共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Norbert Ricken 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2007,26(5):481-498
The current discussion on the role of the (European) universities often starts off with a perspective on the university as
a scientific and/or pedagogical institution and consequently runs into a conflict between both logics in which each element
is somehow devalued from the other perspective. Therefore, it may be productive to analyse the university from a standpoint
in between, a perspective of knowledge as such. In order to conceptualise such a third perspective of knowledge, the history
of the European university is reconstructed and interpreted as a process of reflection on the ‘spiral of knowledge’. Before
this background the idea of the university is renewed in terms of knowledge and summarised in the idea of a ‘deliberate university’.
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Norbert RickenEmail: |
2.
Neal Judisch 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(3):299-318
Recent discussions of physicalism have focused on the question how the physical ought to be characterized. Many have argued
that any characterization of the physical should include the stipulation that the physical is non-mental, and others have
claimed that a systematic substitution of ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ is all that is needed for philosophical purposes. I
argue here that both claims are incorrect: substituting ‘non-mental’ for ‘physical’ in the causal argument for physicalism
does not deliver the physicalist conclusion, and the specification that the physical is non-mental is irrelevant to the task
of formulating physicalism as a substantive, controversial thesis.
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Neal JudischEmail: |
3.
Scott Hill 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2009,10(2):215-228
Daniel Haybron has made an original contribution to philosophical discussions of happiness. He has put forward a theory that
identifies happiness with moods and the propensity to experience moods. Haybron’s contribution deserves a critical examination.
The first section of my paper is interpretive. I show how Haybron uses the concepts of ‘central affective states’ and ‘mood
propensity’ to define happiness. The second and third sections of the paper are critical. They focus on the inclusion of mood
propensity in Haybron’s theory. In the second section I argue that his theory fails because there is an example that shows
a subject can be happy even when that subject does not have a positive mood propensity. In the third section of the paper,
I consider Haybron’s objection that the case in question is ‘object-specific’ and that it is not ‘emotionally-based’. I discuss
both of these technical terms in detail. Moreover, I argue that a modified version of the counter example accommodates these
technical terms while retaining the persuasiveness of the original example.
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Scott HillEmail: |
4.
Christian B. Miller 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):247-275
The central virtue at issue in recent philosophical discussions of the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics has been the virtue
of compassion. Opponents of virtue ethics such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that experimental results from social
psychology concerning helping behavior are best explained not by appealing to so-called ‘global’ character traits like compassion,
but rather by appealing to external situational forces or, at best, to highly individualized ‘local’ character traits. In
response, a number of philosophers have argued that virtue ethics can accommodate the empirical results in question. My own
view is that neither side of this debate is looking in the right direction. For there is an impressive array of evidence from
the social psychology literature which suggests that many people do possess one or more robust global character traits pertaining
to helping others in need. But at the same time, such traits are noticeably different from a traditional virtue like compassion.
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Christian B. MillerEmail: |
5.
Laurence Goldstein 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):377-389
Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes
within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist),
avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes
and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.
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Laurence GoldsteinEmail: |
6.
Adrian Johnston 《Continental Philosophy Review》2008,41(3):345-366
Immanuel Kant is one of Alain Badiou’s principle philosophical enemies. Kant’s critical philosophy is anathema to Badiou not
only because of the latter’s openly aired hatred of the motif of finitude so omnipresent in post-Kantian European intellectual
traditions—Badiou blames Kant for inventing this motif—but also because of its idealism. For Badiou-the-materialist, as for
any serious philosophical materialist writing in Kant’s wake, transcendental idealism must be dismantled and overcome. In
his most recent works (especially 2006’s Logiques des mondes), Badiou attempts to invent a non-Kantian notion of the transcendental, a notion compatible with the basic tenets of materialism.
However, from 1988’s Being and Event up through the present, Badiou’s oeuvre contains indications that he hasn’t managed fully to purge the traces of Kantian transcendental idealism that arguably continue
to haunt his system—with these traces clustering around a concept Badiou christens “counting-for-one” (compter-pour-un). The result is that, in the end, Kant’s shadow still falls over Badiouian philosophy—this is despite Badiou’s admirable,
sophisticated, and instructive attempts to step out from under it—thus calling into question this philosophy’s self-proclaimed
status as materialist through and through.
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Adrian JohnstonEmail: |
7.
Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):91-104
In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive
affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties
respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’
and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’
One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism
or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs
to—present an account of moral obligation.
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Liezl van ZylEmail: |
8.
Gregg Lambert 《Sophia》2008,47(3):293-310
This article responds to the question of the ‘implicit and presupposed theological turn of phenomenology’ by providing a close
reading of Jacques Derrida’s Le Toucher—Jean-Luc Nancy (2000 French/2005 English translation), particularly concerning what Derrida alludes to as ‘the Christian thinking of the
flesh’ in the French phenomenological tradition post-Husserl. In reading Derrida’s own text, the article identifies and then
performs a ‘cryptonomy’ of references to the ‘Christian body,’ and of the ‘return of religion.’ The article also focuses on
the more recent writings of Jean-Luc Nancy, especially Corpus (2000 French), concerning the body and its relationship to the concept of corporality (Leiblichkeit) from Husserl’s Ideas II.
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Gregg LambertEmail: |
9.
Supernatural Miracles and Religious Inclusiveness 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2007,46(3):287-293
In this paper I shall assess Clarke’s assertion that all definitions of miracles that purport to satisfy the criterion of
religious inclusiveness should substitute the term ‘supernatural’ for ‘non-natural’. In addition, I shall attempt to strengthen
Clarke’s conception of the supernatural by offering an analysis of what it means for something to be ‘above’ nature. Lastly,
I shall offer a new argument as to why Clarke’s intention-based definition of miracles is necessarily less religiously inclusive
than Mumford’s causation-based definition.
