Heidegger,Sociality, and Human Agency

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being‐with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life.     

Arnauld's Verbal Distinction between Ideas and Perceptions

In his dispute with Malebranche about the nature of ideas, Arnauld endorses a form of direct realism. This appears to conflict with views put forward by Arnauld and his collaborators in the Port-Royal Grammar and Logic where ideas are treated as objects in the mind. This tension can be resolved by a careful examination of Arnauld's remarks on the semantics of ‘perception’ and ‘idea’ in light of the Port-Royal theory of language. This examination leads to the conclusion that Arnauld's ideas really are objects in the mind, and not perceptual acts as many commentators hold. What Arnauld denies is that these mental objects are really distinct from the external objects they represent. Instead, Arnauld holds that, by the act of conception, the external objects themselves—not copies—come to be present in the mind and are therefore called ‘ideas’.     

Lion Kings or puppies: the influence of fantasy on children’s understanding of pretense

Many have thought that children have an early appreciation of the mind in the case of pretend play. Results from several experiments are against this. However, an experiment by Lillard (Body or mind: children’s categorizing of pretense, Child Development, 67 (1996), 1717-1734, Experiment 4) suggested that when a pretense is about a fantasy character, instead of a real entity, children might have a better understanding of the mind’s involvement. The present experiment tested this, and found that indeed, when pretending to be a fantasy character is at issue, 4-year-olds are significantly more apt to indicate the mind’s involvement. Several possible reasons for this result are discussed.     

Why ‘Swampman’ Would Not Even Get as Far as Thinking it Was Davidson: On the Spatio‐temporal Basis of Davidson's Conjuring Trick

In this article, we analyse one of the most famous recent thought‐experiments in philosophy, namely Donald Davidson's Swampman. Engaging recent commentators on Davidson's Swampman as well as analysing the spatio‐temporal conditions of the thought‐experiment, we will show how the ‘experiment’ inevitably fails. For it doesn't take seriously some of its own defining characteristics: crucially, Swampman's creation of a sudden in a place distinct from Davidson's. Instead of denigrating philosophical thought‐experiments per se, our analysis points towards considering thought‐experiments in a different sense: imaginary scenarios helpfully self‐deconstructing rather than constituting substantive philosophical resources.     

SYSTEMS OF MEASUREMENT

Wittgenstein and Kripke disagree about the status of the proposition: the Standard Metre is one metre long. Wittgenstein believes it is necessary. Kripke argues that it is contingent. Kripke's argument depends crucially on a certain sort of thought‐experiment with which we are invited to test our intuitions about what is and isn’t necessary. In this paper I argue that, while Kripke's conclusion is strictly correct, nevertheless similar Kripke‐style thought experiments indicate that the metric system of measurement is after all relative in something like the way Wittgenstein seems to think. Central to this paper is a thought‐experiment I call The Smedlium Case.     

Four‐year‐olds' beliefs about how others regard males and females

Children's awareness of how others evaluate their gender could influence their behaviours and well‐being, yet little is known about when this awareness develops and what influences its emergence. The current study investigated culturally diverse 4‐year‐olds' (N = 240) public regard for gender groups and whether exposure to factors that convey status and highlight gender influenced it. Children were asked whether most people thought (i) girls or boys, and (ii) women or men, were better. Overall, children thought others more positively evaluated their own gender. However more TV exposure and, among girls only, more traditional parental division of housework predicted children stating that others thought boys were better, suggesting more awareness of greater male status. Children's public regard was distinct from their personal attitudes.     

Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis: My Personal,Psychoanalytic, and Philosophical Sojourn

The dual aim of this article is to show both how Heidegger's existential philosophy enriches post-Cartesian psychoanalysis and how post-Cartesian psychoanalysis enriches Heidegger's existential philosophy. Characterized as a phenomenological contextualism, post-Cartesian psychoanalysis finds philosophical grounding in Heidegger's ontological contextualism, condensed in his term for the human kind of Being, Being-in-the-world. Specifically, Heidegger provides philosophical support (a) for a theoretical and clinical shift from mind to world, from the intrapsychic to the intersubjective; (b) for a shift from the motivational primacy of drives originating in the interior of a Cartesian isolated mind to the motivational primacy of relationally constituted affective experience; and (c) for contextualizing and grasping the existential significance of emotional trauma, which plunges us into a form of Being-toward-death. Post-Cartesian psychoanalysis, in turn, (a) relationalizes Heidegger's conception of finitude, (b) expands Heidegger's conception of relationality, and (c) explores some ethical implications of our kinship-in-finitude.     

