Truthfulness in transplantation: non-heart-beating organ donation

The current practice of organ transplantation has been criticized on several fronts. The philosophical and scientific foundations for brain death criteria have been crumbling. In addition, donation after cardiac death, or non-heartbeating-organ donation (NHBD) has been attacked on grounds that it mistreats the dying patient and uses that patient only as a means to an end for someone else's benefit.     

Donation after circulatory death: burying the dead donor rule

Despite continuing controversies regarding the vital status of both brain-dead donors and individuals who undergo donation after circulatory death (DCD), respecting the dead donor rule (DDR) remains the standard moral framework for organ procurement. The DDR increases organ supply without jeopardizing trust in transplantation systems, reassuring society that donors will not experience harm during organ procurement. While the assumption that individuals cannot be harmed once they are dead is reasonable in the case of brain-dead protocols, we argue that the DDR is not an acceptable strategy to protect donors from harm in DCD protocols. We propose a threefold alternative to justify organ procurement practices: (1) ensuring that donors are sufficiently protected from harm; (2) ensuring that they are respected through informed consent; and (3) ensuring that society is fully informed of the inherently debatable nature of any criterion to declare death.     

Non-heart-beating organ donation: personal and institutional conflicts of interest

While procurement of organs from donors who are not "brain dead" does not appear to pose insurmountable moral obstacles, the social practice may raise questions of conflict of interest. Non-heart-beating organ donation opens the door for pressure on patients or families to forgo possibly beneficial treatment to provide organs to save others. The combined effects of non-heart-beating donation and organ shortages at major transplant centers brought about by the 1991 United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) local-use organ allocation policy created potential conflicts, including the fact that candidates for organs become potential donors far more frequently than previously. Hospitals with a major emphasis on transplantation have economic and academic interests that may have been hurt by the relative organ shortage. Some may view non-heart-beating organ donation as a way to restore weakened programs and thus unconsciously compromise recognition of problems associated with non-heart-beating donation.     

Development of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center policy for the care of terminally ill patients who may become organ donors after death following the removal of life support

In the mid 1980s it was apparent that the need for organ donors exceeded those willing to donate. Some University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) physicians initiated discussion of possible new organ donor categories including individuals pronounced dead by traditional cardiac criteria. However, they reached no conclusion and dropped the discussion. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, four cases arose in which dying patients or their families requested organ donation following the elective removal of mechanical ventilation. Controversy surrounding these cases precipitated open discussion of the use of organ donors pronounced dead on the basis of cardiac criteria. Prolonged deliberations by many committees in the absence of precedent ultimately resulted in what is, to our knowledge, the country's first policy for organ donation following elective removal of life support. The policy is intricate and conservative. Care was taken to include as many interested parties as possible in an effort to achieve representative and broad based support. This paper describes the development of the UPMC policy on non-heart-beating organ donation.     

American Muslim Physician Attitudes Toward Organ Donation

Religious beliefs and values impact Muslim patients' attitudes toward a variety of healthcare decisions, including organ donation. Muslim physician attitudes toward organ donation, however, are less well studied. Utilizing a national survey of physician members of the Islamic Medical Association of North America, relationships between religiosity, patterns of bioethics resource utilization, and sociodemographic characteristics with attitudes toward organ donation were assessed. Of 255 respondents, 251 answered the target question, “in your understanding, does Islamic bioethics and law permit organ donation?.” 177 respondents (70%) answered positively, 30 (12%) negatively, and 46 (18%) did not know. Despite the overwhelming majority of respondents believing organ donation to be permitted by Islamic bioethics and law, fewer than one-third (n = 72, 30%) are registered donors. Several sociodemographic features had a positive association with believing organ donation to be permitted: ethnic descent other than that of South Asian, having immigrated to the USA as an adult, and male sex. When using a logistic regression model controlling for these three variables as potential confounders, the best predictor of Muslim physicians believing organ donation to be permissible was utilization of an Imam as a bioethical resource (odds ratio 5.9, p = 0.02). Religiosity variables were not found to be associated with views on the Islamic permissibility of organ donation. While Muslim American physicians appear to believe there is religious support for organ donation, only a minority sign up to be donors. Greater study is needed to understand how physicians' attitudes regarding donation impact discussions between patients and physicians regarding the possibility of donating and of receiving a transplant.     

