World views and the concept of development: A reply to Lerner and Kauffman

I reply here to the argument of R. M. Lerner and M. B. Kauffman (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 309–333) that an adequate concept of human development is incompatible with a mechanist “world view” but rests instead on a principled integration of contextualist and organicist “world views.” I review how each of these metatheoretical positions is described by the philosopher who proposed them and conclude that the version of contextualism and organicism presented by Lerner and Kauffman is so diluted as to lose the essence of their original meaning. In consequence, the concept of development they propose, which includes the notion of integrative levels, causal variables that interact differently at different times in the course of ontogeny, and probabilistic outcomes is more compatible with the mechanistic metatheory they eschew than with the contextualist and organismic ones they ostensibly espouse.     

On resolving conflicting views of cognitive conflict

F. B. Murray's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 54–61) conclusion that a theoretically ambiguous relationship exists between cognitive conflict and Piaget's notion of equilibration was considered. It was suggested that theoretical clarity can be achieved if a distinction is drawn between conflict induction (disequilibrium) and conflict resolution (equilibration). Murray's suggestion that in Piaget's theory internal (cognitive) conflict can be mentally created was disputed. G. N. Cantor's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 39–53) concerns about the adequacy of the measures of internal conflict in B. J. Zimmerman & D. E. Blom's (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 18–38) study due to their independence from external conflict manipulations was discussed. We agreed with Cantor that such findings obviate direct disconfirmation of an internal conflict construct; however, we suggested that evidence of conservation learning in the absence of either external or internal conflict renders Piaget's account less tenable.     

Genetic mediation of sex differences in horizontality: A rejoinder

Neither M. G. McGee (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 289–295) nor M. J. Allen, M. A. Wittig, and K. Butler (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 284–288) suggest any alternative explanation for our finding that water-level performance appears to have an X-linked genetic basis. The power calculations of Allen et al. are found to be faulty, and McGee confuses the hypothesis we tested with a weaker hypothesis. Although the X-linked genetic model is not an adequate model of water-level performance the water-level data fit the X-linked model far better than color blindness and HCN data McGee presents as exemplars of X-linked characteristics.     

A reexamination of mental arithmetic models and data: A reply to Ashcraft

In a review of the chronometric literature, M. Ashcraft (1982, Developmental Review, 2, 213–236) concludes that adults store each basic arithmetic fact in a table-like retrieval network. In my commentary (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 225–230), I argued that procedural knowledge (stored rules, principles, or heuristics) might be a cognitively more economical basis for generating many number combinations. In this paper, I draw an analogy between this alternative model of number fact representation and how computers efficiently reconstruct arithmetic combinations, note that the research findings do not clearly support any one model of mental arithmetic, and attempt to address Ashcraft's (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 231–235) criticisms of my model.     

Why Reading? Because it's there

Three papers (V. A. Mann, Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15; G. Wolford & C. A. Fowler, Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35; F. J. Morrison, Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47) are critiqued from the standpoint of their adequacy in advancing our understanding of a problem as complex as reading disability. Experimenters should be explicit about their guiding theoretical assumptions, and should think through the relations, if any, between their laboratory tasks and the actual processes of reading. The reading protocol of a dyslexic child is provided, and is interpreted within the frameworks of the Mann, Wolford and Fowler, and Morrison viewpoints.     

Elkind on egocentrism

The purpose of this paper is to respond to D. Elkind's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 218–226) reply to D. Lapsley and M. Murphy's (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 201–217) critique of the adolescent egocentrism theory. After a reprise of the issues in contention, we address the problem of theoretical consistency and self-other differentiation in Dr. Elkind's (1967, Child Development, 38, 1025–1034) theory. The role of formal operations in the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) account of the imaginary audience and personal fable is revised, and the empirical support for Elkind's theory is reviewed. We conclude that there are good conceptual and empirical grounds for doubting the major assumptions of the adolescent egocentrism theory, and that the Lapsley and Murphy (1985) framework has promise in suggesting theoretical integration with other approaches to the self.     

The case of the disappearing disagreements: A reply to Yussen

S. R. Yussen (1984, Developmental Review, 4, 139–144) and I have few disagreements. The major one seems to be in what the purpose of my article (R. J. Sternberg, 1984, Developmental Review, 4, 113–138) should have been. I believe the article fulfills my own purpose, if not Yussen's.     