Neurodualism: People Assume that the Brain Affects the Mind more than the Mind Affects the Brain

People commonly think of the mind and the brain as distinct entities that interact, a view known as dualism. At the same time, the public widely acknowledges that science attributes all mental phenomena to the workings of a material brain, a view at odds with dualism. How do people reconcile these conflicting perspectives? We propose that people distort claims about the brain from the wider culture to fit their dualist belief that minds and brains are distinct, interacting entities: Exposure to cultural discourse about the brain as the physical basis for the mind prompts people to posit that mind–brain interactions are asymmetric, such that the brain is able to affect the mind more than vice versa. We term this hybrid intuitive theory neurodualism. Five studies involving both thought experiments and naturalistic scenarios provided evidence of neurodualism among laypeople and, to some extent, even practicing psychotherapists. For example, lay participants reported that “a change in a person's brain” is accompanied by “a change in the person's mind” more often than vice versa. Similarly, when asked to imagine that “future scientists were able to alter exactly 25% of a person's brain,” participants reported larger corresponding changes in the person's mind than in the opposite direction. Participants also showed a similarly asymmetric pattern favoring the brain over the mind in naturalistic scenarios. By uncovering people's intuitive theories of the mind–brain relation, the results provide insights into societal phenomena such as the allure of neuroscience and common misperceptions of mental health treatments.     

Children's implicit attitude acquisition: Evaluative statements succeed,repeated pairings fail

From the earliest ages tested, children and adults show similar overall magnitudes of implicit attitudes toward various social groups. However, such consistency in attitude magnitude may obscure meaningful age‐related change in the ways that children (vs. adults) acquire implicit attitudes. This experiment investigated children's implicit attitude acquisition by comparing the separate and joint effects of two learning interventions, previously shown to form implicit attitudes in adults. Children (N = 280, ages 7–11 years) were taught about novel social groups through either evaluative statements (ES; auditorily presented verbal statements such as ‘Longfaces are bad, Squarefaces are good’), repeated evaluative pairings (REP; visual pairings of Longface/Squareface group members with valenced images such as a puppy or snake), or a combination of ES+REP. Results showed that children acquired implicit attitudes following ES and ES+REP, with REP providing no additional learning beyond ES alone. Moreover, children did not acquire implicit attitudes in four variations of REP, each designed to facilitate learning by systematically increasing verbal scaffolding to specify (a) the learning goal, (b) the valence of the unconditioned stimuli, and (c) the group categories of the conditioned stimuli. These findings underscore the early‐emerging role of verbal statements in children's implicit attitude acquisition, as well as a possible age‐related limit in children's acquisition of novel implicit attitudes from repeated pairings.     

Beauvoir,the Scandal of Science,and Skepticism as Method

In The Ethics of Ambiguity (herein the Ethics), Simone de Beauvoir declares that science condemns itself to failure if it takes as its task the total disclosure of being (Beauvoir 1948/1976, 130). I suggest that the Ethics actually parallels the spirit of some scientific programs, specifically those that utilize positive skepticism as method. I draw out connections among the Ethics, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau‐Ponty 1945/1962) to which Beauvoir's works show much likeness, and Francis Bacon's The New Organon (Bacon 1620/2000), the latter being at once a scientific and a positive skeptical program. Underscoring the ways in which Beauvoir's method of interrogating the being of beings and reality is compatible with some scientific pictures is important. It complicates the usual thought that existentialism is antiscience, problematizes Beauvoir's overly simplistic depiction of science, and nuances her analysis of the existent's experience of itself.     

The Tactual Ground,Immersion, and the “Space Between”

I ask whether figure‐ground structure can be realized in touch, and, if so, how. Drawing on the taxonomy of touch sketched in Katz's 1925 The World of Touch, I argue that the form of touch that is relevant to such consideration is a species of immersed touch. I consider whether we can feel the space we are immersed in and, more specifically, the empty space against which the surfaces of objects, as I shall urge, “stand out.” Harnessing M. G. F. Martin's account of bodily awareness and touch, I defend a positive thesis, pace Graham Nerlich on whose The Shape of Space (1994) I otherwise rely, both to defend the supposition that empty space can in principle be felt and to argue that touching empty space is not a mere species of absence perception. Along the way, I defuse a causal worry that might be thought to arise in the case of touching empty space.     

