life?

This paper reports the results of a study on the relationship between individual differences and specific uses of music, referring to why and how people use music in everyday life. Questionnaire data from 341 respondents showed that open and intellectually engaged individuals, and those with higher IQ scores, tended to use music in a rational/cognitive way, while neurotic, introverted and non‐conscientious individuals were all more likely to use music for emotional regulation (e.g. change or enhance moods). Results suggest that individual differences in personality and cognitive ability may partly determine the way in which we experience music. Limitations and suggestions for future studies are discussed.