Dualism in medicine,Christian theology,and the aging

Distinguishing a person's soul or mind from a person's body describes dualism, the philosophical premise that fails to integrate the person as one, but instead leaves the person as two, usually as souland body or as mindand body. In dualism, one tends to think of the soul or the mind as the person and the body as an appendage. I argue that 1) dualism is rampant in medicine; 2) that Christian theology has fundamentally opposed it, and 3) that cultural dualism today threatens the aging in particular. To deal with this threat, I argue that the moral task of being human is to become one in mind and body. That is, I argue that the unity of the person which is the unity of the mind and body is not really a metaphysical given, but rather the goal or end of being human.     

The Metaphysical Status of the Embryo: Some Arguments Revisited

abstract This paper re‐examines some well‐known and commonly accepted arguments for the non‐individuality of the embryo, due mainly to the work of John Harris. The first concerns the alleged non‐differentiation of the embryoblast from the trophoblast. The second concerns monozygotic twinning and the relevance of the primitive streak. The third concerns the totipotency of the cells of the early embryo. I argue that on a proper analysis of both the empirical facts of embryological development, and the metaphysical importance or otherwise of those facts, all three arguments are found wanting. None of them establishes that the embryo is not an individual human being from the moment of conception.     

CREATED FOR EVERLASTING LIFE: CAN THEISTIC EVOLUTION PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE CHRISTIAN ACCOUNT OF HUMAN NATURE?

Christians who affirm standard science and the biblical doctrine of creation often endorse theistic evolution as the best approach to human origins. But theistic evolution is ambiguous. Some versions are naturalistic (NTE)—God created humans entirely by evolution—and some are supernaturalistic (STE)—God supernaturally augmented evolution. This article claims that NTE is inadequate as an account of human origins because its theological naturalism and emergent physicalist ontology of the soul or person conflict with the Christian doctrine that God created humans for everlasting life. Both the traditional Christian account of the afterlife and its modern Christian alternatives involve God's supernatural action and a separation (dualism) of person and body at death. STE can combine with several philosophical accounts of the body‐soul relation to provide an adequate Christian account of original human nature.     

Foucault,Freud, and the Repressive Hypothesis

One aspect of Foucault's thought brings him much closer to Freud than many commentators believe. This Freudian “moment” in Foucault is formulated in the following dictum: the soul is the prison of the body. For Foucault, the modern soul is formed when the norms that govern disciplinary training and exercise are internalized. Once internalized, these norms affect our self-understanding and conduct. This paper focuses on Foucault's account of internalization. It shows that this Freudian moment in Foucault mitigates his criticisms of the repressive hypothesis, but it also suggests a conception of interiority that can be interpreted as the modern instantiation of the rapport à soi.     

BRAIN DEATH AND ITS ENTANGLEMENTS

The Islamic philosophical, mystical, and theological sub‐traditions have each made characteristic assumptions about the human person, including an incorporation of substance dualism in distinctive manners. Advances in the brain sciences of the last half century, which include a widespread acceptance of death as the end of essential brain function, require the abandonment of dualistic notions of the human person that assert an immaterial and incorporeal soul separate from a body. In this article, I trace classical Islamic notions of death and the soul, the modern definition of death as “brain death,” and some contemporary Islamic responses to this definition. I argue that a completely naturalistic account of human personhood in the Islamic tradition is the best and most viable alternative for the future. This corporeal monistic account of Muslim personhood as embodied consciousness incorporates the insights of pre‐modern Muslim thinkers yet rehabilitates their characteristic mistakes and thus has the advantages of neuroscientific validity and modern relevance in trans‐cultural ethical discourse; it also helps to alleviate organ shortages in countries with majority Muslim populations, a serious ethical impasse of recent years.     

