Developmental change in subjective probability during adolescence

The developmental change in subjective probability during adolescence, an important period for establishing the probability concept, was investigated. 75 Japanese adolescents, from 12 to 23 yr. of age, were asked to make probability judgments for a lottery under 15 conditions. Analysis showed that with increase in age their subjective probability came closer to the objective probability. Discussion of these results took into consideration recent studies on the development of the concept of probability.     

Response force in RT tasks: Isolating effects of stimulus probability and response probability

Mattes, UIrich, and Miller (1997) found that as response probability decreases in a simple reaction time (RT) task, participants produce more forceful responses as well as longer RTs, suggesting a direct influence of preparatory processes on the motor system. In this previous study, however, response probability was confounded with stimulus probability, leaving open the possibility that response force was sensitive to stimulus- rather than response-related preparation. The present study was conducted to unravel the effects of stimulus and response probability. Experiment 1 manipulated stimulus probability and revealed that responses to a more probable stimulus are less forceful than responses to a less probable stimulus even when both stimuli require the same response. Experiment 2 demonstrated that this stimulus probability effect does not depend on the overall level of response probability. Experiment 3 showed an analogous effect for response probability when stimulus probability is kept constant. The complete pattern of results suggests that both stimulus probability and response probability affect the forcefulness of a response. It is argued that response probability exerts adirect influence on the motor system, whereas stimulus probability influences the motor system indirectly via premotoric adjustments.     

Mathematical logic in the soviet union, 1917–1980

This essay describes a variety of contributions which relate to the connection of probability with logic. Some are grand attempts at providing a logical foundation for probability and inductive inference. Others are concerned with probabilistic inference or, more generally, with the transmittance of probability through the structure (logical syntax) of language. In this latter context probability is considered as a semantic notion playing the same role as does truth value in conventional logic. At the conclusion of the essay two fully elaborated semantically based constructions of probability logic are presented.     

Action outcome probability influences the size of the head-fake effect in basketball

Both kinematic and contextual information (e.g., action outcome probability) play a significant role in action anticipation. However, few researchers have examined the reciprocal influence of the two types of information and fewer still have investigated this issue for deceptive actions in sports. In the present study, we investigate the impact of action outcome probability on the processing of deceptive kinematic cues for the head fake in basketball. We manipulated the probability of the action outcome to either pass the ball to the left or to the right side (i.e., 75%, 50%, 25%) and examined how this contextual information affected the influence of head orientation on pass direction judgments. Outcome probability information was either provided explicitly (Experiment 1) or implicitly (Experiment 2). Both experiments indicated an increased head-fake effect with increasing outcome probability. Moreover, the bias to respond in line with the player’s head direction increased linearly with outcome probability. Also, discriminability between deceptive and genuine actions was poorer for high outcome probability (75%) associated with head orientation than for the 25% and 50% values. Last, a stronger response bias toward the higher probability side for deceptive trials than for genuine trials was only significant when the outcome probability information was processed implicitly in Experiment 2. The results of this study fit well with recent literature on contextual information in action prediction and are discussed in light of confirmation bias and signal detection theory.     

Knowing where is different from knowing what: Distinct response time profiles and accuracy effects for target location,orientation, and color probability

When a location is cued, targets appearing at that location are detected more quickly. When a target feature is cued, targets bearing that feature are detected more quickly. These attentional cueing effects are only superficially similar. More detailed analyses find distinct temporal and accuracy profiles for the two different types of cues. This pattern parallels work with probability manipulations, where both feature and spatial probability are known to affect detection accuracy and reaction times. However, little has been done by way of comparing these effects. Are probability manipulations on space and features distinct? In a series of five experiments, we systematically varied spatial probability and feature probability along two dimensions (orientation or color). In addition, we decomposed response times into initiation and movement components. Targets appearing at the probable location were reported more quickly and more accurately regardless of whether the report was based on orientation or color. On the other hand, when either color probability or orientation probability was manipulated, response time and accuracy improvements were specific for that probable feature dimension. Decomposition of the response time benefits demonstrated that spatial probability only affected initiation times, whereas manipulations of feature probability affected both initiation and movement times. As detection was made more difficult, the two effects further diverged, with spatial probability disproportionally affecting initiation times and feature probability disproportionately affecting accuracy. In conclusion, all manipulations of probability, whether spatial or featural, affect detection. However, only feature probability affects perceptual precision, and precision effects are specific to the probable attribute.     

