Perceptual organization in multistable apparent motion

Is motion perception based on a local piecemeal analysis of the image or do 'global' effects also play an important role? Use was made of bistable apparent-motion displays in trying to answer this question. Two spots were flashed simultaneously on diagonally opposite corners of a 1 deg wide square and then switched off and replaced by two spots appearing on the other two corners. One can either see vertical or horizontal oscillation and the display is bistable just as a Necker cube is. If several such bistable figures are randomly scattered on the screen and presented simultaneously, then one usually sees the same motion axis in all of them, suggesting the presence of field-like effects for resolving ambiguity in apparent motion. While viewing a single figure observers experience hysteresis: they tend to adhere to one motion axis or the other and can switch the axis only by looking away and looking back after 10-30 s have elapsed. The figure can be switched off and made to reappear at some other random location on the screen and it is then always found to retain its motion axis. Several such demonstrations are presented to show that spatial induction effects in metastable motion displays may provide a particularly valuable probe for studying 'laws' of perceptual organization.     

Bayesian confusions surrounding simplicity and likelihood in perceptual organization

In the study of perceptual organization, the Occamian simplicity principle (which promotes efficiency) and the Helmholtzian likelihood principle (which promotes veridicality) have been claimed to be equivalent. Proposed models of these principles may well yield similar outcomes (especially in everyday situations), but as argued here, claims that the principles are equivalent confused subjective probabilities (which are used in Bayesian models of the Occamian simplicity principle) and objective probabilities (which are needed in Bayesian models of the Helmholtzian likelihood principle). Furthermore, Occamian counterparts of Bayesian priors and conditionals have led to another confusion, which seems to have been triggered by a dual role of regularity in perception. This confusion is discussed by contrasting complete and incomplete Occamian approaches to perceptual organization.     

Functional theory of illusory conjunctions and neon colors

Illusory conjunctions are the incorrect perceptual combination of briefly presented colors and shapes. In the neon colors illusion, achromatic figures take on the color of an overlaid grid of colored lines. Both illusions are explained by a theory that assumes (a) poor location information or poor spatial resolution for some aspects of visual information and (b) that the spatial location of features is constrained by perceptual organization. Computer simulations demonstrate that the mechanisms suggested by the theory are useful in veridical perception and they are sufficient to produce illusory conjunctions. The theory suggests mechanisms that economically encode visual information in a way that filters noise and fills in missing data. Issues related to neural implementation are discussed. Four experiments illustrate the theory. Illusory conjunctions are shown to be affected by objective stimulus organization, by subjective organization, and by the linguistic structure of ambiguous Hebrew words. Neon colors are constrained by linguistic structure in the same way as illusory conjunctions.     

Subjective organization and the visibility of illusory contours

The effects of the differential organization of a Necker cube on the perceived salience of an embedded illusory triangle were examined. Overall figural salience was greater when the triangle appeared to be localized on the front rather than the back cube face. Illusory contour salience also increased with increasing inducing area contrast and was greater when the figure was oriented on cardinal as compared to oblique coordinates. However, the latter effects were independent of perceived location within the cube. The finding that subjective organizational and structural factors influenced the perceived salience of the illusory figure but did not interact is consistent with van Tuijl and Leeuwenberg's (1982) suggestion that top-down and bottom-up determinants can operate independently in illusory contour perception.     

Response times to Ehrenstein illusions of varying subjective magnitude: complementarity of psychophysical measures

The following experiments investigate the effects of contrast polarity, inducer spacing, and inducer type on three dependent variables measuring the perception of an illusory surface in Ehrenstein figures: subjective magnitude, response time, and frequency of perception. It was found that response time generally decreased when the other two behavioral indicators increased. However, it was also shown that subjective magnitude provided more discriminating measures of relatively strong illusory percepts, whereas frequency of perception and response time provided more discriminating measures of relatively weak illusory percepts. The findings generally confirm earlier work on the effect of inducer spacing and contrast polarity on the perceived strength of brightness illusions, and in particular reveal the complementarity of subjective magnitude, response time, and frequency of perception as critical measures of configurational effects in the perceptual processing of these phenomena. Thanks are due to J. E. Hoffman, T. Parks, and an anonymous referee for their insightful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.     

Reversal negativity and bistable stimuli: Attention,awareness, or something else?

