Cn-Definitions of Propositional Connectives

We attempt to define the classical propositional logic by use of appropriate derivability conditions called Cn-definitions. The conditions characterize basic properties of propositional connectives.     

The Naturality of Natural Deduction (II): On Atomic Polymorphism and Generalized Propositional Connectives

Studia Logica - In a previous paper (of which this is a prosecution) we investigated the extraction of proof-theoretic properties of natural deduction derivations from their impredicative...     

The Classification of Propositional Calculi

We discuss Smirnovs problem of finding a common background for classifying implicational logics. We formulate and solve the problem of extending, in an appropriate way, an implicational fragment H of the intuitionistic propositional logic to an implicational fragment TV of the classical propositional logic. As a result we obtain logical constructions having the form of Boolean lattices whose elements are implicational logics. In this way, whole classes of new logics can be obtained. We also consider the transition from implicational logics to full logics. On the base of the lattices constructed, we formulate the main classification principles for propositional logics.     

The Compositionality of Logical Connectives in Child Italian

This paper investigates the interpretation that Italian-speaking children and adults assign to negative sentences with disjunction and negative sentences with conjunction. The aim of the study was to determine whether children and adults assign the same interpretation to these types of sentences. The Semantic Subset Principle (SSP) (Crain et al., in: Clifton, Frazer, Rayner (eds) Perspective on sentence processing, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillside, 1994) predicts that children’s initial scope assignment should correspond to the interpretation that makes sentences true in the narrowest range of circumstances, even when this is not the interpretation assigned by adults. This prediction was borne out in previous studies in Japanese, Mandarin and Turkish. As predicted by the SSP, the findings of the present study indicate that Italian-speaking children and adults assign the same interpretation to negative sentences with conjunction (conjunction takes scope over negation). By contrast, the study revealed that some children differed from adults in the interpretation they assigned to negative sentences with disjunction. Adults interpreted disjunction as taking scope over negation, whereas children were divided into two groups: one group interpreted disjunction as taking scope over negation as adults did; another group interpreted negation as taking scope over disjunction, as predicted by the SSP. To explain the findings, we propose that Italian-speaking children initially differ from adults as dictated by the SSP, but children converge on the adult grammar earlier than children acquiring other languages due to the negative concord status of Italian, including the application of negative concord to sentences with disjunction.     

Connectives and narrative text: The role of continuity

Connectives are text devices that signal the relation between adjacent sentences. Recently there has been a surge of research interest in the role played by connectives in on-line processing. The present research tested the hypothesis that connectives will impact on-line processing to the extent that they signal a text event that represents a departure from the continuity of the events stated in the text. In Experiment 1, participants generated sentences to follow a stimulus sentence. An additive, causal, or adversative connective (or no connective) was provided to serve as the first word of the participants’ sentence. Results showed that sentences generated in response to additive or causal connectives depicted text events that were continuous with the stimulus text. In contrast, sentences generated in response to adversative connectives depicted discontinuous text events. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants read coherent sentence pairs containing inappropriately placed additive, causal, or adversative connectives. Support for the continuity hypothesis was found when it was shown that adversative connectives led to the greatest amount of processing disruption, as measured by longer reading time on the postconnective sentence (Experiment 2) and lower ratings of coherence (Experiment 3). Future research in this area is discussed.     

The Undecidability of Propositional Adaptive Logic

We investigate and classify the notion of final derivability of two basic inconsistency-adaptive logics. Specifically, the maximal complexity of the set of final consequences of decidable sets of premises formulated in the language of propositional logic is described. Our results show that taking the consequences of a decidable propositional theory is a complicated operation. The set of final consequences according to either the Reliability Calculus or the Minimal Abnormality Calculus of a decidable propositional premise set is in general undecidable, and can be -complete. These classifications are exact. For first order theories even finite sets of premises can generate such consequence sets in either calculus.     

The Power of a Propositional Constant

Monomodal logic has exactly two maximally normal logics, which are also the only quasi-normal logics that are Post complete, and they are complete for validity in Kripke frames. Here we show that addition of a propositional constant to monomodal logic allows the construction of continuum many maximally normal logics that are not valid in any Kripke frame, or even in any complete modal algebra. We also construct continuum many quasi-normal Post complete logics that are not normal. The set of extensions of S4.3 is radically altered by the addition of a constant: we use it to construct continuum many such normal extensions of S4.3, and continuum many non-normal ones, none of which have the finite model property. But for logics with weakly transitive frames there are only eight maximally normal ones, of which five extend K4 and three extend S4.     

Sentential Connectives and Translation

In the first exposition of the doctrine of indeterminacy of translation, Quine asserted that the individuation and translation of truth-functional sentential connectives like ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’ are not indeterminate. He changed his mind later on, conjecturing that some sentential connectives might be interpreted in different non-equivalent ways. This issue has not been debated much by Quine, or in the subsequent literature, it is, as it were, an unsolved problem, not well understood. For the sake of the argument, I will adopt Quine’s background assumption that all the semantic features of a language can be reduced to the speakers’ dispositions toward assent and dissent, as far as only the truth-conditional core of the meaning of sentences is concerned. I will put forward an argument to the effect that the speech dispositions of most, if not all, English (French, Italian, etc.) speakers constrain a unique translation of their connectives. This argument crucially relies on an empirical conjecture concerning the behaviour of these operators.     

