Can I Reach That Sticker? Preschoolers' Practical Judgments About Their Own and Others’ Body Size

Research to date has focused mostly on children's representation of their physical self as a prelude to the development of a theory of mind (ToM) and on their understanding of the self as distinct from others over time. Whether children approaching the well-known age of ToM mastery are also accurately appraising their own body's functional relationship to the everyday environment remains largely an unanswered question. Little work has investigated typical preschool-age children's explicit accuracy when making judgments about their own body's proportions. In the current study, 98 preschoolers made 16 practical judgments about whether their own body or an experimenter's body could fit through an apparatus (half of the apparatuses were 30% smaller than the body in question, and half were 30% larger). Overall, accuracy increased with age but was unrelated to body size. Children in all age groups performed above chance, and accuracy did not differ depending on target (e.g., self or other). Children in a comparison condition judging fit of inanimate objects (n = 23) performed similarly, though showed less evidence of “yes” bias, and there were no age-based differences in accuracy. Results are discussed with regard to preschoolers’ developing body awareness, as are implications for research protocols in which children are asked to accurately identify their own body size and shape from an array.     

‘He's got his father's bias’: Parental influence on weight bias in young children

Our aim was to explore the role of parents in the transmission of stereotypical body size attitudes and awareness of weight loss strategies to preschool children. Participants were 279 3‐year‐old children and their parents, who provided data at baseline and 1 year later. Parents completed self‐report body size attitude and dieting measures. Child weight bias and awareness of weight loss strategies were assessed through interview. Over time, negative associations with large bodies and awareness of weight loss strategies increased. Fathers’ attitudes prospectively predicted boys’ weight bias and awareness of weight loss strategies. Among girls, parental attitudes were less predictive. Findings confirm the importance of fathers in the development of boys’ body attitudes and inform prevention programmes.     

Social categories guide young children’s preferences for novel objects

To whom do children look when deciding on their own preferences? To address this question, 3‐year‐old children were asked to choose between objects or activities that were endorsed by unfamiliar people who differed in gender, race (White, Black), or age (child, adult). In Experiment 1, children demonstrated robust preferences for objects and activities endorsed by children of their own gender, but less consistent preferences for objects and activities endorsed by children of their own race. In Experiment 2, children selected objects and activities favored by people of their own gender and age. In neither study did most children acknowledge the influence of these social categories. These findings suggest that gender and age categories are encoded spontaneously and influence children’s preferences and choices. For young children, gender and age may be more powerful guides to preferences than race.     

幼儿对所有权权利的理解

对物品的所有权意味着所有者对所有物具有多重权利, 如触碰、使用、更改、追踪和转移等。研究发现, 3岁幼儿就能理解, 所有者对自己的物品具有触碰权和使用权, 而他人不具有。但是, 他们理解所有物的更改权、追踪权和转移权, 却相对滞后。这提示对不同所有权权利表征的发展可能是分化的。此外, 3岁幼儿还理解所有者具有赋予他人使用所有物的权利, 还会积极维护这种权利, 并对阻止权利实施的行为表示抗议, 说明他们也能理解二级所有权权利。为什么幼儿对不同所有权权利的表征会出现分化, 其背后的机制需要未来研究的探索。此外, 某些公共物品(如公共汽车)本身存在着所有权权利相分离的情况, 幼儿是如何表征的, 也值得我们进行研究。不同文化对所有权权利的侧重不同, 提示我们有必要对所有权权利认知的发展进行跨文化检验。     

The effects of sex-Typed labeling on preschool children's information-Seeking and retention

When preschool children are exposed to novel objects, will their tactual and verbal information seeking about these objects and the amount of information they remember about these objects be influenced by whether an adult labels them as things “for girls” or “for boys”? The findings reveal that children actually explored less frequently, asked fewer questions, and recalled the names of objects less frequently when the objects were labeled for the opposite sex than when they were labeled either for their own sex or for both sexes. The results are discussed both in terms of implications for adults who aim to broaden the scope of learning available to children and in terms of the need for additional research to clarify the relation between sex-typed labeling and memory mechanisms involved in facilitating or inhibiting recall.     