Luther on vocation,by Gustaf Wingren: A twenty‐first‐century theological‐literary reading

In this article, the author offers a critical, appreciative appraisal of The One Mediator, Luther on Vocation, by Gustaf Wingren (English translation, 1957), which continues to be a seminal text for understanding Luther's teaching on the theme of vocation. The author points out that the reader needs to keep in mind both the difference between Luther's world of the sixteenth century and the world of the early twenty‐first century, and the sobering reality that pursuing the neighbor's good continues to be an essential, definitive calling that every Christian has. Further, the author calls attention to Wingren's indisputable reminder that, for Luther, vocation is about the way of the Christian in human society. That way of being in pursuit of the neighbor's good is consequent upon the forgiveness of sins, which God bestows on the sinner who receives it through faith in Jesus Christ. It is God alone who is the decisive actor, even though in the former—seeking the neighbor's good—God's work is hidden; that is, the human actor is a “mask of God.”     

Scripture,Metaphysics, and Poetry: Austin Farrer's The Glass of Vision with Critical Commentary

This article reviews two books by Robert MacSwain, Assistant Professor of Theology and Christian Ethics at the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee, which present and examine the work of Austin Farrer, perhaps the greatest Anglican theologian of the twentieth century. In Scripture, Metaphysics, and Poetry, MacSwain offers a critical edition of Farrer's 1948 Bampton Lectures, The Glass of Vision, printed with six essays which assess and examine the Lectures. In Solved by Sacrifice, he considers how Farrer's conception of what faith contributes to reasoned reflection on the study of God changed over the course of his lifetime. After drawing on the work of Henri de Lubac, E.B. Pusey, and contemporary critics, to reflect on The Glass of Vision, this article will suggest how Farrer's presentation of the form of divine truth in the human mind can illumine MacSwain's discussion of Farrer's religious epistemology.     

Autonomy,and Then

Abstract

Among the numerous conceptions of autonomy, three are particularly important: Kant's notion of humans' being subject, and subject only, to moral laws they gave themselves, Frankfurt's idea of persons' willing and acting deriving from the essential character of their wills, and the popular conception of persons' being master over whether others do or do not certain things to them. Kant's moral conception of autonomy, it is argued, is untenable because the moral character of a law and its self-givenness are incompatible. Frankfurt's idea suffers from the fact that we cannot give substance to talk of the essential character of one's will. The third conception is practically irrelevant: there is no principle requiring people to be master over what others do to them. Thus autonomy may have to be dropped from our self-conception. To some this will appear a grave loss. In fact it is not.     

Moral paternalism,virtue, and autonomy

According to colour irrealism, material objects do not have colour; they only appear to have colour. The appeal of this view, prominent among philosophers and scientists alike, stems in large part from the conviction that scientific explanations of colour facts do not ascribe colour to material objects. To explain why objects appear to have colour, for instance, we need only appeal to surface reflectance properties, properties of light, the neurophysiology of observers, etc.

Typically attending colour irrealism is the error theory of ordinary colour judgement: ordinary judgements in which colour is ascribed to a material object are, strictly speaking, false. In this paper, I claim that colour irrealists who endorse the error theory cannot explain how we acquire colour concepts (yellow, green, etc.), concepts they must acknowledge we do possess. Our basic colour concepts, I argue, could not be phenomenal concepts that we acquire by attending to the colour properties of our experience. And, I explain, all other plausible explanations render colour concepts such that our ordinary colour judgements involving them are often true. Given the explanatory considerations upon which the irrealist's position is based, this is a severe problem for colour irrealism.     

Activating the Mind: Descartes' Dreams and the Awakening of the Human Animal Machine

In this essay I argue that one of the things that matters most to Descartes' account of mind is that we use our minds actively. This is because for him only an active mind is able to re‐organize its passionate experiences in such a way that a genuinely human, self‐governed life of virtue and true contentment becomes possible. To bring out this connection, I will read the Meditations against the backdrop of Descartes' correspondence with Elisabeth. This will reveal that in Descartes' writings there is a crucial connection between the conception of ourselves as dreamers and the idea that we fail to realize our true potential as self‐determined, active agents. Dreams, as Descartes conceives them, are passively received mental states that inhibit our freedom to use reason at will. To awaken here takes the form of activating our thoughts, which holds the key to freeing ourselves from the stimulus‐response patterns that Descartes takes to be at work in animal conduct. Applied to the Meditations, these insights suggest that this work engages in questions far beyond the epistemological agenda. By activating the mind, the Meditations teach us how to realize our true human potential as virtuous thinkers and passionate agents.     