Connectives Stranger than Tonk

Many logical systems are such that the addition of Prior's binary connective to them leads to triviality, see [1, 8]. Since is given by some introduction and elimination rules in natural deduction or sequent rules in Gentzen's sequent calculus, the unwanted effects of adding show that some kind of restriction has to be imposed on the acceptable operational inferences rules, in particular if these rules are regarded as definitions of the operations concerned. In this paper, a number of simple observations is made showing that the unwanted phenomenon exemplified by in some logics also occurs in contexts in which is acceptable. In fact, in any non-trivial context, the acceptance of arbitrary introduction rules for logical operations permits operations leading to triviality. Connectives that in all non-trivial contexts lead to triviality will be called non-trivially trivializing connectives.     

The Intertwinement of Propositional and Doxastic Justification

One important distinction in the debate over the nature of epistemic justification is the one between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, while doxastic justification is a property of beliefs, propositional justification is a property of propositions. On a rather common view, which accounts for doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification plus the so-called ‘basing relation’, propositional justification is seen as the prior notion, and doxastic justification is explained in terms of it. According to the opposing view, the direction of explanation needs to be reversed, and doxastic justification should be seen as primary. I distinguish between two notions of priority, and I argue that they give different verdicts with respect to the issue of which notion of justification comes first. The lesson may be taken to be that propositional and doxastic justification are in a relation of intertwinement.     

Propositional quantifiers

Summary In discussing propositional quantifiers we have considered two kinds of variables: variables occupying the argument places of connectives, and variables occupying the argument places of predicates.We began with languages which contained the first kind of variable, i.e., variables taking sentences as substituends. Our first point was that there appear to be no sentences in English that serve as adequate readings of formulas containing propositional quantifiers. Then we showed how a certain natural and illuminating extension of English by prosentences did provide perspicuous readings. The point of introducing prosentences was to provide a way of making clear the grammar of propositional variables: propositional variables have a prosentential character — not a pronominal character. Given this information we were able to show, on the assumption that the grammar of propositional variables in philosopher's English should be determined by their grammar in formal languages (unless a separate account of their grammar is provided), that propositional variables can be used in a grammatically and philosophically acceptable way in philosophers' English. According to our criteria of well-formedness Carnap's semantic definition of truth does not lack an essential predicate - despite arguments to the contrary. It also followed from our account of the prosentential character of bound propositional variables that in explaining propositional quantification, sentences should not be construed as names.One matter we have not discussed is whether such quantification should be called propositional, sentential, or something else. As our variables do not range over (they are not terms) either propositions, or sentences, each name is inappropriate, given the usual picture of quantification. But we think the relevant question in this context is, are we obtaining generality with respect to propositions, sentences, or something else?Because people have argued that all bound variables must have a pronominal character, we presented and discussed in the third section languages in which the variables take propositional terms as substituends. In our case we included names of propositions, that-clauses, and names of sentences in the set of propositional terms. We made a few comparisons with the languages discussed in the second section. We showed among other things how a truth predicate could be used to obtain generality. In contrast, the languages of the second section, using propositional variables, obtain generality without the use of a truth predicate.Special thanks are due to Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., who has given me much valuable assistance with the preparation of this paper. I also thank Alan Ross Anderson, Joseph Camp, Jr., Steven Davis, and Wilfrid Sellars for suggestions and corrections.The preparation of this paper was partly supported by a NSF grant.     

Propositional anaphors

Philosophical Studies - Propositions are posited to perform a variety of explanatory roles. One important role is being what is designated by a dedicated linguistic expression like a that-clause....     

Propositional Names

I propose that an adequate name for a proposition will be (1) rigid, in Kripke’s sense of referring to the same thing in every world in which it exists, and (2) transparent, which means that it would be possible, if one knows the name, to know which object the name refers. I then argue that the Standard Way of naming propositions—prefixing the word ‘that’ to a declarative sentence—does not allow for transparent names of every proposition, and that no alternative naming convention does better. I explore the implications of this failure for deflationism about truth, arguing that any theory that requires the T biconditional to be a priori cannot succeed.     

Propositional Q-Logic

Topic of the paper is Q-logic – a logic of agency in its temporal and modal context. Q-logic may be considered as a basal logic of agency since the most important stit-operators discussed in the literature can be defined or axiomatized easily within its semantical and syntactical framework. Its basic agent dependent operator, the Q-operator (also known as - or cstit-operator), which has been discussed independently by F. v. Kutschera and B. F. Chellas, is investigated here in respect of its relation to other temporal and modal operators. The main result of the paper, then, is a completeness result for a calculus of Q-logic with respect to a semantics defined on the tree-approach to agency as introduced and developed by, among others, F. v. Kutschera and N. D. Belnap.     

The Linguistic Formulation of Fallacies Matters: The Case of Causal Connectives

Argumentation - While the role of discourse connectives has long been acknowledged in argumentative frameworks, these approaches often take a coarse-grained approach to connectives, treating them...     

Logical Connectives for Constructive Modal Logic

Model-theoretic proofs of functional completenes along the lines of [McCullough 1971, Journal of Symbolic Logic 36, 15–20] are given for various constructive modal propositional logics with strong negation.