Understanding conditional promises and threats

Conditional promises and threats are speech acts that are used to manipulate other people's behaviour. Studies on human reasoning typically use propositional logic to analyse what people infer from such inducements. While this approach is sufficient to uncover conceptual features of inducements, it fails to explain them. To overcome this limitation, we propose a multilevel analysis integrating motivational, linguistic, deontic, behavioural, and emotional aspects. Commonalities and differences between conditional promises and threats on various levels were examined in two experiments. The first shows that both types of inducements are understood as being complementary on the linguistic level, but not reversible, due to the specific temporal order of their actions. In addition, it gives a first assessment of emotional reactions. The second experiment investigated the novel question of whether complementary promises and threats, despite semantic differences, both imply an obligation to cooperate on the deontic level. The data corroborate this hypothesis, and they support various appraisal-theoretical assumptions on the elicitation of emotions. They also reveal that content affects not only the attribution of emotions, but also the deontic interpretation.     

Why promises and threats need each other

Despite the pervasive use of promises and threats in social life, very little research has been devoted to examining the effectiveness of these interpersonal tactics in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. Based on the Goal‐Prescribes‐Rationality principle, we hypothesized that cooperation should be most strongly enhanced when promises and threats are communicated in combination, rather than in isolation. Also, we hypothesized that the combination of promises and threats should be especially effective among individuals with prosocial rather than proself orientations. Two studies provided good evidence for the latter hypothesis, in that the combination of promises and threats was only effective in people with prosocial orientations, people who are concerned with equality and collective interest. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of commitment to threats and promises upon bargaining behaviour and outcomes

The course of bargaining is determined in part by interdependent individuals exchanging messages so as to influence other's behaviour, and thereby to increase the likelihood of achieving outcomes consistent with their own goals. The communication of threats and promises are two major message strategies that are employed to influence the behaviour of others in a bargaining relationship. The present study examines the effects of players' level of commitment to these forms of message strategies upon behaviour in a duopoly bargaining task. Past research has oprationalized commitment in terms of the consistency with which an individual has followed through on threats or promises in the past. In the present research, Becker's (1960) concept of a side-bet is employed to provide an alternative means for defining and manipulating commitment. A side-bet obtains when either a threatener or a promiser posts a valued resource, say a bond, which they forfeit if they do not follow through on their stated threat or promise. The main expectations of the present study were that increased commitment to threat meassages would lead to more competitive behaviour and outcomes within a duopoly bargaining task, whereas increased commitment to promise messages would produce more cooperative behaviour and outcomes. Partial support for these major expectations, as well as confirmation of a number of secondary expectations, was obtained.     

Inducements: On the phrasing and logic of conditional promises,threats, and warnings

Summary This study examines the purposive-causal use of IF in inducements (conditional threats and promises). It is shown that subjects are sensitive to the relations obtaining among conditional threats and promises phrased in IF, AND, and OR, and to the inferences that may be drawn from conditional threats and promises. It is demonstrated that the relation between conditionals and disjunctives and between IF NOT and UNLESS statements is affected by the sign of the consequences, i.e., whether a threat or promise is involved, and that subjects are very prone in the context of inducements to accept the obverse of a proposition as following from it, thus committing the fallacy of the negated antecedent. An analysis is provided seeking to account for these effects in terms of pragmatic factors involved in the conversational use of the conditional in inducements.This study was supported in part by U.S. Public Health Service Grant 10006 from the National Institute of Mental Health.     

Inferences from decision difficulty

We propose that people infer the relative attractiveness of the choice alternatives from decision difficulty. A difficult decision signifies that the alternatives are close to each other in attractiveness, and an easy decision signifies that the alternatives are remote from each other in attractiveness. In Study 1, observers used reported decision difficulty to infer preferences of the decision maker. Studies 2-4 showed that inferences about the source of one’s own decision difficulty may affect a decision maker’s preferences. Study 4 integrates the notion of inferences from decision difficulty with dissonance theory, showing that in repeatable decisions difficulty reduces post-decisional spreading of alternatives, as predicted by our model, whereas with one-time decisions, difficulty enhances post-decisional spreading of alternatives, as predicted by dissonance theory.     

