A Hobbesian derivation of the principle of universalization

In this article, I derive a weak version of Kant’s categorical imperative within an informal game-theoretic framework. More specifically, I argue that Hobbesian agents would choose what I call the weak principle of universalization, if they had to decide on a rule of conflict resolution in an idealized but empirically defensible hypothetical decision situation. The discussion clarifies (i) the rationality requirements imposed on agents, (ii) the empirical conditions assumed to warrant the conclusion, and (iii) the political institutions that are necessary to implement the derived principle. The analysis demonstrates the moral significance of the weak principle of universalization and its epistemic advantage over the categorical imperative.     

Paternal Psychiatric Symptoms and Maladaptive Paternal Behavior in the Home During the Child Rearing Years

Data from the Children in the Community Study, a community-based longitudinal study were used to investigate associations between paternal psychiatric disorders and child-rearing behaviors. Paternal psychiatric symptoms and behavior in the home were assessed among 782 families during the childhood and adolescence of the offspring. Paternal anxiety, disruptive, mood, personality, and substance use disorders were independently associated with specific types of maladaptive paternal behavior in the home during the child-rearing years after paternal age, education, income, co-occurring paternal psychiatric symptoms, offspring age, sex, intelligence, temperament, and psychiatric symptoms were controlled statistically. Paternal psychiatric disorders that were present by mean offspring age 14 were associated with elevated risk for maladaptive paternal behavior in the home at mean age offspring 16, after prior maladaptive paternal behavior was controlled statistically. These findings suggest that paternal psychiatric disorder may be an important determinant of maladaptive paternal behavior in the home during the child-rearing years. Improved recognition and treatment of paternal psychiatric disorders may help to reduce the amount of maladaptive parenting behavior that many children and adolescents might otherwise be likely to experience.     

Ismael on the Paradox of Predictability

Philosophia - In this discussion note we argue, contrary to the thrust of a recent article by Jenann Ismael, that resolving the paradox of predictability does not require denying the possibility of...     

Authority,Psychotherapy and the Authority of the Therapist in the Religious Haredi Community

This article considers the meaning and significance of authority, and its relevance to the transference process, within the framework of psychotherapy in the orthodox Jewish (Haredi) community in Israel. In this community, deeply-rooted habits of obedience to the commandments of the Torah and the authority of the Rabbi are integral to maintaining an orthodox way of life. Clinical vignettes with Haredi patients are presented to illustrate the complexities that arise when both patient and therapist belong to the orthodox community, and highlight the authority-related issues that are central to the therapy. This combination of factors requires a sensitive and finely-tuned approach which will enable the therapist to maintain the treatment framework while still accommodating the orthodox way of life.     

Paternal empathy in the transference/countertransference relationship

This paper explores the process of paternal empathy within the context of the transference and countertransference relationship. The masculine and feminine elements of paternal responsiveness are described with implications for therapeutic resonance and mirroring. Case material illustrates the author's thesis.     

Badici on Inclosures and the Liar Paradox

Badici [2008] criticizes views of Priest [2002] concerning the Inclosure Schema and the paradoxes of self-reference. This article explains why his criticisms are to be rejected.     

Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism

The paradox of hedonism is the idea that making pleasure the only thing that we desire for its own sake can be self-defeating. Why would this be true? In this paper, I survey two prominent explanations, then develop a third possible explanation, inspired by Joseph Butler's classic discussion of the paradox. The existing accounts claim that the paradox arises because we are systematically incompetent at predicting what will make us happy, or because the greatest pleasures for human beings are found in certain special goods which hedonists cannot enjoy. On the account that I develop, the paradox is a consequence of a theory about the nature of pleasure, together with a view about the requirements of rational belief. Which of these explanations is correct, I argue, bears on central questions about how to understand the nature and extent of the paradox.     

Problems in the Theory of Democratic Authority

This paper identifies strands of reasoning underlying several theories of democratic authority. It shows why each of them fails to adequately explain or justify it. Yet, it does not claim (per philosophical anarchism) that democratic authority cannot be justified. Furthermore, it sketches an argument for a perspective on the justification of democratic authority that would effectively respond to three problems not resolved by alternative theories—the problem of the expert, the problem of specificity, and the problem of deference. Successfully resolving these problems is at least evidence for the viability of a justification of democratic authority. This perspective integrates procedural concerns with those about the quality of democratic outcomes. It shows that democratic authority, if there is such a thing, requires reliable democratic procedures as the only sort citizens could rationally accept.     

Brown on Mackie: Echoes of the Lottery Paradox

In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among other things, Brown contends that the argument from relativity, offered by John Mackie—error theory’s progenitor—supports a stronger modal reading of error theory. His argument is as follows: Mackie’s is an abductive argument that error theory is the best explanation for divergence in moral practices. Since error theory will likewise be the best explanation for similar divergences in possible worlds similar to our own, we may conclude that error theory is true at all such worlds, just as it is in the actual world. I contend that Brown’s argument must fail, as abductive arguments cannot support the modal conclusions he suggests. I then consider why this is the case, concluding that Brown has stumbled upon new and interesting evidence that agglomerating one’s beliefs can be epistemically problematic—an issue associated most famously with Henry Kyburg’s lottery paradox.