Teaching the Aesthetics of Music Today

What sense does it make to teach the aesthetics of music today? The discussion begins with the illusion of identifying music and language, by regarding language as communication. We use words and propositions in thinking about music, but music is “something other” than words. An analysis of Cook’s conception of a musicographic network leads to thinking about the non-verbal existence of musical works and musical experience.     

Wittgenstein on Dreaming and Skepticism

In this paper I aim to elucidate Wittgenstein’s claim that the so-called dream argument is senseless. Unlike other interpreters, who understand the sentence “I am dreaming” as contradictory or self-defeating, I intend to elucidate in what sense one should understand it as senseless or, more precisely, as nonsensical. In this sense, I propose to understand the above-mentioned claim in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism of skepticism from the Tractatus logico-philosophicus to his last writings. I intend to show that the words “I am dreaming” are nonsensical in the same sense as the alleged proposition “There are physical objects” or the expression of doubt about the existence of external objects.

     

Construction of the World: Ontology in the Tractatus

Why does Wittgenstein say in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that the world has as its members only facts, not things? Focusing on this question, I start with the problem, in its general form, “How is it possible to determine something as X?” and establish the excluding-allowing model for determination. From this model, I derive an argument for Wittgenstein’s aforementioned statement. The argument shows that a whole cannot be determined as consisting of components that are determined separately in a strong sense, whereas in a weak sense it can be. This thus demonstrates why the context principle holds. The recommended interpretation places suitable weight on the Tractarian notion of possibility. It provides new insights into Wittgenstein’s conception of logic, and his atomism about facts and states of affairs.     

Wittgenstein,Theories of Meaning,and Linguistic Disjunctivism

This paper argues that Wittgenstein opposed theories of meaning, and did so for good reasons. Theories of meaning, in the sense discussed here, are attempts to explain what makes it the case that certain sounds, shapes, or movements are meaningful linguistic expressions. It is widely believed that Wittgenstein made fundamental contributions to this explanatory project. I argue, by contrast, that in both his early and later works, Wittgenstein endorsed a disjunctivist conception of language which rejects the assumption underlying the question that such theories seek to answer—namely, the assumption that the notion of a meaningful linguistic expression admits of non‐circular analysis. Moreover, I give two arguments in favor of the view I ascribe to Wittgenstein: one based on later Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning skepticism and one based on considerations concerning the identity of linguistic expressions.     

Wittgenstein’s Peculiar Use of “Internal Relation” in Aspect-Seeing

“Internal relation” is a significant term in both Wittgenstein’s early and later philosophy. The term is used in relation to many problems, including our topic here, “aspect-seeing.” Some scholars have attempted to present a persuasive interpretation of this terminology; however, Wittgenstein’s remarks on “aspect-seeing” somehow thwart their approaches. The obstacle lies in the relata involved: Which terms are connected by an internal relation in the perception of an aspect? In this paper, I review the existing interpretations and present two proposals, one of which is conservative and the other slightly more radical. I argue that Wittgenstein makes divergent use of the distinction between “internal/external relations,” and that this may reveal the potential ambiguities of the words “internal” and “relation.”     

Wittgenstein, Moorean Absurdity and its Disappearance from Speech

G. E. Moore famously observed that to say, “ I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did” would be “absurd”. Why should it be absurd of me to say something about myself that might be true of me? Moore suggested an answer to this, but as I will show, one that fails. Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by Moore’s discovery of a class of absurd but possibly true assertions because he saw that it illuminates “the logic of assertion”. Wittgenstein suggests a promising relation of assertion to belief in terms of the idea that one “expresses belief” that is consistent with the spirit of Moore’s failed attempt to explain the absurdity. Wittgenstein also observes that “under unusual circumstances”, the sentence, “It’s raining but I don’t believe it” could be given “a clear sense”. Why does the absurdity disappear from speech in such cases? Wittgenstein further suggests that analogous absurdity may be found in terms of desire, rather than belief. In what follows I develop an account of Moorean absurdity that, with the exception of Wittgenstein’s last suggestion, is broadly consistent with both Moore’s approach and Wittgenstein’s.     

