The Ontological Status of Cartesian Natures

Abstract: In the Fifth Meditation, Descartes makes a remarkable claim about the ontological status of geometrical figures. He asserts that an object such as a triangle has a 'true and immutable nature' that does not depend on the mind, yet has being even if there are no triangles existing in the world. This statement has led many commentators to assume that Descartes is a Platonist regarding essences and in the philosophy of mathematics. One problem with this seemingly natural reading is that it contradicts the conceptualist account of universals that one finds in the Principles of Philosophy and elsewhere. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of the notion of a true and immutable nature which reconciles the Fifth Meditation with the conceptualism of Descartes' other work. Specifically, I argue that Descartes takes natures to be innate ideas considered in terms of their so-called 'objective being'.     

The Ontological Status of Persons*

Chisholm held that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View affords a non‐Chisholmian way m defend the thesis that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View shows how persons are constituted by‐but not identical to‐human animals. On the Constitution View, being a person determines a person's persistence conditions. On the Animalist View, being an animal determines a person's persistence conditions. Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On Animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true     

Sartre on the Ontological Need for God

Adherents to the relatively new discipline of neurotheology profess that religious faith has a brain neural substrate, with structural, functional, and genetic elements that “hardwire” us to believe in God. It is argued here that a better way to approach the question of why people believe in a transcendent being would be to interrogate the structure of human being, with the intention of uncovering the meanings that underlie the phenomenon of faith. Jean-Paul Sartre may have already provided a necessary and sufficient explanation for this phenomenon. We are, he concluded, ontologically inclined to identify with a supreme being whose essence and existence transcend the limits of our own finite being. It is one thing to arrive at such a conclusion intuitively, but altogether something else to demonstrate, as Sartre does, how this conclusion follows from the structure of human being itself.     

Three Questions about Minding God

Abstract. Gregory Peterson's Minding God does an excellent job of introducing the cognitive sciences to the general reader and drawing preliminary connections between these disciplines and some of the loci of theology. The book less successfully articulates how the cognitive sciences should impact the future of theology. In this article I pose three questions: (1) What semantics is presupposed in relating the languages of theology and the cognitive sciences? How do the truth conditions of these disparate disciplines relate? (2) What precisely does theology gain from what is central to cognitive science: the emphasis on information processing, inner representation, and the computer model of the mind? What exactly does cognitive science offer to theology beyond the now‐standard rejection of Cartesian dualism, the affirmation of an embodied mind, and the repudiation of reduction? (3) What can the cognitive sciences offer in tackling crucial questions in the theology‐science discussion such as divine agency and divine causation? Finally, I point to a possible begging of the question in the claim that cognitive science relates to theology because theology deals with meaning and purpose, and a particular interpretation of cognitive science grants more meaning and purpose to human beings than antecedent post‐Cartesian positions in the philosophy of mind.     

God by Any Other Name?

"Father, Son and Holy Spirit" is not a name for God, but a doxological convenience; a mode of reference to the transcendent mystery that is condensed in Jesus' person and work. It therefore ought to be possible to refer to God differently without referring to a different God, to use other "names" for God that are just as true to the triadically structured mystery revealed in the economy of God's salvation. Those who argue that this breaks the semantic link with the narrative of God's incarnation in Jesus Christ neglect the subjective and pneumatological aspect of our address to God.     

The Intensive Other: Deleuze and Levinas on the Ethical Status of the Other

This paper develops a response to the ethical conception of the human Other formulated by Gilles Deleuze in his review of Michel Tournier’s 1967 novel Friday. The central contention here is that although Deleuze develops a compelling notion of intensive ethics in response to Tournier’s novel, that ethics also remains deeply problematic in refusing to ascribe a positive role to the human Other. My wager is that some of these problems can be brought to light by placing Deleuze’s philosophy in dialogue with that of Emmanuel Levinas. As I seek to show, Levinas’s philosophy of alterity not only reveals that Deleuze is mistaken in failing to ascribe a positive ethical role to the human Other, but also begins to point the way toward a more positive conception of ethics that does not oppose the Other to the intensive realm that Deleuze so much values.     

Studying Dimensions of God Representation: Choosing Closed or Open-Ended Research Questions

God representation was studied by means of a questionnaire and by means of an open-ended question in a representative sample of students at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium. Data were analyzed for the two approaches by means of factor analysis and cluster analysis. Comparison of the two methods indicates that the answer structure of the two data sets is similar, but that the item list gave a somewhat better prediction of the answer to the open-ended question than vice versa.     

预见性的本体论指归

囿于认识论或价值论范围,把有关预见性的一切解释置于本体论解释的视野之外,预见性的本体论根据之追究就会被无端地“搁置”起来,从而处在被“荒漠化”的境地,本体论意义之显现也就会被严实地“遮蔽”起来,即使偶有论及也只处在被“边缘化”的地带。本文由自我认识的诠解引发关于自我认识的预见性研究的本体论和方法论意义,进而集中解说自我认识何以具有预见性,自我认识的预见性有什么特点和表现形式,其存在变化是否具有客观基础暨本体论指归。     

关于经验基础问题及其他质疑的回应

批判的语境经验主义在经验内容上关注构成证据相关性的基础,它通过共同体的批评性互动来建构一种动态而可靠的语境及其规范。朗基诺指出理性和社会二分是对知识概念的误解导致的,而批判的语境经验主义规范来自科学自身的形象。与认知科学中的生成主义进路比较看,批判的语境经验主义主要思考科学探究的过程,它关乎作为公共知识的科学。批判的语境经验主义和实践实在论都拒绝上帝之眼的可能,但在形而上学和规范性问题上两者依然存在差别。