The psychologist who is not a psychologist: a deconstructive reading of Wolfgang Giegerich's idea of psychology proper

This paper represents an archetypal and deconstructive reading of the work of Wolfgang Giegerich. In an attempt to extend and philosophically develop Jung's late‐life view of the objective psyche, Giegerich, via Hegel, defines psychology proper as fundamentally separate from the everyday person and the ‘human, all‐too‐human’ aspects of the soul. It is argued that, in so doing, Giegerich removes the human person from being the primary focus of his psychology and creates instead a hierarchy of ideas and values privileging syntax over semantics, the logical over the empirical, and thinking over imagination. This bypasses the emotionality of the everyday person/patient and also renders psychology proper unable to address the day‐to‐day practice of the analyst. Giegerich attempts to rectify this problem by re‐incorporating what he had previously rejected, making his theory more complex than is apparent in his binary oppositions. In the end, however, it remains a question to what extent Giegerich is successful in avoiding a binary scission (Saban 2015) or a tendency to regularly de‐emphasize the human aspect of the soul (Hoedl 2015) in his need to continue to heroically push off from the ego seeking total freedom from neurosis and from our humanity.     

The Concept of Death: A Religio-philosophical Analysis

In an age in which vast progress has been made in organ transplant technology, it is imperative to determine the point at which a human being is considered dead, for transplantation cannot occur until after death. Traditional religious views imply that a human being is dead upon the departure of the soul from the body. Taking the biological death of the body as a conclusive sign of the soul's departure is not an option. Biological death refers to decomposition, and this cannot equate to the death of the person as such, for this would make the concept and practice of transplantation absurd, for transplantable parts of a biologically dead—i.e. decomposing—body could not be used. On the other hand, if parts of the human body are themselves still biologically alive, could it not be said that taking such parts would amount to murder?

Two conclusions follow from this predicament. First, death as a ‘normative’ concept stands in sharp distinction from a purely biological concept. Second, a normative concept of death is entangled with a normative concept of personhood. That is to say, from the moment that a human being is not considered a person as such, parts of the body could be removed for transplantation or, indeed, for any other justified medical purpose. In this regard, various theories of the person are put forward. Which of these theories is compatible with a workable concept of death? In this paper two principal theories of the person will be discussed and it will be argued that a brain-based theory of death is conducive to a normative concept of death, thus allowing for organ transplantation.     

Abortion, Personhood and the Potential for Consciousness

The view that the fetus' potential for human consciousness confers upon it the right to life has been widely criticised on the basis that the notion of potentiality is so vague as to be meaningless, and on the basis that actual rights cannot be deduced from the mere potential for personhood. It has also been criticised, although less commonly, on the basis that it is not the potential to assume consciousness, but rather the potential to resume consciousness which is morally significant, and on the basis that the fetus does not really possess the potential for consciousness. In response, I argue that these criticisms are mistaken and that the potential for human consciousness is a sufficient condition not simply of potential, but actual, personhood. Since it possesses this potential from the moment of conception, the fetus should be considered an actual person from the moment of its conception.     

Matriliny and mother goddess religion

This article offers critical reflections on the bipolar conception of human history offered by Afrocentric and eco‐feminist theologians. Such a theory, essentially a re‐affirmation of Bachofen's historical speculations, tends to see an intrinsic relationship between matriliny and mother‐goddess religion—both being associated with an earlier, eden‐like, phase of human history. Using anthropological data, the article provides a critique of these currently fashionable accounts of human pre‐history.     

Human Embryos and Human Dignity: Differing Presuppositions in Human Embryo Research in Germany and Great Britain*

This article notes differences in legislation in Germany and Great Britain regarding human embryo research and looks for an explanation in their divergent intellectual traditions. Whereas the German Stem Cell Act invokes an anthropological concept of human dignity to ground its ban on using embryos for research, there is no definition of what it means to be human in either the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act or in the advisory Warnock‐Report. After studying the differences and providing some philosophical background, the essay distinguishes two notions that are significant for understanding human dignity. It then proposes from a theological point of view a basic understanding within a relational anthropology, and comes to the conclusion that because of continuity in development and their relational constitution, humans embryos should be accepted as human from the moment of conception.     

