Knowing others through the self—Influence of self-perception on perception of others: A review

The literature relating to the influence of self-perception on the perception of others is reviewed. Projective effects are shown to occur in judgments of a wide range of psychological characteristics. Cognitive and dissonance theories of the projective process are critically examined. Drawing on the developmental literature, a cognitive theory of the projective process is proposed in which projective phenomena are conceptualized as side effects of a basic mechanism involved in knowing others.     

A review of projective test findings with older adults

The projective test literature on aging is reviewed. It was concluded that, while much critical research remains to be done and many of the studies are flawed, projective testing has contributed a great deal to the understanding of the aging process and has yielded a core of consistent findings. Suggestions for future research which would help resolve some current ambiguities were made.     

Group therapy with sexually abused boys: leadership, projective identification, and countertransference issues

Group therapy is an essential component of the treatment of sexually abused children. Since the painful effects associated with the abuse are often dissociated or acted out, the group leaders learn of the affective experience of the abuse through the process of projective identification. The leaders must be aware of this process, set limits on the abusive acting out in the group, and help moderate, label, and empathize with the affect. It is through this difficult process that the children have a chance to reintegrate and work through their abuse experiences so they no longer feel compelled to act them out through repetitive abusive relationships. Specific leadership, countertransference, and projective identification issues in group therapy with sexually abused boys are discussed.     

Self psychology and projective identification—whither shall they meet? a reply to the editors (1995)

The concept of projective identification continues to be viewed as alien, even dangerous, by self psychologists. Six aspects of self‐psychology/intersubjectivity theory are explored in an attempt to understand the presumed incompatibility of self psychology and projective identification: 1) the empathic vantage point; 2) the focus on subjective reality; 3) the emphasis on the analyst's personal contribution; 4) the focus on selfobject experience; 5) the disruption—restoration process; and 6) the defining of transference and countertransference as “organizing activity.”; The self‐psychological/intersubjective concepts that come closest to describing the phenomenon of projective identification—that is, empathic immersion, affect resonance, and reciprocal mutual influence—fail to capture at least three of its essential elements 1) the patient's persistent, unconscious intent to communicate certain unformulated aspects of self through the other; 2) the analyst's sense of being “taken over”; by the patient's experience; and 3) the intensely visceral quality of the analyst's experience. It is argued that self psychology ignores this important form of patient communication to its own detriment and that the concept of projective identification needs to be reformulated in terms that are more experience near to self psychologists. It is suggested that there exists a normal, developmental need, a selfobject need, to communicate intolerable, unsymbolized affective experience through the other's experience—a need that remains more pervasive and intense in some of us than in others—and that the longed‐for selfobject response is to have one's communication received, contained, and given back in such a way that one knows the other has “gotten”; it from the inside out.     

Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation

Current theories of social cognition are mainly based on a representationalist view. Moreover, they focus on a rather sophisticated and limited aspect of understanding others, i.e. on how we predict and explain others’ behaviours through representing their mental states. Research into the ‘social brain’ has also favoured a third-person paradigm of social cognition as a passive observation of others’ behaviour, attributing it to an inferential, simulative or projective process in the individual brain. In this paper, we present a concept of social understanding as an ongoing, dynamical process of participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. This process may be described (1) from a dynamical agentive systems point of view as an interaction and coordination of two embodied agents; (2) from a phenomenological approach as a mutual incorporation, i.e. a process in which the lived bodies of both participants extend and form a common intercorporality. Intersubjectivity, it is argued, is not a solitary task of deciphering or simulating the movements of others but means entering a process of embodied interaction and generating common meaning through it. This approach will be further illustrated by an analysis of primary dyadic interaction in early childhood.     

