The Psychophysiology Of Intuition: A Quantum-Holographic Theory Of Nonlocal Communication

This work seeks to explain intuitive perception—those perceptions that are not based on reason or logic or on memories or extrapolations from the past, but are based, instead, on accurate foreknowledge of the future. Often such intuitive foreknowledge involves perception of implicit information about nonlocal objects and/or events by the body's psychophysiological systems. Recent experiments have shown that intuitive perception of a future event is related to the degree of emotional significance of that event, and a new study shows that both the brain and the heart are involved in processing a pre-stimulus emotional response to the future event. Drawing on this research and on the principles of quantum holography, I develop a theory of intuition that views the perception of things remote in space or ahead in time (nonlocal communication) as involving processes of energetic resonance connecting the body's psychophysiological systems to the quantum level. The theory explains how focused emotional attention directed to the nonlocal object of interest attunes the bio-emotional energy generated by the body's psychophysiological systems to a domain of quantum-holographical information, which contains implicit information about the object. The body's perception of such implicit information about things distant in space/time is experienced as an intuition.     

What Nature Makes of Her: Kant's Gendered Metaphysics

Women's exclusion from political enfranchisement in Kant's political writings has frequently been noted in the literature, and yet has not been closely scrutinized. More often than not, commentators suggest that this reflects little more than Kant's sharing in the prejudices of his era. This paper argues that, for Kant, women's civil incapacities stem from defects relating to their capacities as moral agents, and more specifically, to his teleological account of the conditions within which we, as imperfect beings, develop our moral capacities. Women are not incidentally or tangentially excluded from the boundaries of political and moral agency, but rather must adopt an explicitly nonmoral character if we are to understand humanity as moving toward its naturally given, moral ends. I argue (1) that Kant's teleological view of human development requires women to develop an explicitly nonmoral character; (2) that this teleology is inextricable from his view of the moral agency that human—and not merely rational—beings are capable of; and (3) that taken together, these suggest that women's subordinate status is internally connected to Kant's view of moral personhood.     

Extrinsic Grace and Eccentric Existence

Catherine Pickstock has critiqued David Kelsey's Eccentric Existence for, among other things, adopting the position on the relation of nature to grace that has become known as “extrinsicism”. Pickstock's critique of Kelsey parallels the criticism that both she and John Milbank have leveled against extrinsicism. This paper considers the merits of Pickstock's charges of extrinsicism and supposedly related theological ills against Kelsey. Finding that they fall short, I suggest that Kelsey's “three narrative” anthropology and its “multiple teleology” are potentially valuable resources for ongoing theological debates concerning nature and grace.     

The role of attitudes and beliefs in differential health care utilisation among Chinese in Singapore

Abstract

One hundred and twenty-eight Chinese patients at two Western medical practices and two Chinese medical practices in Singapore completed a questionnaire regarding perceptions of illnesses. Health beliefs and attitudes towards different medical practitioners. Results indicate significant differences between those who consult only allopathic physicians (Western doctors) and those who consult both practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine (sinsehs) and Western doctors. Individuals consulting both Western doctors and sinsehs perceived a smaller proportion of “general” illness attributes (those found in both Western and Chinese medicine) to be relevant to specific diseases and showed greater endorsement of Chinese health beliefs than did individuals seeking help only from Western doctors. Also individuals consulting both types of practitioners expressed less satisfaction with the doctor's treatment than did those consulting only Western doctors and also rated sinsehs as more concerned with patient well-being and as listening more to their patients.     

Artifacts as Conventional Objects

What underlies children's understanding of artifacts? Studies suggest that beginning around age 7, people reason about artifacts in terms of the inventor's purpose—termed the design stance. Our two studies emphasize another component of artifact understanding—the cultural nature of artifacts—by demonstrating people's sensitivity to an artifact's conventional use. In past studies participants were shown a novel artifact and told that someone invented it for a certain purpose and that later another person used it for a different purpose. Here we demonstrate that if participants are told that many people, as opposed to just one person, use an artifact differently, 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds, and adults do not strictly judge the artifact in terms of its invented purpose. We conclude that people's conceptions of artifacts are more complex and dynamic than has been suggested.     

Book Reviews

Subjective measures of well-being—measures based on answers to questions such as ‘Taking things all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say you're very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy these days?’—are often presented as superior to more traditional economic welfare measures, e.g., for public policy purposes. This paper aims to spell out and assess what I will call the argument from directness: the notion that subjective measures of well-being better represent well-being than economic measures do because subjective measures (and subjective measures alone) are direct measures of well-being. My main thesis is that the argument begs the question against proponents of economic measures: it is based on a premise that they reject and that is no less in need of justification than the conclusion of the argument, namely, the proposition that well-being is constituted by subjectively experienced mental states. If subjective measures can be defended as valid measures of well-being at all, I will maintain, it is because they are (imperfect) indirect measures of well-being.     

