Narrative Solutions: Using Preferred View of Self to Motivate Individual and Family Change

This article describes refinements of the Narrative Solutions approach to individual and family therapy we first presented in Family Process 22 years ago. The centerpiece of this integrative (narrative‐strategic) model is “preferred view of self,” or the constellation of qualities people would like to see in themselves and have others see in them. We assume that problems generally involve one or more people mismanaging discrepancies or “gaps” between preferred views of self and either their actual behavior or how they see others seeing them and their behavior. Because clients are motivated to resolve such discrepancies, we use specifiable conversational strategies to help people (a) be clear about their preferred view of self, (b) notice gaps or discrepancies, and (c) summon resources to manage these gaps more effectively. Positive clinical effects of these strategic conversations can be rapid and dramatic. Case examples highlight applications to child and family problems, and we discuss some challenges and future directions for the Narrative Solutions approach.     

Responsibility and Judgment

I focus on the type of responsibility that an agent has for actions that express his practical identity, making it appropriate to evaluate him on the basis of those actions. This kind of responsibility is often called attributability. In this paper, I argue for a novel view of attributability—the Judgment Responsiveness View (JRV). According to the JRV, an agent is attributability responsible for an action A if and only if A results from either 1) his responding to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has in favor of doing A by doing A or 2) his failing to exercise his capacity to respond to his judgments about the (normative) reasons that he has against doing A by not doing A. The JRV diverges from other views of attributability for actions in two significant respects. First, it is not reasonably thought of as a “deep self view.” According to deep self views, attributable actions are actions that express deep features of the agent, such as his fundamental values, cares, or commitments. As I show, thinking in terms of the deep self is too narrow for attributability. Second, unlike other views, the JRV claims—via condition 2)—that we can be attributionally responsible for actions that result from failing to exercise the attributability‐relevant capacity to avoid them. My argument for the JRV thus shows that attributability is a broader and richer conception of responsibility than has been previously thought.     

Certainty as a moderator of feedback reactions? A test of the strength of the self‐verification motive

The present study investigated whether employees are merely interested in hearing good news about themselves, as predicted by self‐enhancement theory, or are more interested in feedback that confirms their self‐concept, as predicted by self‐verification theory. We examined in a field study whether self‐view certainty serves as a moderator and strengthens the effect of congruence between individuals' self‐views and the performance feedback they receive about these self‐views on feedback reactions. Polynomial regression results revealed that people mainly reacted favourably to positive feedback. Prior self‐views did not play a key role in explaining feedback reactions. As feedback scores were the main determinant of feedback reactions, it seems that feedback reactions are dominated by self‐enhancement strivings and that self‐verification strivings are less prominent. Little support was found for the moderating role of self‐view certainty.     

Examining views of self in relation to views of others: Implications for research on aggression and self-esteem

The traditional view holds that aggressive individuals have unfavorable views of self (i.e., low self-esteem), but recent studies indicate that the opposite might be true (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). This debate may be informed by considering how individuals view others. Following relational schema theory (Baldwin, 1992), which suggests that the combination of self and other views is particularly important in predicting behavior in social situations, we examined self- and other-esteem, view of self in relation to views of others, and different forms of aggression among 125 young adults. Views of both self and others were associated with covert aggression (anger and hostility), whereas only views of others were correlated with overt aggression (physical and verbal). We also explored the discrepancy between views of self and other and found participants with more favorable views of self than others, and those who had equally unfavorable views of both self and others to be most aggressive. Findings suggest that views of both self and other and the relation among these views should be considered in future research on aggression.     

The role of sequence order in determining view canonicality for novel wire-frame objects

Objects are best recognized from so-called “canonical” views. The characteristics of canonical views of arbitrary objects have been qualitatively described using a variety of different criteria, but little is known regarding how these views might be acquired during object learning. We address this issue, in part, by examining the role of object motion in the selection of preferred views of novel objects. Specifically, we adopt a modeling approach to investigate whether or not the sequence of views seen during initial exposure to an object contributes to observers’ preferences for particular images in the sequence. In two experiments, we exposed observers to short sequences depicting rigidly rotating novel objects and subsequently collected subjective ratings of view canonicality (Experiment 1) and recall rates for individual views (Experiment 2). Given these two operational definitions of view canonicality, we attempted to fit both sets of behavioral data with a computational model incorporating 3-D shape information (object foreshortening), as well as information relevant to the temporal order of views presented during training (the rate of change for object foreshortening). Both sets of ratings were reasonably well predicted using only 3-D shape; the inclusion of terms that capture sequence order improved model performance significantly.     

