Rationality,perception, and the all-seeing eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.     

Action,affordances, and anorexia: body representation and basic cognition

We evaluate a growing trend towards anti-representationalism in cognitive science in the context of recent research into the development and maintenance of anorexia nervosa in cognitive neuropsychiatry. We argue two things: first, that this research relies on an explanatorily robust concept of representation—the concept of a long-term body schema; second, that this body representation underlies our most basic environmental interactions and affordance perception—the psychological phenomena supposed to be most hospitable to a non-representationalist treatment.     

Evaluative language,cognitive effort and attitude change

The present article deals with the effects of the use of evaluatively biased language on attitudes, and with the role of cognitive effort. We tested whether active information processing — formulating arguments on the basis of evaluatively biased language — was a necessary condition for attitude change. Results of the present study support the prediction that using evaluative language can infuence attitudes, but that these effects depend on the amount of cognitive effort.     

Innovative problem-solving in a small,wild canid

Animal Cognition - Innovation — the ability to solve problems in a novel way — is not only associated with cognitive abilities and relative brain size, but also by noncognitive traits,...     

Syntax,Semantics, and Intentional Aspects

Abstract

It is widely assumed that the meaning of at least some types of expressions involves more than their reference to objects, and hence that there may be co-referential expressions which differ in meaning. It is also widely assumed that “syntax does not suffice for semantics”, i.e. that we cannot account for the fact that expressions have semantic properties in purely syntactical or computational terms. The main goal of the paper is to argue against a third related assumption, namely that what is responsible for a difference in meaning between co-referential expressions is the computational difference in the cognitive functioning of the expressions. “Intentional aspects” of expressions—those features which their meanings involve in addition to reference—cannot be syntacticized, since they are individuated not in terms of any cognitive feature, but rather in terms of those properties of the referents through which the expressions refer to them, and cognitive features cannot determine such properties in exactly the same sense as they cannot determine reference.     

The Racial Digital Divide: Motivational,Affective, and Cognitive Correlates of Internet Use1

The indisputable existence of a racial digital divide calls into question the democratizing potential of the Internet. Beyond issues of access to the technology are psychological factors that may influence Internet use. A survey of 787 college undergraduates—630 European Americans and 157 African Americans—who have similar access to the Internet was used to examine motivational, affective, and cognitive factors that may influence Internet use and contribute to the racial digital divide. Racial differences in Internet use were obtained, but were limited to e‐mail use. A model of Internet use is offered that considers motivational, affective, and cognitive antecedents and consequences of use.     

THOUGHT,LANGUAGE, AND THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPLICITNESS

Abstract: This article deals with the relationship between language and thought, focusing on the question of whether language can be a vehicle of thought, as, for example, Peter Carruthers has claimed. We develop and examine a powerful argument—the “argument from explicitness”—against this cognitive role of language. The premises of the argument are just two: (1) the vehicle of thought has to be explicit, and (2) natural languages are not explicit. We explain what these simple premises mean and why we should believe they are true. Finally, we argue that even though the argument from explicitness shows that natural language cannot be a vehicle of thought, there is a cognitive function for language.     

GENERAL MENTAL ABILITY,NARROWER COGNITIVE ABILITIES,AND JOB PERFORMANCE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE NESTED-FACTORS MODEL OF COGNITIVE ABILITIES

The nested-factors model is a well-established structural model of cognitive abilities in cognitive ability research but has not yet been used to investigate the role of cognitive abilities in job performance. Core assumptions of the nested-factors model are that a broad general mental ability (GMA) exists besides narrower abilities and that this GMA differs from the narrower cognitive abilities in breadth but not in subordination. The authors of this article propose that a recently emerging statistical technique—relative importance analysis—corresponds to the assumptions of the nested-factors model. To empirically study the implications of using the nested-factors model, the authors applied relative importance analysis to a meta-analytic matrix linking measures of 7 narrower cognitive abilities from an established ability taxonomy (Thurstone's primary mental abilities), GMA, and job performance. Results revealed that GMA accounted for 10.9% to 28.6% of the total variance explained in job performance and that GMA was not consistently the most important predictor. The discussion focuses on potential theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of the nested-factors model for personnel psychology.     