History of organ donation by patients with cardiac death

When successful solid organ transplantation was initiated almost 40 years ago, its current success rate was not anticipated. But continuous efforts were undertaken to overcome the two major obstacles to success: injury caused by interrupting nutrient supply to the organ and rejection of the implanted organ by normal host defense mechanisms. Solutions have resulted from technologic medical advances, but also from using organs from different sources. Each potential solution has raised ethical concerns and has variably resulted in societal acclaim, censure, and apathy. Transplant surgery is now well accepted, and the list of transplant candidates has grown far quicker than the availability of organs. More than 30,000 patients were awaiting organs for transplantation at the end of March 1993. While most organs came from donors declared dead by brain criteria, the increasing shortage of donated organs has prompted a reexamination of prior restrictions of donor groups. Recently, organ procurement from donors with cardiac death has been reintroduced in the United States. This practice has been mostly abandoned by the U.S. and some, though not all, other countries. Transplantation has been more successful using organs procured from heart-beating, "brain dead" cadavers than organs from non-heart-beating cadavers. However, recent advances have led to success rates with organs from non-heart-beating donors that may portend large increases in organ donation and procurement from this source.     

When are you dead enough to be a donor? Can any feasible protocol for the determination of death on circulatory criteria respect the dead donor rule?

The basic question concerning the compatibility of donation after circulatory death (DCD) protocols with the dead donor rule is whether such protocols can guarantee that the loss of relevant biological functions is truly irreversible. Which functions are the relevant ones? I argue that the answer to this question can be derived neither from a proper understanding of the meaning of the term “death” nor from a proper understanding of the nature of death as a biological phenomenon. The concept of death can be made fully determinate only by stipulation. I propose to focus on the irreversible loss of the capacity for consciousness and the capacity for spontaneous breathing. Having accepted that proposal, the meaning of “irreversibility” need not be twisted in order to claim that DCD protocols can guarantee that the loss of these functions is irreversible. And this guarantee does not mean that reversing that loss is either conceptually impossible or known to be impossible with absolute certainty.

     

Clarifying the paradigm for the ethics of donation and transplantation: Was 'dead' really so clear before organ donation?

Recent commentaries by Verheijde et al, Evans and Potts suggesting that donation after cardiac death practices routinely violate the dead donor rule are based on flawed presumptions. Cell biology, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, critical care life support technologies, donation and transplantation continue to inform concepts of life and death. The impact of oxygen deprivation to cells, organs and the brain is discussed in relation to death as a biological transition. In the face of advancing organ support and replacement technologies, the reversibility of cardiac arrest is now purely related to the context in which it occurs, in association to the availability and application of support systems to maintain oxygenated circulation. The 'complete and irreversible' lexicon commonly used in death discussions and legal statutes are ambiguous, indefinable and should be replaced by accurate terms. Criticism of controlled DCD on the basis of violating the dead donor rule, where autoresuscitation has not been described beyond 2 minutes, in which life support is withdrawn and CPR is not provided, is not valid. However, any post mortem intervention that re-establishes brain blood flow should be prohibited. In comparison to traditional practice, organ donation has forced the clarification of the diagnostic criteria for death and improved the rigour of the determinations.     

From a terror management perspective: The efficacy of self-affirmation on organ donation-related thoughts and intentions in China

ABSTRACT

In 2015, the Chinese government officially abolished the practice of harvesting organs from executed prisoners. However, the voluntary donor registration rate among the Chinese population is approximately 2% as of January 2020. Guided by self-affirmation theory and terror management theory, the present investigation examined a number of variables that may be related to donor registration intentions and a method to mitigate death thoughts and misconceptions. An online experiment was conducted in which 352 Chinese participants were randomly assigned to either a self-affirmation (i.e., affirming values that are important to the participants) or a no-affirmation condition. Results revealed that self-affirmation lowered death thoughts among the participants, which in turn were positively related to organ donation misperceptions. Inconsistent with terror management theory, the level of death thoughts was not directly related to participants’ intentions to register as organ donors. Instead, the relationship between the two was mediated by misperceptions toward organ donation.     