An Aesthetics of the Ordinary: Wittgenstein and John Cage

Comparisons of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Cage typically focus on the “later Wittgenstein” of the Philosophical Investigations. However, in this article I focus on the deep intellectual sympathy between the “early Wittgenstein” of the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus—with its evocative and controversial invocation of silence at the end, the famous proposition 7: “Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent”—and Cage's equally evocative and controversial work on the same theme—his “silent piece,” 4′33″. This sympathy expresses itself not only in the common aim of the two works (a mystical appreciation for the ordinary, everyday world that surrounds us) but also in a shared methodology for bringing about this aim (tracing the limits of language from within in order to transcend those very limits). In this sense, I argue that Cage's work gives a concrete, performative reality to Wittgenstein's early conception of language as well as the mystical revelation that lies behind it.     

What Is Wrong Indeed?

This is a critical response to Dr. Tamara Dobler's paper “What Is Wrong with Hacker's Wittgenstein? On Grammar, Context and Sense‐Determination.” It demonstrates that Dr. Dobler has no idea of what Wittgenstein meant by “grammar” or “rule of grammar.” She does not know what Wittgenstein meant by “grammatical proposition,” nor does she know what a compositional account of meaning or a category mistake is. She labours under the illusion that to say, as Wittgenstein did, that a rule of grammar excludes a form of words from use is incompatible with the claim that whether an utterance makes sense may be a context‐dependent issue. Unlike Dr. Dobler, Wittgenstein did not.     

The Inverted Spectrum,Qualia, and Wittgenstein’s Grammatical Analysis

In “Wittgenstein and Qualia,” Ned Block presents an inversion argument for qualia. Taking Wittgenstein’s notes as the starting point, Block argues that if we admit the possibility of the “innocuous” inverted spectrum, we will have to accept the “dangerous” inverted spectrum, where qualia are ineffable contents of experience contents that cannot be fully captured by public language. In my opinion, Block’s argument merits suspicion as it begs the question. While claiming to oppose the inner arena model like Wittgenstein, he presupposes its validity in his argument. I will finally examine how Wittgenstein dissolves confusion about qualia by the way of grammatical analysis.     

Crossing the Finite Provinces of Meaning. Experience and Metaphor

Schutz’s references to literature and arts in his theoretical works are manifold. But literature and theory are both a certain kind of a finite province of meaning, that means they are not easily accessible from the paramount reality of everyday life. Now there is another kind of referring to literature: metaphorizing it. Using it, as may be said with Lakoff and Johnson, to understand and to experience one kind of thing in terms of another. Literally metapherein means “to carry over”. Metaphorizing in this view is then a specific kind of border-crossing between different provinces of meaning. That poses two questions: 1. What means finiteness of those provinces of meaning, what kind of border crossings are possible? What is the ground for metaphorizing meaning? 2. Could this concept used for founding a theory of the constitution of the societal and of society, that overcomes the dichotomy of structure/agency? These questions will be answered with one example in view: Schutz’ report to Kaufmann of his first visit of Husserl describing his experience as feeling like Wilhelm Meister at the Society of the Tower. In a first step this metaphor is presented together with some crumbs of metaphor theory. In a second step these crumbs will be connected to Husserl’s concept of experience. After developing a short overview over Schutz’ “finite provinces of meaning,” the relation of experience, metaphors to the intersubjectivity of these provinces in their dependence from writing and printing is discussed.     

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE

Abstract: We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this article, I argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called “aesthetic judgements.” Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called “secondary sense.” Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one's ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice.     

