The Grammar of Politics, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy

Books reviewed:
Cressida J. Heyes (ed.), The Grammar of Politics, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy , Cornell University Press, 2003, xii + 259, no price. Reviewed by Peter Johnson, University of Southampton Department of Philosophy University of Southampton Highfield Southampton UK     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

Kant and Wittgenstein: Common Sense,Therapy, and the Critical Philosophy

Kant’s reputation for making absolutist claims about universal and necessary conditions for the possibility of experience are put here in the broader context of his goals for the Critical philosophy. It is shown that within that context, Kant’s claims can be seen as considerably more innocuous than they are traditionally regarded, underscoring his deep respect for “common sense” and sharing surprisingly similar goals with Wittgenstein in terms of what philosophy can, and at least as importantly cannot, provide.

Frank Ebersole on Wittgenstein and Pictures in Philosophy

How do we get into trouble in philosophy, and what do pictures have to do with it? This article addresses Frank Ebersole's thoughts on (Wittgenstein's remarks on) pictures in philosophy. It identifies the puzzlement generated for Ebersole by what Wittgenstein says and also considers some puzzling aspects of Ebersole's own renderings of pictures. It distinguishes between the philosophical picture and the pictorial form in which it may be crystalized and shows how philosophy's reliance on situationally disembedded grammatical stories (pictorial or not) leads us into trouble. Accordingly, responding to such trouble consists not in recovering the picture, in the sense of a single “object” or image we had before our mind's eye, but in—what is better described as Ebersole's strategy of—supplying a grammatical example (pictorial or otherwise) to go with our thinking, an example that makes what we think and say clear to ourselves.     

An Aesthetics of the Ordinary: Wittgenstein and John Cage

Comparisons of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Cage typically focus on the “later Wittgenstein” of the Philosophical Investigations. However, in this article I focus on the deep intellectual sympathy between the “early Wittgenstein” of the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus—with its evocative and controversial invocation of silence at the end, the famous proposition 7: “Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent”—and Cage's equally evocative and controversial work on the same theme—his “silent piece,” 4′33″. This sympathy expresses itself not only in the common aim of the two works (a mystical appreciation for the ordinary, everyday world that surrounds us) but also in a shared methodology for bringing about this aim (tracing the limits of language from within in order to transcend those very limits). In this sense, I argue that Cage's work gives a concrete, performative reality to Wittgenstein's early conception of language as well as the mystical revelation that lies behind it.     

Confusion,Irrationality and the Ends of Philosophy: Horwich's Wittgenstein Inspired Metaphilosophy

This paper focuses on Horwich's metaphilosophical interpretation of Wittgenstein. Specifically, it focuses on Horwich's charge that all philosophy is irrational. First, I coordinate the various aspects of Horwich's metaphilosophical program to make sense of his charge of irrationality against philosophy. Second, I argue that this metaphilosophical program misfires in two distinct ways. However, third, I close by calling attention to what I posit to be a critical insight of Horwich's account.     

Wittgenstein on Aspect‐Recognition in Philosophy and Mathematics

Although Wittgenstein’s most extensive discussion of aspect‐recognition appears in Part II of the Philosophical Investigations, aspect‐recognition was of interest to Wittgenstein almost from the beginning of his engagement with philosophy at Cambridge in 1912. However, the nature of that interest changes upon his return to Cambridge in 1929, and that change in turn is connected with the inter‐related ideas that philosophical clarity rests on recognising aspects of our grammar and that mathematical proof leads us to recognise new aspects of mathematical expressions.     

维特根斯坦与奎因:兼容而不对立的两种哲学

维特根斯坦和奎因都鄙视形而上学的和认识论的思辨,并且都花大力气批评传统的哲学概念和理论。但是他们在此批评之后继续从事哲学的路径是不同的。维特根斯坦把哲学等同于对传统哲学思维的批判,并且仅此而已。奎因则通过把哲学问题重塑为科学问题来尽其所能地挽救以往的哲学,并且对他重塑之后的问题做出回答。与人们对维特根斯坦和奎因的通常看法相反,我认为他们从事的哲学研究是互补的、并不是不兼容的。他们只是在表面上看是对立的;而实际上赞同其一方并不意味着拒绝另一方。     