The telltale heart: public policy and the utilization of non-heart-beating donors

The transplant community has quietly initiated efforts to expand the current pool of cadaver organ donors to include those who are dead by cardiac criteria but cannot be pronounced dead using brain-based criteria. There are many reasons for concern about "policy creep" regarding who is defined as a potential organ donor. These reasons include loss of trust in the transplant community because of confusion over the protocols to be used, blurring the line between life and death, stress on family members, and burdens imposed on health care providers when a long-standing policy regarding who can serve as a cadaver organ donor is unilaterally changed. While these concerns are not sufficient reason for abandoning efforts to broaden existing eligibility standards for cadaver donation, they are sufficient reasons for the transplant community to desist in changing existing standards without widespread professional and public discussion.     

Recovery of transplantable organs after cardiac or circulatory death: Transforming the paradigm for the ethics of organ donation

Organ donation after cardiac or circulatory death (DCD) has been introduced to increase the supply of transplantable organs. In this paper, we argue that the recovery of viable organs useful for transplantation in DCD is not compatible with the dead donor rule and we explain the consequential ethical and legal ramifications. We also outline serious deficiencies in the current consent process for DCD with respect to disclosure of necessary elements for voluntary informed decision making and respect for the donor's autonomy. We compare two alternative proposals for increasing organ donation consent in society: presumed consent and mandated choice. We conclude that proceeding with the recovery of transplantable organs from decedents requires a paradigm change in the ethics of organ donation. The paradigm change to ensure the legitimacy of DCD practice must include: (1) societal agreement on abandonment of the dead donor rule, (2) legislative revisions reflecting abandonment of the dead donor rule, and (3) requirement of mandated choice to facilitate individual participation in organ donation and to ensure that decisions to participate are made in compliance with the societal values of respect for autonomy and self-determination.     

Death and organ procurement: public beliefs and attitudes

Although "brain death" and the dead donor rule--i.e., patients must not be killed by organ retrieval--have been clinically and legally accepted in the U.S. as prerequisites to organ removal, there is little data about public attitudes and beliefs concerning these matters. To examine the public attitudes and beliefs about the determination of death and its relationship to organ transplantation, 1351 Ohio residents >18 years were randomly selected and surveyed using random digit dialing (RDD) sample frames. The RDD telephone survey was conducted using computer-assisted telephone interviews. The survey instrument was developed from information provided by 12 focus groups and a pilot study of the questionnaire. Three scenarios based on hypothetical patients were presented: "brain dead," in a coma, or in a persistent vegetative state (PVS). Respondents provided personal assessments of whether the patient in each scenario was dead and their willingness to donate that patient's organs in these circumstances. More than 98 percent of respondents had heard of the term "brain death," but only one-third (33.7%) believed that someone who was "brain dead" was legally dead. The majority of respondents (86.2%) identified the "brain dead" patient in the first scenario as dead, 57.2 percent identified the patient in a coma as dead (Scenario 2), and 34.1 percent identified the patient in a PVS as dead (Scenario 3). Nearly one-third (33.5%) were willing to donate the organs of patients they classified as alive for at least one scenario, in seeming violation of the dead donor rule. Most respondents were not willing to violate the dead donor rule, although a substantial minority was. However, the majority of respondents were unaware, misinformed, or held beliefs there were not congruent with current definitions of "brain death." This study highlights the need for more public dialogue and education about "brain death" and organ donation.     

The dead donor rule: how much does the public care...and how much should we care?

In this brief commentary, we reflect on the recent study by Siminoff, Burant, and Youngner of public attitudes toward "brain death" and organ donation, focusing on the implications of their findings for the rules governing from whom organs can be obtained. Although the data suggest that many seem to view "brain death" as "as good as death" rather than "dead" (calling the dead donor rule into question), we find that the study most clearly demonstrates that understanding an individual's definition of death is neither a straightforward task nor a good predictor of views about donation. Reflecting on the implications for ongoing debates over the dead donor rule, we suggest that perhaps it is not a change in policy that is warranted, but rather a change in the priorities that have garnered such intense focus on this issue within the field of bioethics.     

