The psychotherapist's duty to act reasonably to prevent suicide: A proposal to allow rational suicide

It is proposed that society should re-examine its assumptions about suicide. Rational suicide is viewed as an extension of the right to die. After a review of the legal liability of the psychotherapist and psychiatric facility for both inpatient and outpatient suicide, the author presents an analysis of philosophical, ethical, and psychoanalytic arguments for allowing rational suicide. It is argued that emotional pain should be given more legitimacy as a reason for suicide. The decision to live or to die is argued to best rest with the individual.     

A Kantian moral duty for the soon-to-be demented to commit suicide

It has been argued that, on Kantian grounds, pedophiles, rapists and murderers are morally obligated to take their own lives prior to committing a violent action that will end their moral agency. That is, to avoid destroying the agent's moral life by performing a morally suicidal action, the agent, while he still is a moral agent, should end his body's life. Although the cases of dementia and the morally reprehensible are vastly different, this Kantian interpretation might be useful in the debate on the permissibility of suicide for those facing dementia's effects. If moral agents have a duty to act as moral agents, then those who will lose their moral identity as moral agents have an obligation to themselves to end their physical lives prior to losing their dignity as persons.     

Patient's choice to suicide v. treater's duty to prevent suicide: Some changing clinical dilemmas

The evolution of civil commitment procedures is seen as reflecting changing social and ethical values regarding individual liberty versus protection of self and others. The dilemma of dealing with the modern suicidal patient places the psychiatrist at the interface of conflicting societal expectations. The legal aspects of civil commitment are seen as not necessarily compatible with the best clinical course for the suicidal patient. The relationship of the process of the civil commitment to the process of treatment is briefly explored.     

Right to life, right to die and assisted suicide

In 2002 Diane Pretty went to the European Court of Human Rights to gain a ruling about assisted suicide. In the course of this she argued that the right to life implied a right to die. This paper will consider, from an ethical rather than a legal point of view, how the right to life might imply (or not) a right to die, and whether this includes either a right that others shall help us die, or a right against non-interference if others are willing to help us. It does this by comparing the right to life to conceptions of property rights. This is not because I think human life is property, but because some of our ways of talking and thinking about our control over our own lives seem to be similar to our thoughts about our control over our own property. The right to life has traditionally been taken as a negative right, that is a right that others not deprive us of life. Pretty's argument, however, seems to be moving towards a positive right, not just to remain alive, but to be enabled in doing what we want to with our lives, and thus disposing of them if we so choose. The comparison with property rights suggests that the right to die only applies if our lives are ours absolutely, and may itself be modified by the suggestion that suicide harms all of us by devaluing human life in general.     

Legal rulings on suicide in India and implications for the right to die

In this paper I am concerned to address the question of voluntary or self‐willed death from two distinct positions—a particular community's socio‐religious practice (viz. Jaina sallekhanā) and as the matter stands in law (penal code, constitution, judicial wisdom, etc.) in India—in the light of the recent move by a bench of its apex court striking down the penal code section proscribing suicide. I also wish to draw out some implications of these deliberations for the beneficence of medical practice and related bio‐ethical ramifications in the Indian context.     

Mental disorders and communication of intent to die in indigenous suicide cases, Queensland, Australia

In comparing Indigenous to non-Indigenous suicide in Australia, this study focussed on the frequency of the association between some psychiatric conditions, such as depression and alcohol abuse, and some aspect of suicidality, in particular communication of suicide intent. Logistic regression was implemented to analyze cases of Indigenous (n = 471) versus non-Indigenous suicides (n = 6,655), using the Queensland Suicide Register as a data source. Compared to non-Indigenous suicides, Indigenous cases had lower odds of being diagnosed with unipolar depression, seeking treatment for psychiatric conditions or leaving a suicide note. Indigenous suicides had greater odds of verbally communicating suicide intent and having a history of alcohol and substance use. The magnitude of these differences is remarkable, underscoring the need for culturally sensitive suicide prevention efforts.     

Clinical training and the duty to protect.

Given that the duty to protect is now a well established clinical and legal expectation, training in professional psychology should assist students in developing conceptual models for violence risk assessment and management. This report presents a training model incorporating recent advancements in risk assessment (such as the assessment of psychopathy), the need for basic legal understanding, and knowledge of specific risk management strategies. Additionally, academic and internship training programs in Michigan were surveyed by telephone about current training patterns. Preliminary results indicated program strengths in general awareness and training in risk factors. However, the data also suggested a need to formalize a faculty role in risk education, improve the training of students in relevant legal information, and establish coherent conceptual models of dealing with potential patient violence. It is argued that improving training of future professionals in this way will improve clinical practice, reduce legal liability, and improve public safety.     

The duty to believe according to the evidence

‘Evidentialism’ is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion one’s beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and other shabby evasions and alibis (as I take them to be) for disregarding the duty to believe according to the evidence. Evidentialism is also supported by arguments based on both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations.     

Contribution of imitative suicide to the suicide rate in prisons

Suicide rates in prisons are high. Our aim was to investigate the contribution of imitative suicide to the prison suicide rate. We used Knox tests for space-time clustering in a case register of natural and self-inflicted deaths in prisons in England and Wales and model simulations to estimate the effect size. We found significant space-time clustering among 657 self-inflicted deaths in 90 prisons over 10 years but no space-time clustering among 430 deaths from natural causes in 87 prisons over this period. Model simulations with an imitation rate of 5.8% (CI 1%-11%) reproduced the observed space-time clustering.     

Ethics, pandemics, and the duty to treat

Numerous grounds have been offered for the view that healthcare workers have a duty to treat, including expressed consent, implied consent, special training, reciprocity (also called the social contract view), and professional oaths and codes. Quite often, however, these grounds are simply asserted without being adequately defended or without the defenses being critically evaluated. This essay aims to help remedy that problem by providing a critical examination of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these five grounds for asserting that healthcare workers have a duty to treat, especially as that duty would arise in the context of an infectious disease pandemic. Ultimately, it argues that none of the defenses is currently sufficient to ground the kind of duty that would be needed in a pandemic. It concludes by sketching some practical recommendations in that regard.