相似文献
Morgan LuckEmail: |
10.
Patrick Maynard 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(1):111-121
Cynthia Freeland’s investigation of four kinds of ‘fidelity’ in portraiture is cut across by more general philosophical concerns.
One is about what might be called the expression of persons--the persons or ‘inner selves’ of portrait subjects and of portrait
artist: whether either is possible across each of the four kinds of fidelity, and whether these two kinds of expression are
in tension. More fundamental is the problem of telling how self-expression is at all possible in any of these forms. Finally,
she wonders how photography affects all these questions. This comment addresses portraiture not so much in terms of the four
fidelities, but with another quartet of concepts: four ordinary types of ‘display’, in terms of which we see how artists’
self-expression is possible in all these forms, also including photography. Its key idea is that portraits are displays simply
by being pictures or sculptures, which are kinds of artifacts, hence things that we perceive as having intentional affordance:
that is, as being intentionally made ‘for’ something.
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Patrick MaynardEmail: |
11.
Matteo Morganti 《Axiomathes》2009,19(1):73-85
In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly
enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical
purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing
features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject
them.
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Matteo MorgantiEmail: |
12.
Lefteris Farmakis 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):41-53
Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change.
In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided
due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency
are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s
picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and
Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change.
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Lefteris FarmakisEmail: |
13.
Tony Fitzpatrick 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(4):313-327
This article brings interconnects three debates to show what this might imply for the ‘redemocratisation’ of UK society and
for pedagogical reform. One debate concerns deliberative types of democratic reform, arguing in favour of a ‘creative agnosticism’
towards the two philosophical frameworks which dominate this literature. This leads into a discussion of education and critical
rationality, arguing for an aptitude-based account of moral agency, one which relates to the sociocultural resources we inherit
from the past. The final debate therefore concerns social memory. I do not offer a theory of social memory but critique various
commentators in arguing for what I call a ‘multipolar analysis’. This both describes the analytical method adopted in this
article and the skills and capacities which a system based upon ‘education for discourse’ would need to facilitate. The article
therefore proposes that democracy, education and memory—deliberativeness, critical rationality and social remembering—be brought
closer together for the mutual benefit of each debate.
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Tony FitzpatrickEmail: |
14.
Stefano Predelli 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):293-305
This essay proposes a semantic analysis of biscuit-conditionals, such as Austin’s classic example “there are biscuits in the
cupboard if you want some”. The analysis is grounded on the ideas of contextual restrictions, and of non-character encoded
aspects of meaning, and provides a rigorous framework for the widespread intuitions that (i) the if-clause in a biscuit-conditional
is truth-conditionally idle, but (ii) it ‘qualifies’ the speech-act in question. In the concluding section of this essay,
the analysis is also applied to the importantly similar phenomenon of speech-act adverbs.
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Stefano PredelliEmail: |
15.
Purushottama Bilimoria 《Sophia》2008,47(3):359-376
Nietzsche represents in an interesting way the well-worn Western approach to Asian philosophical and religious thinking: initial
excitement, then neglect by appropriation, and swift rejection when found to be incompatible with one’s own tradition, whose
roots are inexorably traced back to the ‘ancient’ Greeks. Yet, Nietzsche’s philosophical critique and methods - such as ‘perspectivism’
- offer an instructive route through which to better understand another tradition even if the sole purpose of this exercise
is to perceive one’s own limitations through the eyes of the other: a self-destruktion of sorts. To help correct this shortcoming and begin the long overdue task of even-handed dialogue - or contemporary comparative
philosophy - we will be served well by looking at Nietzsche’s mistakes, which in turn informed the tragic critic of the West
of the last century, Martin Heidegger. We may learn here not to cast others in one’s own troubled image; and not to reverse
cultural icons: Europe’s Superman, and Asia’s Buddha.
相似文献
Purushottama BilimoriaEmail: |
16.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
17.
Timothy Chappell 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(3):255-265
I discuss Bernard Williams’ ‘integrity objection’ – his version of the demandingness objection to unreasonably demanding ‘extremist’
moral theories such as consequentialism – and argue that it is best understood as presupposing the internal reasons thesis.
However, since the internal reasons thesis is questionable, so is Williams’ integrity objection. I propose an alternative
way of bringing out the unreasonableness of extremism, based on the notion of the agent’s autonomy, and show how an objection
to this proposal can be outflanked by a strategy that also outflanks the ‘paradox of deontology.’
相似文献
Timothy ChappellEmail: |
18.
Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can
ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion,
the subject owns the ‘inserted’ thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative
analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the ‘inserted’ thoughts.
We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought
insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions
of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality,
rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition.
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Matthew BroomeEmail: |
19.
Stephen Finlay 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):315-340
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis
of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms
of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the
end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical
uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform
the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.
相似文献
Stephen FinlayEmail: |
20.
Christopher Cordner 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):593-609
In his later writings on ethics Foucault argues that rapport à soi – the relationship to oneself – is what gives meaning to
our commitment to ‘moral behaviour’. In the absence of rapport à soi, Foucault believes, ethical adherence collapses into
obedience to rules (‘an authoritarian structure’). I make a case, in broadly Levinasian terms, for saying that the call of
‘the other’ is fundamental to ethics. This prompts the question whether rapport à soi fashions an ethical subject who is unduly
self-concerned. Here we confront two apparently irreconcilable pictures of the source of moral demands. I describe one way
of trying to reconcile them from a Foucaultian perspective, and I note the limitations in the attempt. I also try to clear
away what I think to be a misunderstanding on Foucault’s part about what is at stake in the choice between these pictures.
To clarify my critique of Foucault, I also relate it to a similar recent critique of virtue ethics by Thomas Hurka.
相似文献
Christopher CordnerEmail: |