Predictions penetrate perception: Converging insights from brain,behaviour and disorder

It is argued that during ongoing visual perception, the brain is generating top-down predictions to facilitate, guide and constrain the processing of incoming sensory input. Here we demonstrate that these predictions are drawn from a diverse range of cognitive processes, in order to generate the richest and most informative prediction signals. This is consistent with a central role for cognitive penetrability in visual perception. We review behavioural and mechanistic evidence that indicate a wide spectrum of domains—including object recognition, contextual associations, cognitive biases and affective state—that can directly influence visual perception. We combine these insights from the healthy brain with novel observations from neuropsychiatric disorders involving visual hallucinations, which highlight the consequences of imbalance between top-down signals and incoming sensory information. Together, these lines of evidence converge to indicate that predictive penetration, be it cognitive, social or emotional, should be considered a fundamental framework that supports visual perception.     

Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology

According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed—first developed here. I argue that pure and hypothetical phenomenal contrast arguments face significant difficulties, but that there is a sound glossed phenomenal contrast argument for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.     

Bayesian cognitive science,predictive brains,and the nativism debate

The rise of Bayesianism in cognitive science promises to shape the debate between nativists and empiricists into more productive forms—or so have claimed several philosophers and cognitive scientists. The present paper explicates this claim, distinguishing different ways of understanding it. After clarifying what is at stake in the controversy between nativists and empiricists, and what is involved in current Bayesian cognitive science, the paper argues that Bayesianism offers not a vindication of either nativism or empiricism, but one way to talk precisely and transparently about the kinds of mechanisms and representations underlying the acquisition of psychological traits without a commitment to an innate language of thought.     

Prototypes,exemplars, and the natural history of categorization

The article explores—from a utility/adaptation perspective—the role of prototype and exemplar processes in categorization. The author surveys important category tasks within the categorization literature from the perspective of the optimality of applying prototype and exemplar processes. Formal simulations reveal that organisms will often (not always!) receive more useful signals about category belongingness if they average their exemplar experience into a prototype and use this as the comparative standard for categorization. This survey then provides the theoretical context for considering the evolution of cognitive systems for categorization. In the article’s final sections, the author reviews recent research on the performance of nonhuman primates and humans in the tasks analyzed in the article. Diverse species share operating principles, default commitments, and processing weaknesses in categorization. From these commonalities, it may be possible to infer some properties of the categorization ecology these species generally experienced during cognitive evolution.     

Cognitive Discrepancy,Dissonance, and Selective Exposure

Abstract

Although cognitive dissonance is regarded as one of the most recognized causes of selective exposure [N. J. Stroud, Niche News (Oxford University Press, 2011)], the mechanism for such causation is still unclear. By inducing dissonance in a web-based experiment, this study demonstrates how cognitive dissonance relates to information preferences—the intention to seek congruent information and the intention to seek incongruent information. The findings suggest that perceived hostility with respect to one’s belief (cognitive discrepancy) can enhance the intention to seek out for attitude-consistent information. More importantly, individuals were found to have the intention to avoid counterattitudinal information, but only when they experienced some sort of psychological discomfort (dissonance). In other words, while cognitive discrepancy leads individuals to crave for confirming information, only those who encounter negative emotions are likely to employ avoidance of disconfirming information as a dissonance-reduction strategy.     

Meta-awareness and the involuntary memory spectrum: Reply to Meyer,Otgaar, and Smeets (2015)

In their commentary, Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015) raise several important issues about the definitions, characteristics and applications of various involuntary cognitive phenomena. Here we respond to the comments of Meyer et al. in ways that we hope will advance understanding of these issues, and inform future research. In particular, we have focused on the characteristics of involuntary phenomena—particularly in relation to meta-awareness—and the clinical relevance of mind-wandering.     

Deontic reasoning reviewed: psychological questions,empirical findings,and current theories

Deontic reasoning is concerned with questions of whether actions are forbidden or allowed, obligatory or not obligatory. This article reviews empirical findings and psychological theories on deontic reasoning with regard to three questions that have guided psychological research during the last decades: How do people’s deontic capabilities develop? How well do people perform in deontic reasoning tasks? And how do they represent deontic rules? In conclusion, it is discussed why deontic reasoning—despite astonishing, early developing competencies—is still a complex cognitive activity.     

