How to answer an unanswerable question? Factors affecting correct “don't know” responding in memory tasks

When reporting from memory, people may often be asked unanswerable questions—questions for which the correct answer has never been encoded. These unanswerable questions should be met with an “I don't know” response. Previous research has shown that a manipulation commonly used to enhance memory at retrieval—context reinstatement—reduces appropriate “do not know” responding to unanswerable questions. Here we investigated whether this reduction is due to increased belief that a given question is answerable, or solely to increased confidence in specific responses for questions already believed to be answerable. In two experiments, we show that context reinstatement reduces “do not know” responding even when a “do not remember” option is available to express beliefs that particular questions are answerable. These results indicate that improved access to contextual information at retrieval creates an erroneous belief that unanswerable questions are in fact answerable.     

Mental Health,Belief Deficit Compensation,and Paranormal Beliefs

The present study examined the relationship between religious and nonreligious paranormal beliefs and mental health, as well as the possibility that nonreligious subjects compensate for a lack of identification with traditional religion by increased nonreligious paranormal beliefs. Subjects were 80 undergraduates categorized as religious or nonreligious on the basis of scores on the Traditional Religion subscale of the Paranormal Belief Scale. Religious subjects had significantly higher total paranormal belief scores than nonreligious subjects. Those adopting religious paranormal beliefs were actually somewhat more likely to adopt other nonreligious paranormal beliefs. The failure of nonreligious subjects to compensate fully for this traditional religious belief deficit was reflected in their mental health ratings on the Langer's Mental Health Scale (Langer, 1962). Paranormal beliefs were found to be negatively correlated with reported symptoms of psychopathology, supporting the formulation that paranormal beliefs may serve to ensure psychic integrity by acting as “self-serving cognitive biases.”     

Evaluating scientific research: Belief,hindsight bias,ethics, and research evaluation

Students may exhibit two forms of cognitive biases, belief and hindsight bias, in evaluating a scientific experiment. Counter to disagreement, they may only believe an outcome that agrees with their belief to be more predictable in hindsight than foresight. The focus of this research is on the relationship between these biases. Students were queried about their dichotomous beliefs (learned vs. genetic) about behavior for an animal experiment and then assigned randomly to a no‐outcome or genetic outcome condition. With agreement between students' belief and outcome, the findings revealed hindsight bias (foreseeability) supported by the outcomes for surprise, disappointment, ethics, and research evaluation. With disagreement, hindsight bias was trumped along with perceiving the experiment as being less ethical and scientifically sound. Regardless of the outcome, students seem to adhere to their beliefs. Hence, students may believe that the outcome is inconsequential because it is obvious or contrary to their beliefs.     

Virtue epistemology and tacit cognitive processes in high-grade knowledge

Duncan Pritchard has recently argued that a certain brand of virtue epistemology, known as “virtue responsibilism”, cannot account for knowledge acquired through the use of tacit reasoning processes. I defend virtue responsiblism by showing that Pritchard's charge is founded on a mischaracterization of the view. Contra Pritchard, responsibilists do not demand that agents have complete access to the grounds for their beliefs in order to know. A closer examination of prominent accounts of virtue responsiblism, including Zagzebski's and Hookway's, reveals that the accessibility requirement is much weaker than Pritchard presumes. Zagzebski maintains that it is only intellectually virtuous motivations which drive the agent to adopt truth-conducive procedures and habits that must be accessible, rendering the agent responsible for her belief. Hookway writes that agents may display virtue not by actively monitoring or accessing each step of their deliberation, but by allowing deeply embedded intellectual traits to tacitly guide or shape their process of inquiry. Additional support for Hookway's claim comes from Dreyfus and Dreyfus's model of learning and mastery, which will be briefly discussed at the end. I conclude, therefore, that virtue responsibilists can accommodate knowledge acquired through nonreflectively accessible cognitive operations.     

Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

Tracing enhances problem-solving transfer,but without effects on intrinsic or extraneous cognitive load

People can make pointing gestures and tracing actions with the index finger with little or no conscious effort. From the perspective of cognitive load theory, such “biologically primary” gestures and actions might help people learn “biologically secondary” concepts and skills requiring extended cognitive effort, such as reading, science, or mathematics. Studies on tracing or tracing and pointing have yielded mixed findings regarding hypothesized effects on intrinsic and extraneous cognitive load. The present study investigated whether computer-based instructions to trace elements of worked examples on angle relationships would affect school students' (N = 106) self-reports of intrinsic and extraneous cognitive load, as well as problem-solving transfer test performance. The tracing effect on transfer posttests seen in prior studies was replicated, but cognitive load hypotheses were not supported. Implications for educational practice and future research are discussed.     

PERSONAL ATTACHMENT TO BELIEFS

Abstract: There is a tendency in philosophical discussions to see beliefs as belonging to specific people—to see things in terms of “your” belief, or “my” belief, or “Smith's” belief. I call this “personal attachment to beliefs.” This mindset is unconscious, deeply ingrained, and a powerful background stance in discussion and thinking. Attachment has a negative impact on the quality of philosophical discussion and learning: difficulties in acknowledging error and changing beliefs, blindness to new evidence, difficulties in understanding new ideas, entrenchment in views, rancorous behavior, and the encouragement of competitive personal contests rather than collaborative searches for the truth. This article investigates the nature of attachment and traces out some of the undesirable consequences for classroom philosophical discussion, thinking, writing, and learning. It presents an alternative model to attachment and offers constructive suggestions for implementing the results of the investigation in the philosophy classroom and elsewhere.     

Agent Reliabilism,Subjective Justification,and Epistemic Credit

In this paper I examine John Greco's agent reliabilism, in particular, his requirement of subjective justification. I argue that his requirement is too weak as it stands to disqualify as knowledge claims some true beliefs arrived at by reliable processes and that it is vulnerable to the “value problem” objection. I develop a more robust account of subjective justification that both avoids the objection that agents require beliefs about their dispositions in order to be subjectively justified and explains why knowledge is more valuable than true belief.     

Maladaptive Core Beliefs and their Relation to Generalized Anxiety Disorder

Research has demonstrated that individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) hold unhelpful beliefs about worry, uncertainty, and the problem-solving process. Extant writings (e.g., treatment manuals) also suggest that other types of maladaptive beliefs may characterize those with GAD. However, these other beliefs have received limited empirical attention and are not an explicit component of cognitive theories of GAD. The present study examined the extent to which dysfunctional attitudes, early maladaptive schemas, and broad self-focused and other-focused beliefs explain significant variance in GAD symptoms, over and above negative and positive beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about uncertainty, and negative beliefs about problems. N = 138 participants classified into Probable GAD and Non-GAD groups completed self-report measures. After controlling for trait anxiety and depressive symptoms, only beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about uncertainty, and schemas reflecting unrelenting standards (e.g., “I must meet all my responsibilities all the time”), the need to self-sacrifice (e.g., “I'm the one who takes care of others”), and less positive views of other people and their intentions (e.g., lower endorsement of views such as “other people are fair”), were unique correlates of Probable GAD versus Non-GAD or GAD severity. Theoretical and clinical implications are discussed.     

“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

Belief in free will as an adaptive,ungrounded belief

False beliefs and delusions are usually regarded negatively, especially in psychology and evolutionary biology. Recently, McKay and Dennett (2009b) have argued that there are ungrounded beliefs which confer benefits on individuals even if they are false. I propose to expand this class of beliefs to include the belief that one has free will, and I will defend the claim that this belief is advantageous, even if it is false. One derives one’s belief in control from one’s experience of control, which is generated by a set of cognitive systems termed “control systems.” While the control systems and the interpretive mechanism are useful in and of themselves, the belief in personal free will is adaptive because it directly leads to fitness-increasing behaviors. As such, we have good reason to regard the belief that one has free will as an adaptive, ungrounded belief. This paper will also suggest that further research on the possible distinction between belief in personal free will and belief in general free will may put us in a better position to understand recent, apparently contradictory data on individuals’ beliefs regarding free will and other related phenomena.     