成就动机和性别对风险倾向的预测作用

研究通过对等同绝对值(CE)的比较将冒险倾向转换为可以量化比较的变量,旨在探讨成就动机和性别在经济获益和损失的各种概率情景下对冒险倾向的预测作用。结果发现,高低成就动机组并没有表现出冒险倾向的显著差异。进一步的相关分析发现,成就动机中的回避失败维度与获益情景下的冒险倾向相关显著,而追求成功维度与各个情景下的相关都不显著。以回避失败维度聚类得到的高低回避失败组,体现出来的冒险倾向趋势显示高回避失败组的被试在获益低概率、获益中等概率、获益高概率、损失低概率、损失中等概率和损失高概率6种情景下都更加回避冒险,而且两组等同绝对值中位数的差异在获益中等概率和获益高概率两种情况下达到显著。另外,冒险倾向的性别差异只在损失中等概率和损失高概率两种情景中达到显著,这两种情况下都是女性更冒险,这与传统的女性更保守的刻板印象不同。     

Effects of stimulus probability and visual similarity on stimulus encoding

Visual similarity, stimulus probability, and stimulus contrast were manipulated in two memory-scanning experiments to determine how stimulus probability affects encoding. Two hypotheses were tested: The first, a featural facilitation hypothesis, localizes the effect of stimulus probability on feature extraction; the second claims that stimulus probability has its effect on stimulus recognition. In both experiments, visual similarity was found to slow encoding, particularly under low-contrast conditions. This effect was larger for low probability stimuli than for high probability stimuli and increased as the difference in probability between two visually similar stimuli increased. These results are inconsistent with the featural facilitation hypothesis, but can be explained in terms of differential priming of internal recognition responses for members of the stimulus set, such that more probable members are more easily recognized.     

Implicit attentional orienting in a target detection task with central cues

Studies using Posner’s spatial cueing paradigm have demonstrated that participants can allocate their attention to specific target locations based on the predictiveness of preceding cues. Four experiments were conducted to investigate attentional orienting processes operating in a high probability condition (cues 75% predictive) as compared to a low probability condition (cues 50% predictive) using various types of centrally-presented cues. Spatially-informative cues (arrows and circles with gaps) resulted in cueing effects (CEs) for both probability conditions, with significantly larger CEs in the high probability conditions than the low probability conditions. Participants in the high probability conditions reported little or no awareness of cue–target probabilities after task completion. Our results provide support for an implicit learning account of the proportion valid effect under experimental conditions involving spatially-informative central cues and relatively short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs).     

Bayesian probability

Bayesian decision theory is here construed as explicating a particular concept of rational choice and Bayesian probability is taken to be the concept of probability used in that theory. Bayesian probability is usually identified with the agent’s degrees of belief but that interpretation makes Bayesian decision theory a poor explication of the relevant concept of rational choice. A satisfactory conception of Bayesian decision theory is obtained by taking Bayesian probability to be an explicatum for inductive probability given the agent’s evidence.     

Non-aging fore-periods and simple reaction time

This study deals with the relationship between the momentary objective probability of the delivery of a stimulus and the reaction time in a simple reaction-time task. The hypothesis was that the reaction time is closely related to the objective probability via expectancy i.e., the momentary probability of the delivery of the stimulus as experienced by the subject. This problem was experimentally approached from two directions: (1) by varying the objective probability, in which case the reaction times should change inversely with the objective probability, and (2) by keeping the objective probability constant (by using the Bernoulli process), in which case the reaction times should not change. Eight male subjects were used. The first assumption proved to be correct, whereas the second held only when certain mean inter-stimulus intervals were used.     