The Literary Wittgenstein Philosophy and Literature: A Book of Essays

Books reviewed:
The Literary Wittgenstein edited by John Gibson and Wolfgang Huerner, Routledge, London, 2004 (pp. xi + 356). Philosophy and Literature: A Book of Essays , M. W. Rowe, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004 (pp xii + 238). Reviewed by M. H. Weston, University of Essex University of Essex Wivenhoe Park Colchester CO4 3SQ     

The Question of Internationalism in Philosophy and Aesthetics

In this article aesthetics is treated purely as a branch of philosophy, and the points made are intended to apply both to philosophy more generally and aesthetics more specifically. The manner in which internationalism obviously has to do with the organization of the disciplines is discussed. Does it have any bearing on their content or substance? The distinction between organization and content is probed and seen to be much less obvious than at first sight apparent and is doubtfully tenable. Nations are foreign to philosophy in two respects. First we would remain philosophically impoverished if we attended only to the philosophy produced in our own nation. Secondly, and more interestingly, nations cannot be the subject of philosophy since they are individuals. Individuals can only be of philosophical interest in so far as they can be identified under general categories; then what matters is the category, not the individual. Philosophy, including philosophy of art, can only be interested in individuals as first-order examples or illustrations of more general second-order claims or theses. So nations must be excluded from the domain of philosophy. It does not follow that such exclusion amounts to internationalism. Indeed though internationalism itself might be a philosophical idea the dismissal of nations as philosophically irrelevant more obviously represents a commitment to universalism than to internationalism. Internationalism and universalism should not be confused though they overlap. Universalism is the ideal of the so-called enlightenment project which is defended in this paper against post-modernist criticism and also against the charge that it constitutes a view from nowhere. The view from nowhere is in the strictest sense utopian and for that reason is to be championed as a means for criticising our current assumptions and beliefs and not dismissed. Overt bias including national bias is not a problem, though the writer of philosophy must strive against it on pain of failing to write philosophy. A writer, however, can only guard against overt prejudice and bias. But a text, whether or not philosophical, is also silently exclusionary, that is, there are groups it silently excludes. At a later date the reader can often detect examples of silent exclusion. Since these silences are indefinitely many, it is always possible for a group to feel excluded. The important philosophical point is to concede the possibility of linguistic and indeed conceptual exclusion, to study its mechanisms and to consider on what principles, if any, a moral charge of exclusion is justified and when not.     

Wittgenstein,education and religion

Conclusion Wittgenstein's approach to religion is an important part of any assessment of the significance of his thought as a whole for educational thinking and practice. As we have seen, although his view of religion is elusive and stands in need of definitive evaluation, it offers a number of insights and challenges.Whilst Wittgenstein's approach conflicts in important respects with the LR view of education in religion, because that view is based on important social and cultural realities which are significant for Wittgensteinian principles, it is not supplanted. The Wittgensteinian approach both supplies important perspectives which will enrich the LR view, whilst giving support to a greater pluralism in the way in which education in religion is conceived, including forms of substantial religious upbringing and schooling.     

Wittgenstein,mindreading and perception

Can we perceive others' mental states? Wittgenstein is often claimed to hold, like some phenomenologists, that we can. The view thus attributed to Wittgenstein is a view about the correct explanation of mindreading: He is taken to be answering a question about the kind of process mindreading involves. But although Wittgenstein claims we see others' emotions, he denies that he is thereby making any claim about that underlying process and, moreover, denies that any underlying process could have the significance it is claimed to have for this debate. For Wittgenstein, the question is not “Is this perception?” but “What do we mean by ‘perception' here?” and that question is answered by investigating the grammar of the relevant concepts. That investigation, however, reveals similarities and differences between what we call “perception” here and elsewhere. Hence, Wittgenstein's answer to the question “Can we perceive others' mental states?” is yes and no: Both responses can be justified by appeal to different concepts of perception. Wittgenstein, then, has much to contribute to our understanding of mindreading, but what he has to contribute is nothing like the view typically attributed to him here.     

Wittgenstein,Quasi-fideism,and Scepticism

In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief.

     

Machines,Logic and Wittgenstein

Philosophia - Wittgenstein’s “machines-as-symbols” are considered with respect to their historical sources and their symbolic and logical nature. Among these sources and...