Assumptive Worlds,Self-Definition,and Striving Among Women

It is clear that we all have beliefs about the social world and how it works that we rely on as we make sense of and negotiate within that world. Although the importance of assumptions about ourselves and the world has been demonstrated in relation to crisis and trauma, their relevance to more proactive activities such as goal striving has not yet been established. To do this, I first present a conceptual framework and then offer (a) a profile of women's vulnerability-related assumptive worlds, (b) correlations of these assumptive worlds and identification with four societal reference groups (political orientation, religion, gender, cultural identity), and (c) regression data concerning the combined and unique ability of social referents and assumptive worlds to explain goal striving. I conclude by discussing implications for empowerment goals in work with women as well as future research.     

ARE LIBERALS AND EVANGELICALS SINGING FROM THE SAME SONG SHEET?

Characterising Liberal and Evangelical theology as positions on a continuum or spectrum is common within Protestant circles. I argue that Liberals and Evangelicals do not share a common conceptual framework but embody competing and incommensurable conceptual schemes. Liberal theology then is not a distortion of true Biblical Christianity, as is often supposed, but rather is an entirely different approach to doing theology, indeed, to seeing the world. What I hope to achieve by way of this paper is to provide a context within which to better understand both Liberal and Evangelical claims, and to offer an explanation as to why the debates between the two schools are seemingly intractable. Further, I hope to encourage Liberals and Evangelicals to pursue the difficult task of understanding each other's position so that genuine dialogue can take place.     

A Psychology of Religious Plurality: From Intra-Religious Dialogue to Intra-Psychic Reality

Panikkar’s (The intra-religious dialogue, 1978) classic, re-issued by Paulist Press in 1999, grapples with the theological challenges in the disciplines of comparative theology and the theology of religions through what he terms, “intra-religious dialogue.” In this psychology of religious plurality, I use works from a variety of disciplines to highlight the achievements of Panikkar’s intra-religious dialogue, as well as to critique his work in the hope of finding categories of understanding that can be profitably used to face the inter-personal crises of the contemporary world, namely religious terrorism.     

Beliefs as inner causes: The (lack of) evidence

Many psychologists studying lay belief attribution and behavior explanation cite Donald Davidson in support of their assumption that people construe beliefs as inner causes. But Davidson’s influential argument is unsound; there are no objective grounds for the intuition that the folk construe beliefs as inner causes that produce behavior. Indeed, recent experimental work by Ian Apperly, Bertram Malle, Henry Wellman, and Tania Lombrozo provides an empirical framework that accords well with Gilbert Ryle’s alternative thesis that the folk construe beliefs as patterns of living that contextualize behavior.     

‘From nature to nature’s God’: Ellis A. Davidson—mid-Victorian educator, moralist, and consummate Designer

In recovering the life and work of Ellis Abraham Davidson (1828–1878), this paper draws attention to a Victorian who expands our understanding of Anglo-Jewry as he does not fit the occupational stereotypes. Unusually, he contributed to education, more specifically to the socially-important but frequently neglected topic of technical education. He taught the “lowly” arts, generally known in the nineteenth century as “arts and manufactures”, or the “useful arts”, or “art and design”. Thus although he did not become an artisan or tradesman himself, through his teaching others acquired the requisite skills to become artisans and tradesmen. Moreover, drawing on his experience teaching practical subjects he lectured to Jewish artisans and advised the Board of Guardians on the best way to support apprentices. Finally, and most importantly, this study of Davidson sheds new light on the relations between science, technology, and Judaism in the mid-Victorian period. Thus the final two sections of this paper will examine his commitment to a form of natural theology that set him against Darwin’s theory of evolution and also informed his only book directed specifically at the Anglo-Jewish community.     

Indirect Realism with a Human Face

Epistemic Indirect Realism (EIR) is the position that justification for contingent propositions about the extra‐mental world requires an inference based on a subjective, experiential mental state. One objection against EIR is that it runs contrary to common sense and practice; in essence, ordinary people do not form beliefs about things in the external world on the basis of experiential mental states. This objection implies EIR is contrary to ordinary experience, impractical, and leads to scepticism. In this paper, I will defend EIR against this objection by distinguishing EIR based on conceptual awareness and non‐conceptual awareness. In particular, I will argue that direct acquaintance provides sufficient (non‐conceptual) awareness that can explain how ordinary folks are capable of forming justified beliefs about the external world in a way consistent with EIR. Overall, I present a framework for showing that EIR can satisfy ordinary epistemic practices without betraying human nature or over‐intellectualizing the required epistemic standards for possessing a justified belief.     

Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief?

My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the degrees of justification of the corresponding beliefs. There are two ways in which degrees of justification can be computed within this framework. I argue that there is not any way of doing the calculations in a broadly probabilistic manner. The only alternative looks to be a thoroughly non-probabilistic way of thinking wedded to the thought that justification is closed under competent deduction. However, I argue that such a view is unable to capture the intuitive notion of justification, for it leads to an uncomfortable dilemma: either a widespread scepticism about justification, or drawing epistemically spurious distinctions between different types of lotteries. This should worry anyone interested in well-founded belief.     

Response to Slavin: Considering the Evolutionary and Existential Contexts of Dialectical Constructivism

Within his evolutionary framework, Slavin elaborates eloquently on the dialectic of construction of meaning and anticipation of death. Also within that framework he highlights the emergence of the universal dialectic of self-interest and care for others, perhaps finding its most poignant expression in the relation of parents and children. I raise questions about Slavin's attribution of a “sense of loss” to humans who allegedly long for the experience of evolutionarily earlier species, particularly their sense of automatic connectedness and automatic ways of relating to the world free of the burdens of uncertain, self-conscious choice. A longing for earlier states in human development is easier to grasp than a longing for the experience of less advanced species from which humans evolved. Nevertheless, Slavin's views and my own are otherwise deeply compatible, particularly his sense of what emerges as the uniquely human challenge of intersubjective construction of meaning in the context of individual self-interest and in the face of death. Slavin is also emphatic that the pervasiveness of absolute belief systems that preempt awareness of ambiguity, the anxiety of freedom, and the dread of death, does not gainsay their defensive nature. I argue, in accord with Altman, Butler, and others, that denial of death may promote dissipation of communal sensibility and replacement of it in a capitalist world (and perhaps others as well) with destructive splitting and fetishistic, competitive pursuit of money and power.     

Nishida,Agency, and the ‘Self-Contradictory’ Body

In this essay, I investigate Kitarō Nishida's characterization of what he refers to as the ‘self-contradictory’ body. First, I clarify the conceptual relation between the self-contradictory body and Nishida's notion of ‘acting-intuition’. I next look at Nishida's analysis of acting-intuition and the self-contradictory body as it pertains to our personal, sensorimotor engagement with the world and things in it, as well as to our bodily immersion within the intersubjective and social world. Along the way, I argue that Nishida develops a rich and exceedingly current way of thinking through different facets of embodiment and interpersonal relatedness. I further argue that Nishida's work provides compelling reasons to foreground the mutually implicative, co-emergent nature of embodied self and world in our theorizing about the nature of self and experience.     

THE VARIETIES AND REVISIONS OF ATHEISM

Abstract. The philosopher Antony Flew has argued for decades that theistic arguments cannot meet criteria of truth. In this essay I respond to Flew's recent announcement that research into the emergence of DNA provides grounds for rational belief in an intelligent orderer, a “God.” Flew's theistic turn is important for philosophers of religion and the wider science‐and‐religion dialogue. It becomes apparent, however, that Flew's “conversion” is not as decisive as one might imagine. While he admits growth in scientific and philosophical understanding, he rejects the idea of growth in religious understanding. Further, he endorses a version of “theoretical theism” while denying the practical importance of belief. Such denial of practical conviction is part of a modernist mindset that separates freedom from the embeddedness of human beings in the natural world. I conclude by noting that the entanglement of human action and wider physical processes, an entanglement seen emblematically in the environmental crisis, requires not only considering the importance of intelligence and order in the emergence of life but also the significance of human agency in claims about the divine and the natural world.     