Ambiguous (or bistable) figures are visual stimuli that have two mutually exclusive perceptual interpretations that spontaneously alternate with each other. Perceptual reversals, as compared with non-reversals, typically elicit a negative difference called reversal negativity (RN), peaking around 250 ms from stimulus onset. The cognitive interpretation of RN remains unclear: it may reflect either bottom-up processes, attentional processes that select between the alternative views of the stimulus, or it may reflect the change in the contents of subjective awareness. In the present study, event-related potentials in response to endogenous unilateral and bilateral reversals of two Necker lattices were compared with exogenously induced reversals of unambiguous lattices. The RN neither resembled the attention-related N2pc response, nor did it correlate with the content of subjective visual awareness. Thus, we conclude that RN is a non-attentional ERP correlate of the changes in the perceptual configuration of the presented object.     

Reversible-figure perception: mechanisms of intentional control

Observers can exert a degree of intentional control over the perception of reversible figures. Also, the portion of the stimulus that is selected for primary or enhanced processing (focal-feature processing) influences how observers perceive a reversible figure. Two experiments investigated whether voluntary control over perception of a Necker cube could be explained in terms of intentionally selecting appropriate focal features within the stimulus for primary processing. In Experiment 1, varying observers' intentions and the focus of primary processing produced additive effects on the percentage of time that one alternative was perceived. In Experiment 2, the effect of varying the focus of primary processing was eliminated by the use of a small cube, but the effect of intention was unaltered. The results indicate that intentional control over perception can be exerted independently of focal-feature processing, perhaps by top-down activation or priming of perceptual representations. The results also reveal the limits of intentional control.     

PSYCHOPHYSICAL RELATIONS IN VISUAL PERCEPTION OF LENGTH, AREA AND VOLUME

E kman , G., and J unge , K. Psychophysical relations in visual perception of length, area and volume. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1961, 2 , 1–10. — Subjective length, area and volume as functions of the corresponding stimulus variables were studied in three experiments. The exponents of the psychophysical power functions scattered around 1 for perception of 'real' space. For perspective drawings of cubes and spheres, however, the exponents were about 0.75. From a further analysis of the data it was tentatively concluded that perspective and shadow are insufficient cues to visual volume, and that the subjective scale reflects perception of area rather than volume, especially in the case of small stimuli.     

Differences in top-down influences on the reversal rate of different categories of reversible figures

Understanding the mechanisms underlying the multistability of reversible figures may provide valuable insights into the normal functioning of our visual system. The proposed factors that control the perceptual alternations of reversible figures can be classified into bottom-up and top-down processes. In the present study, we report differences in top-down effects on the reversal rate depending on whether a structural perspective (Necker cube, Schr?der staircase) or a meaningful content (duck/rabbit figure, chef/dog figure) is subject to the reversal phenomenon. In order to activate top-down mechanisms explicitly the subjects had the instruction to bring the reversal rate under voluntary control. The results indicated that both slowing down and speeding up the rate of alternations was more effective for the content-reversal figures (duck/rabbit, chef/dog) than for the rather abstract perspective-reversal figures (Necker cube, Schr?der staircase). In order to investigate the effect of meaningfulness in figure/ground reversals, the effect of the same instructional variable was also determined for Rubin's vase/faces and the Maltese cross. The results showed a similar tendency as in the case of the comparison between perspective reversals and content reversals. Possible cognitive processes that may play a role in top-down influences on figure reversal and theoretical implications of these findings for the interaction of bottom-up and top-down processes are discussed.     

Kinetic subjective contours

Continuous changes in spatially separated figures can evoke perception of subjective contours and figures in physically homogeneous space between them. This occurs when all of the interruptions in the objectively present patterns (inducing elements) can be seen as caused by a unitary figure partly occluding them. Two experiments demonstrated and explored this phenomenon. In both, displays were presented to subjects under three conditions. In one condition, stationary inducing elements were shown as they would be interrupted by a figure rotating in front of them. In another condition, the background and inducing elements rotated, with interruptions occurring as if a stationary figure were in front. In a third condition, observers were shown 10 static views taken from the figure-rotation sequence for each display. Subjects consistently perceived unitary central figures with well-defined forms and clear edges from pattern changes given by figure movement and background movement. As with static subjective figures, kinetic subjective figures appear in front of, partly occluding, the inducing elements. These percepts form rapidly, and they depend upon temporal relations rather than upon information present in momentary views. Subjects occasionally reported subjective edges or a central figure in the stationary displays in Experiment 1, but not at all in Experiment 2, in which guessing tendencies were reduced by more specific instructions. The existence of kinetic subjective contours suggests that the visual system readily utilizes relationships among occlusion events separated in space and time. The minimum conditions for contour perception require neither information all along an edge nor simultaneous specification of the edge at two or more places.     