A longitudinal study of children's depressive symptoms, self-perceptions, and cognitive distortions about the self

This longitudinal study examined how depressive symptoms relate to children's self-perceptions and to estimates of children's cognitive distortions about the self in a nonclinical sample of children who were followed from 4th grade (n = 248) through 6th grade (n = 227). Report card grades measured children's academic competence, and teachers' ratings of children's level of peer acceptance at school indicated social acceptance. Self-reported depressive symptoms predicted a change in children's negative views of the self. Moreover, the self-perceptions of children who exhibited more symptoms of depression appeared to reflect an underestimation of their actual competence. Children's negative self-perceptions and underestimations about the self were not associated with a subsequent change in depressive symptoms. The implications of the findings for cognitive theories of depression and future research with this population are discussed.     

Our Followers Are Lions,Theirs Are Sheep: How Social Identity Shapes Theories About Followership and Social Influence

Two studies examine how self‐categorization theory can be used to refine our understanding of people's implicit theories about followership and social influence. Results from Study 1 show that perceivers regard followers of a group they themselves identify strongly with (rather than not at all) to be more representative of the prototype of effective followers (displaying enthusiasm, industry, good citizenship) and to be less representative of the antiprototype of effective followers (displaying conformity, incompetence, and insubordination). Results are replicated in a second experiment in which we compare the views of those self‐categorizing as either Republican or Democrat responding to followers of the Republican and Democratic Party. Results of Study 2 replicate those of Study 1 and also reveal qualitative differences in the preferred influence strategy for dealing with followers. Specifically, respondents seek to engage in persuasion when trying to change the behavior of ingroup followers, while resorting to coercion when trying to change the behavior of outgroup followers. Our results are the first to provide evidence that perceivers' theories about what followers are like and how they are influenced most effectively are structured by perceivers' identification (and dis‐identification) with the particular groups that leaders are championing.     

Assessing Individual Differences in Experiential (Intuitive) and Rational (Analytical) Cognitive Styles

Even though it is argued that intuition has ‘come of age’ in the behavioral sciences, there are still unresolved issues regarding self‐report assessment of intuitive and analytical styles of information processing (cognitive styles). The unitary view proposes that intuition and analysis are opposite ends of a single continuum. The dual view proposes that intuition and analysis are independent (orthogonal) constructs. Moreover, within the dual view, it has been proposed that intuition and analysis can be further subdivided into ability and engagement subcomponents. The aim of this article was to test both of these claims and thereby move discussions regarding the assessment of cognitive styles further forward. This research is important given that much intuition research in organizations is predicated on self‐report methods of assessment. Using data from a sample of police officers and police staff from a large police organization in the United Kingdom, we found that the adoption of a dual (rather than unitary) perspective when assessing experiential and rational cognitive styles is warranted, whereas adopting an ability and engagement refinement is not (hence a simpler formulation is to be preferred). We also observed a number of main effects and interactions with respect to job type, job level, gender, and experience. We offer guidelines for the self‐report assessment of intuition and analysis cognitive styles and discuss a typology of styles. The article concludes by outlining a number of practical implications for cognitive styles assessment in organizational settings.     

Aligning inside and outside perspectives of the self: A cross‐cultural difference in self‐perception

Past research shows that European Americans tend to take a first‐person perspective to understand the self and are unlikely to align the inside look with the outside gaze, whereas Asians tend to take a third‐person perspective and are likely to shift their inside look in the direction of the outsize gaze. In three experiments, we compared Asians and European Americans' self‐perceptions when the presence of their parents in the background of self‐perception was primed or otherwise. Without the priming, both European Americans and Asians viewed themselves more positively from their own perspective than from their parents' perspective. With the priming, only Asians lowered the positivity of their self‐perceptions to match the perceived positivity of the self in the parents' perspective. These results suggest that Asians do not have a static, passive tendency to assimilate their self‐views into the perceived external assessments of the self. Rather, their self‐views are fluid and flexible.     