Beyond the Tools of the Trade: Heidegger and the Intelligibility of Everyday Things

In everyday life, we constantly encounter and deal with useful things without pausing to inquire about the sources of their intelligibility. In Div. I of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes just such an inquiry. According to a common reading of Heidegger's analysis, the intelligibility of our everyday encounters and dealings with useful things is ultimately constituted by practical self‐understandings (such as being a gardener, shoemaker, teacher, mother, musician, or philosopher). In this paper, I argue that while such practical self‐understandings may be sufficient to constitute the intelligibility of the tools and equipment specific to many practices, these “tools of the trade” are only a small portion of the things we encounter, use, and deal with on a daily basis. Practical self‐understandings cannot similarly account for the intelligibility of the more mundane things—like toothbrushes and sidewalks—used in everyday life. I consider whether an anonymous self‐understanding as “one,” “anyone,” or “no one in particular” —das Man—might play this intelligibility‐constituting role. In examining this possibility, another type of self‐understanding comes to light: cultural identities. I show that the cultural identities into which we are “thrown,” rather than practical identities or das Man, constitute the intelligibility of the abundance of mundane things that fill our everyday lives. Finally, I spell out how this finding bears on our understanding of Heidegger's notion of authenticity.     

Why True Globalization Depends on New Scientific Models

Ervin Laszlo's Science and the Akashic Field is vital to our transition from a long epoch of empire building—of the drive to control Earth's resources by fierce competition in a situation of perceived scarcity—to a future of truly cooperative global family. Laszlo's universe is a far cry from the one Western science has taught us and compatible with my own views as a “post-Darwinian” evolution biologist. In fact, no small number of Western scientists today have defected from the official scientific story of How Things Are to create or adopt various versions of the new scientific worldview Laszlo presents—a worldview rooted in older sciences and cultures such as Vedic, yet ultimately not just timely, but futuristic. These new scientific models, integrating ancient and modern knowledge, represent a paradigm shift greater than the Copernican revolution and are crucial to the next stage in humanity's evolution as a planetary species.     

Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation

For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential paper, Helen Beebee offers a partial solution to the problem by giving an account of causation by absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be causes). I argue that Beebee's account can be extended to cover causation of absence (i.e. causation in which absences are supposed to be effects) as well. More importantly, I argue that the extended Beebeeian account calls for a major modification to David Lewis's theory of causal explanation, usually taken as standard. Compared to the standard theory, the result of this modification, which I shall call ‘the liberal theory of causal explanation’, has, among other things, the advantage of being able to accommodate causal explanations in which the explananda are not given in terms of events.     

The Salto Vitale Method in Philosophy

Did G. E. Moore prove the existence of things outside us? Philosophers have objected to his proof, but not for good reasons. Since when, for instance, has absolute certainty been the mark of philosophy? But Moore's proof was superfluous, as its conclusion had already been proved previously. (If immanent critique were the only acceptable way to refute a philosophy rationally, “Nothing exists” would be immune from refutation—which is preposterous.)     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.     

Cessation and integration in classical yoga

In this paper I challenge and attempt to correct conclusions about Classical Yoga philosophy drawn by traditional and modern interpretations of Patañjali's Yoga‐sūtras. My interpretation of Patañjali's Yoga—which focuses on the meaning of “cessation” (nirodha) as given in Patañjali's central definition of Yoga (YS 1.2)—counters the radically dualistic and ontologically‐oriented interpretations of Yoga presented by many scholars, and offers an open‐ended, epistemologically‐oriented hermeneutic which, I maintain, is more appropriate for arriving at a genuine assessment of Patañjali's system (dar?ana) of Yoga.     

Buddhist functionalism—Instrumentality reaffirmed

This article seeks to determine if Buddhism can best be understood as primarily a functionalist tradition. In pursuing this, some analogies arise with various Western strands—particularly James’ ‘pragmatism’, Dewey's ‘instrumentalism’, Braithwaite's ‘empiricism’, Wittgenstein's ‘language games’, and process thinkers like Hartshorne and Jacobson. Within the Buddhist setting, the traditional Theravāda framework of sila (ethics/precepts), samādhi (meditation) and pañña (wisdom) are examined, together with Theravāda rituals. Despite some ‘correspondence’ approaches with regard to truth claim statements, e.g. vipassanā ’insight’ and Abhidharma analysis, a more profound functionalism seems present. This is even more clear with the Mahāyāna. Apart from the basic and explicit Mahāyāna underpinning of upāya, the Mādhyamika, Tantras and Ch'an (Zen) schools are clearly functionalist. Moreover, despite initially seeming more ‘absolutist’ in their positions, other strands like the Pure Land and Nichiren faith traditions, and Dharmakirti's Vijñānavāda epistemology can also be tied into this functionalist setting.     