Cultural and learning differences in the Judd illusion

In the present study, we examined whether individual differences in the perception of illusory Judd drawings point to variability in the pickup of informational variables. Two sources for these individual differences were addressed: culture and learning. East Asian (n = 24) and Western (n = 24) participants made perceptual judgments of the midpoint of the shaft of various Judd figures in a pretest–practice–posttest design. During practice, half of the participants received feedback about the actual midpoint after each trial, while the other half did not receive feedback. The results showed differences among perceivers of different cultures in judging the midpoints of the shafts of Judd figures, particularly with respect to their propensity to improve perceptual accuracy after repeated practice and feedback. For most participants, changes in illusory bias as a consequence of learning were shown to reflect either a change in what informational variable they exploited or a rescaling or calibration of the perception to the informational variable. However, the individual differences in illusory bias related to culture could not be unequivocally attributed to either of these perceptual-learning processes.     

As the cube turns: Evidence for two processes in the perception of a dynamic reversible figure

The reported reversals of a rotating Necker cube, which changes direction of rotation when a perspective reversal occurs, were examined under a number of conditions. These permitted comparisons of reversal rates within viewing periods, across successive viewing periods within an experimental session, and across successive weekly sessions. In addition, observers viewed either one or two rotating cubes simultaneously within each of the various viewing periods. Clear evidence for a learning effect was obtained in the form of significant savings across successive viewing periods and sessions. At the same time, results from the multiple-cube conditions and from the pattern of reversals within individual viewing periods appeared to be more consistent with a process of neural fatigue. A two-stage model of reversible-figure perception is proposed which is characterized by (1) fatiguing with extended viewing of the two sets of neural channels that underlie the two percepts of the reversible figure, and (2) learning, which helps to establish the organization of the cortical channels as well as moderate channel activity via such processes as attention and strategy.     

The interaction of objective and subjective organizations in a localization search task

We investigated how both objective and subjective organizations affect perceptual organization and how this perceptual organization, in turn, influences observers’ performance in a localization search task. Two groups of observers viewing exactly the same stimuli (objective organization) performed in significantly different ways, depending on how they were induced to parse the display (subjective organization). In Experiments 1 and 2, the observers were asked to describe the location of a tilted target among a varying number of vertical or horizontal distractors. Subjective organization was induced by instructing observers to parse the display into either three horizontal regions (rows) or three vertical regions (columns). The position of the target was critical: location performance, as assessed by reaction time and errors, was consistently impaired at the locations adjacent to the boundaries defining the regions, producing what we refer to as thesubjective boundary effect. Furthermore, the extent of this effect depended on whether the stimulus-driven and conceptually driven information concurred or conflicted. This made location information more or less accessible. In Experiment 1, the strength of objective grouping was a function of the proximity of the items (near or far conditions) and their orientation in a 6×6 matrix. In Experiment 2, the strength of objective grouping was a function of similarity of color (items were color coded by rows or by columns) and the orientation of the items in a 9×9 matrix. The subjective boundary effect was more pronounced when the display promoted grouping in the direction orthogonal to that of the task (e.g., when observers parsed by rows but vertical distractors were closer together [Experiment 1] or color coded [Experiment 2] to induce global columns). In contrast, this effect decreased when the direction of both objective and subjective organizations was parallel (e.g., when observers parsed by rows and horizontal distractors were closer together [Experiment 1] or were color coded [Experiment 2] to induce global rows). A localization search task proved to be an ideal forum in which objective and subjective organizations interacted. We discuss how these results indicated that observers’ performance in a localization task was determined by the interaction of objective and subjective organizations, and that the resulting perceptual organization constrained coarse location information.     

Distortions in memory for maps

Evidence is presented for systematic errors in memory for real and artificial maps, local environments, and visual forms. These errors are attributed to two heuristics that are derived from principles of perceptual organization. Maps of countries or localities are conceived of as figures in backgrounds. Remembering the absolute location of figures is difficult, and is facilitated by remembering locations relative to other figures and/or relative to the natural directions of the figure. In alignment, figures are lined up relative to one another, a phenomenon related to perceptual grouping by proximity. In rotation, the natural axes induced by a figure converge with frame axes (north-south, east-west, or horizontal, vertical), a phenomenon related to perceptual organization by common fate. Heuristic-induced errors occur in a variety of tasks, and even when subjects are explicitly forewarned. These heuristics may be invoked in forming representations as well as in inference, and function analogously to syntax in locating smaller elements in larger units.     