Sociability modifies dogs’ sensitivity to biological motion of different social relevance

Preferential attention to living creatures is believed to be an intrinsic capacity of the visual system of several species, with perception of biological motion often studied and, in humans, it correlates with social cognitive performance. Although domestic dogs are exceptionally attentive to human social cues, it is unknown whether their sociability is associated with sensitivity to conspecific and heterospecific biological motion cues of different social relevance. We recorded video clips of point-light displays depicting a human or dog walking in either frontal or lateral view. In a preferential looking paradigm, dogs spontaneously viewed 16 paired point-light displays showing combinations of normal/inverted (control condition), human/dog and frontal/lateral views. Overall, dogs looked significantly longer at frontal human point-light display versus the inverted control, probably due to its clearer social/biological relevance. Dogs’ sociability, assessed through owner-completed questionnaires, further revealed that low-sociability dogs preferred the lateral point-light display view, whereas high-sociability dogs preferred the frontal view. Clearly, dogs can recognize biological motion, but their preference is influenced by their sociability and the stimulus salience, implying biological motion perception may reflect aspects of dogs’ social cognition.     

Individual Self,Relational Self,Collective Self: Hierarchical Ordering of the Tripartite Self

The individual self comprise unique attributes, the relational self comprises partner-shared attributes, and the collective self comprises ingroup-shared attributes. All selves are fundamental components of the self-concept, with each being important and meaningful to human experience and with each being associated with health benefits. Are the selves, however, equally important and meaningful? We review a program of research that tested four competing theoretical views suggesting that the motivational hub of human experience is (a) the individual self, (b) the relational self, (b) the collective self, or (c) determined by contextual or cultural factors. The research furnished support to the view that the individual self is the primary form of self-definition. We discuss alternative explanations and implications. We end with the introduction of a theoretical model, the boomerang model, that has the potential to integrate the diverse literature on the topic.     

The Enhancing Effect of Overconfidence on Subsequent Learning Performance: Potential Mediation Effects of Dissatisfaction and Effort

Three studies were conducted to investigate whether individuals whose performance on a learning task fell short of their previous overconfident self‐assessment would apply more effort on a subsequent task to resolve their dissatisfaction and thereby achieve better subsequent performance than individuals who made accurate or underconfident self‐assessments. Specifically, Study 1 and Study 2 used overestimation, and Study 3 used overplacement to predict subsequent performance by measuring students' self‐assessments before the first task, their level of dissatisfaction with their actual performance on that task, the effort they applied in learning, and their performance on the subsequent task. Furthermore, Study 3 divided the participants randomly into a false feedback group (the control group) and a real feedback group (the experimental group). The results showed that when controlling for prior performance, participants who were more overconfident tended to express greater dissatisfaction and increase more effort to achieve their desired outcomes when they perceived a gap between their desired performance and their actual performance. Notably, they achieved better subsequent performance, whereas those in the control group who were overconfident neither applied more effort in subsequent learning nor increased their subsequent performance when they received “unbiased feedback.” The implications of these findings for education are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mindset effects on information search in self‐evaluation

Research on mindset theory (Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999 ) observed that people in an implemental mindset show an orientation towards positive illusionary self‐evaluations, whereas people in a deliberative mindset opt for accurate self‐evaluations. In the present study, we tested whether these self‐evaluative orientations and the associated search for certain types of self‐relevant information (feedback) are moderated by low versus high self‐views. With high self‐view participants we observed the hypothesized mindset effects on information search, but we obtained the reverse pattern for low self‐view participants. The latter finding points to self‐defensiveness in low self‐view individuals. Implications are discussed in terms of the consequences of accurate versus positive illusionary self‐evaluations for the successful control of goal pursuits, and individual differences in mindset effects. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining Discrepancies Between Actual and Preferred Practice of School Counselors

This study of elementary, middle, and high school counselors (N = 361) investigated the discrepancies, and the factors predictive of the discrepancies, between the actual practice and preferred practice in interventions associated with a comprehensive, developmental school counseling program. Results indicated that school counselors preferred to spend their time in accord with best practice. Subsequently, selected professional, employment, self‐efficacy, and school climate variables were found to predict differences between actual and preferred practice.     

