Dimensionality of rosenberg’s self-esteem scale among normal-technical stream students in Singapore

Dimensionality of the widely used Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) was investigated in a sample of 153 seventh-grade Asian students from Singapore. Confirmatory factor analyses performed on the scores of the RSES revealed two factors (positive and negative self-esteem) as hypothesized. Both factors were empirically related to different external variables. Results from multiple regression analyses indicated that positive self-esteem significantly predicted students’ mastery goal orientation and academic self-efficacy scores while negative self-esteem significantly predicted students’ disruptive behavior. These findings provide some preliminary support that the two factors could possibly be measuring substantively distinct dimensions, thus calling into question the unidimensionalty of the RSES in an Asian school-based sample. This study was supported by a grant from Center for Research in Pedagogy and Practice, National Institute of Education (CRP 26/04 RA) to Rebecca P. Ang.     

Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism

In psychological research on cultural differences, the distinction between individualism and collectivism has received the lion's share of attention as a fundamental dimension of cultural variation. In recent years, however, these constructs have been criticized as being ill-defined and "a catchall" to represent all forms of cultural differences. The authors argue that there is a conceptual confusion about the meaning of ingroups that constitute the target of collectivism. Collectives are rarely referred to in existing measures to assess collectivism. Instead, networks of interpersonal relationships dominate the operational definition of "ingroups" in these measures. Results from a content analysis of existing scales support this observation. To clarify and expand the individualism-collectivism distinction, a theoretical framework is proposed that draws on M. B. Brewer and G. Gardner's (1996) conceptualization of individual, relational, and collective selves and their manifestation in self-representations, beliefs, and values. Analyses of data from past studies provide preliminary support for this conceptual model. The authors propose that this new theoretical framework will contribute conceptual clarity to interpretation of past research on individualism and collectivism and guide future research on these important constructs.     

Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism

Do differences in individualism and collectivism influence values, self-concept content, relational assumptions, and cognitive style? On the one hand, the cross-national literature provides an impressively consistent picture of the predicted systematic differences; on the other hand, the nature of the evidence is inconclusive. Cross-national evidence is insufficient to argue for a causal process, and comparative data cannot specify if effects are due to both individualism and collectivism, only individualism, only collectivism, or other factors (including other aspects of culture). To address these issues, the authors conducted a meta-analysis of the individualism and collectivism priming literature, with follow-up moderator analyses. Effect sizes were moderate for relationality and cognition, small for self-concept and values, robust across priming methods and dependent variables, and consistent in direction and size with cross-national effects. Results lend support to a situated model of culture in which cross-national differences are not static but dynamically consistent due to the chronic and moment-to-moment salience of individualism and collectivism. Examination of the unique effects of individualism and collectivism versus other cultural factors (e.g., honor, power) awaits the availability of research that primes these factors.     

How individualism–collectivism orientations predict happiness in a collectivistic context

We discuss how individualistic/collectivistic orientations of employees predict affective well-being at work, and how this relationship is moderated by the perceptions of spirit of camaraderie in organizations. The sample comprises 161 employees of 109 organizations operating in Portugal, a collectivistic culture. The findings suggest that: (a) collectivistic individuals show higher affective well-being than individualists; (b) this relationship is moderated by the employees’ perceptions of the spirit of camaraderie in their organizations; (c) higher affective well being levels tend to be experienced by collectivists who find working in an organizational context to be rich in spirit of camaraderie, and lower levels of affective well being are expressed by individualists who perceive poor spirit of camaraderie in their working environments. The paper emphasizes that employee happiness can have different bases in different cultures and that individualism/collectivism orientations do not operate in the same way in different cultural and organizational contexts. We are very grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.     

Individualism–collectivism and group creativity

Current research in organizational behavior suggests that organizations should adopt collectivistic values because they promote cooperation and productivity, while individualistic values should be avoided because they incite destructive conflict and opportunism. In this paper, we highlight one possible benefit of individualistic values that has not previously been considered. Because individualistic values can encourage uniqueness, such values might be useful when creativity is a desired outcome. Although we hypothesize that individualistic groups should be more creative than collectivistic groups, we also consider an important competing hypothesis: given that collectivistic groups are more responsive to norms, they might be more creative than individualistic groups when given explicit instructions to be creative. The results did not support this competing hypothesis and instead show that individualistic groups instructed to be creative are more creative than collectivistic groups given the same instructions. These results suggest that individualistic values may be beneficial, especially when creativity is a salient goal.     

Dimensionality of the Children’s Depression Inventory: Meta-analysis of Pattern Matrices

This meta-analysis of 24 studies, comprising 35 independent samples with 18,099 participants, examined the factor structure of the Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI). The 5-factor solution involving Somatic Concerns, Externalizing, Negative Self-Concept, Lack of Personal and Social Interest, and Dysphoric Mood was supported for all samples. The 5-factor solution was appropriate for child, adolescent, general, at-risk/clinical, and English-speaking samples, whereas the 4-factor solution was the best for samples using non-English versions of the CDI. As the factor structure varied among study subgroups, the strength of relations between scale items and their underlying depressive symptoms varied. Hence, comparisons of mean CDI scores can be misleading.     

Individualism–collectivism and organ donation intentions

This article investigates the impact of individualism–collectivism on a person's willingness to donate organs. In Study 1, an online survey showed that individualism–collectivism was significantly and positively associated with participants' willingness to register as organ donors while perceived benefit mediated this relationship. Study 2 demonstrated the causal effect of individualism–collectivism on organ donation intentions using a priming technique. Participants primed with collectivism were more likely to register as organ donors than those primed with individualism. Our findings provide unique insights into whether cultural values (i.e., individualism–collectivism) can predict people's organ donation intentions.     

The 4-month-old infant’s perception of holograms and real objects: A demonstration of equivalence

Three experiments were conducted to determine whether 4-month-old infants perceive and respond to holograms as real objects. Infants in the first experiment failed to differentiate between a hologram of a toy car and the real car from which the hologram was constructed. In a second and third experiment, infants responded to holograms of two objects as they did to the real objects. The implications of using holograms in the study of early perceptual development are discussed.     

Establishing equivalence–equivalence analogical relations via tact and listener training

We investigated the role of verbal behavior on the emergence of analogy-type responding as measured via equivalence–equivalence relations. In Experiment 1, 8 college students learned to label arbitrary stimuli as, “vek,” “zog,” and “paf”, and in Experiment 2, 8 additional participants learned to select these stimuli when hearing their names in an auditory–visual matching-to-sample (MTS) task. Experimenters tested for the emergence of relational tacts (i.e., “same” and “different”) and equivalence–equivalence relations (analogy tests) via visual–visual MTS. Half of the participants were exposed to a think-aloud procedure. Even though they all passed analogy tests while tacting stimuli relationally, only participants exposed to tact training (Experiment 1) did so without the need for remediation. The results of these experiments confirm that individual discriminative and relational control of stimuli established through verbal behavior training is sufficient to produce equivalence–equivalence analogical responding, advancing the analysis of complex cognitive (problem-solving) phenomena.     

Noninvasive measurement of smokers’ tar and nicotine intake

A simple device for monitoring cigarette smokers’ intake of tar and nicotine is described. This device divided the mainstream smoke into two parallel paths, one containing seven parallel capillary tubes and the other containing one capillary tube; a Cambridge filter trapped the smoke passing through the path containing one tube. Analyses of both tar and nicotine trapped in the filter were performed by gravimetric and chemical methods. Calibration tests verified that a constant fraction of the tar and nicotine was retained in the apparatus over a wide range of conditions, allowing the calculation of smoke intake into the mouth. With supplementary methods for measuring the amount of smoke exhaled, the apparatus can be used to measure smoke deposition in the respiratory tract.     

von Uexküll’s Theory of Meaning and Gibson’s Organism–Environment Reciprocity

Abstract

Jakob von Uexküll is mostly known for his concept of Umwelt—the meaningful surrounding of animals. von Uexküll insisted vehemently on the fact that Umwelt vindicated Kant’s subjectivist epistemology in the biological domain. However, we argue that a crucial yet widely overlooked development in von Uexküll’s theory of meaning implies a more radical vision strikingly germane to J. J. Gibson’s own direct realist epistemology-ontology and in tension with his own subjectivist concept of Umwelt. Gibson argued that organism and environment are complementary and meaning is not constructed via a subjective act but is directly available in the world as opportunities for action, namely, affordances. We show that von Uexküll’s notion of “functional tone” is similar to Gibson’s concept of affordance in that it includes action in perception. More important, von Uexküll introduces the musical metaphor of harmony to characterize the relationship between animal and environment. Like Gibson’s reciprocity, harmony implies an unmediated isomorphism between the dispositions of the animal and those of the environment that allows for direct perceptual contact with the world and action upon it.     

Neuroimaging of Wernicke’s Encephalopathy and Korsakoff’s Syndrome

There is considerable evidence that neuroimaging findings can improve the early diagnosis of Wernicke's encephalopathy (WE) in clinical settings. The most distinctive neuroimaging finding of acute WE are cytotoxic edema and vasogenic edema, which are represented by bilateral symmetric hyperintensity alterations on T2-weighted MR images in the periphery of the third ventricle, periaqueductal area, mammillary bodies and midbrain tectal plate. An initial bout of WE can result in Korsakoff's syndrome (KS), but repeated bouts in conjunction with its typical comorbidity, chronic alcoholism, can result in signs of tissue degeneration in vulnerable brain regions. Chronic abnormalities identified with neuroimaging enable examination of brain damage in living patients with KS and have expanded the understanding of the neuropsychological deficits resulting from thiamine deficiency, alcohol neurotoxicity, and their comorbidity. Brain structure and functional studies indicate that the interactions involving the thalamus, mammillary bodies, hippocampus, frontal lobes, and cerebellum are crucial for memory formation and executive functions, and the interruption of these circuits by WE and chronic alcoholism can contribute substantially to the neuropsychological deficits in KS.     

