Accountability and cooperation in social dilemmas: The influence of others’ reputational concerns

The present study examined the assumption that non-anonymous choices in social dilemmas (i.e., choices for which one is accountable) may influence cooperation, but only to the extent that decision-makers believe that the others will evaluate non-cooperation negatively. Based on a recent review by Kerr (1999), it was expected that under conditions of accountability, decision-makers would cooperate more when they believed that the others within the group were also concerned about their social reputation and therefore were aware of the social norm of cooperation within social dilemmas. As a consequence, it could be expected that non-cooperation by oneself would be evaluated negatively by those others since they seemed to be aware of what ought to be done in a social dilemma (i.e., the norm of cooperation). Results confirmed these predictions and, in addition, also showed that greater willingness to cooperate was associated with stronger feelings of collective concern. The findings are discussed in terms of recent literature on anonymity effects in social dilemmas. This research was part of the second author's master thesis at Maastricht University. The first author was supported by a fellowship of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO, no. 016.005.019).     

惩罚和社会价值取向对公共物品两难中人际信任与合作行为的影响

通过两个计算机情境模拟实验, 采用“取消惩罚”范式, 引入社会价值取向变量, 发现惩罚对人际信任和合作行为具有消极影响, 具体表现为当惩罚取消后, 经历过惩罚的被试的人际信任水平显著低于无惩罚条件被试的水平。惩罚对博弈者合作行为的影响在社会价值取向不同的博弈者之间存在显著差异：经历过惩罚的亲社会型被试在惩罚取消阶段的合作程度显著低于惩罚存在阶段的合作程度, 并且显著低于无惩罚条件被试的相应水平。惩罚通过亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平对合作程度产生间接负效应, 即惩罚程度越强, 亲社会型博弈者的人际信任水平越低, 进而使其合作程度也下降。     

The Influence of Other's Morality and Own Social Value Orientation on Cooperation in The Netherlands and the U.S.A.

The present study examines a two-person social dilemma characterised by the conflict between the pursuit of own benefits and collective benefits. The main purpose is twofold: (1) to examine the effect of perceptions of one person's morality (e.g. honesty) on expected cooperation from another and own cooperation, and (2) to examine whether pre-existing differences between individuals in their social value orientation, or preferences for certain patterns of outcomes to self and others (McClintock, 1978), would modify these effects of other's morality. As predicted on the basis of the Might over Morality hypothesis (Liebrand, Jansen et al., 1986), it was found that considerably more cooperation was expected from one perceived as highly moral than from another perceived as low on morality. Contrary to a second Might over Morality prediction, however, this effect was not moderated by individual differences in social value orientation. In addition, it was found that subjects with pro-social value orientations, as well as those with individualistic and competitive orientations cooperated considerably more with a person perceived as highly moral than with another perceived as low on morality. This latter finding extends previous work on social value orientation in that it suggests that individuals who are predisposed to choose noncooperatively in social dilemmas are willing to cooperate if they are quite confident that the other has truly cooperative and good intentions. Finally, the aforementioned findings were observed in two experiments, one conducted in The Netherlands, the other in the United States. This supports the cross-cultural generalisability of the present findings.     

Social Norms and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: The Effects of Context and Feedback

Drawing from research on social norms, we proposed and tested the hypothesis that people behave more competitively in social dilemmas involving economic decisions compared to those involving noneconomic decisions. We also proposed that people would compete more if they see that others have unexpectedly competed in a prior situation and cooperate more when others have unexpectedly cooperated in a previous situation. Further, we hypothesized that if others behave consistently with expectations, such behaviors (either cooperative or competitive) would not affect subsequent behavior. One hundred ninety-five under graduate students participated in an experiment in which they made choices in two different social dilemma games. Results support the hypotheses, and the discussion addresses the implications of the study for research on social norms and decision making.     

The Group-Based Binding Pledge as a Solution to Public Goods Problems

A social dilemma is a situation in which members of a group are faced with a conflict between two choices: maximizing personal interests (defection) or maximizing collective interests (cooperation). It is generally more profitable to defect, but if all do so, all are worse off than if all choose to cooperate. A public goods dilemma is a special case of a social dilemma in which people must contribute resources to provide a public good. Communication, especially face-to-face discussion, has been shown to be effective in facilitating cooperation in such situations, including asking members to make a pledge to contribute (cooperate). The purpose of this study was to evaluate some explanations for the effectiveness of a pledge in enhancing cooperation. Two hundred and fifty-six undergraduate students (in groups of four subjects) were asked to make choices in a public goods dilemma. The results suggest that a pledge is effective in enhancing cooperation because it induces group identity and the perception of criticality. It is suggested that when face-to-face discussion is not feasible, a pledge system may be effective in solving real life social dilemmas.     