Toward Honest Ethical Pluralism

I give the label “ethical pluralism” to the meta-ethical view that competing moral views are valid. I assume that validity is conferred on a moral view by its satisfying the relevant meta-ethical criteria in a maximally satisfactory way. If the relevant meta-ethical criteria are based on something roughly like the wide reflective equilibrium model, then ethical pluralism is likely to be correct. Traditional moral views do not grant exemptions from their own binding rules or principles to agents – should any exist – who adhere to a competing valid moral view. Given the usual conception of accepting a moral view, an ethical pluralist cannot honestly accept a traditional moral view. Consequently, I argue, an ethical pluralist is committed to the view that all traditional moral views are invalid. Given the likelihood of ethical pluralism, this conclusion is alarming. I set forth a weak conception of accepting a moral view that is designed to allow an ethical pluralist honestly to accept a traditional moral view. In particular, my conception is designed to explain how someone can (a) be guided by the view that she accepts; (b) accept her own moral view while rationally not accepting competing views that she thinks are equally valid; and (c) not be prepared to prescribe morally to those who are following other valid views. Central to my formulation are what I call a stance of modest respectful disapproval toward other people’s wrong behavior, together with acceptance of decisive moral reasons for oneself that are generated by the valid moral view that one accepts.     

Spatial updating during locomotion does not eliminate viewpoint-dependent visual object processing

Two experiments were conducted to investigate whether locomotion to a novel test view would eliminate viewpoint costs in visual object processing. Participants performed a sequential matching task for object identity or object handedness, using novel 3-D objects displayed in a head-mounted display. To change the test view of the object, the orientation of the object in 3-D space and the test position of the observer were manipulated independently. Participants were more accurate when the test view was the same as the learned view than when the views were different no matter whether the view change of the object was 50° or 90°. With 50° rotations, participants were more accurate at novel test views caused by participants’ locomotion (object stationary) than caused by object rotation (observer stationary) but this difference disappeared when the view change was 90°. These results indicate that facilitation of spatial updating during locomotion occurs within a limited range of viewpoints, but that such facilitation does not eliminate viewpoint costs in visual object processing.     

Personal Constructs of Mind-Body Identity in People Who Experience Medically Unexplained Symptoms

“Medically unexplained symptoms” (MUS) refers to chronic physical symptoms without a clear medical cause, which produce significant levels of distress and functional impairment. This project modified the repertory grid technique to explore how twenty participants experiencing MUS construed self and others in bodily and psychological ways. Findings suggested that symptoms are well integrated within participants' wider mind–body construct systems. Increased distance between how self in general is construed compared to self when symptoms are worst was associated with reduced anxiety. Measuring intrapersonal and interpersonal implicative dilemmas suggested that moral and relational construing of identity is affected by MUS.     

The Effect of Self‐Consciousness on the Expression of Gender Views1

This study examines the effect of public self‐consciousness on the expression of gender‐role attitudes. It was hypothesized that high publics were more likely to alter their gender‐view expressions to meet situational expectations than were high privates and that, under an activated state of public self‐attention, people were more likely to alter their gender views. Tested in 156 college students in a quasi‐experiment conducted in classrooms, these hypotheses were supported only in work‐related gender‐role attitude expressions, but not in domestic gender‐view expressions The experimental manipulation of public self‐consciousness in a classroom setting might have made work‐related identities more salient. Correspondingly, participants were more responsive to regulating work but not domestic gender views.     

Are Actual and Perceived Intellectual Self‐enhancers Evaluated Differently by Social Perceivers?

Do actual and perceived self‐enhancement entail differing social impressions (i.e. interpersonal evaluations)? Actual self‐enhancement represents unduly positive self‐views, as gauged by an objective criterion (in this case, IQ scores), whereas perceived self‐enhancement involves the extent to which an individual is seen by informants (i.e. peers or observers) as self‐enhancing. In an online survey (N = 337), a laboratory experiment (N = 75), and a round‐robin study (N = 183), we tested the effects of actual and perceived intellectual self‐enhancement on (informant‐rated) emotional stability, social attractiveness, and social influence. Actual self‐enhancers were rated as emotionally stable, socially attractive, and socially influential. High perceived self‐enhancers were judged as socially influential, whereas low‐to‐moderate perceived self‐enhancers were deemed emotionally stable and socially attractive. Privately entertained, illusory positive (even extreme) self‐beliefs confer social benefits, whereas being perceived as self‐enhancing buys social influence at the cost of being despised. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology