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R. Matthew Shockey 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(6):525-539
Against the background of a recent exchange between Cristina Lafont and Hubert Dreyfus, I argue that Heidegger's method of “formal indication” is at the heart of his attempt in Sein und Zeit to answer “the ontological question of the being of the ‘sum’” (SZ, p. 46). This method works reflexively, by picking out certain essential features of one's first-person singular being at the outset of its investigation that are implicit in the question “what is it to be the entity I am?” On the basis of these features, various further a priori, ontological structures (care and temporality) that constitute one as a first-person singular entity then become accessible. Formal indication is thus formal in two senses: it officially designates or signals certain first-person singular phenomena as the topic of investigation, and it picks out features which define the ontological form of the entity in question. It is thereby the method by which a legitimately transcendental account of our being may be begun to be generated by each of us from out of our factical, immanent existence. 相似文献
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Carleton B. Christensen 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(3-4):411-437
Heidegger's central concern is the question of being (Seinsfrage). The paper reconstructs this question at least for the young (pre- Kehre) Heidegger in the light of two interconnected hypotheses: (1) the substantial content of the question of being can be identified by seeing it as a response to (Marburg) neo-Kantianism; and (2) this content centres around the claim that, pace the neo-Kantians, 'epistemological' concerns are grounded in 'ontological' ones, for which reason 'ontology' must precede 'epistemology' as a form of philosophical inquiry. In section I the general position of (Marburg) neo-Kantianism is sketched. In section II the implications of the neo-Kantian position for the concepts of truth and reality, reason, and experience, are outlined; significant similarities to Sellars, Davidson, and Brandom are revealed. Finally, in section III Heidegger's analysis of everydayness is shown to yield a distinct critique of the neo-Kantian relativization of the concept of the real to the theoretically knowable. From this critique it emerges why Heidegger thinks that 'ontology' precedes 'epistemology'. The project of fundamental ontology marked by the question of being thus shows itself to be at least in part a response to the aporia of Marburg neo-Kantianism. 相似文献
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Dermot Moran 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):491-514
AbstractIn this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger’s concept of ‘transcendence’ as it appears in Being and Time (1927), ‘On the Essence of Ground’ (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907, and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, ‘transcendence in immanence’ is a leitmotif of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations §11 in a manner that is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of consciousness and intentionality and Heidegger deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his ‘On the Essence of Ground’, his submission to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence. 相似文献
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Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2007,133(3):443-453
Robert Stalnaker is an actualist who holds that merely possible worlds are uninstantiated properties that might have been
instantiated. Stalnaker also holds that there are no metaphysically impossible worlds: uninstantiated properties that couldn't
have been instantiated. These views motivate Stalnaker's "two dimensional" account of the necessary a posteriori on which
there is no single proposition that is both necessary and a posteriori. For a (metaphysically) necessary proposition is true
in all (metaphysically) possible worlds. If there were necessary a posteriori propositions, that would mean that there were
propositions true in all possible worlds but which could only be known to be true by acquiring empirical evidence. Consider
such a purported proposition P. The role of empirical evidence for establishing P's truth would have to be to rule out worlds
in which P is false. If there were no such worlds to be ruled out, we would not require evidence for P. But by hypothesis,
P is necessary and so true in all metaphysically possible worlds. And on Stalnaker's view, the metaphysically possible worlds
are all the worlds there are. So there can be no proposition that is true in all possible worlds, but that we require evidence
to know. In this way, the motivation for Stalnaker's two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori rests on his denying
that there are metaphysically impossible Worlds. I argue that given his view of what possible worlds are, Stalnaker has no
principled reason for denying that there are metaphysically impossible worlds. If I am right, this undercuts Stalnaker's motivation
for his two dimensional account of the necessary a posteriori.
相似文献
Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |
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Brigitte Falkenburg 《Synthese》2011,182(1):149-163
Depending on different positions in the debate on scientific realism, there are various accounts of the phenomena of physics. For scientific realists like Bogen and Woodward, phenomena are matters
of fact in nature, i.e., the effects explained and predicted by physical theories. For empiricists like van Fraassen, the
phenomena of physics are the appearances observed or perceived by sensory experience. Constructivists, however, regard the
phenomena of physics as artificial structures generated by experimental and mathematical methods. My paper investigates the
historical background of these different meanings of “phenomenon” in the traditions of physics and philosophy. In particular,
I discuss Newton’s account of the phenomena and Bohr’s view of quantum phenomena, their relation to the philosophical discussion,
and to data and evidence in current particle physics and quantum optics. 相似文献
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Fredrik Svenaeus 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2010,31(3):179-196
This paper investigates the question of what an organ is from a phenomenological perspective. Proceeding from the phenomenology
of being-in-the-world developed by Heidegger in Being and Time and subsequent works, it compares the being of the organ with the being of the tool. It attempts to display similarities
and differences between the embodied nature of the organs and the way tools of the world are handled. It explicates the way
tools belong to the totalities of things of the world that are ready to use and the way organs belong to the totality of a
bodily being able to be in this very world. In so doing, the paper argues that while the organ is in some respects similar
to a bodily tool, this tool is nonetheless different from the tools of the world in being tied to the organism as a whole,
which offers the founding ground of the being of the person. However, from a phenomenological point of view, the line between
organs and tools cannot simply be drawn by determining what is inside and outside the physiological borders of the organism.
