La croyance au monde juste comme facteur explicatif de diverses réactions à des injustices professionnelles

The belief in a just world is defined as the tendency to consider that “people get what they deserve and deserve what they get”, i.e. to consider that the world is, globally, a place of justice. Facing an individual unjustly victim of negative events and for whom it seems impossible to restore the justice objectively, we frequently deny the existence of the unjustice, even if we say the responsible of what he gets. But if we can react by adopting “passive” reactions (using the victim’s moral or behavioral responsibility, as in Lerner, or evocating a future favoring the victim,..), we can also adopt “active” strategies which can lead to an objective re-establishment of the justice. In the present study, we examined the influence of the degree of the belief in the just world on the selected strategy facing professional injustices. And effectively, our results indicate a some preferences in the use of such or strategy, preferences accentuated by the gender and the professional statute.     

Creating and criticizing theory

F. W. Vondracek, R. M. Lerner, and J. E. Schulenberg (Journal of Vocational Behavior, 1983, 23, 179–202) criticize the vocational literature for failing to “follow acceptable scientific procedures for building a theory” and for failing to attend to important methodological and substantive developments. It is argued here that no single acceptable process for creating theory exists and three strategies useful for developing a theory are illustrated: immerse yourself in data, pick a specific set of results to explain, and try to resolve inconsistencies in the literature. Three criteria for evaluating theories and criticisms of them are discussed: comprehensiveness (content value), accuracy (truth value), and clarity (form). The paper by Vondracek et al. is examined from this perspective and is shown to lack the specificity, clarity, and accuracy necessary to be an effective guide to better vocational research or theory.     

Husserl’s hyletic data and phenomenal consciousness

In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of character that we do not create but can only discover. This determinate, non-representational stratum of perceptual consciousness also serves as a bridge between consciousness and the world beyond it. I articulate and defend this conception of perceptual consciousness. I locate the view in the space of contemporary positions on phenomenal character and argue for its superiority. I close by briefly arguing that the Husserlian account is perfectly compatible with physicalism (this involves disarming the Grain Problem).     

Me have a traffic accident? The effects of core self-evaluations on the perceived likelihood and perceived undesirability of traffic accidents

Problem: The aim of this article was to demonstrate the influence of “Core Self-Evaluations” (CSEs) on the perception which drivers have of the occurrence of a “traffic accident”, in particular the evaluation of its likelihood, of the personal control exercised and its undesirability (attitude). More generally, this article introduces the concept of CSE in the field of driver psychology and discusses its relevance. Method: 201 French drivers replied to a questionnaire measuring CSEs, the perceived likelihood of having an accident, attitude and perceived personal control. Results and discussion: The more positively drivers evaluated themselves, the more they judged that they were in control and that accidents were unlikely. Drivers with a negative self-evaluation had an attitude more negative than drivers with positive CSEs solely when they judged the accident as unlikely. This positive correlation between attitude and perceived likelihood for drivers with negative CSEs could be viewed as the result of “wishful thinking” or “rationalisation” modes of reasoning. For these drivers a positive relationship was also observed between driving experience and perceived personal control, the latter thus cancelling out the effect of CSEs. This result suggest that with experience self-evaluation as a driver becomes positive and compensates for the effect of a negative general self-evaluation on perceived personal control and perceived likelihood. Practical implications: Using and adapting the Experience-Based Analysis technique for each group of drivers (positive or negative CSEs) is recommended, as well as implementing interventions that triggers drivers’ awareness of CSEs influence and that promote their self-regulating skills.     

The specter of freedom: ressentiment and Dostoevskij’s notes from underground

The essay examines the Underground Man’s ambivalent position in Dostoevskij’s hierarchy of values in light of the Nietzschean concept of ressentiment. To elucidate the problem of free will in Notes from Underground, I propose to supplement Nietzsche’s theory with the concept of ressentiment as developed by Max Scheler, whose endorsement of Christian love as a means of overcoming ressentiment suggests an affinity with Dostoevskij’s own deeply religious worldview. With the help of Schelerian phenomenology, I read the novel as an early statement of the problem of Christian freedom in Dostoevskij’s oeuvre. Like the “Pro and Contra” section of The Brothers Karamazov, Notes from Underground turns our attention to the “costs” of the Christian ideal: in a world exposed to the ultimate horizon of desire through Christ, those lacking the serenity of faith may be doomed to the merciless torment of ressentiment.     