Parental Meta-Emotion Philosophy in Families with Conduct-Problem Children: Links with Peer Relations

We addressed the question of whether mothers of conduct-problem (CP) children differ from mothers of non-CP children in their awareness and coaching of emotion, and also examined whether mother's awareness and coaching of emotion is associated with better peer relations in CP children. Meta-emotion philosophy, assessed through audio taped interviews, and preschool children's peer relations, observed in same-sex dyadic interaction with a close friend, were investigated in families with CP and non-CP children. Results indicated that mothers of CP children were less aware of their own emotions and less coaching of their children's emotions than mothers of non-CP children. Moderation analyses revealed that children's level of aggression moderated the relationship between mother's meta-emotion and children's peer play. For both aggressive and nonaggressive children, higher levels of mother awareness and coaching of emotion was associated with more positive and less negative peer play, although effects were stronger for families with nonaggressive children. These data suggest that both aggressive and nonaggressive children can benefit when parents are more aware and coaching of emotion. Implications for the development of an intervention program aimed at improving parental awareness and coaching of emotion is discussed.     

Priming of spatial distance enhances children's creative performance

According to construal level theory, psychological distance promotes more abstract thought. Theories of creativity, in turn, suggest that abstract thought promotes creativity. Based on these lines of theorizing, we predicted that spatial distancing would enhance creative performance in elementary school children. To test this prediction, we primed spatial distance by presenting 6- to 9-year-olds with pictures of increasingly distal objects (from their own desk to the galaxy) or increasingly proximal objects (from the galaxy to their own desk) and then assessed the fluency and originality of their ideas in a creativity test. We found, consistent with the hypothesis, that after priming of spatial distance, compared with priming of spatial proximity, children were more creative, as reflected in higher scores of both fluency and originality. This result was not qualified by children's age or gender.     

Representing intentions in self and other: studies of autism and typical development

Two experiments were conducted to explore the extent to which individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), as well as young typically developing (TD) children, are explicitly aware of their own and others’ intentions. In Experiment 1, participants with ASD were significantly less likely than age‐ and ability‐matched comparison participants to correctly recognize their own knee‐jerk reflex movements as unintentional. Performance on this knee‐jerk task was associated with performance on measures of false belief understanding, independent of age and verbal ability, in both participants with ASD and TD children. In Experiment 2, participants with ASD were significantly less able than comparison participants to correctly recognize their own or another person’s mistaken actions as unintended, in a ‘Transparent Intentions’ task ( Russell & Hill, 2001 ; Russell, Hill & Franco, 2001 ). Performance on aspects of the Transparent Intentions task was associated with performance on measures of false belief understanding, independent of age and verbal ability, in both participants with ASD and TD children. This study suggests that individuals with ASD have a diminished awareness of their own and others’ intentions and that this diminution is associated with other impairments in theory of mind.     

Object identification in preschool children and adults

We introduce computer-based methodologies for investigating object identification in 3- to 5-year-old children. In two experiments, preschool children and adults indicated when they could identify degraded pictures of common objects as those pictures either gradually improved or degraded in clarity. Clarity transformations were implemented in four ways: blurring, decreasing the picture's physical size, decreasing the pixel signal-to-noise ratio, and cropping. In Experiment 1, all age groups correctly identified objects at a more degraded state when those objects began moderately, as opposed to very, degraded and then clarified. This finding supports the notion that previous perceptual hypotheses interfere with object identification (i.e. the perceptual interference effect). In Experiment 2, children, but not adults, overestimated their ability to recognize objects in a degraded state when the object's identity was given to them beforehand. This suggests that for young children knowledge of the object's true identity cannot be ignored when evaluating their current perceptions. This is the first demonstration of the perceptual interference effect in children. We discuss both methodological and theoretical implications of the findings for research on object perception and theory of mind.     

The role of attention in eye-movement awareness

People are unable to accurately report on their own eye movements most of the time. Can this be explained as a lack of attention to the objects we fixate? Here, we elicited eye-movement errors using the classic oculomotor capture paradigm, in which people tend to look at sudden onsets even when they are irrelevant. In the first experiment, participants were able to report their own errors on about a quarter of the trials on which they occurred. The aim of the second experiment was to assess what differentiates errors that are detected from those that are not. Specifically, we estimated the relative influence of two possible factors: how long the onset distractor was fixated (dwell time), and a measure of how much attention was allocated to the onset distractor. Longer dwell times were associated with awareness of the error, but the measure of attention was not. The effect of the distractor identity on target discrimination reaction time was similar whether or not the participant was aware they had fixated the distractor. The results suggest that both attentional and oculomotor capture can occur in the absence of awareness, and have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between attention, eye movements, and awareness.     

