Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names

Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. I will defend this theory against the problem of meaningfulness, and show that the theory is in general well motivated. My solution to the problem of meaningfulness is that speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness are tracking grammaticality, and not propositional content.     

The problem of empty names and Russellian Plenitude

‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express different propositions, even though neither ‘Ahab’ nor ‘Holmes’ has a referent. This seems to constitute a theoretical puzzle for the Russellian view of propositions. In this paper, I develop a variant of the Russellian view, Plenitudinous Russellianism. I claim that ‘Ahab is a whaler’ and ‘Holmes is a whaler’ express distinct gappy propositions. I discuss key metaphysical and semantic differences between Plenitudinous Russellianism and Traditional Russellianism and respond to objections that stem from those differences.     

Problems with using mechanisms to solve the problem of extrapolation

Proponents of evidence-based medicine and some philosophers of science seem to agree that knowledge of mechanisms can help solve the problem of applying results of controlled studies to target populations (‘the problem of extrapolation’). We describe the problem of extrapolation, characterize mechanisms, and outline how mechanistic knowledge might be used to solve the problem. Our main thesis is that there are four often overlooked problems with using mechanistic knowledge to solve the problem of extrapolation. First, our understanding of mechanisms is often (and arguably, likely to remain) incomplete. Secondly, knowledge of mechanisms is not always applicable outside the tightly controlled laboratory conditions in which it is gained. Thirdly, mechanisms can behave paradoxically. Fourthly, as Daniel Steel points out, using mechanistic knowledge faces the problem of the ‘extrapolator’s circle’. At the same time, when the problems with mechanistic knowledge have been addressed, such knowledge can and should be used to mitigate (nothing can entirely solve) the problem of extrapolation.     

Dogs learn to solve the support problem based on perceptual cues

Numerous recent studies have investigated how animals solve means-end tasks and unraveled considerable variation in strategies used by different species. Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) have typically performed comparably poorly in physical cognition tasks, but a recent study showed that they can solve the on–off condition of the support problem, where they are confronted with two boards, one with a reward placed on it and the other with a reward placed next to it. To explore which strategies dogs use to solve this task, we first tested 37 dogs with the on–off condition tested previously and then tested subjects that passed this condition with three transfer tasks. For the contact condition, the inaccessible reward was touching the second board. For the perceptual containment condition, the inaccessible reward was surrounded on three sides by the second board, but not supported by it, whereas for the gap condition, discontinuous boards were used. Unlike in the previous study, our subjects did not perform above chance level in the initial trials of the on–off condition, but 13 subjects learned to solve it. Their performance in the transfer tasks suggests that dogs can learn to solve the support problem based on perceptual cues, that they can quickly adopt new cues when old ones become unreliable, but also that some apparently inherent preferences are hard to overcome. Our study contributes to accumulating evidence demonstrating that animals typically rely on a variety of perceptual cues to solve physical cognition tasks, without developing an understanding of the underlying causal structure.     

Children can solve Bayesian problems: the role of representation in mental computation

Can children reason the Bayesian way? We argue that the answer to this question depends on how numbers are represented, because a representation can do part of the computation. We test, for the first time, whether Bayesian reasoning can be elicited in children by means of natural frequencies. We show that when information was presented to fourth, fifth, and sixth graders in terms of probabilities, their ability to estimate the Bayesian posterior probability was zero. Yet when the same information was presented in natural frequencies, Bayesian reasoning showed a steady increase from fourth to sixth grade, reaching an average level of 19, 39, and 53%, respectively, in two studies. Sixth graders' performance with natural frequencies matched the performance of adults with probabilities. But this general increase was accompanied by striking individual differences. More than half of the sixth graders solved most or all problems, whereas one third could not solve a single one. An analysis of the children's responses provides evidence for the use of three non-Bayesian strategies. These follow an overlapping wave model of development and continue to be observed in the minds of adults. More so than adults' probabilistic reasoning, children's reasoning depends on a proper representation of information.     

On the Quinean-analyticity of mathematical propositions

This paper investigates the relation between Carnap and Quine??s views on analyticity on the one hand, and their views on philosophical analysis or explication on the other. I argue that the stance each takes on what constitutes a successful explication largely dictates the view they take on analyticity. I show that although acknowledged by neither party (in fact Quine frequently expressed his agreement with Carnap on this subject) their views on explication are substantially different. I argue that this difference not only explains their differences on the question of analyticity, but points to a Quinean way to answer a challenge that Quine posed to Carnap. The answer to this challenge leads to a Quinean view of analyticity such that arithmetical truths are analytic, according to Quine??s own remarks, and set theory is at least defensibly analytic.     