Faith (F) and presence moment (O) in analytic processes: an example of a narcissistic disorder

Based on Freud's remark that a neurosis can not be slain in absentia, the thesis is established that presence moments constitute the central points in the analytic process. The interpenetrative dynamics between analyst and analysand creates an analytical field, in which a pre‐conception is formed. This pre‐conception meets the self‐revealing psychic world of the patient. This realization is a moment of presence (O) and the analytic third is determined. In this moment, the presence of psychic reality is irrefutable present and can be called by name. The name, which is seen as a presentational symbol, is a creation of the analytic couple, but has its source in the genetic roots of the patient. The presentational arises from the presence, which can then become the representation. F is central in this process and is part of the analytic couple. Based on detailed case material of a narcissistic disorder it is shown that a dynamic that impresses at first narcissistic, can be understood from a different point of view as a struggle for the analytical attitude and belief (F).     

Heidegger,Sociality, and Human Agency

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being‐with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life.     

Disembodied Souls or Soul-Less Bodies: Spirituality as Fragmentation

SUMMARY

‘Soul’ and ‘body’ are two linguistic expressions of one and the same reality, the human being. In pastoral care, aged care, and palliative care the stated aim is always to care for the whole person. An increasing focus on ‘spirituality’ has also led to objectifying and measuring what is ultimately beyond calculation. To care for each person as an ‘ensouled body’ and ‘embodied soul’ is to acknowledge we are in the service of one another. In entering one another's stories, words like impose, define, and manage are replaced by trust, love, and faithfulness. Measurable outcomes are then replaced by risk, ambiguity, and mystery: the heart and soul and body of human care.     

Self and Self-Consciousness: Aristotelian Ontology and Cartesian Duality

The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively encounters the self and that the Cartesian extent of inner space is self-contained are profound errors, distortions through the lenses of modern theories.     

Self‐Creation? On the Dignity of Human Beings

It was not through biotechnological possibilities that human beings first discovered “self‐creation” as a question. Rather, the question fits into the horizon of the primordial human desire to be like God. Against this hamartiological insight, a soteriological expectation related to technology has arisen. The latter expectation must be rejected, but not in all respects. Rather, one has to stress the inventive and constructive aspect of the dignity to rule, which is implied in human linguistic reason (λογοσ). There are, however, boundaries to be perceived and to be set. This becomes evident when embryo‐consuming research is at stake. In this context, the main question is: Wherein lies human “dignity”? This is the same question as: wherein lies the “being‐as‐person”? The author sees the fewest difficulties in attributing personhood to the beginning of life, which occurs with the fusion of ovum and sperm. This attribution is not justified by the material substrate as such. Rather, it is the result of intertwining the element, namely the lump of cells, and the word of institution, which “speaks together” the lump of cells and the person: This lump of cells is a person. Human beings are honored and enabled to use this instituting word, a φυσ?ι, because according to Gen 2:7 and 19f, God granted unto human beings linguistic reason (λογοσ), and thus the power to define. In this intertwining of element and instituting word lies the human dignity, which is undeservedly conferred on humans as a categorical gift. This absolute gratuity implies the unconditional acknowledgment of the dignity and the personhood of human beings—before one can speak of any characteristics or abilities. Psalm 8 underscores the elementary human dependency on unconditional acknowledgment as an inviolable person, an acknowledgment preceding all human characteristics and achievements. The psalm further intertwines this acknowledgment and the commission to rule, which is conferred on human beings, as an insoluble unity. What at first appear to be opposites is in fact a synopsis and inseparable connection of creaturely human determinations that correspond to God's simultaneously being the almighty creator and the compassionate, merciful father. By using “dignity” and “person” as critical terms of negotiation, theology can engage in a conversation with the societal and political public. In rejecting the dominant determination of the “person” as an autonomous, self‐determinately active, individual rational being, theology finds an ally in juridical thinking, which also acknowledges the dignity even of persons unable to act. Two consequences are to be drawn concerning biotechnology: perceiving the remaining dependency, vulnerability and vanity of human beings forces us to abandon illusions of “self‐creation” and immortality. Second, priorities are required that determine the goals and limits of research—especially in protecting the personal dignity of embryos—in the light of our accountability before God the creator and judge.     