Is it just reading?: Comments on the papers by Mann,Morrison, and Wolford and Fowler

Comments on the stimulating papers by V. A. Mann (Reading skill and language skill. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 1–15), F. Morrison (Reading disability: A problem in rule learning and word decoding. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 36–47), and G. Wolford and C. A. Fowler (Differential use of partial information by good and poor readers. Developmental Review, 1984, 4, 16–35) come under four headings. First, their differences with respect to the organizing themes are identified. Second, the central difficulty, for theories of reading disability, posed by the high correlation between reading and IQ, and ways of dealing with this difficulty, are discussed. In the third and fourth sections, comments on the individual papers and a summary of the main lessons to be learned from this collection are presented.     

Traits,processes, and the purpose of templates

The template method proposed by D. J. Bem and D. C. Funder 1978, Psychological Review, 85, 485–501) can have two separate purposes. First, template-behavior pairs can be used as a type of explanation in which situational influences are incorporated within a trait theory. Second, template matching can be used as a method for evaluating process theories. Recent discussion (D. J. Bem, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 390–393; D. C. Funder, 1983; Psychological Review, 90, 283–289; W. Mischel & P. K. Peake, 1982, Psychological Review, 89, 730–755) confuses these two purposes. If used as a type of explanation, then templates can be criticized on the grounds of blunt empiricism; but if templates are used as a method for evaluating process theories, then process theorists should welcome this new technique.     

Egocentrism redux

This commentary addresses itself to D.K. Lapsley and M.N. Murphy's critique (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 201–217) of my theory of egocentrism (D. Elkind, 1967, Child Development, 38, 1025–1034). These authors argue that the theory of egocentrism is inconsistent, that self-other differentiation occurs earlier than the theory suggests, and that self-consciousness does not require egocentrism. They conclude that perspective taking provides a more consistent and clear explanation of the adolescent phenomena of the imaginary audience and the personal fable than does egocentricism. I disagree and counter their arguments with my own.     

The Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment: A comment on Elardo and Bradley's review

The published and unpublished research pertaining to Caldwell's Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment (HOME) inventory was recently reviewed by R. Elardo and R. H. Bradley (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 113–145). Their review was unfortunately deficient in a number of respects. For example, certain methodological issues bearing on the interpretation of the available data were either unrecognized or dismissed without adequate consideration. In addition, some of the data in the studies cited which contradicted or clouded their conclusions were omitted. An extension and reanalysis of the conclusions reached by Elardo and Bradley in light of recently published studies which were not included in their review, and data not discussed in the studies which were reviewed, is provided. Methodological problems are highlighted, and directions for future research are suggested.     

Comments on Thomas and Jamison's “a test of the X-linked genetic hypothesis for sex differences on Piaget's water-level task”

In this paper H. Thomas and W. Jamison's (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 274–283) formulation and evaluation of an X-linked genetic model for explaining male superiority on Piaget's water horizontality task is examined. Criticisms are leveled against (1) the suitability of the model invoked for explaining the sex difference found, (2) the power of the statistical test used to evaluate the model, and (3) the appropriateness of their correction factors. A research strategy for advancing our understanding of the sex difference in performance at this task is suggested.     

Procedural knowledge versus fact retrieval in mental arithmetic: A reply to Baroody

Based on a review of reaction time studies, a model of mental arithmetic performance which emphasizes the process of fact retrieval from organized memory representations was proposed (M. H. Ashcraft, Developmental Review, 1982, 2, 213–236). In contrast to this view A. J. Baroody (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 225–230) proposes that most mental arithmetic performance depends on procedural knowledge such as rules, heuristics, and principles. While Baroody's idea is both intriguing and potentially important, its exposition is quite vague and speculative. Without concrete suggestions as to the nature of the proposed rules and heuristics, especially for routine problems like 4 + 3 and 8 × 5, Baroody's proposal appears to be pertinent only to special cases like N + 0 and N + 1. Lacking this sort of elaboration, the alternative does not provide a useful or compelling explanation of the existing Chronometric results, and seems, at best, to be premature.     

Affordances and infant learning: A reply to Horowitz

We reply to three major points made by F. Horowitz (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 405–409) in her commentary on the ecological approach to infant knowing presented by E. Goldfield (1983, Developmental Review, 3, 371–404). We first clarify the relation between perceiving and acting from an ecological perspective, and distinguish between affordances as environmental properties scaled to the perceiver/performer and representations as mental structures. We then present a critique of the process of association offered by Horowitz as an explanation of infant learning. Association fails to specify the constraints on what is learned, while the ecological process of noticing affordances, presented by Goldfield, considers such constraints. We conclude by presenting operational criteria for measuring affordances and evidence that perception is scaled to the perceiver/performer.     