Do conscious perception and unconscious processing rely on independent mechanisms? A meta-contrast study

There is currently no consensus regarding what measures are most valid to demonstrate perceptual processing without awareness. Likewise, whether conscious perception and unconscious processing rely on independent mechanisms or lie on a continuum remains a matter of debate. Here, we addressed these issues by comparing the time courses of subjective reports, objective discrimination performance and response priming during meta-contrast masking, under similar attentional demands. We found these to be strikingly similar, suggesting that conscious perception and unconscious processing cannot be dissociated by their time course. Our results also demonstrate that unconscious processing, indexed by response priming, occurs, and that objective discrimination performance indexes the same conscious processes as subjective visibility reports. Finally, our results underscore the role of attention by showing that how much attention the stimulus receives relative to the mask, rather than whether processing is measured by conscious discrimination or by priming, determines the time course of meta-contrast masking.     

The effects of perceptual set on the shape and apparent depth of subjective contours

Two experiments showed the influence of perceptual set on the perception of subjective contours. In the first, the perceived shape of a subjective-contour figure (a minimal version of the Ehrenstein configuration) was varied by altering the observer’s viewing set. The second experiment showed that apparent depth emerged in subjective-contour figures when observers were set to perceive the illusory contours.     

The Relationship Between Visual Illusion and Aesthetic Preference – an Attempt to Unify Experimental Phenomenology and Empirical Aesthetics

Experimental phenomenology has demonstrated that perception is much richer than stimulus. As is seen in color perception, one and the same stimulus provides more than several modes of appearance or perceptual dimensions. Similarly, there are various perceptual dimensions in form perception. Even a simple geometrical figure inducing visual illusion gives not only perceptual impressions of size, shape, slant, depth, and orientation, but also affective or aesthetic impressions. The present study reviews our experimental phenomenological work on visual illusion and experimental aesthetics, and examines how aesthetic preference is influenced by stimulus factors determining visual illusions including anomalous surface and transparency as well as geometrical illusion. Along with line figures producing geometrical illusions, illusory surface figures inducing neon color spreading and transparency effects were used as test patterns. Participants made both of psychophysical judgments and of aesthetic judgments for the same test pattern. Both of geometrical illusions and aesthetic preferences were found to change similarly as a function of stimulus variables such as the number of filling lines and the size ratio of the inner and outer figural components. Also, following specific stimulus variables such as lightness contrast ratio and spatial interval between inducing figural elements (so called ``packmen''), strong effects of color spreading and transparency were accompanied with strong preferences. It seems that the paradigm to investigate aesthetic phenomena along with perceptual dimensions is useful to bridge the gap between experimental phenomenology and experimental aesthetics.     

Cueing the interpretation of a Necker Cube: a way to inspect fundamental cognitive processes

The term perceptual bistability refers to all those conditions in which an observer looks at an ambiguous stimulus that can have two or more distinct but equally reliable interpretations. In this work, we investigate perception of Necker Cube in which bistability consists of the possibility to interpret the cube depth in two different ways. We manipulated the cube ambiguity by darkening one of the cube faces (cue) to provide a clear cube interpretation due to the occlusion depth index. When the position of the cue is stationary the cube perceived perspective is steady and driven by the cue position. However, when we alternated in time the cue position (i.e. we changed the position of the darkened cube face) two different perceptual phenomena occurred: for low frequencies the cube perspective alternated in line with the position of the cue; however for high frequencies the cue was no longer able to bias the perception but it appears as a floating feature traveling across the solid with the cube whole perspective that returns to be bistable as in the conventional, bias-free, case.     

The Embodied Subjective Perspective

Perspective is a distinctive feature of external perception. There is a question of how to account for perceptual constancy in spite of changing perspectives. Alva Noe proposes the notion of ＂perspectival property＂ [P-property] and appeals to the perspectival aspect of perceptual content. His proposal conflicts with perceptual experiences and hence incurs many criticisms. Drawing on Husserl＇s phenomenology and Gibsonian psychology, I propose the notion of ＂perspectival awareness＂ [P-awareness]. I will argue that P-awareness is embodied pre-thematic self-awareness instead of the experience of a special kind of objective property. With the notion of P-awareness in mind, I then elaborate on the embodied subjective feature of perspective.