Parallel process and projective identification in psychoanalytic supervision

In the present paper I explore the notion of the parallel process, a controversial concept in psychoanalytic supervision. I suggest that the parallel process is essentially the operation of the defensive process of projective identification, which in some quarters is similarly viewed with skepticism and/or is mistakenly seen as primarily a malignant defense operating exclusively in severe character pathology (Kernberg, 1975; Mendelsohn, 2009). Further, I present several vignettes of psychoanalytic supervision where a series of parallel processes occurred, and I suggest that these parallel enactments are the result of the projective identifications which stimulated them. I agree with critical writers who say that simply suggesting the presence of a parallel process in the supervision adds no new information to the supervision, but I show how an exploration of the parallel enactments, which includes (1) exploring the patient-therapist dyadic dynamics, (2) a narrowly focused exploration of the dynamics of the therapist/presenter, and (3) and an exploration of the dynamics of the therapist-supervisor dyad, can enrich the treatment, as well as the supervision. Finally I suggest that while the projective identification that occurs in the supervisory dyad does not always lead to a parallel process, every parallel process is the result of projective identification(s). I further suggest that while every parallel process does not lead to an enactment via projective identification, enactments can only occur via the parallel process instigated by projective identification.     

Projective identification in Othello and Verdi's Otello

In this paper I explore how projective identification is depicted in Shakespeare's Othello (1603–4 [2006]) and in Verdi's Otello (1887). Both the play and the opera can be seen as studies in projection – in the evacuation into others of feelings that the subject finds unbearable, such as envious and jealous exclusion or unbearable sexual excitement. The essential issue is the same in both the play and the opera, which is that the very sight of love between Othello and Desdemona, or of contentment in anyone's mind, drives Iago mad with envy and jealousy, which he has to expel and project into others, particularly into Othello, who is susceptible to this attack because of his own narcissistic vulnerability. I take two episodes, which appear in both the play and the opera, to explore in detail how projective identification is represented both verbally and musically. I suggest that music, and words used musically, are particularly suited to conveying complex inter‐ and intra‐personal processes such as projective identification.     

Drawing out resistance: The use of the house-tree-person test to facilitate communication in verbal therapy groups

Resistance as an impediment in both individual and group therapy is discussed, and the special resistances common to groups are described through a review of the literature. An adaptation of John Buck's House-Tree-Person projective test is suggested as a method for overcoming resistance that can be used by group therapists, including those unfamiliar with art therapy techniques. Case examples are presented of a group session in which resistance is a prominent deterrent to progress and another in which the use of the projective drawing technique facilitates the dissolution of resistance.     

Induced emotional reactions and attitudes in the psychoanalyst as transference in actuality

The long hiatus between Freud's seminal paper on countertransference in 1910 and the contributions of the 1950s on totalistic countertransference is analyzed in terms of historical factors and others intrinsic to psychoanalysis. Induced reactions in the psychoanalyst as transference in actuality is differentiated from classical countertransference and the growing literature on totalistic countertransference, as well as from transferences involving the usual displacement and projective mechanisms. Several cases are discussed to indicate the wide range of psychopathology in which induced reactions occur and their value in reconstruction. The reasons for the confusing use of the concept, countertransference, for a variety of psychological processes in the analyst are cited, and a new model of five categories centering around modes of communication are posited: empathic transitory identifications, preconscious associations and imagery, induced reactions to transferences, induced reactions as transference in actuality, and classical countertransference. The relationship of induced reactions to classical countertransference is discussed, as well as implications of induced reactions as transference in actuality for internalization theory, and implicitly for the psychology of the self. Finally, some clinical issues in the use of induced reactions are eluciated.     

A demonstration of shape constancy

In order to compare the recognition of objective (defined in three dimensions) and projective (on the frontal-parallel plane) shapes, subjects were asked to identify angles (either objective or projective) on random polygons that were displayed in complex and meaningful photographic slides in the frontal-parallel plane. The subjects’ judgments corresponded much more closely to the objective than to the projective shapes, almost independently of which of the two shapes they were asked to judge and of whether the slides were presented in a normal upright orientation or were rotated 180 deg. The results are incompatible with the strong form of the shape-slant hypothesis, which assumes that the primary perceptual information concerns the properties of the projective retinal image. The results indicate, instead, that a tacit conception of three-dimensional space is primary in the perceptual process.