Search,rest, and grace in Pascal

For Pascal, how are human beings related, or how do they relate themselves, to the summum bonum in this life? In what sense do they share in it, and how do they come to share in it? These are questions that emerge in many ways in Pascal’s writing, significantly in his concept of repos. To answer these questions, especially by elucidating what repos is for human beings in this life, I would like to begin with Graeme Hunter’s “Motion and Rest in the Pensées”. Hunter’s account of Pascal is important because his purpose is to specifically address how certain aspects of modernity affect how Pascal understood repos. Hunter is certainly correct when he argues that for Pascal, repos is an orderly, directed seeking of truth—what Hunter designates as “search.” However, Hunter’s account of Pascal’s repos falls short of completion, because he neglects a crucial part of Pascal’s articulation of repos: his emphasis on the role of God’s grace in searching. By neglecting Pascal’s emphasis on grace, Hunter inadvertently depicts Pascal as reducing repos to motion, rather than envisioning them together in dialectical unity. I argue that for Pascal, it is correct to say that someone who is anxiously searching has indeed “already found,” but this cannot be solely due to human efforts: rather, it because the whole enterprise is entirely infused by grace.     

Robert Rosen’s Work and Complex Systems Biology

Complex Systems Biology approaches are here considered from the viewpoint of Robert Rosen’s (M,R)-systems, Relational Biology and Quantum theory, as well as from the standpoint of computer modeling. Realizability and Entailment of (M,R)-systems are two key aspects that relate the abstract, mathematical world of organizational structure introduced by Rosen to the various physicochemical structures of complex biological systems. Their importance for understanding biological function and life itself, as well as for designing new strategies for treating diseases such as cancers, is pointed out. The roles played by multiple metastable states in the “continuous uphill flow of Life” supported through internal bioenergetic processes that are coupled to essential inflows are also discussed in relation to dynamic realizations of (M,R)-systems. Furthermore, the roles played by the underlying, many-valued, quantum logics and symbolic computations for ultra-complex biological systems are also briefly discussed.     

The Problem of Cross-world Predication

While standard first-order modal logic is quite powerful, it cannot express even very simple sentences like “I could have been taller than I actually am” or “Everyone could have been smarter than they actually are”. These are examples of cross-world predication, whereby objects in one world are related to (sometimes the same) objects in another world. Extending first-order modal logic to allow for cross-world predication in a motivated way has proven to be notoriously difficult. In this paper, I argue that the standard accounts of cross-world predication all leave something to be desired. I then propose an account of cross-world predication based on quantified hybrid logic and show how it overcomes the limitations of these previous accounts. I will conclude by discussing various philosophical consequences and applications of such an account.     

Artifact and Essence

An essential property is a property that an object possesses in every possible world in which that object exists. An individual essence is a property (or set of properties) that an object possesses in every world in which that object exists, and that no other object possesses in any possible world. Call the claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence ‘artifactual essentialism’. I will argue that artifactual essentialism is true. In doing so, I will be responding to two recent arguments by Penelope Mackie against artifactual essentialism (Mackie (2006), esp. ch. 3.). In “Individual Essence Properties”, I will rehearse the qualifications that any property must meet if it is to constitute an individual essence, and in “Artifacts and the Recycling Problem” and “Artifacts and the Tolerance Problem”, I will rehearse Mackie’s arguments against artifactual essentialism. In “Artifacts and Weak Unshareability?” and “Artifacts and Strong Unshareability?”, I will show why both of these arguments fail. In “Mona Lisa’s Essence”, I will defend the interesting claim that some artifacts possess an individual essence. In the final section I will entertain some objections to my proposal.     

Modal Stability and Warrant

Keith DeRose believes that it is a strength of his contextualist analysis that it explains why the recently much-discussed skeptical Argument from Ignorance (AI) is so persuasive. Not only that, however; DeRose also believes that he is able to explain the underlying dynamics of AI by utilizing solely the epistemological and linguistic resources contained within his contextualist analysis. DeRose believes, in other words, that his contextualist analysis functions as a genuinely self-contained explanation of skepticism. But does it? In this paper I argue that DeRose’s analysis does not function as a self-contained explanation of skepticism since, as it turns out, DeRose’s analysis is simply irrelevant to the main concerns of the skeptic. To the extent that DeRose’s analysis is irrelevant in this way, I conclude that such an analysis cannot be considered a satisfactory treatment of AI.     

Influence and development: Two basic paradigms of education

The article discusses two basic paradigms of western educational theory, namely the concept of “influence” and the concept of “development”. Two historical contextes are analyzed, John Locke's theory of human learning and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's theory of natural development. Both theories are rejected in favour of a position beyond “influence” and “development”. This position of a theory of education (Erziehung) is marked with the term “moral communication”.     

Are children any more logical than monkeys on the five-term series problem?

Six-year-old children were tested on several versions of the five-term transitivity problem as used by B. O. McGonigle and M. Chalmers (1977, Nature (London), 267, 694–696) with squirrel monkeys as subjects. Both binary and triadic versions of the tests were administered in both verbal and nonverbal modes to help determine whether or not any major procedural differences between the monkey version and that used conventionally in research with children might account for the monkey's apparently nonlogical solution of the problem. The main result is that children showed very similar response profiles to that of monkeys in all the conditions used. In addition, “labeling”, direct seriation, and “association” post-tests suggest that nonlogical strategies can underwrite ostensibly impeccable transitive “reasoning” in child as well as monkey.     

