Interpolation processes in object perception: reply to Anderson (2007)

P. J. Kellman, P. Garrigan, & T. F. Shipley presented a theory of 3-D interpolation in object perception. Along with results from many researchers, this work supports an emerging picture of how the visual system connects separate visible fragments to form objects. In his commentary, B. L. Anderson challenges parts of that view, especially the idea of a common underlying interpolation component in modal and amodal completion (the identity hypothesis). Here the authors analyze Anderson's evidence and argue that he neither provides any reason to abandon the identity hypothesis nor offers a viable alternative theory. The authors offer demonstrations and analyses indicating that interpolated contours can appear modally despite absence of the luminance relations, occlusion geometry, and surface attachment that Anderson claims to be necessary. The authors elaborate crossing interpolations as key cases in which modal and amodal appearance must be consequences of interpolation. Finally, the authors dispute Anderson's assertion that vision researchers are misguided in using objective performance methods, and they argue that his challenges to relatability fail because contour and surface processes, as well as local and global influences, have been distinguished experimentally.     

The importance of frameworks for directing empirical questions: reply to Goodie and Fantino (2000)

A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) make two main criticisms of the predictions of M. C. Lovett and C. D. Schunn's (1999) RCCL model. (RCCL is pronounced "ReCyCLe"; it stands for Represent the task, Construct a set of action strategies, Choose from among those strategies according to success rate, Learn new success rates.) In both cases, the authors believe the criticisms reflect a failure to appreciate the difference between broad frameworks and specific mathematical/computational models. In this article, the value of a broad framework, such as RCCL, in directing new empirical analyses and guiding theoretical development is shown. In particular, RCCL expands on existing work to reveal how variability and change in mental representations influence base-rate sensitivity. The authors also address several other issues raised by A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) and show that qualitative shifts in individuals' choice behavior are present in their original data--a key prediction of RCCL that does not appear in previous accounts.     

The crucial importance of empirical evidence in the development of bereavement theory: reply to Archer (2001).

In his commentary, J. Archer (2001a) argued that G. A. Bonanno and S. Kaltman's (1999) review and integration of the bereavement literature failed to consider evolutionary theory or other approaches to the origins of grief. Archer also argued that Bonanno and Kaltman had merely replaced the traditional grief work perspective with cognitive restructuring, thereby ignoring the processes related to avoidance and distancing from the loss. In this reply, the author first explains that although it was compelling to do so, Bonanno and Kaltman did not emphasize an evolutionary approach to the origins of grief reactions because in their current form these theories lack empirical and theoretical clarity. Second, the author shows that, contrary to Archer's reading, Bonanno and Kaltman's article viewed cognitive restructuring as a mechanism used primarily by extremely grieved persons and only in some cognitive domains. Last, the author shows that Bonanno and Kaltman have championed rather than ignored avoidant or distancing processes.     

The relationship between value and temporal context is an empirical question: a reply to Fantino (2000)

E. Fantino (2000) argued that R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's (2000) experiments fail to elucidate the relationship between stimulus value and temporal context. His reasoning is that predictions for R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's probe tests based on delay-reduction theory (DRT) and the contextual choice model (CCM) are indistinguishable. However, his method of applying DRT to the probes ensures that temporal context will have no effect on which stimulus is preferred, contrary to the core principle of that theory. The only basis for differential responding in the probes is baseline training, and R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano's data clearly show that the terminal-link schedules, independent of temporal context, control choice in the probes, as predicted by CCM.     

The theory of incubation: a reply to Bersh

Bersh's critique of Eysenck's theory of incubation is summarized, and some arguments are presented to indicate that while some criticisms are pertinent, they do not invalidate the theory.     

Holography does not account for goodness: a critique of van der Helm and Leeuwenberg (1996)

P. A. van der Helm and E. L. J. Leeuwenberg (1996) outlined a holographic account of figural goodness of a perceptual stimulus. The theory is mathematically precise and can be applied to a broad spectrum of empirical data. The authors argue, however, that the account is inadequate on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The theoretical difficulties concern the internal consistency of the account and its reliance on unspecified auxiliary assumptions. The account also makes counterintuitive empirical predictions, which do not fit past data or the results of a series of new experimental studies.     

Defining consciousness in the context of incidental sequence learning: theoretical considerations and empirical implications

The notion that sequential regularities can be learned implicitly without ensuing conscious knowledge has sparked off a prolific research program within cognitive psychology. However, there is continuing dissent among researchers about the very existence of the phenomenon. This is, at least in part, due to a failure to ground research on implicit sequence learning in conceptual definitions of “consciousness” and “conscious sequence knowledge.” In this article the authors take up a definition of consciousness according to which conscious mental contents are characterized by their global availability to cognitive processes (e.g., Baars in: A cognitive theory of consciousness Cambridge University Press, 1988; in: In the theater of consciousness: the workspace of the mind Oxford University Press, 1997). It is argued that unlike recognition tests or generate tasks, verbal report is a sensitive and specific measure of conscious (i.e., globally available) sequence knowledge. Finally, it is shown that the choice between two commonly used measures of conscious sequence knowledge can profoundly affect the outcome of a sequence learning experiment.     

The theory behind Psychoticism: a reply to Eysenck

In this reply to Eysenck, we attempt to clarify why we have criticized Eysenck's Psychoticism model and have found it necessary to introduce our own alternative model. It is concluded that the validity of the P scale as a measure of Psychoticism has not been demonstrated and that the P construct itself is untenable.     

The low robustness of the gain effect of interpersonal attraction: Some empirical and theoretical considerations

Subjects were exposed either to positive–positive evaluations or to negative-positive evaluations. In addition, evaluator's credibility was manipulated (high, low, neutral). Liking for the evaluator, perceived correctness, and perceived contingency of the evaluations were assessed as dependent variables. The gain effect suggested by Aronson and Linder (1965) was not found in any of the three dependent measures. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Some theoretical and technical considerations concerning the emergence of a symptom of the transference neurosis: an empirical study

A detailed study was done of the five occurrences of a striking conversion symptom that appeared in the first 400 hours of an analysis. This study focused on the dynamics of the resistances and of the transference to explain why the symptom appeared when it did. It was possible to identify a consistent, repeated pattern of shifts in the resistive dynamics in response to interpretations of resistances that led to the emergence of the symptom. This type of process was viewed as demonstrating the concrete expression of the transference neurosis, distinguishable from the characteristic transferences that are seen moment-to-moment throughout a treatment from beginning to end. The implications of this distinction for the theory of the concept of the transference neurosis have been presented, emphasizing their importance in the clinical setting and for clinical theory.