德性伦理与规范伦理在生命伦理中的契合

在生命伦理领域中,规范伦理与德性伦理都曾发挥重要作用,然而,德性伦理没有受到人们足够的重视,重新厘定传统德性伦理的现代价值显得尤为重要.初步探究在生命伦理迅速发展的情况下,德性伦理与规范伦理相结合的模式.     

略论制度伦理与德性伦理的关系

制度伦理的核心是伦理 ,其对德性伦理起作用的方式也应该是制度中的伦理因素而不是强制性规范。制度伦理以其内涵的伦理精神以及作为一种社会存在来影响个人德性。制度伦理与德性伦理相互作用并相互转化     

德性伦理及其现当代价值

现当代是否只适合发展规范伦理,而德性伦理注定趋向衰落?本文在分析德性伦理与道德特质、中国古代与西方德性伦理传统、马克思主义如何对待德性伦理以及如何应对德性伦理所面临的挑战和冲击等问题的基础上,认为德性伦理在现当代仍有重要的价值意义,仍是伦理学研究与道德建设具有重要理论意义和实践意义的课题。     

面向生活世界的伦理人类学

一、在规范伦理学与德性伦理学论争的背后规范伦理学与德性伦理学的论争是当代伦理学研究中的重要学术现象。规范伦理学以罗尔斯和哈贝马斯为代表,德性伦理学以麦金太尔为代表,形成了观点相互对立的两大伦理学阵营。规范伦理学以哲学思辨的方法研究伦理问题,其研究领域主要是伦理的价值或道德的应然,期望     

浅谈中西方传统的德性伦理

东西方传统的德性伦理具有不同的内涵。中国传统德性论认为,德性是与生俱来的;西方传统认为,人的德性是后天养成的。中国的德性伦理不仅规范处理人与人之间的关系,也处理人与自然之间的关系;西方的德性伦理则只规范处理人与人之间的关系。中国的德性伦理相对独立;西方的德性伦理则要受理性的支配和指导。     

论周人的德性伦理

考察周人的德性伦理结构,可以发现宗教中至上神天与祖先神的分离,在伦理上表现为公德之德与私德之孝的分离,使得周人的德性理论突破了血缘关系的范围,成为天下邦国联盟的公共伦理规范。周人德性伦理的结构从纵向上看,是人的德性与天的德性的合一,即天人合德。从横向上看,是领袖人物的德性与众民百姓的德性的合一:即四方同德。从界限上看,是上下内外的合一,即至善伦理与底线伦理的合一、文德与武德的统一。     

德性与伦理规范刍议

道德都是历史的、具体的,但并不意味着人类不存在某种道德的普适性,也不表明当今社会毋须对普适伦理的寻求.康德的道德既是德性又是规范性;既是道德主体之自觉,又含有道德本体之意味,两者是内在统一的.然而,西方社会因历来政治、法律重于伦理道德,更多的表现为外在的规范伦理.中国传统伦理思想与之不同,是以内在规范和道德自觉之统一为其特征.传统的规范性道德理论,面临现代社会纷繁复杂的价值观和道德无序的局面,已无能为力.德性伦理的复兴,并不排斥伦理规范,而是要在新的历史条件下化外在规范为内在规范,使德性和规范在更高的层面得到内在统一.     

当代西方德性伦理的思想特色

德性伦理是当代西方伦理学中非常重要的一支,已经成为了当代各种思想不断争论的舞台和焦点.可以说,在当代,几乎每一种新的思潮和文化流派都会或多或少地涉及德性伦理.与康德主义和功利主义相比较,德性伦理具有基础性、批判性和叙事性等特征.     

批判与建构:规则伦理的问题及亚里士多德德性伦理的启示

西方伦理学中的功利主义和道义论通过压缩和简化,从“人”这里抽出感性或理性,将之归结为人的全部,以此为预设,它们都希望通过构建某种普遍原则一劳永逸地解决道德生活领域的问题,统称为规则伦理.在德性伦理看来,因为对人及其幸福的误解,离开德性论规则,规则伦理知识与伦理生活出现了某种脱节,追寻德性于是成为了解决现代道德问题的出路,而这可以从亚里士多德的德性伦理中寻找智性资源.亚里士多德作为美德伦理系统经典的阐述者,至少可以在三个方面为当代的德性伦理方案提供直接借用的资源:幸福目的论的解释框架为德性伦理学提供了理论基点;对幸福的诠释在一定程度上为德性伦理搭起了生活目的的范式;在德性与规则之间追寻幸福为伦理学把握人类生活、建构德性伦理方案指明了现实途径.     

德性伦理论要

德性伦理强调以人类自身的内在品质作为人的一切生活的出发点,这不仅使德性伦理在人类伦理思想的起源处规避着人类伦理生活的方向,而且在现代人类遭遇道德困境的形势下,又指示着人类伦理生活所应该采取的态度。德性伦理最终的理论指向便是将成就德性与明其规范统一起来,从而真正实现人自身的价值。在现代社会价值多元化的背景下,对传统德性伦理资源的挖掘,显得尤为重要。无论是亚里士多德的德性传统,还是原始儒家的德性传统,都可以为现代伦理理论的建设提供丰富的智性资源。     

On Virtue Ethics

If one goes beyond the Western perspective, one realizes that most philosophy outside the West has been virtue-ethical in character. But it also turns out that there are simply more historical kinds of virtue ethics than most virtue ethicists recognize. Virtue ethics is mainly of interest because of its contemporary relevance and plausibility, and it is argued here that a virtue ethics that emphasizes empathy is very plausible in contemporary terms. Such an approach can say some strong things in favor of democracy, but it can also criticize Western thought for putting too much emphasis on autonomy rights rather than people’s, and especially women’s, welfare.     

