ALL ANIMALS MATTER: MARC BEKOFF'S CONTRIBUTION TO CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

Abstract. Along with Jane Goodall, Mark Bekoff proposes that religion can join science in recognizing that animals have minds of their own; that humans can humbly imagine themselves inside these minds, all the while recognizing their independent integrity; and that, as creatures with psyches, animals deserve respect and care. In his various writings Bekoff offers many hints of what a theology of animal minds might look like and how it might be part of a more comprehensive theology of respect and care for the community of life. Process or Whiteheadian theology offers a way of appreciating Bekoff's insights, linking them with the ecojustice movement, showing how they can be linked with various themes in evolutionary biology, and developing a threefold approach to animal well‐being: cosmological, ethical, and spiritual. In so doing, process thought shows how the practice of science, particularly as expressed in cognitive theology, involves a marriage of empathy and observation, which represents science and spirituality at their best.     

THE PARTICULARITY OF ANIMALS AND OF JESUS CHRIST

Clough's theological account of animals critiques the familiar negative identification of animals as not‐human. Instead, Clough highlights both the distinctive particularity of each animal as created by God and the shared fleshly creatureliness of human and nonhuman animals. He encourages Christians to recognize Jesus Christ as God enfleshed more than divinely human, and consequently to care for nonhuman animals as those who share with human animals in the redemption of all flesh. This move risks downplaying the possibilities for creaturely specific forms of redemption; limiting the cosmic efficacy of salvation in Christ; and losing the particularity of Christ's divine and human natures. Another, possibly less risky, direction to take Clough's insights about creatureliness and well‐formed theological ethics might attend to the perverse ways that humans assess the worthiness of human and nonhuman animals by substituting particularities of use and abuse for the particularities of creation and salvation.     

MORAL APES, HUMAN UNIQUENESS, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD

Recent advances in evolutionary biology and ethology suggest that humans are not the only species capable of empathy and possibly morality. These findings are of no little consequence for theology, given that a nonhuman animal as a free moral agent would beg the question if human beings are indeed uniquely created in God's image. I argue that apes and some other mammals have moral agency and that a traditional interpretation of the imago Dei is incorrectly equating specialness with exclusivity. By framing the problem in terms of metaphor, following the work of Paul Ricoeur and Sallie McFague, I propose that the concept of the imago Dei could be extended to accommodate moral species other than our own.     

NAMING THE HUMAN ANIMAL: GENESIS 1–3 AND OTHER ANIMALS IN HUMAN BECOMING

Recently the paleoanthropologist Pat Shipman has proposed what she calls the animal connection as the human trait that connects all other traits. Theologians and biblical scholars have proposed many relational, functional, and ontological interpretations of the image of God in humans and human nature, but have generally not included a connection with animals. Genesis 1–3, however, weaves human and animal creation in a variety of ways, and Adam's naming of other species implies they are understood as family or kin. Thus Genesis 1–3 understands a relationship with other animals as integral to human becoming and uses family or kinship as a root metaphor for human–animal relations.