Bodily Awareness, Imagination and the Self

Common wisdom tells us that we have five senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. These senses provide us with a means of gaining information concerning objects in the world around us, including our own bodies. But in addition to these five senses, each of us is aware of our own body in ways in which we are aware of no other thing. These ways include our awareness of the position, orientation, movement, and size of our limbs (proprioception and kinaesthesia), our sense of balance, and our awareness of bodily sensations such as pains, tickles, and sensations of pressure or temperature. We can group these together under the title ‘bodily awareness’. The legitimacy of grouping together these ways of gaining information is shown by the fact that they are unified phenomenologically; they provide the subject with an awareness of his or her body ‘from the inside’. Bodily awareness is an awareness of our own bodies from within. This perspective on our own bodies does not, cannot, vary. As Merleau‐Ponty writes, ‘my own body…is always presented to me from the same angle’ (1962: 90). It has recently been claimed by a number of philosophers that, in bodily awareness, one is not simply aware of one's body as one's body, but one is aware of one's body as oneself. That is, when I attend to the object of bodily awareness I am presented not just with my body, but with my ‘bodily self’. The contention of the present paper is that such a view is misguided. In the first section I clarify just what is at issue here. In the remainder of the paper I present an argument, based on two claims about the nature of the imagination, against the view that the bodily self is presented in bodily awareness. Section two defends the dependency thesis; a claim about the relation between perception and sensory imagination. Section three defends a certain view about our capacity to imagine being other people. Section four presents the main argument against the bodily self awareness view and section five addresses some objections.     

The metacognitive disambiguation effect

From an early age, children show a tendency to map novel labels onto unfamiliar rather than familiar kinds of objects. Accounts of this tendency have not addressed whether children develop a metacognitive representation of what they are doing. In 3 experiments (each N = 48), preschoolers received a test of the metacognitive disambiguation effect, which involved deciding whether the referent of a novel label was located in a bucket of things “I know” or bucket of things “I don’t know.” Most 4-year-olds passed this test, whereas most 3-year-olds did not. Children’s performance was predicted by their ability to report whether various words and pseudowords were ones that they knew, even after age and vocabulary size were controlled. As children develop an awareness of their lexical knowledge/ignorance, they also develop a metacognitive representation of their tendency to map novel labels onto unfamiliar rather than familiar kinds.     

What's new? Children prefer novelty in referent selection

Determining the referent of a novel name is a critical task for young language learners. The majority of studies on children’s referent selection focus on manipulating the sources of information (linguistic, contextual and pragmatic) that children can use to solve the referent mapping problem. Here, we take a step back and explore how children’s endogenous biases towards novelty and their own familiarity with novel objects influence their performance in such a task. We familiarized 2-year-old children with previously novel objects. Then, on novel name referent selection trials children were asked to select the referent from three novel objects: two previously seen and one completely novel object. Children demonstrated a clear bias to select the most novel object. A second experiment controls for pragmatic responding and replicates this finding. We conclude, therefore, that children’s referent selection is biased by previous exposure and children’s endogenous bias to novelty.     

The absence of a shape bias in children's word learning

There is debate about whether preschool-age children interpret words as referring to kinds or to classes defined by shape similarity. The authors argue that the shape bias reported in previous studies is a task-induced artifact rather than a genuine word-learning strategy. In particular, children were forced to extend an object's novel label to one of several stand-alone, simple-shaped items, including a same-shape option from a different category and a different-shape option from the same superordinate category. Across 6 experiments, the authors found that the shape bias was eliminated (a) when the objects were more complex, (b) when they were presented in context, or (c) when children were no longer forced to choose. Moreover, children preferred the different-shape category alternatives when these were part of the same basic-level category as the target. The present experiments suggest that children seek out objects of the same kind when presented with a novel label, even if they are sometimes unable to identify the relevant kinds on their own.     

