Satiation for social reinforcers: The effects of contingency,vicarious experience,and ambiguous situations

The relative satiation effect, an inverse relationship between the frequency of prior social reinforcement (the word “good”) and the later effectiveness of the social reinforcer in controlling behavior, was studied. In Experiment 1, a discrimination task in which social reinforcement was given for correct responses was administered to first- to fourth-grade children (6 to 10 years of age), who had during a preexposure phase performed a preliminary task or observed another child performing. During the preexposure phase, the experimenter delivered frequent or infrequent social reinforcement that was either contingent or noncontingent. Only performers and observers who had experienced frequent noncontingent reinforcement showed the satiation effect during the discrimination task phase. The results were interpreted as inconsistent with J. L. Gewirtz' (Developmental Psychology, 1969, 1, 2–13) social drive formulation but supportive of an informational analysis in which the children are seen as responding appropriately to unambiguous evidence concerning the reliability of contingency information. In Experiment 2, seating arrangements were varied so that information concerning the direction of reinforcement was made ambiguous. Performers were less responsive during the discrimination phase after experiencing frequent noncontingent reinforcement when seated alone or opposite an observer than when seated next to an observer. The results are interpreted as indicating trust of the reliability of the contingency under ambiguous conditions.     

Distraction and social comparison as mediators of social facilitation effects

Sanders and Baron (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 32, 956–963) suggested that increases in drive produced by the presence of others (social facilitation) are due to the tendency for others to distract task performers as they worked on a task. This Distraction-Conflict theory proposes that socially mediated drive induction will occur whenever there is some reason to shift attention from the task to the social stimuli. In the case of humans, one such reason may be the opportunity to obtain social comparison information from an audience or coactors. The present research demonstrated that social facilitation effects (improved simple task performance and impaired complex task performance produced by the presence of others) occurred only when subjects were motivated to obtain comparison information (Experiment I) and when comparison information was available (Experiment II). The availability of comparison information also led to increased accuracy in estimating the coactor's performance. This indicated that in conditions manifesting social facilitation, subjects were spending some time monitoring the coactor's work, which is an inherently distracting activity. Several supplementary measures of distraction were generally consistent in indicating greater distraction under conditions manifesting social facilitation. The present results offer no support for the explanations of social facilitation suggested by Zajonc and by Cottrell.     

Elkind on egocentrism

The purpose of this paper is to respond to D. Elkind's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 218–226) reply to D. Lapsley and M. Murphy's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 201–217) critique of the adolescent egocentrism theory. After a reprise of the issues in contention, we address the problem of theoretical consistency and self-other differentiation in Dr. Elkind's (1967, Child Development, 38, 1025–1034) theory. The role of formal operations in the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) account of the imaginary audience and personal fable is revised, and the empirical support for Elkind's theory is reviewed. We conclude that there are good conceptual and empirical grounds for doubting the major assumptions of the adolescent egocentrism theory, and that the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) framework has promise in suggesting theoretical integration with other approaches to the self.     

On resolving conflicting views of cognitive conflict

F. B. Murray's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 54–61) conclusion that a theoretically ambiguous relationship exists between cognitive conflict and Piaget's notion of equilibration was considered. It was suggested that theoretical clarity can be achieved if a distinction is drawn between conflict induction (disequilibrium) and conflict resolution (equilibration). Murray's suggestion that in Piaget's theory internal (cognitive) conflict can be mentally created was disputed. G. N. Cantor's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 39–53) concerns about the adequacy of the measures of internal conflict in B. J. Zimmerman & D. E. Blom's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 18–38) study due to their independence from external conflict manipulations was discussed. We agreed with Cantor that such findings obviate direct disconfirmation of an internal conflict construct; however, we suggested that evidence of conservation learning in the absence of either external or internal conflict renders Piaget's account less tenable.     