NIETZSCHE,THE CROSS,AND THE NATURE OF GOD

In this essay, I treat of a type of moral objection to Christian theism that is formulated by Friedrich Nietzsche. In an effort to provoke a negative moral‐aesthetic response to the conception of God underlying the Christian tradition, with the ultimate aim of recommending his own allegedly ‘healthier’ ideals, Nietzsche presents a number of distinct but related considerations. In particular, he claims that the traditional theological interpretation of the crucifixion of Jesus expresses the tasteless, vulgar, and morally objectionable character of God, thus rendering Him unworthy of belief. In response to Nietzsche's worries, I first of all argue that his account of the origins of the belief in God is both prima facie implausible and historically false. At the same time I recognize that Nietzsche is expressing, in his typically bombastic manner, a genuine and widely held worry about what the crucifixion, as an event in salvation history, says about the nature of God. In response to this worry, I draw on the work of Wilhelm Dilthey in order to support the contention that the concept of divine transcendence, which underlies Nietzsche's concern, has its proper place within the Greek metaphysical tradition, rather than in Christian faith. Building on the work of Franz Rosenzweig and Jürgen Moltmann, I outline a conception of God that more accurately reflects the claim that the cross is the definitive revelation of the divine nature while at the same time foreclosing on the possibility of the kind of response that Nietzsche articulates.     

The twelfth Bartlett memorial lecture: The role of single neurons in the psychology of perception

I feel deeply honoured by your invitation to give the Bartlett lecture, and am especially glad to do so in Holland, the home of so many distinguished psychologists of sensation and perception. And there is a third reason why it has given me much pleasure, for Sir Frederick Bartlett was one of those who had an important influence on the direction of my career some 40 years ago. I had to decide whether to spend my last year at Cambridge reading psychology or physiology, so I attended a short course of introductory lectures he gave in July. About half a dozen of us sat on upright wooden chairs circled around him as he sat in an armchair, smiling benignly. The first thing he did was to tell us to close our notebooks, for he was not going to say anything that would help us to pass any exams. And I believe the very last words of his last lecture were, “So you see it is all very difficult”. I was very glad he said that, for I had in fact found it all very heavy going: my brain seemed always to be lost in clouds of uncertainty when “remembering”, “thinking”, or “perceiving” were mentioned, because there was no conceptual framework for these processes except the words themselves and others spun around them. What I was looking for were the definable quantities of physics, chemistry and even physiology, these I could handle conceptually in their geometric and functional interactions, whereas I always find a purely verbal argument about abstractions difficult to follow and impossible to believe. So this lack of any nonverbal conceptual framework was very painful.

There was one phrase I think I recall him using that particularly aroused my interest-“the effort after meaning”; intuitively this seemed to be very important, but however much effort I made the meaning never quite emerged. I had almost decided that my mistrust of words made me unsuited to a career in psychology, but all the same I put my problem about “physiology or psychology” directly to Bartlett. After finding out that I was mainly interested in problems of sensation and perception, he said he thought that E. D. Adrian's research over the last 20 years had made more difference to that subject than any results obtained from within psychology itself.     

The relationship between faith and evidence in St. Augustine

There has been much debate in both theological and philosophical circles over the matter of evidentialism—that is, whether an individual must augment or supplement their belief in God with evidences supportive of that belief. However, what has been (for the most part) lacking is a discussion which endeavors to integrate theological and philosophical desiderata. In this paper I will suggest that the framework for such a discussion can be found in the work of St. Augustine—in particular, in the way he holds together his belief in the sufficiency and necessity of faith and his ample use of evidences for belief in God.     

NEW DIRECTIONS,NEW COLLABORATIONS

In a world where all of life is on the edge of extinction and destruction by humankind, those who practice religion‐and‐science within a mutual dialogue bear the responsibility of doing so with this edge of life in mind. To speak of religion‐and‐science as a field of inquiry is to acknowledge the ethical responsibilities it entails. If one task of Zygon is to reformulate religion in light of the future dialogue of religion‐and‐science, we need to think about what kind of hope for the future is needed. Clearly, we are not simply called to repeat the past or comment on what has already been done by other academics. To help accomplish these goals and to reflect on the mission and future of Zygon, I appeal to the metaphor of improvisation, particularly as it is embodied in the visual and performing arts.     