心理贫困：概念、表现及其干预

长期物质贫困产生特殊的心理后果——心理贫困。心理贫困指的是不利于贫困阶层摆脱贫困的心理与行为模式,主要表现为 “志向失灵”与“行为失灵”,即抱负与志向缺位,理念和意识扭曲,能力与行为方式错位,还易于做出不利于脱贫的决策行为;长此以往,就陷入“贫穷—特定心理与行为模式—继续贫穷”的恶性循环。对此,研究者们先后开发了有条件现金转移项目、减少认知资源损耗项目、“转移和坚持”心理干预策略、社会阶层流动信念干预策略、公平感提升策略等干预方案。该领域研究及其相关成果对“精准”扶贫,促进社会公平、增加人类福祉具有重要意义。未来研究应在整合的干预方案和本土化的干预方案等方面予以加强。     

心理贫困：概念、表现及其干预

长期物质贫困产生特殊的心理后果——心理贫困。心理贫困指的是不利于贫困阶层摆脱贫困的心理与行为模式,主要表现为 “志向失灵”与“行为失灵”,即抱负与志向缺位,理念和意识扭曲,能力与行为方式错位,还易于做出不利于脱贫的决策行为;长此以往,就陷入“贫穷—特定心理与行为模式—继续贫穷”的恶性循环。对此,研究者们先后开发了有条件现金转移项目、减少认知资源损耗项目、“转移和坚持”心理干预策略、社会阶层流动信念干预策略、公平感提升策略等干预方案。该领域研究及其相关成果对“精准”扶贫,促进社会公平、增加人类福祉具有重要意义。未来研究应在整合的干预方案和本土化的干预方案等方面予以加强。     

Belief as emotion

It is commonly held that (i) beliefs are revisable in the face of counter-evidence and (ii) beliefs are connected to actions in reliable and predictable ways. Given such a view, many argue that if a mental state fails to respond to evidence or doesn't result in the kind of behavior typical or expected of belief, it is not a belief after all, but a different state. Yet, one finds seeming counter examples of resilient beliefs that fail to respond to evidence, or that do not connect to action in the way that is expected. I offer a view of belief that does not force us to exclude states as real beliefs that we pre-reflectively think of as beliefs, and that does not require us to “outsource” the work belief seems to do to other mental states. I propose that we view belief as a type of emotion where emotions are understood a irreducibly blended states, containing representational, motivational and phenomenological elements.     

An Investigation of Teachers' Beliefs of Students' Algebra Development

Elementary, middle, and high school mathematics teachers (N = 105) ranked a set of mathematics problems based on expectations of their relative problem-solving difficulty. Teachers also rated their levels of agreement to a variety of reform-based statements on teaching and learning mathematics. Analyses suggest that teachers hold a symbol-precedence view of student mathematical development, wherein arithmetic reasoning strictly precedes algebraic reasoning, and symbolic problem-solving develops prior to verbal reasoning. High school teachers were most likely to hold the symbol-precedence view and made the poorest predictions of students' performances, whereas middle school teachers' predictions were most accurate. The discord between teachers' reform-based beliefs and their instructional decisions appears to be influenced by textbook organization, which institutionalizes the symbol-precedence view. Because of their extensive content training, high school teachers may be particularly susceptible to an expert blindspot, whereby they overestimate the accessibility of symbol-based representations and procedures for students' learning introductory algebra.     

Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind1

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. the belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. the author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet.     

Discussion

While in no way denying the interest of the study of “Theories of Mind”, the discussion tends to show that, in the tasks described in the papers, the development of abilities to process perceptual and verbal information is sufficient in itself to fully account for changes in observed responses. Whether the issue is false beliefs or the distinction between appearance and reality, children's behavior is highly dependent on their working memory span, their operational efficiency (action coordination) and their current state of knowledge. “Theories of Mind” emerge as indices of cognitive development. Their adaptive value is more problematical.