The Concept of Death: A Religio-philosophical Analysis

In an age in which vast progress has been made in organ transplant technology, it is imperative to determine the point at which a human being is considered dead, for transplantation cannot occur until after death. Traditional religious views imply that a human being is dead upon the departure of the soul from the body. Taking the biological death of the body as a conclusive sign of the soul's departure is not an option. Biological death refers to decomposition, and this cannot equate to the death of the person as such, for this would make the concept and practice of transplantation absurd, for transplantable parts of a biologically dead—i.e. decomposing—body could not be used. On the other hand, if parts of the human body are themselves still biologically alive, could it not be said that taking such parts would amount to murder?

Two conclusions follow from this predicament. First, death as a ‘normative’ concept stands in sharp distinction from a purely biological concept. Second, a normative concept of death is entangled with a normative concept of personhood. That is to say, from the moment that a human being is not considered a person as such, parts of the body could be removed for transplantation or, indeed, for any other justified medical purpose. In this regard, various theories of the person are put forward. Which of these theories is compatible with a workable concept of death? In this paper two principal theories of the person will be discussed and it will be argued that a brain-based theory of death is conducive to a normative concept of death, thus allowing for organ transplantation.     

Procuring organs from a non-heart-beating cadaver: a case report

Organ transplantation is an accepted therapy for major organ failure, but it depends on the availability of viable organs. Most organs transplanted in the U.S. come from either "brain-dead" or living related donors. Recently organ procurement from patients pronounced dead using cardiopulmonary criteria, so-called "non-heart-beating cadaver donors" (NHBCDs), has been reconsidered. In May 1992, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) enacted a new, complicated policy for procuring organs from NHBCDs after the elective removal of life support. Seventeen months later only one patient has become a NHBCD. This article describes her case and the results of interviews with the health care team and the patient's family. The case and interviews are discussed in relation to several of the ethical concerns previously raised about the policy, including potential conflicts of interest, the definition of cardiopulmonary death, and a possible net decrease in organ donation. The conclusion is reached that organ procurement from non-heart-beating cadavers is feasible and may be desirable both for the patient's family and the health care providers.     

Dying but not killing: donation after cardiac death donors and the recovery of vital organs

Michael Potts, Paul A. Byrne, and David W. Evans are critical of donation after cardiac death (DCD). Contrary to the authors' assertion that the removal of vital organs is the proximate cause of death, the eventual fulfillment of the neurological criteria of death is solely dependant on the rate of brain cell death in the absence of circulation. Consistent with the "dead donor rule," DCD is not the cause of death.There are also procedural mechanisms to address the potential conflicts of interest that concern the authors. Rather than being prohibited, DCD may be an ethically justifiable exception to the rule that organ donors must be dead prior to organ recovery.     

Do the myths still exist? Revisiting people's negative beliefs about organ donation upon death

The prevalence of myths preventing people partial to donation in Australia from consenting is unknown. Respondents (N?=?468: 381 donors, 26 non-donors, 61 undecided) were surveyed about their (negative) donation beliefs. Approximately 30% of donors were neutral or supported negative beliefs about organ allocation, especially donation to undesirable organ recipients and a black market organ trade. Confusion about brain death, lack of family and religious support, and discomfort with donation were negative beliefs endorsed by some respondents irrespective of donor preference. Proportionally, donors had greater trust in hospitals/doctors than other groups. Some myths still exist but may vary with donation preference.     

Predictors of willingness to register as an organ donor among dutch adolescents

Abstract

In order to identify relevant determinants of organ donor registration among Dutch adolescents, a school-based cross-sectional survey was conducted among 145 high school students. Fifty-one percent of respondents indicated they were willing to register as organ donors and 80% reported a positive general attitude towards registration. Various misconceptions about the registration and donation procedure were identified. On average only moderate knowledge levels related to organ donation were found. In order of strongest association, negative outcome expectancies, past behaviour and experience, positive outcome expectancies, and social outcome expectancies proved to be significant predictors of willingness to register as organ donors. Self-efficacy was indirectly associated with willingness via outcome expectancies. Knowledge about organ donation was not significantly associated with willingness. The results suggest that in order to persuade adolescents to register as organ donors, refutational messages will have to be developed to counterargue the prevailing negative outcome expectancies related to organ donation and registration as an organ donor.