Spinoza's Rethinking of Activity: From the Short Treatise to the Ethics

This paper argues that God's immanent causation and Spinoza's account of activity as adequate causation (of finite modes) do not always go together in Spinoza's thought. We show that there is good reason to doubt that this is the case in Spinoza's early Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well‐being . In the Short Treatise , Spinoza defends an account of God's immanent causation without fully endorsing the account of activity as adequate causation that he will later introduce in the Ethics (E3def2). We turn to an examination of how God's immanent causation relates to the activity of finite things in the Ethics . We consider two ways to think about the link between God, seen as immanent cause, and the activity of finite things: namely, in terms of entailment and in terms of production. We argue that the productive model is most promising for understanding the way in which the activity of finite things and God's immanent causality are connected in Spinoza's (mature) philosophy     

On avoiding bullshit

Author's note: By the time it is published this article will have been written more than a year ago; it was conceived and sketched out in letters to friends as far back as four years past, when the ideas in it would huve been considered quintessentially weird. Some things have changed since then–even since the summer of 1970 the most important being a climate of opinion antong a number of literate people, who are not yet in power anyplace in the world that I know of. Books have been published in the interim, Toper's Future Shock, Matson's The Broken Image, Mumford's The Pentagon of Power, Reich's The Greening of America, among others (Mumford is still the heavyweight); books of disparate vulue which are, nevertheless, symptomatic of the change, none of which I had the opportunity to read before I wrote this article. There are signs that the patient—us—may have a fighting chance. Only a chance, mind you, for there have appeared reactions which grow less subtle day by day, antagonisms that probably could have been predicted by anyone familiar with power's way of justifying its love affair with death. My article attempts to be predictive only to the extent that phenomena which are manifest imply their own futurity; if cause for optimism has appeared like a single power upon a dung heap, that too was always there in the nature of things. And high time!     

Discourse theory trumps discourse theory: Wouter Hanegraaff's Esotericism and the Academy

This review article argues that Wouter Hanegraaff's Esotericism and the Academy is deeply influenced by a methodological cluster usually referred to as ‘discourse theory.’ That the author is not willing to classify his own approach as such is explained with recourse to his dispute with Kocku von Stuckrad, who, according to Hanegraaff, would embody discourse theory, whereas Hanegraaff would embody history. A comparison of Hanegraaff's Esotericism and the Academy: Rejected Knowledge in Western Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and von Stuckrad's Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric Discourse and Western Identities (Leiden: Brill, 2010) reveals that this is a misleading classification and that Hanegraaff's study comes closer to what discourse theory is all about. As a consequence, Esotericism and the Academy is the very first study on ‘Western esotericism’ that offers a convincing justification of this particular label as an overarching discursive category.     

The Erotic and the Mystical in Postmodernity

Abstract

There has always been a close connection between divine and erotic love in the Western mystical tradition, from the Pseudo-Dionysius to St John of the Cross, and it is found also in poets such as John Donne and George Herbert. It is a tradition returned to in Ron Hansen's novel Mariette in Ecstasy (1991) in which Mariette, though banished from her convent, remains a stigmatic and Christ's ‘lover’. The essay concludes with a brief review of the postmodernity that entertains both the erotic—dangerous sex—and the love of God in true hospitality.     

Social neuroscience evidence for dehumanised perception

Dehumanisation describes perceiving a person as nonhuman in some ways, such as lacking a mind. Social psychology is beginning to understand cognitive and affective causes and mechanisms—the psychological how and why of dehumanisation. Social neuroscience research also can inform these questions. After background on social neural networks and on past dehumanisation research, the article contrasts (a) research on fully humanised person perception, reviewing studies on affective and cognitive factors, specifically mentalising (considering another's mind), with (b) dehumanised perception, proposing neural systems potentially involved. Finally, the conclusion suggests limitations of social neuroscience, future research directions, and real-world consequences of this all-too-human phenomenon.     

Explaining normative reasons

In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support-explanationism, for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ-ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism—ought-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good-explanationism, on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons-First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support-explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non-naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons-First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’.