Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.     

The Moral Foundations of Human Rights Attitudes

Human rights are claimed to be innate and based on moral principles. Human rights attitudes have been shown to be related to political ideology, but there have been few studies investigating their relationship with morality. Using moral foundations theory, we examine whether morals can predict human rights attitudes across two studies. The first study used questionnaires to show that human rights are based exclusively on individualizing moral foundations; however, increases in individualizing and decreases in binding foundations predict increases in human rights endorsement. Moral foundations also mediated the relationship between political identification and human rights. Both individualizing and binding foundations performed a role in explaining the lower endorsement of human rights by conservatives as compared to liberals. The second study used textual analysis of newspaper articles to show that human-rights-related articles contained more moral language than other articles, in particular for the individualizing foundations. Conservative newspapers had a greater use of binding foundations in human rights articles than liberal newspapers.     

个体道德修养与生命健康--关于道德建设途径的思考

在人类进入21世纪的今天,无论是发展中国家还是相对发达的西方世界,都面临着一些道德失范、身心失落的问题。如何有效地提升个体的道德素质,进而提高全社会的道德水准,更好地促进人类道德建设,是值得我们伦理学工作者深思的重要现实课题。本文尝试就此做一些探讨,以做引玉之砖。一道德建设的关键在于个体道德内化伦理学研究的最终落脚点在于外部道德规范、道德准则的内化。道德内化可谓伦理学研究的“牛鼻子”,也是个体道德养成的关键所在。而整个人类的道德建设则是由单个道德主体的道德养成构成的,因此,也可以说人类道德建设的关键就在于…     

Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of Science

Whether the US Constitution guarantees a right to conduct scientific research is a question that has never been squarely addressed by the United States Supreme Court. Similarly, the extent to which the First Amendment protects the right to communicate the results of scientific research is an issue about which there is scant judicial authority. This article suggests that a crucial guidepost for exploring both these uncharted areas of constitutional law should be whether restrictions on scientific research or communication truly implicate fundamental individual rights or instead primarily concern issues of general social welfare—issues that in a democracy are properly decided by the representative branches of government or their delegates, not by the judiciary.     

个体道德的发生与公民道德建设

个体道德的发生 ,是通过道德内化来实现的。道德内化的过程是社会和个体互动的过程。因此 ,在公民道德建设中 ,我们应当把外部道德控制和内部道德控制、道德灌输机制与道德接受机制、先进性要求和广泛性要求有机地结合起来     

《社会道德与个体道德》评介

社会道德与个体道德是依据社会和个体的关系作出的一种道德分类。社会道德也称群体道德 ,指社会实际的道德状况。个体道德也称个人道德 ,指个人实际所具有的道德或品行。社会道德与个体道德既相互区别 ,又相互联系 ;既相互对立 ,又相互统一 ;同时还相互渗透和相互转化。社会道德是由每个人的个体道德有机结合的统一体 ,没有不包含个人、与个人道德不相关联的社会道德。个体道德是社会道德有机体中的一分子 ,没有脱离社会、与社会道德毫不相关的个体道德。现实生活中 ,社会道德与个体道德的许多问题 ,既有历史留给我们需要进一步解读的问题 ,…     

当前个体生活的特点及其道德困境

当前社会的各个方面正在发生着急剧的变化,在此基础上,人们的生活方式也在悄然改变,个体生活呈现出新的特点。以道德的眼光来审视个体生活,可以发现,在个体的生活中出现了与社会道德要求不相适应的方面而表现为一定的道德困境,比如,生活的功利化使生活的意义受到冷落,生活的物质化引起人们对消费公平的质问,生活中对科技的过度依赖和沉溺带来的道德隐忧,等等。走出这种道德困境在于提升个体对自由全面发展的认识,把意义纳入自身生活的内容之中,做一个有道德和有追求的人。     

人的所有制与人权概念

人的所有制是被用来从总体上表明一个人类共同体内部各成员之间占有关系的一种社会制度或社会关系;人的所有制是人类社会最基本的经济制度,它是区别和划分人类历史上各种不同经济形态的根本标志,是一个比生产资料所有制更为重要和更为基本的社会所有制的存在形式;人权概念是一个先后为在相关人类共同体中分别建立和维持人的公民所有制、劳动力的公民所有制、公民所有制的劳动者人身所有制、人格的公民平等、人的个人所有制、劳动力的个人所有制、个人所有制的劳动者人身所有制、婚权的个人所有制和使包括所有成年女性在内的所有社会成年成员享有人格的人类平等、劳动力的部分社会所有制等社会制度而被提出来的哲学概念、法律概念和政治概念。     

医患关系失和与患者道德权利的保护

在分析导致医患关系失和原因的基础上,界定“患者道德权利”内涵,揭示患者道德权利被忽视和遭受侵害是导致医患关系紧张的常见原因,结合患者道德权利的特点,提出强化患者权利保护的措施,即转化患者道德权利为制度性权利,提升权利的权威与效力;提高医务人员人文素质及执业能力;创新患者道德权利保护机制.     

Gratitude,Rights, and Moral Standouts

Many maintain that if a beneficiary has a right to a benefit provided by his benefactor, then the former cannot owe the latter gratitude for that benefit. In this paper I argue against that view. I provide examples in which benefactors provide others with benefits to which they have a right even though most others are denying them that right. These benefactors are moral standouts; they do what is right when most similarly situated agents fail to do so. I then spell out some of the features of these benefactors’ actions that make them worthy of gratitude.     

异熟概念的道德哲学意蕴

异熟概念之意指与果报不同,而有强烈的道德哲学意蕴.通过异熟概念的建立,唯识学认为道德善恶不同于价值而有绝对的意义,同时将道德善恶评判的范围严格限定在有记业上边,并阐明了道德对于现实生存状况的决定关系.     

Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants

According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no ??moral equality of combatants.?? That is, on the traditional view the combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war??but not vice versa (barring certain qualifications). I shall argue here, however, that in the large number of wars (and in practically all modern wars) where the combatants on the justified side violate the rights of innocent people (??collateral damage??), these combatants are in fact liable to attack by the combatants on the unjustified side. I will support this view with a rights-based account of liability to attack and then defend it against a number of objections raised in particular by Jeff McMahan. The result is that the thesis of the moral equality of combatants holds good for a large range of armed conflicts while the opposing thesis is of very limited practical relevance.