How to solve the problem of phenomenal unity: finding alternatives to the single state conception

The problem of phenomenal unity (PPU) consists in providing a phenomenological characterization of the difference between phenomenally unified and disunified conscious experiences. Potential solutions to PPU are faced with an important challenge (which Tim Bayne calls the “explanatory regress objection”). I show that this challenge can be conceived as a phenomenological dual to what is known as Bradley’s regress. This perspective (i) facilitates progress on PPU by finding duals to possible solutions to Bradley’s regress and (ii) makes it intelligible why many characterize phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a single global conscious state. I call this latter view the “single state conception” (SSC). SSC is superficially attractive, because it seems to provide a solution to the phenomenological dual to Bradley’s regress, but should still be rejected, because (1) it does not solve PPU; (2) instead, it creates more problems; (3) these problems can be avoided by alternative conceptions of phenomenal unity.     

How to solve a mechanical problem: the relevance of visible and unobservable functionality for kea

Animals sometimes succeed quickly in solving a mechanical problem that is a modification of one they have previously learnt to solve. However, they may do so by attending to the visible features of the relevant physical dimension without knowing its causal functionality, if that is not directly perceivable. This kind of problem solving can be tested by simultaneously offering two mechanical devices with the same visual features but different inherent appropriateness for problem solving. Here, we provide data collected by following this procedure for the first time in a bird species. Captive kea, Nestor notabilis, a parrot species highly interested in the affordances of objects, were offered a mechanical problem in which they had to remove a baited tube from one of two upright poles where removal was blocked at the end of one pole but not the other. With extended but not with restricted exploration of a baseline apparatus, the kea immediately succeeded in removing the tube from an apparatus that had modified pole ends when they were able to visually observe (without touching) that one of these ends would block tube removal but the other would not. However, when the kea were allowed to explore two poles that had a removable and a fixed obstruction where the difference in function was not visible, they preferred the removable one during unbaited exploration but failed afterwards to push a tube to the end of the pole with the loose structure during subsequent baited test trials. Thus, in spite of the speed with which the kea learnt the tasks, there was no indication that they understood the underlying unobservable causal structure of the problem.     

Opacity and the double life of singular propositions

In this paper I analyze David Kaplan?s essay “Opacity”. In “Opacity” Kaplan attempts to dismiss Quine?s concerns about quantification across intensional (modal and intentional) operators. I argue that Kaplan succeeds in showing that quantification across intensional operators is logically coherent and that quantified modal logic is strictly speaking not committed to essentialism. However, I also argue that this is not in and of itself sufficient to support Kaplan?s more ambitious attempt to move beyond purely logical results and provide unified, uncontroversial interpretations of both “believes” and “necessarily”. In the paper I raise several questions about the subject matter of logic and the role of semantics, with special focus on singular propositions.     

Some studies on the internal structure of propositions

Summary Five experiments were carried out to test the information processing of the propositional arguments instrument and beneficiary. Proceeding from the assumption that propositions are basic units of memory, it was hypothesized that instrument and beneficiary would show different effects in recall experiments, depending on whether they were components of appropriate propositions or not. Experiments I and II were conducted to test this assumption. The results showed that things are more complicated than was expected. Besides propositional structure, the semantic integration of concrete propositions has to be taken into account to predict their psychological processing. Experiments III, IV, and V were conducted to prove this. On the whole, it was found that instruments can always be considered as arguments but beneficiaries only when they are obligatory; and further that in general instrument arguments are semantically more strongly implied by their predicates than beneficiary arguments are.I would like to thank Trevor Scott for his help in writing the English text. Requests for offprints should be sent to Johannes Engelkamp, Psychologisches Institut, Universität des Saarlandes, D-6600 Saarbrücken, Federal Republic of Germany     

Structured propositions and the logical form of predication

Synthese - Jeffrey King, Scott Soames, and others have recently challenged the familiar identification of a Russellian proposition, such as the proposition that Brutus stabbed Caesar, with an...     

On the essence of empty properties

This paper deals with generalisations of modally based criteria for determining whether a given property is essential to an individual to the case of generic essences. These criteria usually presuppose extensionally individuated properties. The limitations of their generalisations are demonstrated using the case of the necessarily empty individual property and the necessarily empty individual office. I do not present a novel stance on the discussion of individual essences. The novelty of this paper lies in its claim that none of these criteria can be generalised to generic essences.

     

Naming with proper names: the left temporal pole theory

Existing empirical data on proper names processing are critically reviewed in trying to understand which tasks may involve the left temporal pole, which proper name related functions are supported by this structure and eventually offer some speculations about why these functions might have developed in this location in the course of human evolution. While clinical group studies support the idea that proper name processing takes place in the left temporal pole, single case studies of selective proper name anomia or sparing, as well as neuroimaging studies, suggest the involvement of a larger neural network. Within this network, an important role may be played by the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, including areas critical in social interaction. The differentiation in the brain of proper name processing from common names processing could in part be due to social pressure, favouring a neural system able to more efficiently and unambiguously sustain designating categories or designating individual entities. The activation of the left temporal pole in proper name processing is shown to increase with age. Longer social interaction may thus contribute to convey proper names processing toward areas closer to those supporting social cognition.