Some effects of gaze on subjects motivated to seek or to avoid social comparison

In a conceptual replication and extension of Sarnoff and Zimbardo's study (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 62, 356–363), subjects were motivated to seek (Fear Arousal) or avoid (Embarrassment Arousal) social comparison. They were then required to affiliate with another person who either encouraged social comparison by gazing directly at the subject or discouraged it by averting his gaze. This other person was either an appropriate reference person (similar saate) or irrelevant for social comparison purposes. As predicted, Fear subjects liked a companion who looked at them and felt less tense in his presence, while Embarrassed subjects preferred the person who looked away. This interaction occurred only in the Appropriate Reference Person condition, a result consistent with an explanation based on social comparison processes.     

Measured interests versus expressed interests as predictors of long-term occupational membership

This study compared the predictive accuracy of measured versus expressed interests over a 21-year period using as a criterion occupational membership at age 36. Subjects were 83 males whose measured and expressed interests were elicited at ages 15, 18, and 25. The Strong Vocational Interest Blank was used to determine measured interests while expressed interests were determined through a combination of questionnaires and interviews. C. McArthur's (Journal of Applied Psychology, 1954, 38, 346–353) method was employed to determine the predictive validity of subjects' measured interests. The predictive validity of expressed interests was determined by using A. Roe's (The psychology of occupations. New York: Wiley, 1956; Journal of Counseling Psychology, 1957, 4, 212–217) scheme for occupational classification to code occupational preferences and compare them to age 36 occupations. Results indicated that at each point in the study expressed interests were slightly better predictors of age 36 occupational membership than measured interests. Supplementary analyses revealed no relationship between the extent to which subjects' measured or expressed interests corresponded to age 36 occupations and either overall job or career satisfaction.     

Equity judgments in hypothetical,four-person partnerships

Subjects' ratings of the fairness of a set of suggested allocations in hypothetical, four-person partnerships demonstrated that an ordinal relationship between inputs and outcomes is not a sufficient definition of equity. Subjects' suggestions for fair distributions of outcomes failed to conform to G. W. Walster's (Representative Research in Social Psychology, 1975, 6, 65–67) increasing-profits and profit-sign criteria, and were better fit by R. J. Harris' (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 194–209) linear formula than by any other formula thus far proposed.     

The case of Piaget's group INRC

What is it that distinguishes Piaget's transformations N, R, and C from the rest of the 16! transformations of the 16 binary propositional operations? Here Piaget's INRC is considered as a subgroup of the group $\text{M}$₂ of all automorphisms and dual automorphisms of the free Boolean algebra with two generators. This group is isomorphic to S₄ × C₂. Its elements are given explicitly. Many other psychologically relevant subgroups of $\text{M}$₂ play an important role. They are discussed and their connections shown. Particular attention is given to involutions, even if the view that they constitute the sole representation of reversibility is abandoned. Piaget's transformation R turns out not to be the inverse operation of relations. The group of automorphisms, dual automorphisms, anti-automorphisms of the algebra of binary relations on a finite set is found. A crystallographic presentation of these groups is given and related work by Bart (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1971, 5, 539–553), Leresche (Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, 1976, 14, 219–241), and Pólya (The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1940, 5, 98–103) is discussed.     

Comments on Thomas and Jamison's “a test of the X-linked genetic hypothesis for sex differences on Piaget's water-level task”

In this paper H. Thomas and W. Jamison's (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 274–283) formulation and evaluation of an X-linked genetic model for explaining male superiority on Piaget's water horizontality task is examined. Criticisms are leveled against (1) the suitability of the model invoked for explaining the sex difference found, (2) the power of the statistical test used to evaluate the model, and (3) the appropriateness of their correction factors. A research strategy for advancing our understanding of the sex difference in performance at this task is suggested.     

Informational cues and attributions based on role behavior

A recent experiment by Messick and Reeder (Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1972, 18, 482–491) attempted to extend Jones, Davis, and Gergen's (Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 302–310) classic finding that out-of-role behavior.is more informative for person perception than in-role behavior. It is argued, however, that this study confounded two variables, role performance and occupation. Evidence is presented that the occupation variable alone could have produced Messick and Reeder's results. Both variables seem to affect attributions. The importance of these findings for relating attribution theory and role theory is discussed.     

