Priming effect on the exceptive conditional ‘except if’

Here we report the results of one priming experiment that examines the comprehension of exceptive conditionals—for example, ‘Mary will go out tonight except if she has an exam tomorrow’—and indicative conditionals—for example, ‘Mary will not go out tonight if she has an exam tomorrow’. The experiment showed that participants read the true possibility ‘Mary is not going out tonight and she has an exam tomorrow’ faster when it was primed by an exceptive conditional than when it was primed by an indicative; other possibilities (‘Mary is going out tonight and she does not have an exam tomorrow’, ‘Mary is going out tonight and she has an exam tomorrow’ and ‘Mary is not going out tonight and she does not have an exam tomorrow’) were primed equally by both connectives. The experiments showed that (1) when people understand ‘B except if A’, they access the true possibilities ‘not-A & B’ and ‘A & not-B’, and (2) when they understand ‘B, if not-A’ they access ‘not-A & B’, but they do not access ‘A & not-B’. We discuss the implications of this for current theories of reasoning.     

Journal Reviews

Allenby , A. L. (London). ‘Begegnung mit Archetypen’ Bach , Susan R. (Zürich). ‘Spontaneous pictures of leukemic children as an expression of the total personality, mind and body’ Biomeyer , R. (Berlin). ‘Symbole: Einstellungen-Definitionen-Wirkungen’ Jacoby , M. (Zürich). Autorität und Revolte—der Mythus vom Vatermord. Jacoby , M. (Zürich). ‘Der Mythus vom verlorenen Paradies—heute’ Kirsch , T. B. (Palo Alto). ‘The practice of multiple analyses in analytical psychology’. Kraemer , W. (London). ‘Homosexuality—is it an illness?’ Mccully , Robert S. (South Carolina). ‘A Jungian Commentary on Epstein's case (Wet-shoe fetish)’ Mccully , Robert S. (South Carolina). ‘Archetypal psychology as a key for understanding prehistoric art forms’ Marshak , Mel . (London). ‘I never knew I knew that’ Pontius , Anneuese (New York). ‘Dyslexia and specifically distorted, drawings of die face—a new subgroup with prosopagnosia’ Pontius , Anneuese and Ruttiger , K. F. (New York). ‘Frontal lobe system maturational lag in juvenile delinquents as shown in narrative test.’ Strobel , H. (Zürich). ‘Das “Menschenbild” in der Analytischen Psychologic von C. G. Jung’ Wood , Dorothy , A. (New York). ‘Psychological impressions from an Indian dream’     

Fichte,Hegel, and the Life and Death Struggle

Several commentators have argued that Hegel's account of ‘self-consciousness’ in Chapter IV of the Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as an ‘immanent critique’ of Fichte's idealism. If this is correct, it raises the question of whether Hegel's account of ‘recognition’ in Chapter IV can be interpreted as a critique of Fichte's conception of recognition as expounded in the Foundations of Natural Right. A satisfactory answer to this question will have to provide a plausible interpretation of the ‘life and death struggle’ as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition. This paper aims to provide such an interpretation. The first part of the paper provides a discussion of Fichte's account of recognition that emphasizes its ‘epistemic’ concerns. The second part argues that Hegel's account of the ‘life and death struggle’ can be read plausibly as an immanent critique of Fichte's account of recognition.     

On ascetic practices and hermeneutical cycles

Sports reflection is rather locked into a binary view of narrow and broad internalists. Narrow internalists, or formalists, argue that sports are solely constituted by their rules: the ‘autotelic’ stance. Broad internalists, or interpretivists, on the other hand, reason that sport is more than just a lusory end in itself. This paper will revitalize reflection on sports as a locus of the human condition by breaking through this binary opposition. It will focus on the positive aspects of the concept of ‘agon’ (suffering, enduring). As an ‘agonal’ or competitive social practice, sport may be a means to a ‘heterotelic’ end that surpasses the concept of sport as self-referential play: seeking knowledge, understanding the human condition and cultivating virtue. As such, self-improvement through repetitive practice (‘askesis’) has always been a key theme of human existence. Our ‘ascetic planet’ is inhabited by individuals who are constantly and relentlessly training themselves for the better. This may be self-focused, but it may also have a broader scope: we train ourselves to become better humans, contributing to a just and sustainable society. Paradoxically, however, this will only work when we become aware of our exercises as forms of life that engage the practising person. A hermeneutics of endurance cycling can enrich our understanding of this sports activity as a form of asceticism. As such, it will elaborate a view on cycling as an upwardly oriented ‘spiral’ that can contribute not only to self-knowledge and self-improvement on the individual level (‘metanoia’), but also to an ‘ecosophical renaissance’ on the collective level.     