Inferences from semifactual 'even if' conditionals

We report three experiments on semifactual conditionals such as 'even if he had worn his seatbelt he would have been injured'. Semifactuals contain a counterfactual antecedent (the presupposed fact is, he did not wear a seatbelt) and a true consequent (the fact is, he was injured). The experiments show that from the denial of the antecedent, 'he did not wear his seatbelt', reasoners do not infer the standard conclusion 'he was not injured' but instead they infer the asymmetric conclusion, 'he was injured'. From the affirmation of the consequent, 'he was injured', they do not infer the standard conclusion 'he wore his seatbelt' but instead they infer that there is no valid conclusion. The first experiment shows this pattern for 'even if' subjunctive conditionals compared to 'if' indicative conditionals, the second extends it to 'even if' subjunctive conditionals compared to 'even though' indicative concessives, and the third extends it to 'if...also/still' subjunctive conditionals. The results suggest that people think about two possibilities to understand a semifactual: the conjecture, he wore his seatbelt and he was injured, and the presupposed facts, he did not wear his seatbelt and he was injured.     

Inferences of mental illness from noninvolvement

These studies continue the exploration of variables related to a person's use of the mental illness categorization. The central concern in the present studies was the effect of perceived variation in a target person's level of involvement in a social situation. While a low level of involvement, as portrayed in videotaped scenarios, prompts attribution of mental illness, other features of implicit personality theories also relate to greater or lesser attribution of mental illness. Those participants who gave evidence of having attributed lower levels of involvement, regardless of filmed information, also attributed higher levels of mental illness. Social workers, compared to general population participants, attributed higher levels of mental illness at all levels of target involvement. We discuss the implications of these findings for dissemination and assignment of the mentally ill role.     

Time travel and counterfactual asymmetry

Synthese - We standardly evaluate counterfactuals and abilities in temporally asymmetric terms—by keeping the past fixed and holding the future open. Only future events depend...     

Fantasy proneness and counterfactual thinking

Counterfactual thinking (CFT; mentally simulating alternatives to reality) is central to learning and motivation. Two studies explored the relationship between CFT and fantasy proneness, a personality trait typified by excessive fantasies hard to distinguish from reality. In study1, participants completed a fictional diary entry which was used to measure spontaneous CFT and the Creative Experiences Questionnaire measure of fantasy proneness. Fantasy proneness was significantly correlated with the generation of counterfactual thoughts. Both CFT and fantasy proneness have been independently associated with low mood and study2 included a measure of negative emotional state (the Depression, Anxiety and Stress scale) in addition to the CEQ and CFT. Fantasy proneness and negative emotion both predicted CFT, but no interaction between them was observed. The results suggest that individuals high in fantasy proneness have a general tendency to think counterfactually.     

Story understanding and counterfactual reasoning

D. Kahneman and A. Tversky (1982), in a seminal study on counterfactual reasoning, claimed empirical support for a simulation heuristic wherein ease of converting unusual conditions determines their selection as causes over normal conditions. Discourse analysis of their stories revealed a confounding of explanation and normality. A connectionist simulation of online comprehension and memory access of alternative conditions without conversion accounted for their data. Normality and explanation were varied independently in 2 experiments. Explanation but not normality affected the rank ordering of counterfactual conditions after reading. Access of alternative conditions in simulation was again the best predictor of empirical findings. Comprehension and memory operate where stories communicate information for decision making such as counterfactual reasoning and hindsight bias.     