We have, from the beginning of history, integrated technological devices (tools) in our being-in-the-world in ways that make
them parts of ourselves rather than parts of the world (more organ- than tool-like), and also, more recently, have started
to make our organs more tool-like by visualising, moving, manipulating, and controlling them through medical technology. In
this paper, Heidegger’s analysis of organ, tool, and world-making is confronted with this development brought about by contemporary
medical technology. It is argued that this development has, to a large extent, changed the phenomenology of the organ in making
our bodies more similar to machines with parts that have certain functions and that can be exchanged. This development harbours
the threat of instrumentalising our bodily being but also the possibility of curing or alleviating suffering brought about
by diseases which disturb and destroy the normal functioning of our organs. 相似文献
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Arnulf Kolstad 《Integrative psychological & behavioral science》2010,44(1):58-64
This article focuses on the “machine paradigm” in psychology and its consequences for (mis)understanding of human beings.
It discusses causes of the mainstream epistemology in Western societies, referring to philosophical traditions, the prestige
of some natural sciences and mathematical statistics. It emphasizes how the higher psychological functions develop dialectically
from a biological basis and how the brain due to its plasticity changes with mental and physical activity. This makes a causal
machine paradigm unfit to describe and explain human psychology and human development. Some concepts for an alternative paradigm
are suggested. 相似文献
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Palmer EM Horowitz TS Torralba A Wolfe JM 《Journal of experimental psychology. Human perception and performance》2011,37(1):58-71
Many visual search experiments measure response time (RT) as their primary dependent variable. Analyses typically focus on mean (or median) RT. However, given enough data, the RT distribution can be a rich source of information. For this paper, we collected about 500 trials per cell per observer for both target-present and target-absent displays in each of three classic search tasks: feature search, with the target defined by color; conjunction search, with the target defined by both color and orientation; and spatial configuration search for a 2 among distractor 5s. This large data set allows us to characterize the RT distributions in detail. We present the raw RT distributions and fit several psychologically motivated functions (ex-Gaussian, ex-Wald, Gamma, and Weibull) to the data. We analyze and interpret parameter trends from these four functions within the context of theories of visual search. 相似文献
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T Natsoulas 《The American journal of psychology》1983,96(4):435-467
Four answers to the title question are critically reviewed. (a) The first answer proposes that we perceive our brain events, certain occurrences in our brain that appear to us as parts of the environment. (b) Gestalt psychology distinguishes the phenomenal from the physical and proposes that we always perceive some aspect of our own phenomenal world--which is isomorphic but not identical to certain of our brain events. (c) J. J. Gibson held that our perceptual experiences are registrations of properties of the external environment--which is, therefore, perceived directly (i.e., without experiencing anything else). (d) The fourth answer comprehends perceptual experience to be a qualitative form of noninferential awareness of the apparent properties of specific environmental things. It differs from Gibson's answer in several respects, including the claim that some aspect of the external world appears to us whenever we have perceptual experience. 相似文献
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Dyslexic children often show attention problems at school, but it is not clear the nature of their impairments. The aim of this study was to analyze whether verbal processing artefacts could mediate attention deficits. Forty-seven children (22 dyslexics and 25 controls), aged between 7 to 12, were assessed through an ADHD rating scale and a battery of tasks tapping different attentional processes (selective, sustained, executive, and orienting). Phonological measures were used as covariates. Children with dyslexia showed attentional impairments (using both rating scales and neuropsychological tasks); however their performance was significantly affected by phonological performance. In conclusion, dyslexics may be inattentive at school because they are slow processors, in particular when they are presented with verbal stimuli. 相似文献
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Abstract Fifty five people, either currently sick or having recovered from their illness, were recruited if they reported positive consequences of illness. They were questioned about their experiences of illness, 41 by semi-structured interview and 14 by open-ended questionnaire and responses were classified into 17 categories. The categories were similar but slightly more extensive than previous accounts of positive consequences reported in the literature. The content of the interviews and questionnaires was used to construct a 66 item questionnaire about positive consequences of illness which was then completed by 97 patients. A principal components analysis indicated a large first factor accounting for 27% of the variance. Endorsement of items varied between 87% and zero for chronic lung disease patients attending pulmonary rehabilitation. However, all patients endorsed at least one item and the median number of items endorsed was 31. Positive consequences of illness are highly varied and more common than often realised, and this has implications for the concept and measurement of quality of life. 相似文献
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