Development of social role understanding

The concepts of social roles and role intersections have been used to explain adults' social competence. However, children's social competence in terms of developing role concepts has not been systematically delineated. After a brief review of the few developmental studies that have been performed in this area, a systematic developmental sequence of role understanding in children from 1 to 13 years of age is discussed and a method for assessing such sequences is described. The sequence, which was based on K. W. Fischer's (1980, Psychological Review, 87, 477–531) construction-inclusion model of conceptual skill development, was tested in several studies using two sets of social roles and tasks and was found to be highly scalable and age related. The significance of role concept development is also discussed as it relates to the development of social competence in other domains.     

Decrements in children's responses to big and tall: A reconsideration of the potential Cognitive and Semantic causes

The potential causes of decrements in children's understanding of big and tall (Maratsos, 1973, Maratsos, 1974, 10, 367–375) are reconsidered. On the basis of data from English-speaking children, two of these hypotheses, the Strong Cognitive Hypothesis and the Strong Semantic Hypothesis, offer equally plausible explanations for those decrements. However, data from Arabic-speaking children between 2;9 and 6;3, who do not show a similar decrement in their understanding of kabiir, support the Strong Semantic Hypothesis that decrements in English-speaking children's understanding of big and tall are due to their positing semantic features such as [+ Vertical] for one word and overgeneralizing them to related words. This, in turn, supports Carey's (M. Halle, J. Bresnan, & G. Miller (Eds.), Linguistic theory and psychological reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978. Pp. 264–293) theory that features are abstracted out for words after children are able to use those words correctly on the basis of stored haphazard examples. Further, the results support the view that children at least sometimes posit features for a word on the basis of its individual privileges of occurrence, rather than on the basis of what that word contrasts with.     

Moral judgment: Theory and research on differences between males and females

That men and women differ in their moral orientations is a commonly held stereotype. The view that men are morally superior can be found in the writings of philosophers and psychologists (most notably Freud). Recently, Carol Gilligan (Harvard Educational Review, 1977, 47, 431–517) has entered this discussion bringing to it what she calls a “different [woman's] voice.” In this paper, the theory of an ethic of care is described and contrasted with Kohlberg's morality of justice. The empirical support for Gilligan's claim that men and women differ in their moral orientations is examined and a discussion of Gilligan's contribution to an integrated theory of morality is offered.     

Congruence and consistency derived from the circular and the hierarchical models as predictors of Occupational Choice Satisfaction

Peiser and Meir (Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1978, 12, 270–278) tested the predictability of Occupational Choice Satisfaction (OCS) using Holland's constructs of congruence and consistency as applied to Roe's classification of occupations and the circular structure of vocational interests. In the present study congruence and consistency are applied to the same data, but the constructs are defined according to the hierarchical model for the structure of interests (I. Gati,Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1979, 15, 90–106). The hierarchical and the circular models are found to be of similar efficiency in predicting OCS by congruence and by consistency. Each model, however, has its unique and distinctive predictions, and thus they seem to complement each other rather than to compete.     

Finite and infinite state confusion models

A confusion model is defined as a model that decomposes response probabilities in stimulus identification experiments into perceptual parameters and response parameters. Historically, confusion models fall into two groups. Models in Group I, which includes Townsend's (Perception and Psychophysics, 1971, 9, 40–50) overlap model, were developed on the basis of the notion that stimulus identification is mediated by a finite number of internal states. We call the general class of models that have this processing interpretation finite state confusion models. Models in Group II, which includes Luce's (R. O. Luce et al., Eds., Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (Vol. I), New York: Wiley, 1963) biased choice model, were not developed on the basis of an explicit processing interpretation. It is shown here that models in Group II are not finite state confusion models. We prove in addition that except for Falmagne's (Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 1972, 9, 206–224) simply biased model models in Group II belong to a certain class of infinite state confusion models, namely, models asserting that stimulus identification is mediated by a continuous space of vectors representing detector activation levels.     