Jung and Lévy-Bruhl

Abstract: For his knowledge of ‘primitive’ peoples, C. G. Jung relied on the work of Lucien Lévy‐Bruhl (1857–1939), a French philosopher who in mid‐career became an armchair anthropologist. In a series of books from 1910 on, Lévy‐Bruhl asserted that ‘primitive’ peoples had been misunderstood by modern Westerners. Rather than thinking like moderns, just less rigorously, ‘primitives’ harbour a mentality of their own. ‘Primitive’ thinking is both ‘mystical’ and ‘prelogical’. By ‘mystical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ peoples experience the world as identical with themselves. Their relationship to the world, including to fellow human beings, is that of participation mystique. By ‘prelogical’, Lévy‐Bruhl meant that ‘primitive’ thinking is indifferent to contradictions. ‘Primitive’ peoples deem all things identical with one another yet somehow still distinct. A human is at once a tree and still a human being. Jung accepted unquestioningly Lévy‐Bruhl's depiction of the ‘primitive’ mind, even when Jung, unlike Lévy‐Bruhl, journeyed to the field to see ‘primitive’ peoples firsthand. But Jung altered Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ mentality in three key ways. First, he psychologized it. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is to be explained sociologically, for Jung it is to be explained psychologically: ‘primitive’ peoples think as they do because they live in a state of unconsciousness. Second, Jung universalized ‘primitive’ mentality. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is ever more being replaced by modern thinking, for Jung ‘primitive’ thinking is the initial psychological state of all human beings. Third, Jung appreciated ‘primitive’ thinking. Whereas for Lévy‐Bruhl ‘primitive’ thinking is false, for Jung it is true—once it is recognized as an expression not of how the world but of how the unconscious works. I consider, along with the criticisms of Lévy‐Bruhl's conception of ‘primitive’ thinking by his fellow anthropologists and philosophers, whether Jung in fact grasped all that Lévy‐Bruhl meant by ‘primitive’ thinking.     

Prototypical similarity,self-categorization,and depersonalized attraction: A perspective on group cohesiveness

In contrast to traditional approaches that widely equate group cohesiveness with interpersonal attraction, self-categorization theoryargues that self-categorization depersonalizes perception in terms of the group prototype, and transforms the basis of interindividual attitude (liking) from idiosyncracy into prototypicality. An implication is that while attraction in interpersonal relationships relates to overall similarity, attraction among group members is based on prototypical similarity. To test this idea, subjects (N = 219) participated in an experiment in which they reported their attitude towards an individual who would be their partner, or a fellow group member (of either group ‘Visual’ or group ‘Tactile’) for a subsequent task. Subject-target similarity varied on each of two dimensions: dimension ‘A’ was more prototypical of group ‘Visual’, and dimension ‘F’ of group ‘Tactile’. The independent variables of social orientation (interpersonal, group ‘Visual’, group ‘Tactile’), similarity on dimension A (A ±), and dimension F(F±) were manipulated in a 3 × 2 × 2 design. The three hypotheses tested in this experiment were generally supported. Subjects preferred prototypically similar group members to interpersonal partners, and downgraded prototypically dissisimilar group members (HI). Identification was positively related to target evaluation (H2), more strongly for prototypically similar than dissimilar targets (H3), and the identification-attraction relationship was mediated by perceived prototypical similarity. Group-based effects were independent of perceptions of overall similarity.     

The Hesychast method of prayer: its anthropological and symbolic significance

Hesychasm is an Eastern Christian method of prayer based on the invocation of the Name of Jesus and on the ‘descent of the noÛs (‘intellect’, ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’) into the heart’. This spiritual path, the method of which emerged in its most explicit form between the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries on Mount Athos, is the core of Christianity, since it consists in the inner practice of the fervent and continuous repetition of the holy Name and aims to achieve metánoia (‘change of the noÛs’) for the entire human being; and a personal relationship with Jesus Christ through an incessant militia super terram comparable to the Muslim jihād al-akbar (‘great holy war’). A meditated analysis of some forms of symbolism which characterize the method in question plus a few comparisons between some central components of Hesychasm, Sufism and other traditional spiritual paths may be an adequate starting-point to understand more deeply the symbolic and anthropological aspects of this eminently ‘paradoxical’ ascetic discipline.     

‘At home in the uncanny’: Freud's account of das Unheimliche in the context of his theory of religious belief

This paper serves as an exploration of Freud's comment that one of the functions of religious belief is to make humanity feel ‘at home in the uncanny’ (heimisch im Unheimlichen). The first section examines the context of Freud's comment within The Future of an Illusion. Attention is then shifted to Freud's essay on ‘The ‘‘Uncanny’’’, and to his conclusion that the ‘uncanny’ is the name for everything that ought to have remained secret and hidden but has come to light. A number of interpretations of the ‘at home’ remark are discussed, and it is suggested that religion might fruitfully be viewed as an attempt to come to terms with humanity's ‘transcendental homelessness’.     