Normative roles,conceptual variance,and ardent realism about normativity

ABSTRACT

In Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund considers a “variance thesis” about our most fundamental (and seemingly most “authoritative”) normative concepts. This thesis raises the threat of an alarming symmetry between different sets of normative concepts. If this symmetry holds, it would be incompatible with “ardent realism” about normativity. Eklund argues that the ardent realist should appeal to the idea of “referential normativity” in response to this challenge. I argue that, even if Eklund is right in his core arguments on this front, many other important challenges for ardent realism remain that also stem from the issues about possible variance in normative concepts that he considers. Following this, I introduce further issues about conceptual variance. These are issues that arise within the context of the framework that Eklund proposes the ardent realist use to confront the variance theses he considers. In particular, the issues concern what normative role as such is, as well as, relatedly, which roles associated with a concept (or predicate) get to count as part of its normative role. The upshot is that issues about conceptual variance in normative domains might be even more challenging for the ardent realist to deal with than Eklund argues.     

Why Metaphors have no Meaning: Considering Metaphoric Meaning in Davidson

Abstract

Since the publication of Donald Davidson’s essay “What Metaphors Mean” (1978) – in which he famously asserts that metaphor has no meaning – the views expressed in it have mostly met with criticism: prominently from Mary Hesse and Max Black. This article attempts to explain Davidson’s surprise-move regarding metaphor by relating it to elements in the rest of his work in semantics, such as the principle of compositionality, radical interpretation and the principle of charity. I conclude that Davidson’s views on metaphor are not only consistent with his semantic theory generally, but that his semantics also depend on these insights. Eventually, the debate regarding Davidson’s views on metaphor should be conducted on the level of his views on the nature of semantics, the relationship between language and the world and the possibility that there is something like conceptual schemes.

Sedert die publikasie van Donald Davidson se opstel What Metaphors Mean (1978) – waarin hy die berugte stelling maak dat metafoor geen betekenis het nie – is sy sieninge meestal begroet met kritiek, ook van prominente figure soos Mary Hesse en Max Black. Hierdie artikel poog om’n verduideliking te vind vir Davidson se verrassende skuif aangaande metafoor, deur sy sieninge hieroor te kontekstualiseer teen die agtergrond van elemente uit die res van sy werk in semantiek, soos die beginsel van komposisionaliteit, radikale interpretasie en die beginsel van rasionele akkomodasie (charity). Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor nie slegs naatloos aansluit by sy algemene sieninge aangaande semantiek nie, maar dat die res van sy semantiese teorie ook athang van sy sieninge aangaande metafoor. Uiteindelik behoort die debat rakende Davidson se sieninge aangaande metafoor gevoer te word op die vlak van die aard van semantiek, die verhouding tussen taal en die werldikheid en die moontlike bestaan van konseptuele skemas.     

Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense

Few philosophers believe that G. E. Moore’s notorious proof of an external world can give us justification to believe that skepticism about perceptual beliefs is false. The most prominent explanation of what is wrong with Moore’s proof—as well as some structurally similar anti-skeptical arguments—centers on conservatism: roughly, the view that someone can acquire a justified belief that p on the basis of E only if he has p-independent justification to believe that all of the skeptical hypotheses that undermine the support lent by E to p are false. In this paper I argue that conservatism does not make trouble for Moore’s proof. I do this by setting up a dilemma concerning the notion of “justification to believe” that figures in conservatism. On one understanding of justification to believe, conservatism is subject to obvious counterexamples. On another understanding of justification to believe, conservatism is consistent with Moore’s “proof” conferring justification upon its conclusion. Since these two understandings exhaust the logical space, the conservative indictment of Mooreanism fails.     

ANIMALS,ANIMISTS, AND ACADEMICS

Abstract. Animism is the label given to worldviews in which the world is understood to be a community of living persons, only some of whom are human. (An older use of the term to label a putative “belief in spirits” is less useful.) Animists inculcate locally meaningful means of communicating with other‐than‐human persons, especially in order to express respect. Ethnographic accounts of particular animist ways of engaging with animal persons are noted. I argue that ethologists interested in engaging respectfully with animals while researching cognition, behavior, and other critical issues may find their research methods and results enhanced by learning from animists about tested methods of communicating with animals. The mediation of animists in this communicative engagement between animals and those who research among them is proposed not as a romantic gloss on modernist culture but in full recognition that the challenge offered by dialogue with marginalized and excluded “others” may result in a reconfiguration of academic protocols. Nonetheless, this entry into full relationality is seriously posed as an improved means of achieving established goals of understanding animals, humans, and the world we coinhabit.