Recognizing the role of perception in action at 6 months

The present research examined whether infants as young as 6 months of age would consider what objects a human agent could perceive when interpreting her actions on the objects. In two experiments, the infants took the agent's actions of repeatedly reaching for and grasping one of two possible objects as suggesting her preference for that object only when the agent could detect both objects, not when the agent's perceptual access to the second object was absent, either because a large screen hid the object from the agent ( Experiment 1 ), or because the agent sat with her back toward the object ( Experiment 2 ). These results suggest that young infants recognize the role of perception in constraining an agent's goal‐actions.     

CHARACTER,PSYCHOANALYTIC IDENTIFICATION,AND NUMERICAL IDENTITY

Identification figures prominently in moral psychological explanations. I argue that in identification the subject has an ‘identity‐thought’, which is a thought about her numerical identity with the figure she identifies with. In Freud's psychoanalytic psychology character is founded on unconscious identification with parental figures. Moral philosophers have drawn on psychoanalysis to explain how undesirable or disadvantageous character dispositions are resistant to insight through being unconscious. According to Richard Wollheim's analysis of Freud's theory, identification is the subject's disposition to imagine, unconsciously, her bodily merging with the figure she identifies with. I argue that this explanation of identification is not adequate. Human character is held to be capable of change when self‐reflection brings unconscious identifications to conscious self‐knowledge. I argue that for self‐knowledge these identifications must be an intelligible part of the subject's self‐conception, and that Wollheim's ‘merging phantasy’ is not intelligible to the subject in this way. By contrast, the subject's thought that she is numerically identical to the figure she identifies with does provide an intelligible starting‐point for reflecting on this identification. This psychoanalytic account provides a clear conception of identification with which to investigate puzzle cases in the moral psychology of character.     

Sensory awareness versus sensory impression: Affect and attention interact to produce somatic meaning

Abstract

Contrary to the assumptions of common sense—and of some research—focusing on one's physical sensations does not necessarily make them more unpleasant. Rather, attention and affect interact to produce somatic meaning. Fifty-six male subjects exercised at 60% of their aerobic capacity with either no instructions, or instructions to closely monitor their somatic sensations. Half of each group thought they might receive an electric shock while they exercised. Subjects then listed the sensations they perceived, and indicated their degree of noticeability, their subjective unpleasantness, and their presumed cause. Monitoring subjects reported the same number of physical sensations as did the no-instruction subjects, and rated them as noticeable to the same degree. Nonetheless, monitoring produced a more negative interpretation of one's sensations under threat, but a more positive one under no threat. The findings support and extend the view of somatic experience as inherently plastic. The results also suggest that sensory attention can influence the meaning of somatic information—in both a positive and a negative direction—without necessarily imparting more of it.     

Depth of intention

The paper attempts to reconstruct some notions of Naess's semantics, and at the same time to relate them to more recent developments. On Naess's view, there is no such thing as a language in the sense of a shared structure which determines clear‐cut literal meanings like Fregean Gedanken or propositions. We use words, and try to interpret each other; but there is no a priori or intuitive basis for secure and precise knowledge about language. Interpretation or understanding, as well as thinking and perception, involve discrimination at higher or lower levels. There is neither a ceiling of crystal‐clear propositions nor a floor of ‘given’ sensations or ‘objective’ stimuli independent of categorizations and discriminations, which might serve as a bridge for translation or interpretation between the conceptual‐perceptual schemes of individuals. The notions of ‘concept’, ‘conceptual framework’, ‘situation’, ‘situation type’ and ‘proposition’ are defined, with some reliance on Barwise and Perry's situation semantics. Two notions of accessibility of situation types are defined; one as constructibility of the type at a given level of discrimination, i.e. in terms of objects discerned and concepts discriminated; the other as intelligibility of the type. Intelligibility entails constructibility, but not conversely. A type of situation may be constructible at some person's level of discrimination, but not coherently intelligible to him. On this basis, a logic of senses or truth‐conditions for uses of expressions is developed, and a logic of interpretations of uses. The central notions of Naessian semantics are defined: ambiguity and direction of interpretation, level of discrimination and depth of intention.