On aspiring to present a developmental theory of occupational aspirations: A reader's guide to Gottfredson

L. S. Gottfredson's preceding comment (Journal of Vocational Behavior 1983, 23, 203–212)is characterized by undocumented and arbitrary assertions. Moreover, we still maintain and cite further evidence that the features of the stages she describes represent an implausible account of development. We conclude that there is nothing in either L. S. Gottfredson's original (Journal of Counseling Psychology 1981, 28, 545–579) article or her preceding paper that leads us to alter our belief that the views we present in our own article (Journal of Vocational Behavior 1983, 23, 179–212) will be useful for the future development of vocational theory and intervention.     

The case of the disappearing disagreements: A reply to Yussen

S. R. Yussen (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 139–144) and I have few disagreements. The major one seems to be in what the purpose of my article (R. J. Sternberg, 1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) should have been. I believe the article fulfills my own purpose, if not Yussen's.     

Evaluating a sex-related ability: Comparison with same-, opposite-, and combined-sex norms

A study was conducted to replicate and extend Zanna, Goethals, and Hill's (Zanna, M. P., Goethals, G. R., & Hill, J. F. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1975, 11, 86–93) experiment investigating social comparison choices for evaluating a sex-related ability. In a 2 × 3 design male and female undergraduates received ambiguous feedback about their performance on a test. The test was described as one in which either males typically excel or females typically excel, or no sex differences for performance were mentioned. Subjects were then given the opportunity to select normative comparison information in order to evaluate their performance. Information about same-sex, opposite-sex, and combined (male and female) norms was available. The results showed that interest in same-sex and combined information was high on both first and second choices. Opposite-sex comparisons were of low priority. Same-sex comparisons were of high priority even when sex differences were not made salient. Males and females differed to some extent in their comparison choices. The results suggest that while persons prefer to compare with similar (same-sex) others, they are also interested in making broader kinds of comparisons (with combined-sex norms). The results are discussed in terms of Wilson's (Wilson, S. R. Sociometry, 1973, 36, 600–607) two-process analysis of ability comparison and Goethals and Darley's (Goethals, G., & Darley, J. In J. M. Suls & R. L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison processes; Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Washington, D. C.: Hemisphere/Halsted/Wiley, 1977) related attribute hypothesis.     

Young children's free responses to anomalous commands

Twelve children, 21–34 months old, six in R. Brown's Stage I and six in Stages II and III, responded to commands varying in length, grammaticality, and meaning. All of the children responded significantly less often when the commands were situationally anomalous and/or ungrammatical. Results failed to replicate the results of E. Shipley, E. Smith, and L. Gleitman (Language, 1969, 44, 332–342) and J. Wetstone and B. Friedlander (Child Development, 1973, 44, 743–750). The results also suggest that young children rely heavily upon situational cues in their earliest comprehension of adult speech, and this supports arguments made by J. Strohner and K. Nelson (Child Development, 45, 567–576) and R. Chapman and J. Miller (Journal of Speech and Hearing, 1975, 18, 355–371). Since subjects rely upon nonlinguistic cues to respond appropriately, syntactic competence cannot be inferred from apparent comprehension.     

A reexamination of the faithful subject role

Fillenbaum (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 532–537; Fillenbaum & Frey, Journal of Personality, 1970, 38, 43–51) has proposed that a relatively large number of subjects within certain experiments will adopt a faithful subject role, that is, they will intentionally avoid basing their behavior on any suspicions they may have regarding the experimenter's hypothesis. However, examination of the studies on which this conclusion was based casts doubt on whether Fillenbaum's subjects were truly faithful or whether they may have become aware of the nature of the deception after all opportunity for awareness to influence their responses had passed. To test this hypothesis, awareness measures were administered to subjects either before they took an incidental learning test or (as in Fillenbaum's studies) after the test. As predicted, fewer subjects were classified as faithful in the first condition than in the second. It was concluded that, in fact, very few if any subjects are actively faithful. Discussion also concerned the problems associated with role analyses of subject behavior.