Meaning of Social Inclusion to Young People Not in Employment,Education or Training

The ‘social inclusion’ of young people, particularly those who are ‘not in education, employment or training’, is a contemporary concern in policy discourses. However, it has been argued that the term ‘social inclusion’ is defined by adults and imposed on young people, and there is little understanding of what ‘social inclusion’ means to young people themselves. Using a participatory methodology, this study investigated what ‘being included’ meant to young people. A qualitative approach with a thematic analysis was used to explore the accounts of 11 participants and yielded three main themes. ‘“Acceptance”—the building blocks of inclusion’ reflected the power of interpersonal acceptance in determining young people's sense of inclusion. ‘“Learning why I don't matter”—when power and discourse shape inclusion’ illustrated how social discourses and power dynamics influenced young people's experience of inclusion. ‘“Keeping up or falling behind”—internalising the discourse of inclusion’ reflected how young people internalised some of these societal definitions of inclusion and responded to them. Those who felt ‘accepted’ or ‘included’ in a ‘mainstream’ sense articulated a sense of agency and hope. For those who did not, it appeared that agency dissolved as did a sense of hope for the future. Although the participants negotiated their ‘inclusion’ through close, trusting relationships with others, the application of the societal discourses of inclusion such as productivity, independence and career mindedness had the potential to leave them feeling excluded, isolated and distressed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inscrutability and its Discontents

That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's “Problem of the Many.” Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word “rabbit,” they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that “When I use ‘rabbit,’ I refer to rabbits” is made true by the meaning of the word “refer.” The reference relation is extended to other languages by translation. The explanation for this peculiarly egocentric conception of semantics—questions of others’ meanings are settled by asking what I mean by words of my language—is to be found in our practice of predicting and explaining other people's behavior by empathetic identification. I understand other people's behavior by asking what I would do in their place.     

The Wretchedness of Belief

In Culture and Value Wittgenstein remarks that the truly “religious man” thinks himself to be, not merely “imperfect” or “ill,” but wholly “wretched.” While such sentiments are of obvious biographical interest, in this paper I show why they are also worthy of serious philosophical attention. Although the influence of Wittgenstein's thinking on the philosophy of religion is often judged negatively (as, for example, leading to quietist and/or fideist‐relativist conclusions) I argue that the distinctly ethical conception of religion (specifically Christianity) that Wittgenstein presents should lead us to a quite different assessment. In particular, his preoccupation with the categorical nature of religion suggests a conception of “genuine” religious belief which disrupts both the economics of eschatological‐salvationist hope, and the traditional ethical precept that “ought implies can.” In short, what Wittgenstein presents is a sketch of a religion without recompense.     

Meaning,Use and Ostensive Definition in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations

In this paper, I argue that the restricted claim in §43a of the Philosophical Investigations is that, for a large class of cases of word meanings, the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Although Wittgenstein does not provide any example of words having uses but no meaning as exceptions to the claim, he does hint at exceptions, which are names being defined, or explained, ostensively by pointing to their bearers, in §43b. Names in ostensive definitions, or explanations, are meaningful, but not being used, and are therefore exceptions to the claim that meaning is use.     

A Comfortable Sureness: Knowledge,Animality and Conceptual Investigations in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

This essay analyses some remarks of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in which Wittgenstein compares human behaviour to that of animals and says he wants to consider man as an animal. The essay’s main purpose is to show that these remarks are essentially understood as part and parcel of what Wittgenstein calls “conceptual investigations” and that, consequently, they give little support to On Certainty’s naturalistic interpretations. A second purpose of the essay is to show that Wittgenstein does not intend to combat the use of “I know” in contexts such as those evoked by Moore; rather he wants to draw attention to the different ways in which we say or can say “I know.”

     

Arithmetic as Grammar

What is a number? Using material from Wittgenstein’s 1930s lectures, I argue that this question expresses a disorientation best overcome by recollecting rules that govern the number words. Why do we have the rules we do? We may be persuaded to adopt one rule rather than another by experience, when experiment shows it to be the more convenient way; we may also be persuaded by the “experience” of a new aspect. Mathematics is a “motley of techniques” for doing certain things; religion is a certain spirit meant to pervade everything we do. An important likeness is that in both instruction is essentially grammatical.