Modal skepticism and counterfactual knowledge

Timothy Williamson has recently proposed to undermine modal skepticism by appealing to the reducibility of modal to counterfactual logic (Reducibility). Central to Williamson’s strategy is the claim that use of the same non-deductive mode of inference (counterfactual development, or CD) whereby we typically arrive at knowledge of counterfactuals suffices for arriving at knowledge of metaphysical necessity via Reducibility. Granting Reducibility, I ask whether the use of CD plays any essential role in a Reducibility-based reply to two kinds of modal skepticism. I argue that its use is entirely dispensable, and that Reducibility makes available replies to modal skeptics which show certain propositions to be metaphysically necessary by deductive arguments from premises the modal skeptic accepts can be known.     

Promise is debt, threat another matter: the effect of credibility on the interpretation of conditional promises and threats.

Evidence from reasoning tasks shows that promises and threats both tend to receive biconditional interpretations. They also both display high speaker control. On the face of it, the only difference seems to be the positive or negative signing of the consequent. In a promise, the speaker tries to persuade the hearer to do something by holding out the prospect of a particular reward; in a threat, the speaker tries to refrain the hearer from doing something by holding out the prospect of a particular punishment. This paper investigates the respects in which conditional promises and threats differ further by means of an inference task. The credibility of the consequent was manipulated in order to examine whether the acceptability ratings of inferences based on promises and on threats would be equally affected. The results of the inference task and an analysis of the reasons people give for their answers suggest that the credibility of promises is less affected by the use of excessive consequents than the credibility of threats. In other words, promise remains debt, whereas threat is another matter.     

Comparative syllogism and counterfactual knowledge

Comparative syllogism is a type of scientific reasoning widely used, explicitly or implicitly, for inferences from observations to conclusions about effectiveness, but its philosophical significance has not been fully elaborated or appreciated. In its simplest form, the comparative syllogism derives a conclusion about the effectiveness of a factor (e.g. a treatment or an exposure) on a certain property via an experiment design using a test (experimental) group and a comparison (control) group. Our objective is to show that the comparative syllogism can be understood as encoding a simulation view of counterfactuals, in that counterfactual situations are conceptual constructs that can be correctly simulated by homogeneous comparison groups. In this simulation view, the empirical data from the comparison groups play an evidential role in the evaluation of counterfactuals and in obtaining counterfactual knowledge. We further indicate how successful experimental designs can help us to obtain correct simulations, and thus to bring us to scientifically-empirically based counterfactual knowledge.     

Probabilities of counterfactuals and counterfactual probabilities

Probabilities figure centrally in much of the literature on the semantics of conditionals. I find this surprising: it accords a special status to conditionals that other parts of language apparently do not share. I critically discuss two notable ‘probabilities first’ accounts of counterfactuals, due to Edgington and Leitgeb. According to Edgington, counterfactuals lack truth values but have probabilities. I argue that this combination gives rise to a number of problems. According to Leitgeb, counterfactuals have truth conditions-roughly, a counterfactual is true when the corresponding conditional chance is sufficiently high. I argue that problems arise from the disparity between truth and high chance, between approximate truth and high chance, and from counterfactuals for which the corresponding conditional chances are undefined. However, Edgington, Leitgeb and I can unite in opposition to Stalnaker and Lewis-style ‘similarity’ accounts of counterfactuals.     

Superexplanations for counterfactual knowledge

Philosophical Studies - I discuss several problems for Williamson’s counterfactual-theory of modal knowledge and argue that they have a common source, in that the theory neglects to elucidate...     

Spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and causal explanations

We report two Experiments to compare counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have been different and causal explanations about why the outcome occurred. Experiment 1 showed that people generate counterfactual thoughts more often about controllable than uncontrollable events, whereas they generate causal explanations more often about unexpected than expected events. Counterfactual thoughts focus on specific factors, whereas causal explanations focus on both general and specific factors. Experiment 2 showed that in their spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, people focus on normal events just as often as exceptional events, unlike in directed counterfactual thoughts. The findings are consistent with the suggestion that counterfactual thoughts tend to focus on how a specific unwanted outcome could have been prevented, whereas causal explanations tend to provide more general causal information that enables future understanding, prediction, and intervention in a wide range of situations.