Sublexical and lexical representations in speech production: effects of phonotactic probability and onset density

Phonotactic probability, neighborhood density, and onset density were manipulated in 4 picture-naming tasks. Experiment 1 showed that pictures of words with high phonotactic probability were named more quickly than pictures of words with low phonotactic probability. This effect was consistent over multiple presentations of the pictures (Experiment 2). Manipulations of phonotactic probability and neighborhood density showed only an influence of phonotactic probability (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, pictures of words with sparse onsets were named more quickly than pictures of words with dense onsets. The results of these experiments provide additional constraints on the architecture and processes involved in models of speech production, as well as constraints on the connections between the recognition and production systems.     

Response-level probability effects on reaction time: now you see them, now you don't

Many reaction time (RT) experiments have tested for response-level probability effects. Their results have been mixed, which is surprising because psychophysiological studies provide clear evidence of motor-level changes associated with an anticipated response. A survey of the designs used in the RT studies reveals many potential problems that could conceal the effects of response probability. We report five new RT experiments testing for response-level probability effects with the most promising of the previous designs-that of Blackman ( 1972 )-and with new designs. Some of these experiments yield evidence of response-level probability effects, but others do not. It appears that response-level probability effects are present primarily in simple tasks with a strong emphasis on response preparation, possibly because participants only expend effort on response preparation in these tasks.     

Effects of contextual predictability and transitional probability on eye movements during reading

In 2 eye-movement experiments, the authors tested whether transitional probability (the statistical likelihood that a word precedes or follows another word) affects reading times and whether this occurs independently from contextual predictability effects. Experiment 1 showed early effects of predictability, replicating S. A. McDonald and R. C. Shillcock's (2003a) finding that words with a high transitional probability (defeat following accept) are read faster than words with a low transitional probability (losses following accept). However, further analyses suggested that the transitional probability effect was likely due to differences in predictability rather than transitional probability. Experiment 2, using a better controlled set of items, again showed an effect of predictability, but no effect of transitional probability. The authors conclude that effects of transitional probability are part of regular predictability effects. Their data also show that predictability effects are detectable very early in the eye-movement record and between contexts that are weakly constraining.     

Reaction time as a function of the intensity and probability of occurrence of vibrotactile signals

Three Ss made judgments of the presence or absence of a burst of 60-cps vibration onthe index fingertip.The probability of S’s reporting the presence of a signal was found to be influenced by signal probability and signal intensity. Mean reaction time for reporting the presence of a signal decreased as a function of signal intensity and signal probability whereas mean reaction time for reporting the absence of a signal increased as a function of signal intensity and signal probability. On trials where no signal was presented mean R T for reporting a signal decreased with increases in the signal probability whereas mean RT for reporting the absence of a signal increased with increases in signal probability. The results were interpreted as support for the hypothesis that S’s decision time was longer the closer on the sensory continuum a particular observation was to his criterion.     

Social consequences of personality disorders: probability and timing of marriage and probability of marital disruption

The associations between DSM-IV personality disorders and probability of marriage, early marriage, and marital disruption were evaluated among people that participated in the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions, which is a nationally representative face-to-face survey of 43,093 respondents, 18 years and older. Participants completed a structured interview for the diagnosis of seven personality disorders, and provided information about the occurrence and timing of marriage and marital disruption. Results suggest that personality disorders were associated with decreased probability of marriage, increased probability of early marriage, and increased probability of marital disruption. These findings suggest that personality disorders have substantial consequences for the probability and timing of marriage and probability of marital disruption.     

概率估计的趋势效应及其对决策的影响机制——基于心理动量的视角

概率是反映风险与不确定性的重要指标, 概率估计具有趋势效应, 会对决策产生影响。文章描述了概率估计趋势效应的两种表现形式, 概率估计变化的趋势性(即不同时间点概率估计变化产生的趋势作用)与单边概率估计的趋势性(即高于或低于某个概率区间范畴的上界或下界的估计表述所产生的趋势作用), 揭示了概率估计趋势效应对于个体判断、决策行为和非理性决策偏差的影响; 基于心理动量的理论视角提出了一个整合模型, 阐述了概率估计趋势效应催生心理动量体验继而引发后续决策行为的内在机理。未来的研究可进一步关注：多方信息来源主体下概率估计的趋势效应; 动态趋势效应与静态概率估计的交互作用; 风险沟通中的概率估计变化趋势。     