西方政治伦理思想的历史流变及其启示

自古至今,西哲们紧跟时代的脚步,不断把西方的政治伦理观推陈出新:美德政治伦理、神性政治伦理、非道德主义的政治伦理、权利政治伦理。全面、系统地梳理和展现西方政治伦理思想的演变及其价值诉求,对于理解和把握政治伦理学中的一些重要理论问题具有重大的启迪意义。     

试论西方伦理学的科学路径

由于文化的差异,西方伦理学在发展路径上表现出明显的科学化倾向:一方面,与中国伦理学认为通达道德境界的道路只能是修身养性不同,西方伦理学却主张科学的理性有助于达到道德的理想目标;另一方面,与中国伦理学甚至认为为道与为学在根本上是对抗的相反,西方伦理学却断言美德本身就是知识。     

Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics

Several philosophers have recently claimed to have discovered a new and rather significant problem with virtue ethics. According to them, virtue ethics generates certain expectations about the behavior of human beings which are subject to empirical testing. But when the relevant experimental work is done in social psychology, the results fall remarkably short of meeting those expectations. So, these philosophers think, despite its recent success, virtue ethics has far less to offer to contemporary ethical theory than might have been initially thought. I argue that there are plausible ways in which virtue ethicists can resist arguments based on empirical work in social psychology. In the first three sections of the paper, I reconstruct the line of reasoning being used against virtue ethics by looking at the recent work of Gilbert Harman and John Doris. The remainder of the paper is then devoted both to responding to their challenge as well as to briefly sketching a positive account of character trait possession.     

Xunzi: A Paradigm of Rationalistic Virtue Ethics in Early Confucianism

Against the background of modern academic study, this article consciously uses Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a tool to theoretically analyze Xunzi’s ethical philosophy. This article tries to briefly analyze the basic structure of Xunzi’s moral philosophy and to reveal its unique rationalist theoretical character by exploring the following three topics: “the understanding of human beings,” “the establishment of a moral foundation,” and “the accomplishment of virtue in practice.” From the perspective of comparative philosophy, this article can also be viewed as a model for bringing about communication and synthesis between two philosophical traditions, namely Confucian ethics and Western virtue ethics.     

On Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field of Study

This essay is a critical engagement with recent assessments of comparative religious ethics by John Kelsay and Jung Lee. Contra Kelsay's proposal to return to a neo‐Weberian sociology of religious norm elaboration and justification, the authors argue that comparative religious ethics is and should be practiced as a field of study in active conversation with other fields that consider human flourishing, employing a variety of methods that have their roots in multiple disciplines. Cross‐pollination from a variety of disciplines is a strength of comparative ethics, which has enlivened recent and ongoing research on ethics, not a problem to be resolved by convergence on a single, distinctively comparative project. The authors also argue in response to Lee and Kelsay that while individual comparative studies of virtue and personal formation can be flawed in various ways, this line of research has been productive and at times very compelling. Moreover, attention to comparative virtue ethics shows how scholarship on some ethical topics necessitates drawing on a variety of perspectives and disciplinary backgrounds, a conclusion relevant to all work in religious ethics today.     

Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology

In this paper I examine and reply to a deflationary challenge brought against virtue ethics. The challenge comes from critics who are impressed by recent psychological evidence suggesting that much of what we take to be virtuous conduct is in fact elicited by narrowly specific social settings, as opposed to being the manifestation of robust individual character. In answer to the challenge, I suggest a conception of virtue that openly acknowledges the likelihood of its deep, ongoing dependence upon particular social relationships and settings. I argue that holding this conception will indeed cause problems for some important strands of thought in virtue ethics, most notably in the tradition of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. But an approach to virtue ethics modeled on David Hume's treatment of virtue and character in A Treatise of Human Nature promises to escape these problems.     

Confucian Ethics and Impartiality: On the Confucian View about Brotherhood

This essay reviews Confucian ethics with regard to impartiality and Confucian notion of brotherhood. It focuses on the comments by Song Neo- Confucians, Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, about a famous case involving brotherhood. In this case Diwu Lun of the Han dynasty treated his diseased son and his diseased nephew in different ways. The author argues that Confucianism, starting from a naturalist standpoint, affirms the partiality in the relations between brothers, and judges deliberate impartiality negatively. On this point, one cannot simply view Confucianism as analogous to the Kantian ethics which promises impartiality or the virtue ethics which opposes impartiality.     

New Directions in Ethics: Naturalisms, Reasons and Virtue

This paper discusses three topics in contemporary British ethical philosophy: naturalisms, moral reasons, and virtue. Most contemporary philosophers agree that 'ethics is natural' - in Section 1 I examine the different senses that can be given to this idea, from reductive naturalism to supernaturalism, seeking to show the problems some face and the problems others solve. Drawing on the work of John McDowell in particular, I conclude that an anti-supernatural non-reductive naturalism plausibly sets the limits on what we can do in ethics. Moral reasons are widely discussed - in Section 2 I describe some of the criteria that used to distinguish moral practical reasons, and note possibilities and problems. Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Anscombe in particular, I suggest that an inclusive, minimalist account of moral reasons may be most fruitful. There has been a revival of philosophical interest in virtue ethics, which I take to be linked to the emergence of non-reductive naturalisms - in Section 3 I describe three points where virtue ethics has an especially significant contribution to make: learning, motivational self-sufficiency, and the question of whether virtues can be reasons. The naturalism of Section 1 constrains the accounts of moral reasons considered in Section 2, and depends upon an account of virtue as learned second nature, discussed in Section 3.