Textbooks and introductions to Western Esotericism

This article reviews the presently available supply of textbooks and introductions to the new academic field of study known as ‘Western esotericism’. By analogy with computer software, the author refers to the early ‘religionist’ phase of research in this domain as ‘Western esotericism 1.0’. He argues that Antoine Faivre's small French textbook L’ésotérisme (1992) marked the beginning of a more satisfactory upgrade that might be referred to as ‘Western esotericism 2.0’ and remains dominant in teaching and research today. A critical review of textbooks and introductions representative of this second phase of academic professionalisation reveals a number of structural problems and weaknesses (‘bugs and design faults’) that need to be corrected in order for the field to complete its adolescence and reach academic maturity. To accommodate the needs and new perspectives of the upcoming generation of scholars in this field, it is therefore time for an upgrade to ‘Western esotericism 3.0’.     

The oedipal wound in two stories by Kafka: The Metamorphosis and A Country Doctor

Kafka read Freud and was interested in psychoanalysis but believed there was no ‘cure’ for what was essentially the problem of living. As always with creative artists, the writer is his own psychoanalyst, and the actual process of writing is his means of self-revelation. The aim of this paper is to consider, in relation to two stories (The Metamorphosis and A Country Doctor), Kafka’s use of this background oedipal conflict with his father or received values (the ‘law’) as a springboard for the type of wound that results in creative writing. The wound for him became a kind of personal myth, and was also associated with other painful stimuli, including his tuberculosis and his troubled love affairs, but above all with his identity as a writer. The writing process and the ‘faith-value’ it demands is an underlying metaphor behind these narratives of Kafka’s ‘dream-like inner life’. There are parallels here with Bion’s psychoanalytic philosophy of ‘suffering’ and ‘psyche-lodgement’.     

Dissociation,the true self and the notion of the frozen baby

Abstract

The widespread ‘trauma talk’ that is prevalent in the social sciences, has, in recent years, become increasingly commonplace in psychoanalytic writings, especially in attachment theory and relational psychoanalysis. This paper examines dissociation, a key concept in ‘trauma theory’, in conjunction with the Winnicottian term ‘true self’, in the context of a particular discursive and theoretical combination of the two. This discursive formation is named ‘the frozen baby discourse’, and it is presented and analysed. A critique is offered of the way ‘true self’, understood as a humanistic concept, is often used together with dissociation, in order to create a theoretical construct that is far removed from Winnicottian theory. This paper begins by exploring definitional issues, both around dissociation and ‘true self’. It is subsequently argued that this contemporary usage of ‘true self’ in combination with dissociation has important implications for psychoanalytic practice.     

Historical Judgement, Transcendent Perspective and 'Resurrection Appearances'

Suppose one judges as a historian that after Jesus' death there was an occurrence during the careers of various individuals in which: they took it that Jesus was appearing, raised by God to Life; and a concept worked in their minds, ‘Already, Jesus has been raised to Life’. Assume also that before one are fuller statements proposed now as to what happened. Some themselves cite just inner-worldly, non-transcendent factors – delusion and so on. The ‘Encountered’ statement however runs: ‘A transcendent reality, Jesus raised by God to Life, was encountered by the individuals.’ At first glance it might seem that in principle one could say: ‘Whereas I have not been convinced by the statements citing inner-worldly factors alone, I do by contrast find the Encountered statement convincing and elucidatory.’ But on closer scrutiny, would it indeed be possible for one maturely to say that? Some commentators voice a quick ‘Yes’– an apologetic argument thus. On the other hand some press challenges that a priori one may never fittingly say that. We should be content neither with a swift ‘Yes’ nor with swift dismissiveness. How you think directly about ‘resurrection appearances’ depends much on your analysis apropos of a wide range of epistemological and other matters. Some challenges are that the Encountered statement is as such flawed. But these claims rest on premises which arguably we should judge misguided. Some challenges (Humean and Barthian) concern how one is placed when the Encountered statement lies adjacent to ‘inner-worldly’ statements. Now we should maintain a standpoint on which a person can reach, apart from regard to Jesus, a theistic outlook: yet not by ‘natural theology’. Where that person is oneself, no a priori obstacles prevent one's maturely saying, ‘The Encountered statement for me elucidates, in contrast to the others’. These points can be put without talk of ‘probability estimates’ or ‘explanation’.     

