The identity of experiences and the identity of the subject

Philosophical Studies - Barry Dainton has developed a sophisticated version of the bundle theory of the subject of experiences. I shall focus on three claims Dainton makes: the identity-conditions...     

Personal identity is social identity

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - The question of the identity or persistence of the self through time may be interesting for philosophers, but it is hardly a burning question for most...     

Split identity: intransitive judgments of the identity of objects

Identity is a transitive relation, according to all standard accounts. Necessarily, if x = y and y = z, then x = z. However, people sometimes say that two objects, x and z, are the same as a third, y, even when x and z have different properties (thus, x = y and y = z, but x ≠ z). In the present experiments, participants read stories about an iceberg that breaks into two icebergs, one to the east and the other to the west. Many participants (32–54%, in baseline conditions across experiments) decided that both successors were the original iceberg, despite the different spatial locations of the successors. Experiment 1 shows that this tendency is not due to participants failing to understand both to mean both are simultaneously the original. Similarly, Experiment 2 demonstrates that the tendency is not solely due to their interpreting the question to be about properties of the icebergs rather than about the icebergs themselves. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest, instead, that participants may understand Which is the original? to mean Which, in its own right, is entitled to be the original? Emphasizing entitlement increases the number of seemingly intransitive responses, whereas emphasizing the formal properties of identity decreases them.     

Reversing the Levi identity

The AGM (Alchourrón-GÄrdenfors-Makinson) model of belief change is extended to cover changes on sets of beliefs that arenot closed under logical consequence (belief bases). Three major types of change operations, namely contraction, internal revision, and external revision are axiomatically characterized, and their interrelations are studied. In external revision, the Levi identity is reversed in the sense that onefirst adds the new belief to the belief base, and afterwards contracts its negation. It is argued that external revision represents an intuitively plausible way of revising one's beliefs. Since it typically involves the temporary acceptance of an inconsistent set of beliefs, it can only be used in belief representations that distinguish between different inconsistent sets of belief.     

Assessing multiple facets of gender identity: the gender identity questionnaire.

314 men and 451 women participated in a study to assess the reliability and validity of the multifaceted Gender Identity Questionnaire. Reliability coefficients of the (sub)scales varied between .67 and .80; content, criterion, and construct validity were satisfactory.     

Narrative identity,practical identity and ethical subjectivity

The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical subjectivity, the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard’s work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity.     

Adolescent identity formation: a Swedish study of identity status using the EOM-EIS-II

The aim of this study was to examine ego identity status among Swedish adolescents using the EOM-EIS-II. Identity status scores and distributions were examined for 222 (108 female, 114 male) Swedish high school students. Identity status differences were found between genders. There was a greater likelihood of female adolescents being categorized as moratoriums than were males, and there was a greater likelihood of males being categorized as diffusions than were females. Statistically significant differences were found between genders on the following subscales: moratorium, foreclosure, and diffusion. No statistically significant differences were found between females and males on the identity achievement subscale. To achieve a preliminary construct validation of the results from the EOM-EIS-II, four of the 222 participants were also assessed using Marcia's identity status interview. A fairly good accordance between the interview assessment of identity status and the EOM-EIS-II assessment were found. Interview results showed differences between the interviewers on each subscale (IA, M, F, and D). The same differences were detected on three of four subscales when assessing these individuals' identity statuses using the EOM-EIS-II.     

Relevant identity

We begin to fill a lacuna in the relevance logic enterprise by providing a foundational analysis of identity in relevance logic. We consider rival interpretations of identity in this context, settling on the relevant indiscernibility interpretation, an interpretation related to Dunn's relevant predication project. We propose a general test for the stability of an axiomatisation of identity, relative to this interpretation, and we put various axiomatisations to this test. We fill our discussion out with both formal and philosophical remarks on identity in relevance logic.     

Defending the self against identity misclassification

When people perform role-violating behaviors that are diagnostic of membership in a stigmatized group, they risk identity misclassification—i.e., being mistaken for a member of that group. Because false stigmatization raises the possibility of interpersonal punishment, role violators who wish to avoid it must communicate their non-stigmatized status to others. Conversely, self-protective strategies such as self-affirmations (Steele, 1988 Steele, C. M. 1988. “The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self”. In Advances in experimental social psychology, Edited by: Berkowitz, L. Vol. 21, 261–302. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) that do not communicate non-stigmatized status should fail to reduce role violators' discomfort. Consistent with this assumption, heterosexual men who publicly violated a gender role norm—and thereby risked misclassification as gay—reported heightened discomfort and diminished implicit self-evaluation, unless they directly or indirectly communicated their heterosexual status to their ostensible audience. Moreover, a standard self-affirmation task failed to protect heterosexual role violators from discomfort. Discussion highlights the implications of these findings for research on social role adherence, stigmatization, and self-affirmation.     

Fictionalism and the informativeness of identity

Identity claims often look nonsensical because they apparently declaredistinct things to be identical. I argue that this appearance is notjust an artefact of grammar. We should be fictionalists about such claims,seeing them against the background of speakers' pretense that their wordssecure reference to a plurality of objects that are then declared to beidentical from within the pretense. I argue that it is the resultinginterpretative tension – arising from the fact that two things cannever be identical – that allows us to understand the real point ofsuch statements. This view also offers a new solution to Fege's puzzleof the informativeness of identity statements.