A perceiver’s own abilities influence perception,even when observing others

Perceptual judgments of objects, such as judgments of their size, distance, and speed, are influenced by the perceiver’s ability to act on these objects. For example, objects that are easier to block appear to be moving slower than objects that are more difficult to block. These effects are known as action-specific effects. Recent research has found similar patterns when a person observes someone else act: When the other person’s task is more difficult, objects look farther away and faster to the observer, whereas when the other person’s task is easier, the objects look closer and slower to the observer. These previous findings that another person’s ability penetrates into perceptual judgments challenge the idea that action-specific effects are specific to the perceiver’s own abilities. However, in the present study, we show that the apparent effects of another person’s ability on the observer’s judgments are actually due to the observer’s own abilities as if he or she was in the other person’s situation. This implicates a type of self-projection motor simulation mechanism. The results also preserve the critical idea that action-specific effects are perceiver specific and, consequently, that they could be adaptive for planning future actions.     

The permanence of mental objects: testing magical thinking on perceived and imaginary realities

This study tested participants' preparedness to acknowledge that an object could change as a result of magical intervention. Six- and 9-year-old children and adults treated perceived and imagined objects as being equally permanent. Adults treated a fantastic object as significantly less permanent than either perceived or imagined objects. Results were similar when a different type of mental-physical causality--a participant's own wish--was examined. Adults were also tested on the permanence of personally significant imagined objects (participants' images of their future lives). Although almost all participants claimed that they did not believe in magic, in test trials they were not prepared to rule out the possibility that their future lives could be affected by a magical curse.     

Disagreement and causal learning: Others' hypotheses affect children's evaluations of evidence

When children evaluate evidence and make causal inferences, they are sensitive to the social context in which data are generated. This study investigated whether children learn more from evidence generated by an agent who agrees with them or from one who disagrees with them. Children in two age groups (5- and 6-year-olds and 9- and 10-year-olds) observed the functioning of a machine that lit up and played music in the presence of certain objects. After endorsing one of two plausible causal hypotheses, children observed a puppet either agree or disagree with their own hypotheses. The puppet then generated a further piece of evidence that confirmed, disconfirmed, or was neutral with respect to the children's hypotheses. When they were later asked to make causal inferences about objects they did not directly observe, children in both age groups responded differentially to identical evidence depending on whether the agent agreed or disagreed, and they often drew stronger inferences in response to disagreement. In addition, older children were particularly sensitive to disagreement when the evidence was ambiguous. Our results suggest that children consider the relationship between their own and others' hypotheses when evaluating evidence that others generate. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Integration without awareness: expanding the limits of unconscious processing

Human conscious awareness is commonly seen as the climax of evolution. However, what function-if any-it serves in human behavior is still debated. One of the leading suggestions is that the cardinal function of conscious awareness is to integrate numerous inputs-including the multitude of features and objects in a complex scene-across different levels of analysis into a unified, coherent, and meaningful perceptual experience. Here we demonstrate, however, that integration of objects with their background scenes can be achieved without awareness of either. We used a binocular rivalry technique known as continuous flash suppression to induce perceptual suppression in a group of human observers. Complex scenes that included incongruent objects escaped perceptual suppression faster than normal scenes did. We conclude that visual awareness is not needed for object-background integration or for processing the likelihood of an object to appear within a given semantic context, but may be needed for dealing with novel situations.     

Weight and health status of inner city African American children: Perceptions of children and their parents

Poor socioeconomic status and African American (AA) ethnicity contribute to an increased risk of obesity for many inner city children. One hundred and forty six AA children and 108 AA parents attending an inner city health fair completed surveys regarding perceptions of their own (or their child's) weight and the impact of weight on health. The children were measured and their body mass indexes were calculated. Thirty-seven percent of the child respondents (n = 52) were at risk of overweight or overweight; of these, 67% perceived themselves as normal weight, and 77% thought their weight was healthy. Weighing more was felt to be healthy by 17% of children and 29% of parents. Of 39 parents whose children were at risk of overweight or overweight, 68% felt their child's weight was normal and 80% thought it was healthy. These results suggest that inner city AA children and their parents often do not recognize being overweight or the health implications of being overweight.