Social identification effects in social dilemmas: a transformation of motives

Three experimental studies were conducted to examine two alternative explanations for the widely established positive effect of social identification in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. We hypothesised that social identification effects could be either ascribed to (1) an increase in the value assigned to the collective good (i.e. goal‐transformation hypothesis) or (2) an enhancement of trust in the cooperation of other group members (i.e. goal‐amplification hypothesis). To disentangle these two explanations, we examined the effects of social identification on the contributions to a public good of people with a different social value orientation (i.e. pre‐existing differences in preferred outcome distribution between self and others). Following the goal transformation hypothesis, we predicted that an increased group identification would raise contributions, in particular for people essentially concerned with their personal welfare (i.e. pro‐self value orientation). Alternatively, following the goal amplification hypothesis it was expected that increased group identification would primarily affect decisions of people concerned with the collective welfare (i.e. prosocial value orientation). The results of all three studies provided support for the goal‐transformation rather than goal‐amplification hypothesis, suggesting that ‘selfish’ individuals can be encouraged to cooperate by increasing the salience of their group membership. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cultural Values in Intergroup and Single-Group Social Dilemmas

Do cultural values influence the manner in which people cooperate with one another? This study assessed cultural characteristics of individuals and then related these characteristics to cooperative behavior in social dilemmas. Participants were assessed for their degree of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism, cultural values identified by Triandis (1995). They made choices in either a single-group or an intergroup social dilemma. The single-group dilemma entailed a three-person dilemma; the intergroup dilemma was identical but added subgroup competition, i.e., an opposing three-person group. The results indicated an interaction between cultural characteristics and type of dilemma for cooperation. The single-group versus intergroup effect reported by Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994) was replicated, but only for vertical individualists. The vertical individualists were least cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were more cooperative in the intergroup dilemma-where cooperation with the group maximized personal outcomes. The vertical collectivists were most cooperative in the single-group dilemma but were less cooperative in the intergroup dilemma- where group defection resulted in maximum group outcomes. The horizontal individualists and collectivists exhibited an intermediate level of cooperation, with no differences in cooperation between the single-group and intergroup dilemmas. Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between cultural values and cooperation, in particular with reference to vertical and horizontal components of individualism and collectivism, is more complex than has been suggested in past research. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

Self-Construal and Cooperation: Is the Interdependent Self More Cooperative Than the Independent Self?

The present study examined whether a temporary activation of independent or interdependent self-construals by priming has an influence on cooperation in social dilemmas. It was expected that individuals primed with independence would be primarily concerned with their own outcomes, whereas individuals primed with interdependence would also be concerned with the outcomes of their interaction partner. The former should therefore exhibit lower levels of cooperation. Additionally, the influence of social value orientation on cooperation was measured. Participants played 32 rounds of a give-some dilemma with an alleged interaction partner. As predicted, participants primed with independence exhibited lower levels of cooperation than participants primed with interdependence. Results are discussed in terms of their significance for research on self-construals and social dilemmas.     

Social Value Orientation,Expectations, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta‐analysis

Interdependent situations are pervasive in human life. In these situations, it is essential to form expectations about the others' behaviour to adapt one's own behaviour to increase mutual outcomes and avoid exploitation. Social value orientation, which describes the dispositional weights individuals attach to their own and to another person's outcome, predicts these expectations of cooperation in social dilemmas—an interdependent situation involving a conflict of interests. Yet, scientific evidence is inconclusive about the exact differences in expectations between prosocials, individualists, and competitors. The present meta‐analytic results show that, relative to proselfs (individualists and competitors), prosocials expect more cooperation from others in social dilemmas, whereas individualists and competitors do not significantly differ in their expectations. The importance of these expectations in the decision process is further highlighted by the finding that they partially mediate the well‐established relation between social value orientation and cooperative behaviour in social dilemmas. In fact, even proselfs are more likely to cooperate when they expect their partner to cooperate. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems in social dilemmas

Sanctioning systems in social dilemmas are often meant to increase trust in others and to increase cooperation. We argue, however, that sanctioning systems may also give people the idea that others act in their own self-interest and undermine the belief that others are internally motivated to cooperate. We developed the “Removing The Sanction” paradigm and a new trust manipulation, and showed in three experiments that when there is a sanction on defection, trust in others being internally motivated to cooperate is undermined: Participants who had experienced the presence of a sanctioning system trusted fellow group members less than participants who had not. In a similar vein, the sanction undermined cooperation when trust was initially high. The implications of these paradoxical findings are discussed.