Weyl’s Appropriation of Husserl’s and Poincar“s Thought

This article locates Weyl's philosophy of mathematics and its relationship to his philosophy of science within the epistemological and ontological framework of Husserl's phenomenology as expressed in the Logical Investigations and Ideas. This interpretation permits a unified reading of Weyl's scattered philosophical comments in The Continuum and Space-Time-Matter. But the article also indicates that Weyl employed Poincaré's predicativist concerns to modify Husserl's semantics and trim Husserl's ontology. Using Poincaré's razor to shave Husserl's beard leads to limitations on the least upper bound theorem in the foundations of analysis and Dirichlet's principle in the foundations of physics. Finally, the article opens the possibility of reading Weyl as a systematic thinker, that he follows Husserl's so-called transcendental turn in the Ideas. This permits an even more unified reading of Weyl's scattered philosophical comments.     

The mathematical form of measurement and the argument for Proposition I in Newton’s Principia

Newton characterizes the reasoning of Principia Mathematica as geometrical. He emulates classical geometry by displaying, in diagrams, the objects of his reasoning and comparisons between them. Examination of Newton??s unpublished texts (and the views of his mentor, Isaac Barrow) shows that Newton conceives geometry as the science of measurement. On this view, all measurement ultimately involves the literal juxtaposition??the putting-together in space??of the item to be measured with a measure, whose dimensions serve as the standard of reference, so that all quantity (which is what measurement makes known) is ultimately related to spatial extension. I use this conception of Newton??s project to explain the organization and proofs of the first theorems of mechanics to appear in the Principia (beginning in Sect. 2 of Book I). The placementof Kepler??s rule of areas as the first proposition, and the manner in which Newton proves it, appear natural on the supposition that Newton seeks a measure, in the sense of a moveable spatial quantity, of time. I argue that Newton proceeds in this way so that his reasoning can have the ostensive certainty of geometry.     

The philosophical–anthropological foundations of Bennett and Hacker’s critique of neuroscience

Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation.     

Children’s and Adolescents’ Conceptions of Happiness

Previous research on children’s and adolescents’ happiness has mainly focused on the different variables that may contribute to it. However, very few studies have investigated the beliefs that children and adolescents hold about happiness. It is important to study developmental and gender differences in the conceptions of happiness as beliefs affect people’s emotions and behaviors, and they may help explain how children and adolescents strive for their own (and potentially others’) happiness. To that aim, we conducted two different studies. In Study 1a 20 people (lay judges) completed two categorization tasks to obtain categorization systems that may include all the relevant content categories identified in previous literature with adults, adolescents and children. In Study 1b, we asked 162 children and adolescents to define—in their own words—what happiness meant for them. Their responses were coded according to two different systems derived from previous finding with adults and children and to an alternative coding system derived from the qualitative analyses of children’s and adolescents’ responses. Overall, results showed that hedonic conceptualization of happiness were mainly present in late childhood; whereas eudaimonic conceptualizations were mainly present in adolescence. No significant gender differences were found.     

Grice’s Analysis of Utterance-Meaning and Cicero’s Catilinarian Apostrophe

The pragmatics underlying Paul Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning provide a powerful framework for investigating the commitments arguers undertake. Unfortunately, the complexity of Grice’s analysis has frustrated appropriate reliance on this important facet of his work. By explicating Cicero’s use of apostrophe in his famous “First Catilinarian” this essay attempts to show that a full complex of reflexive gricean speaker intentions in essentially to seriously saying and meaning something.

Hume’s theory of justice and Vanderschraaf’s vulnerablity objection

Philosophical Studies -     

Review of Nie Minli’s Being and Substance: On Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z1–9

In his new book Being and Substance: A Study of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z1–9, Nie Minli, taking a holistic perspective, argues that the primary substance—that is, the individual in Categories—is identical to form, which is the primary substance in Metaphysics Z, and that Z3 has finished arguing what the real candidate of substance is and the inserted Z7–9 texts are the “core and key” of the entire book. In spite of his excellent scholarship and masterful interpretation of Metaphysics Z4–6, Z7, Categories 1–5 and Physics Α, Nie offers insufficient textual support for his interpretation of the primary substance in Metaphysics Z and the content of Z3. Although substance is the subject (hypokeimenon) and a “this” (tode ti) in Categories, it is the ultimate subject (hypokeimenon eschaton) and a “this” (tode ti) and separable (choriston) in Metaphysics. As the ultimate subject, substance is form and matter but not the individual. As a “this” (tode ti) and separable (choriston), substance is form; moreover, the primary substance is form. In my view, that form is substance in Z3 serves more as a plan or outline needed to prove in the following than as a definite conclusion. This article also points out that tode ti in Z8, 1033b21 refers to the individual but not the form. Homōnuma in Z9 cannot be understood as “sharing the same name but with different meaning,” but, rather, simply as “having the same name.”     

Benjamin’s Children’s Theater and the Problem of Pure Means

Studies in Philosophy and Education -