Applied Ethics. A Defence

Given a reasonable coherentist view of justification in ethics, applied ethics, as here conceived of, cannot only guide us, in our practical decisions, but also provide moral understanding through explanation of our moral obligations. Furthermore, applied ethics can contribute to the growth of knowledge in ethics as such. We put moral hypotheses to crucial test in individual cases. This claim is defended against the challenges from moral intuitionism and particularism.     

A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics

A common intuition is that there is a moral difference between ‘making people happy’ and ‘making happy people.’ This intuition, often referred to as ‘the Asymmetry,’ has, however, been criticized on the grounds that it is incoherent. Why is there, for instance, not a corresponding difference between ‘making people unhappy’ and ‘making unhappy people’? I argue that the intuition faces several difficulties but that these can be met by introducing a certain kind of reason that is favouring but non-requiring. It is argued that there are structural similarities between the asymmetry and moral options and that the asymmetry can be defended as an instance of a moral option.     

In Defence of Moderate Aesthetic Formalism

I argue against Kendall Walton's argument against formalism, in his 'Categories of Art', that we must always take the history of production into account in ascribing aesthetic properties to works of art. I concede that he is right about representational properties and about what I call 'contextual' properties of works of art. But that conclusion cannot be generalized to abstract and non-contextual art, and it cannot be generalized to the non-representational and non-contextual features of representational and contextual works of art. I then dispute Walton's intriguing 'guernicas' example. I also consider his other counter-examples. I argue that art-historical categories can be put to one side when we consider the aesthetic nature of abstract and non-contextual abstract works of art. However, there is no doubt that many other works of art possess significant non-formal aesthetic values.     

In Defence of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

Abstract

In ‘Against Agent-Based Virtue Ethics’ (2004) Michael Brady rejects agent-based virtue ethics on the grounds that it fails to capture the commonsense distinction between an agent's doing the right thing, and her doing it for the right reason. In his view, the failure to account for this distinction has paradoxical results, making it unable to explain why an agent has a duty to perform a given action. I argue that Brady's objection relies on the assumption that an agent-based account is committed to defining obligations in terms of actual motives. If we reject this view, and instead provide a version of agent-basing that determines obligations in terms of the motives of the hypothetical virtuous agent, the paradox disappears.     

无本质的应用伦理学--对当前应用伦理学本质特征争论的质疑

近年来,国内<哲学动态>、<哲学研究>、<中国哲学年鉴>、<光明日报>、<中国人民大学学报>、<自然辩证法研究>、<道德与文明>等报刊开辟了专门园地,讨论"应用伦理学的本质特征".毋庸置疑,这一讨论直接推动了应用伦理学在我国的发展,增进了学界对应用伦理学特征的更为准确的理解和把握.     

应用伦理:当代伦理学研究的热点--第三次全国应用伦理学讨论会综述

20世纪60年代兴起的应用伦理学已日益成为伦理学的"显学".近20余年来,改革开放给我国的政治、经济和社会生活带来了深刻的变化,大量的现实道德问题促使伦理学家为之进行严肃认真的思考并做出积极的反应.     

应用伦理学和当代社会道德结构--再论应用伦理学的基本特性

针对<中国人民大学学报>2003年第1期的专题研究"应用伦理学:伦理学的新视野"中的三篇论文,[1]笔者在<中国人民大学学报>2003年第5期发表了题为<基本价值观还是程序方法论--论应用伦理学的基本特性>的论文,提出了应用伦理学"作为基本价值观和程序方法论相统一"的观点,并对甘绍平教授等三位学者的观点提出了自己的看法.令人高兴的是,笔者的商榷得到了甘教授的积极回应.     

信息时代的应用伦理学与应用伦理课题--第十一次中韩伦理学国际学术研讨会侧记

20 0 3年 1 0月 2 0～ 2 2日 ,第十一次中韩伦理学国际学术研讨会在中南财经政法大学举行。大会由中国伦理学会、中南财经政法大学主办 ,中国人民大学伦理与道德建设研究中心协办。来自中、韩两国的 1 2 0余名学者以“信息时代的应用伦理”为主题 ,就应用伦理学的学科性质以及信息时代的应用伦理论题展开了热烈的探讨。现将会议涉及的主要问题综述如下 :关于应用伦理学的学科性质与信息时代应用伦理学的精神气质　部分论者认为 ,应用伦理学的核心问题在于 :应用伦理学到底是一种基本价值观还是一种程序方法论。针对国内学者偏执于两端的倾向…     

再论应用伦理学的学科性质——兼论伦理学的"伦理"基础

在关于应用伦理学学科性质的讨论中,那种"集‘基本价值观’和‘程序共识论’于一体"的应用伦理学观应是其中最为重要的成果,并且是我们进一步讨论的基础。它其实向人们展示了"一个平台"与"两个端点",但它并没有真正掌握具体领域具体问题这一"端点"的本质特征,因而没能真正理解应用伦理学的学科性质。广义伦理学应该是应用伦理学协商对话的共同基础。由此出发,应用伦理学的学科性质就学科而言,它不仅涉及伦理学,也要涉及其他领域的专门学科;就其任务而言,它既要确保具体行为符合伦理原则和道德规范,又要顾及其他具体领域的正当利益诉求;就其方法而言,它采取的是"程序共识"的方法;就其结果而言,它具有"伦理妥协"的特征。     

什么是应用伦理学?

应用伦理学已成为与理论伦理学在旨趣上相异的研究 ,并形成了一些研究领域。以这一事实为出发点 ,本文力图通过提出并回答 (1)应用伦理学的概念意义是什么 ,(2 )应用伦理学应用什么 ,(3)应用伦理学应用于什么 ,(4 )应用伦理学为了什么而应用 ,(5)应用伦理学怎样应用 ,这五个紧密联系的问题 ,确立一种原则应用模式的应用伦理学的行动性的定义 ,并辩护这种伦理学。     

关于应用伦理学的几个问题

应用伦理学本质上属于规范伦理学 ,必然在一定程度上具备理论伦理学的性质。应用伦理学的研究对象不仅应当包括道德境遇的判断方法和伦理规范的选择原则 ,而且必须包括伦理道德行为的实施技巧。应用伦理学既要借鉴传统规范伦理学的方法 ,又要形成独具特色的方法。     

Empathy and the Limits of Thought Experiments

This article criticizes what it calls perspectival thought experiments, which require subjects to mentally simulate a perspective before making judgments from within it. Examples include Judith Thomson's violinist analogy, Philippa Foot's trolley problem, and Bernard Williams's Jim case. The article argues that advances in the philosophical and psychological study of empathy suggest that the simulative capacities required by perspectival thought experiments are all but impossible. These thought experiments require agents to consciously simulate necessarily unconscious features of subjectivity. To complete these experiments subjects must deploy theory‐theoretical frameworks to predict what they think they would (or ought to) do. These outputs, however, systematically mislead subjects and are highly prone to error. They are of negligible probative value, and this bodes poorly for their continued use. The article ends with two suggestions. First, many thought experiments are not problematically perspectival. Second, it should be possible to carry out “in‐their‐shoes” perspectival thought experiments by off‐loading simulations onto virtual environments into which philosophers place subjects.     

Norton and the Logic of Thought Experiments

John D. Norton defends an empiricist epistemology of thought experiments, the central thesis of which is that thought experiments are nothing more than arguments. Philosophers have attempted to provide counterexamples to this claim, but they haven’t convinced Norton. I will point out a more fundamental reason for reformulation that criticizes Norton’s claim that a thought experiment is a good one when its underlying logical form possesses certain desirable properties. I argue that by Norton’s empiricist standards, no thought experiment is ever justified in any deep sense due to the properties of its logical form. Instead, empiricists should consider again the merits of evaluating thought experiments more like laboratory experiments, and less like arguments.     

"应用伦理学"学术研讨会综述

20 0 0年 1 1月 2 6— 2 9日 ,由澳门中国哲学学会主办、北京师范大学哲学系协办的关于“应用伦理学”学术研讨会在澳门召开 ,30余名伦理学专家、学者参加了本次研讨会。大家围绕经济伦理、生态伦理以及科技伦理等问题展开了热烈的具有前沿性的探讨。一、关于经济伦理的探究本次研讨会的一个中心议题就是对经济伦理的研讨。北京师范大学齐振海教授指出 ,从经济伦理角度去研究市场经济 ,既要看到市场经济在历史发展过程中的巨大进步作用 ,也不能忽视其在一定程度上所带来的负面影响。市场经济在推动社会道德进步的具体作用表现在 :市场经济使…     

论思想实验与物质实验之异同

思想实验与物质实验同属于科学实验的范畴,有着相同的价值,相同的构成要素,相似的运作过程,在科学史中都曾发挥过重要的作用。但和物质实验相比较而言,人们对思想实验的形象、运行机制,以及它的巨大威力的来源等知之甚少。要想揭示思想实验的本原面目,对思想实验有一个清晰的认识,必须从我们所熟知的物质实验着手,将思想实验与物质实验的构成要素进行细致的比对。在比较中对思想实验的形象作出一个完整的刻画,为思想实验在科学中找到一个合适的定位,也有利于思想实验在当代科学前沿发挥更大的作用。     

亚当·斯密伦理思想研究的新探索--评《经济学家的道德追问--亚当·斯密伦理思想研究》

众所周知,亚当@斯密是一位伟大的经济学家,以英国资产阶级古典政治经济学的奠基人而著称于世.他的经济思想,不仅对西欧,甚至对世界资本主义都产生过重大影响.