THE BIBLICAL ROOTS OF LOCKE'S THEORY OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

Locke's consciousness‐based theory of personal identity resulted not only from his agnosticism on substance, but also from his biblical theology. This theory was intended to complement and sustain Locke's moral and theological commitments to a system of otherworldly rewards and sanctions as revealed in Scripture. Moreover, he inferred mortalist ideas from the Bible, rejecting the resurrection of the same body and maintaining that the soul dies at physical death and will be resurrected by divine miracle. Accordingly, personal identity is neither in the soul, nor in the body, nor in a union of soul and body. To Locke, personal identity is in consciousness, which, extending “backwards to any past Action or Thought,” enables the self, both in this life and upon resurrection for the Last Judgment, to recognize that “it is the same self now it was then; and ‘tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done” (Essay II.xxvii.9).     

Soul: What does it mean for Russian children?

'Soul' is one of the fundamental categories of our consciousness. What does it mean for a child? Russian children from an urban area (n = 148) were interviewed to answer this question. The data shows that children understand soul as an internal phenomenon, which is responsible for the social, emotional and moral life of a person. Children believe that the soul has primacy over the body, serves to control and guide human behaviour and performs such functions as emotions, thinking, memory and wishes. Children communicate animistic, ethical and psychological meanings to the concept of soul. Comparative data obtained in four age groups of children (5-6, 6-7, 7-8, 9-10 year olds) are discussed.     

Enigmatic Bayle

The subject of this article is Herder’s unique conception of the soul-body relationship and its divergence from and dependence on Leibniz. Herder’s theory is premised on a rejection of the windowlessness of monads in two important respects: interaction between material bodies (as gleaned from Crusius and Kant) and interaction between the soul and body. Herder’s theory depends on Leibniz insofar as it agrees with the intimate connection Leibniz posits between the soul and the body, as his epistemology demonstrates, with, however, the significant modification that the connection is real. Herder transforms the Leibnizian rehabilitation and use of substantial forms to develop a double-conception of the human soul as both thinking substance and substantial form: the soul, qua thinking substance, needs a body through whose senses it can interact with, and acquire knowledge of, the external world; the soul, qua substantial form, constructs itself this material body by harnessing the forces of attraction and repulsion. Herder’s theory provides an alternative to other contemporary accounts of the soul-body relationship, especially Kant’s, which start from the problem of relating two distinct substances. His unique and original reconciliation of the modern dichotomy of spirit and matter, via his connecting of Leibniz’s realms of final and efficient causes, is of great significance for the rise of German Idealism.     

‘Who am I?’

The dreams and existential questions of those, who came into being in order to replace a dead person, pivot around a central cry: ‘Who am I?’ If conceived, born or designated as a replacement child, such an individual may suffer—even as an adult—from a rarely recognized unconscious confusion of identity, compounded by grief and survivors’ guilt. From before the child is born, the archetypal forces of death and life are joined in a fateful constellation; the soul of the replacement child bears the shadow of death from the very beginning of life. Hope for the replacement child lies in an emergence of true self as soul recreates original life. Analysis can help the replacement child experience a ‘rebirth into true life’, not as ‘the one who returned’, but as a psychologically newborn individual; the path of individuation countering the replacement child‘s identification with the dead. Jungian analysis offers unique concepts for understanding and healing the replacement child; C.G. Jung himself was born after two stillborn babies and an infant that lived only five days.     

Removing the Mote in the Knower's Eye: Education and Epistemology in Hugh of St. Victor's Didascalicon

The Didascalicon of Hugh of St. Victor encourages the study of many disciplines in order for the soul to acquire knowledge that aids in the restoration of human nature. However, according to Hugh's epistemology much of the acquired knowledge depends upon sensory qualities internalized as images which distract the soul and cause it to degenerate from its original unity. This essay explores the tension between Hugh's educational optimism and Hugh's epistemological pessimism. After considering and rejecting two unsuccessful strategies the soul might pursue for avoiding degeneration and distraction, we shall utilize Hugh's non‐representational conception of cognition to develop a plausible intellectual strategy. We shall also build upon some of Hugh's remarks about music to sketch a model of self‐knowledge as a kind of proportionality in the soul.