Searching for Sharks and a Second Self

Twenty years ago, Pastoral Psychology published “The Extra Mile—Case History of a Homicide” (Moss, Pastoral Psychology 42:107–136, 1993, p.134). In that autobiographical vignette, I argued that pastoral theology has a responsibility to: “1) articulate contemporary ultimate concerns, 2) clarify healthy avenues for compensation, and 3) tell stories about the hopeful revelations of God’s providence in a broken world” (Moss, Pastoral Psychology 42:107–136, 1993, p.134). This story illustrates all three of these points by recording a psychological fragmentation and restoration resulting from the death of a dear friend—“a friend who sticks closer than a brother” (Prov. 18:24). Aristotle referred to this type of friend as “a second self.” In the Celtic church such a person was anam cara, a Gaelic expression for “soul friend.” A few years ago I lost such a friend to cancer. During my grieving process I created a private tribute from our unfulfilled wish to go on one more adventure together—specifically, a shark hunt. The capture and release of sharks is a unique extreme sport. It is also the vehicle by which I finally resolved my grief: I reunited with my second self by means of an image in the eye of a requiem shark, a reflection of anam cara. The interrelated layers of this occurrence—particularly its coincidences—evidence Providence, as well as provide an example of a “Contact with the Dead Experience” described by Andrew Greeley and myself some 20 years ago in the Journal of Religion and Health (Moss, Journal of Religion and Health 29:261–283, 1990).     

The world,the flesh and the argument from design

In the the passage just quoted from theDialogues concerning Natural Religion, David Hume developed a thought-experiment that contravened his better-known views about “chance” expressed in hisTreatise and firstEnquiry. For among other consequences of the ‘eternal-recurrence’ hypothesis Philo proposes in this passage, it may turn out that what the vulgar call cause is nothing but a secret and concealed chance. (In this sentence, I have simply reversed “cause” and “chance” in a well-known passage fromHume's Treatise, p. 130). In the first eight sections of this essay, I develop one topological and model-theoretic analogue of Hume's thought-experiment, in which ‘most’ (‘A-generic’) modelsM of a ‘scientific’ theoryU are both ‘eternally recurrent’ and topologically random (in a sense which will be made precise), even though they are ‘inductively’ defined, via a step-by-step (‘empirical’?) procedure that Hume might have been inclined to endorse. The last aspect of this model-theoretic thought-experiment also serves to distinguish it from simpler measure-theoretic prototypes that are known to follow from Kolmogorov's Zero-One Law (cf. the Introduction, 5.2, 6.1 and 6.7 below). In the last three sections, I will argue more informally

1. that the metamathematical thought-experiments just mentioned do have a genuine metaphysical relevance, and that this relevance is predominantly skeptical in its implications;
2. that such ‘nonstandard’ instances of semantic underdetermination and ‘pathology’ seem to be the metatheoretic rule rather than the exception; and therefore,
3. that metamathematical and metatheoretic ‘malign-genius’ arguments are quite coherent, contrary (e.g.) to assertions such as that of Putnam (1980), pp. 7–8.

In the essay's conclusion, finally, I assimilate (2) and (3) to the familiar datum that ‘simplicity’, rather than ‘pathology’, has more often than not turned out to be an anomalous ‘special case’ in the historical development of scientific and mathematical ontology.     

1966 and All That: James Gibson and Bottom-Down Theory

ABSTRACT

The “later” James Gibson is widely misrepresented as an extreme stimulus–response theorist. In fact, Gibson's 1966 book presents a radical alternative to stimulus–response theory. “Perceptual systems” are not passive and receptive but “organs of active attention” (1966/1968, p. 58). Perceivers “reach out” into the world. This commentary examines some of the implications of Gibson's systems-cum-functionalist-cum-ecological approach, including the relations between the senses; the concept of “sensationless” perception; and most fundamentally, the nature of perceptual systems as extending beyond the body. I conclude that an adequate understanding of perception cannot be limited to the already severely limited domain of psychology. If Gibson is right, “ecological psychology” is a contradiction in terms.     

Skepticism,Contextualism, and Discrimination*

The skeptic says that “knowledge” is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that ‘knowledge” is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about “knowledge”? And what implications do these hypotheses about “knowledge” have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about “knowledge”, but that both hypotheses about “knowledge” have deeply anti‐skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.     

A note on final causes and their role in contextualism

According to the contextualist world view, it is not possible to specify before-hand the formal characteristics of the outcomes of development. Some authors have claimed that this constitutes a rejection of final causes. This note distinguishes between the two kinds of final cause, “end stages” and “functions,” both of which can be found in the literature and traced back to Aristotle. It is argued that only one kind of final cause (end stages) is rejected in contextualism and that the other kind (functions) may even be useful to contextualism.