The mental nose and the Pinocchio effect: Thermography,planning, anxiety,and lies

We applied thermography to cognitive neuropsychology, particularly as a somatic marker of subjective experience during cognitive and emotional tasks. We found significant correlations between changes in facial temperature and mental set. Specifically, the temperature of the nose tended to decrease during emotional tasks and increase during cognitive tasks. However, for stress tests or high arousal reactions to emotional stimuli, the direction of the thermal change depended on the nature of the setting, real or simulated. Detection of deception is a mixed field where cognitive effort, physiological stress, and empathy have evolved, affecting the direction of the thermal variation—higher or lower temperature of the tip of the nose and forehead. We found that the temperature change of the nose and forehead may enable detecting when people lie about facts (the Pinocchio effect markers). In general, one important contribution is to recover mental thermometry as a potent tool for neurocognitive studies.     

The influence of early mother—child interaction on preschool cognitive/linguistic outcomes in a high-social-risk group

In this paper, elements of early mother—child interaction are related to later cognitive and linguistic outcomes in a sample of 53 high social risk mothers and their preschoolers. Mother—child interaction was observed longitudinally when the children were 13 and 20 months old. Multiple regression analyses were used to predict cognitive and linguistic outcomes at 3 and 5 years from measures of early mother—child interaction. The results indicated that the quality of early mother—child interaction was a significant predictor of preschool cognitive and linguistic outcomes. This was shown to be true regardless of the contribution of the mother's IQ.     

Truthiness,the illusory truth effect,and the role of need for cognition

Ease of processing—cognitive fluency—is a central input in assessments of truth, but little is known about individual differences in susceptibility to fluency-based biases in truth assessment. Focusing on two paradigms—truthiness and the illusory truth effect—we consider the role of Need for Cognition (NFC), an individual difference variable capturing one’s preference for elaborative thought. Across five experiments, we replicated basic truthiness and illusory truth effects. We found very little evidence that NFC moderates truthiness. However, we found some evidence that (without an experimental warning), people high on NFC may be more susceptible to the illusory truth effect. This may reflect that elaborative thought increases the fluency with which encoded statements are processed after a delay (thus increasing the illusory truth effect). Future research may fruitfully test whether the influence of NFC and other individual difference measures depends on whether people are making immediate or delayed truth judgments.     

Virtuous Play: The Ethics,Pleasures, and Burdens of Brain Training

Through normative appeals of cognitive enhancement, the brain has become a site of both promise and peril. Displaying oneself as ethically sound may now include showing requisite care for cognitive capacities. Moreover, enhancing our cognitive reserves is framed as aspirational means of averting neurodegenerative disease and neoliberal precarity. Such demanding labours of self-care warrant close scrutiny. Promissory discourses proclaim our ‘neuroplasticity’, encouraging subjects to work on endlessly improvable functional capacities that hold labour market value. Yet a ‘fun morality’ is equally prevalent in today’s experiential economies. Neuro-enhancement is thus sold not as an ascetic chore, but an ecstatic potential. Hope, fear, pleasure, and ethical conduct are, therefore, all closely entwined in the ‘virtuous play’ of ‘brain training’, where commercial entities use digital platforms for game-based tasks designed to enhance cognitive abilities. These services are typically promoted through appeals to our dutiful biocitizenship. This type of virtuous play is increasingly the means by which subjects produce themselves as simultaneously pleasure-seeking, productive, and resoundingly ‘well’. However, this understanding of virtuosity is often narrowly derived—reduced to ‘active ageing’, corporate-style ‘neurohacking’, and ‘brain profiles’—that threaten to foreclose other ways of imagining well-being. In failing to recognize the neoliberal underpinnings of virtuous play we entrench burdensome attachments to emerging modes of personal enhancement. Against these seductive appeals of combining pleasure with self-improvement, we must cultivate a critical reflexivity regarding exactly how ‘enhancement’ is conceived, opening room for lines of possibility outside of currently dominant frameworks.     

Managing,Understanding, Applying,and Creating Knowledge in the Information Age: Next-Generation Challenges and Opportunities

New media, new knowledge practices, and concepts point to the need for greater understanding of cognitive processes underlying knowledge acquisition and generation in open informational worlds. The authors of the articles in this special issue address cognitive and instructional challenges surrounding multiple document comprehension—a prerequisite of digital literacy and knowledge work in the information age. In this article, we raise issues of conceptual clarity regarding constructs such as source and document, and discuss work in disciplinary literacy and knowledge-building communities to clarify uses of information resources to support knowledge creation. The discussion aims to (a) provide insights into the cognitive and social practices needed for students to manage, understand, apply, and create knowledge and (b) suggest research directions to advance these goals.