Settling space and covering the nation: Some conceptual considerations in analysing affect and discourse

This article explores how affect and discourse intertwine. We analyse a corpus of newspaper editorials and comment pieces from 2013 to 2014 concerning Aotearoa New Zealand's national day investigating how affective-discursive practices are mobilised to ‘cover the nation’ and ‘settle space’. We identify pervasive formulations of ‘bitter Māori’ and ‘indifferent Kiwis’ and the canon of affective-discursive repertoires and subject positions routinely set up as part of continuing white settler (Pākehā) cultural projects. A second objective is to contribute to the development of theory and method in studies of affect. We argue against non-representational perspectives and for a practice viewpoint that can work with entanglements of semiosis and embodied affect. Concepts from social psychological studies of discourse are applied in preference to ‘structures of feeling’, ‘affect economies’, ‘emoscapes’ and ‘emotion styles’.     

Wittgenstein and the Real Numbers

When it comes to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, even sympathetic admirers are cowed into submission by the many criticisms of influential authors in that field. They say something to the effect that Wittgenstein does not know enough about or have enough respect for mathematics, to take him as a serious philosopher of mathematics. They claim to catch Wittgenstein pooh-poohing the modern set-theoretic extensional conception of a real number. This article, however, will show that Wittgenstein's criticism is well grounded. A real number, as an ‘extension’, is a homeless fiction; ‘homeless’ in that it neither is supported by anything nor supports anything. The picture of a real number as an ‘extension’ is not supported by actual practice in calculus; calculus has nothing to do with ‘extensions’. The extensional, set-theoretic conception of a real number does not give a foundation for real analysis, either. The so-called complete theory of real numbers, which is essentially an extensional approach, does not define (in any sense of the word) the set of real numbers so as to justify their completeness, despite the common belief to the contrary. The only correct foundation of real analysis consists in its being ‘existential axiomatics’. And in real analysis, as existential axiomatics, a point on the real line need not be an ‘extension’.     

The Cognitive Interview for Use with Adults: An Empirical Test of an Alternative Mnemonic and of a Partial Protocol

Research showed that the four Cognitive Interview (CI) mnemonics used individually are unequally effective. We propose to test (i) their benefit when used within the same free recall phase and (ii) an original instruction, ‘guided peripheral focus’ (GPF). In two studies, 84 and 42 students were interviewed with Structured Interviews (SI), CIs or CI variations about a film viewed 1 week before. Results indicated that (i) if a CI variation with the GPF instead of the ‘perspective’ elicits more correct information than an SI or a CI, variations replacing the ‘perspective’ or the ‘order’ and ‘perspective’ with control instruction(s) do not; (ii) a partial CI integrating the ‘everything’, ‘context’ and GPF increases correct information compared with an SI, whereas the CI does not. We will discuss in which extent these results demonstrate the effectiveness of the ‘everything’, ‘context’ and ‘GPF’ and a potential lack of benefit of the ‘order’ and ‘perspective’. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Being as Iconic: Aquinas on ‘He Who Is’ as the Name for God

Aquinas claims that ‘He Who Is’ is the most proper of the names we have for God. But this attempt to ‘describe’ God with a philosophical concept like ‘being’ can seem dangerously close to creating a false conception based on our limited understanding – an idol. A dominant criticism of Aquinas’ use of this term is that any attempt to use ‘being’ to describe God will inevitably make him merely some object in our ontology alongside other beings, unacceptably mitigating God's radical transcendence and otherness. I will argue that Aquinas has a very creative response to this charge: ‘being’ stands in a unique relationship as the only concept that can ensure we do not draw God under some particular creaturely limit and thus use divine names to create an ‘idol’. In other words, ‘being’ is a special paradigm concept/term which ensures that we preserve humility in our attempts to name God.     

The presence of Spinoza in the exchanges between Sigmund Freud and Romain Rolland1

Although Freud recognized his profound affinity with Spinoza, we seldom find explicit and direct references to the philosopher in his works. The correspondence between Romain Rolland, the ‘Christian without a church’, and Freud, the ‘atheist Jew’, is full of Spinozian reminiscences that nourish their works of this period and are underpinned by their mutual transference. The Future of an Illusion is written according to a Spinozian blueprint and aims at replacing religion, qualified as superstition, by psychoanalysis. A quotation from Heine, ‘brother in unbelief’, is a direct reference to Spinoza. Concurring with Freud’s critiques of dogmas and churches, Rolland proposes an analysis of the ‘oceanic feeling’ as a basis of the religious sentiment. Freud replies with Civilization and Its Discontents. In 1936, on the occasion of Rolland’s 70th birthday, Freud sends him an open letter, A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis, where the strange feeling that he has experienced in front of the Parthenon refers inter alia to his double culture: Jewish and German. In the light of this correspondence, the creation of psychoanalysis turns out to be a quest for the sacred that has disappeared in modernity; Freud, though, was able to find it inside man’s unconscious.