A PILOT STUDY OF NATURALLY OCCURRING HIGH‐PROBABILITY REQUEST SEQUENCES IN HOSTAGE NEGOTIATIONS

In the current study, the audiotapes from three hostage‐taking situations were analyzed. Hostage negotiator requests to the hostage taker were characterized as either high or low probability. The results suggested that hostage‐taker compliance to a hostage negotiator's low‐probability request was more likely when a series of complied‐with high‐probability requests preceded the low‐probability request. However, two of the three hostage‐taking situations ended violently; therefore, the implications of the high‐probability request sequence for hostage‐taking situations should be assessed in future research.     

用文字概率衡量不确定性：特征和问题

文字概率是衡量不确定性的方式之一, 即人们使用诸如“也许”、“未必”的词汇来描述特定事件发生的可能性。文字概率不同于数字概率, 主要体现在文字概率的模糊性、非概率运算性和语义特性上。这使得相对于数字概率, 用文字概率衡量不确定性既有优势也有问题, 进而对人们的不确定信息沟通和风险决策造成影响。虽然文字概率与数字概率存在特征上的差异并且人们在日常交流中偏爱文字概率, 但是大部分风险领域的研究却仅局限于数字概率, 今后有必要研究使用文字概率测量的风险决策。在已有文字概率特征研究的基础上, 还可以进一步探究其不同于数字概率的其它特征(文字/数字概率与双系统模型的联系、文字概率的跨文化差异等)及其对风险决策的影响。     

Partial avoidance contingencies: Absolute omission and punishment probabilities

Avoidance contingencies were defined by the absolute probability of the conjunction of responding or not responding with shock or no shock. The “omission” probability (ρ₀₀) is the probability of no response and no shock. The “punishment” probability (ρ₁₁) is the probability of both a response and a shock. The traditional avoidance contingency never omits shock on nonresponse trials (ρ₀₀=0) and never presents shock on response trials (ρ₁₁=0). Rats were trained on a discrete-trial paradigm with no intertrial interval. The first lever response changed an auditory stimulus for the remainder of the trial. Shocks were delivered only at the end of each trial cycle. After initial training under the traditional avoidance contingency, one group of rats experienced changes in omission probability (ρ₀₀>0), holding punishment probability at zero. The second group of rats were studied under different punishment probability values (ρ₁₁>0), holding omission probability at zero. Data from subjects in the omission group looked similar, showing graded decrements in responding with increasing probability of omission. These subjects approximately “matched” their nonresponse frequencies to the programmed probability of shock omission on nonresponse trials, producing a very low and approximately constant conditional probability of shock given no response. Subjects in the punishment group showed different sensitivity to increasing absolute punishment probability. Some subjects decreased responding to low values as punishment probability increased, while others continued to respond at substantial levels even when shock was inevitable on all trials (noncontingent shock schedule). These results confirm an asymmetry between two dimensions of partial avoidance contingencies. When the consequences of not responding included occasional omission of shock, all subjects showed graded sensitivity to changes in omission frequency. When the consequences of responding included occasional shock delivery, some subjects showed graded sensitivity to punishment frequency while others showed control by overall shock frequency as well.     

A theory of perceived risk and attractiveness

People judged both the attractiveness and risk of lotteries to win or lose money. The lotteries were designed to test whether risk and attractiveness judgments show systematic deviations from the simple sum of probability-by-utility-products analogous to (S)EU theory. Our results led to an alternative combination rule for probability and outcome information, with a relative weight averaging component and a configural (i.e., sign- or rank-dependent) probability weighting component. Ratings of risk and attractiveness were negatively correlated, but the two tasks showed systematic differences in the rank order of judgments. Both judgments could be fit by the same configural relative weight averaging model, but with different parameters (especially the sign-dependent probability weighting functions). Risk judgments were more sensitive to the probability of losses and zero outcomes compared to attractiveness judgments, which were more sensitive to the probability of gains. There were individual differences on the extent of this difference in probability weights between risk and attractiveness judgments.