A road careened into the woods: Comments on Dr. Morrison's commentary

Morrison's commentary on the paper entitled “Social Competence as a Developmental Construct” E. Waters & L. A. Sroufe Developmental Review 1983 3 79–97 focused primarily on the relevance of grand theory to contemporary issues in developmental psychology. The present comments reiterate central themes in the Waters and Sroufe paper that were either misconstrued or not discussed in the commentary. Waters and Sroufe offered (1) a definitional sketch rather than a grand theory, (2) a discussion of the need to employ diverse measures in order to assess a single construct at different ages, (3) much more extensive reference to empirical evidence than indicated in the commentary, and (4) a detailed discussion of assessment strategies common to various projects in which the coherence of individual development has been most evident in empirical data.     

What's left is closer to right : A response to keating

The present paper attempts to respond to criticisms made by Keating (1988, Developmental Review, 8, 376–384) regarding the present author's earlier paper which described a recasted model of formal operations ( Byrnes, 1988, Developmental Review, 8, 66–87). This earlier paper made a distinction between conceptual and procedural knowledge at the level of formal operations, and presented evidence supporting this recasted model. Keating (1988) argues that the recasted model fails to capture what Piaget originally intended, that it fails to incorporate a procedural knowledge component, and that there is some question as to what would constitute empirical support for the model. The present paper discusses each of these criticisms and others in turn, and clarifies earlier arguments.     

Intervention and sleeper effects: A reply to Victoria Seitz

Victoria Seitz (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 361–373) has misperceived and misunderstood our position (A. D. B. Clarke & A. M. Clarke, Developmental Review, 1981, 344–360). For example, our argument endorsed a transactional and not a main-effect model, nor was our aim to argue that early intervention has no important later consequences, nor did we dispute Consortium findings (I. Lazar & R. Darlington, Lasting effects after preschool, Washington, D.C.: DHEW Publication No. (OHDS) 79-30178, 1978). In fact, agreements with Seitz greatly exceed disagreements. Our skepticism about whether a behavioral treatment can have long-range effects without also having earlier ones remains. Long-term changes appear to result from ongoing long-term processes.     

Predictions of X-linked inheritance for human characteristics

The conclusion reached by H. Thomas and W. Jamison (Developmental Review, 1981, 1, 274–283) that an observed sex-related difference in water-level task performance is due to an X-linked major gene raises the question of whether available data would be consistent with X-linkage predictions other than the one tested. Several predictions of X-linked inheritance for human characteristics are presented and discussed. It was concluded that although water-level task performance may involve a heritable component, the available data from seven independent studies reviewed by Thomas and Jamison are insufficient for determining the specific mode of genetic transmission.     

Confusing developmental and individual differences

T. Globerson (1985, Developmental Review, 5, 261–273) compared the relative effects of an individual difference variable field dependency (FD/I) with a developmental variable (age) on a measure of M-capacity, in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) design. Age is a highly significant effect and the sum of squares associated with this factor accounts for 66% of the variance in M-capacity. FD/I is not significant and accounts for less than 1% of the variance in M-capacity. This is interpreted as indicating that M-capacity is a purely developmental phenomenon showing negligible individual differences. This paper argues that this result is an inevitable artifact of the experimental design. Further, the design is a common one in developmental psychology, and its dangers are largely unrecognized. The main problems concern (1) dichotomizing a continuous variable and treating the dichotomy as two levels of a factorial variable, (2) drawing inferences about the size of relationship between the continuous variable and the dependent variable on the basis of the variance accounted for by the factorial variable in the ANOVA, (3) differential reliability of measures of the independent variables, and (4) selective control of the sampling of the independent variables. These issues are explored in a simulation of Globerson's data and in an analogous analysis of data relating age and height, as independent variables, with weight as a dependent variable.     

Equilibration as cognitive conflict

The suitability of taking cognitive conflict as an operational definition of equilibration is examined along with the implications for conservation training. Exceptions are taken to the B. J. Zimmerman and D. E. Blom (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 18–38) analysis of conservation and some qualifying empirical results presented. It is concluded that cognitive conflict is sufficient, but not necessary, to bring about cognitive change.