Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants

According to the dominant position in the just war tradition from Augustine to Anscombe and beyond, there is no ??moral equality of combatants.?? That is, on the traditional view the combatants participating in a justified war may kill their enemy combatants participating in an unjustified war??but not vice versa (barring certain qualifications). I shall argue here, however, that in the large number of wars (and in practically all modern wars) where the combatants on the justified side violate the rights of innocent people (??collateral damage??), these combatants are in fact liable to attack by the combatants on the unjustified side. I will support this view with a rights-based account of liability to attack and then defend it against a number of objections raised in particular by Jeff McMahan. The result is that the thesis of the moral equality of combatants holds good for a large range of armed conflicts while the opposing thesis is of very limited practical relevance.     

Moral demands and the far future*

I argue that moral philosophers have either misunderstood the problem of moral demandingness or at least failed to recognize important dimensions of the problem that undermine many standard assumptions. It has been assumed that utilitarianism concretely directs us to maximize welfare within a generation by transferring resources to people currently living in extreme poverty. In fact, utilitarianism seems to imply that obligations to help people who are currently badly off are trumped by obligations to undertake actions targeted at improving the value of the long-term future. Reflecting on the demands of beneficence in respect of the value of the far future forces us to view key aspects of the problem of moral demandingness in a different light.     

Social Psychology,Moral Character,and Moral Fallibility*

In recent years, there has been considerable debate in the literature concerning the existence of moral character. One lesson we should take away from these debates is that the concept of character, and the role it plays in guiding our actions, is far more complex than most of us initially took it to be. Just as Gilbert Harman, for example, makes a serious mistake in insisting, plain and simply, that there is no such thing as character, defenders of character also make a mistake to the extent that they imply there is no problem raised by the psychological literature for either the concept of character or the nature of character‐based ethics. My hope for this paper is to avoid both of these mistakes by first, exploring exactly what is the concept of character that is so firmly rooted in our philosophical and everyday thinking; and second, exploring the implications of the psychological literature for this appropriately understood concept of character. In so doing, I will come to a resolution that vindicates the existence of character, while at the same time calls attention to the real and serious problem suggested by the psychological evidence. This, we will see, is a problem of moral motivation.     

Scientific Explanation and Moral Explanation*

Moral philosophers are, among other things, in the business of constructing moral theories. And moral theories are, among other things, supposed to explain moral phenomena. Consequently, one's views about the nature of moral explanation will influence the kinds of moral theories one is willing to countenance. Many moral philosophers are (explicitly or implicitly) committed to a deductive model of explanation. As I see it, this commitment lies at the heart of the current debate between moral particularists and moral generalists. In this paper I argue that we have good reasons to give up this commitment. In fact, I show that an examination of the literature on scientific explanation reveals that we are used to, and comfortable with, non‐deductive explanations in almost all areas of inquiry. As a result, I argue that we have reason to believe that moral explanations need not be grounded in exceptionless moral principles.     

简论道德文化

新时期应有的社会主义道德文化 ,具有先进文化的鲜明特征 ,是促进社会全面进步的精神动力的关键因素 ,它集中体现了文化教育人、引导人、培养人、塑造人的基本功能 ,并渗透于各种文化领域。文化建设的一个首要着眼点 ,应注重把道德文化确立为其主题选择。     

道德建设论要

中国改革与社会发展的伟大实践需要我们将道德建设作为一个特定的伦理学范畴进行全面系统的研究.道德建设是促使道德进步的系统工程.在这个系统工程中,道德的理论建设是前提,家庭、学校和社会的道德教育是基础,职业道德建设是主体.道德建设系统的开放性特点要求经济、政治、法制和文化等方面的建设提供必要的保障,要实现这个要求就必须建立健全的伦理制度.     

略谈道德相对主义

本文对道德相对主义割裂道德特殊性与普遍性、相对性与绝对性,否认道德的客观标准和道德普遍性的理论实质和实践危害给予了分析批判,指出其对于我们引导人们明辨道德是非、树立正确的道德价值观、遵行社会主义道德和公民道德原则规范,吸收人类历史上有价值的道德资源,培养高尚的道德品质,都是极为不利的。     

Problems for Moral Twin Earth Arguments*

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers. The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy between moral properties and secondary qualities. This paper argues that Holland’s extension depends crucially on the fact that his target is a direct response-dependent account of moral value. His argument does not work against such accounts of more basic normative notions such as ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’. And these more basic notions may then serve as the basic normative building blocks for an indirectly response-dependent moral theory. * Thanks to Mark Timmons for helpful and friendly comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to an audience at the 2003 Pacific APA, and to the reviewers for this journal.     

道德教育之道德的内容结构探讨

道德教育的根本宗旨应是培养既愿做又会做"道德人"的"道德人",这就要求道德教育之道德的内容应是由道德知识、特定社会的道德现实、主体的道德能力构成的有机统一体,不作如是观,道德教育培养的"道德人"便只是"道德书生",在道德实践中可能会因缺乏道德实践能力而时常陷入道德悖论的"困惑"之中,进而可能背离愿意做"道德人"的初衷,转而渐渐不愿做"道德人".构建合理的道德教育之道德的内容结构,需要厘清基本理路,作多方面的认知创新.     

On the Irreducibility of Moral Incapacity

There is a growing consensus that moral incapacities are an important feature of the moral life and moral character. Philosophers are, however, somewhat at odds over the status and explanatory role of such volitional limits in models of moral psychology. They are sometimes understood reductively, as the products or expressive manifestations of underlying, working parts of character (such as dispositions, beliefs, passions, and values). Others view moral incapacities as constitutive elements of character, that is, primitive features of moral mindedness and agency which help give a person their moral substance and shape. I defend the constitutive conception by arguing against the most promising reductive account available: Dwight Furrow’s account of the incapacity underlying Oscar Schindler’s moral heroism. This gives strong evidence that moral incapacity is a basic and constitutive feature of our conception of character.     

On the Moral Significance of Sacrifice

ABSTRACT

The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and on possible duties to make sacrifices. It does not provide an exhaustive or a systematic account of the subject. There are too many disparate questions, and too many different perspectives from which to examine them to allow for a systematic let alone an exhaustive account, and too many factual issues that I am not aware of. Needless to say, the observations that follow are in part stimulated by the popularity of some views that are mistaken. I will not however examine any specific view or account of these matters. The aim is to provide some pointers that will be helpful when considering specific issues regarding the moral significance of sacrifice.     

论宗教的道德价值

原初的道德与宗教处于混沌一体之中。二者分化以后 ,宗教以其特殊方式提供道德规范的神圣性、道德理想人格的完满性与社会正义的至善性 ;在宗教信仰的特殊形式中蕴含着对真之笃信与对存在终极性关切的道德价值精神 ,并为道德规范提供价值合理性根据。     

论道德言说的复杂性

道德不可言说,但道德又不得不言说,这是道德言说的现实处境.语言真实性与道德真实性、道德语义与道德语意、话语权与道德权的内在关联,展示着道德言说的复杂性.正是复杂的语言与复杂的道德交织在一起,构成了复杂而生动的道德生活.