Personal construct theory and the argument against mental illness

An attempt is made to integrate Thomas Szasz's 0974) theory of personal conduct and George Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs (PCT). It is argued that PCT provides an alternative to the void left behind by Szasz's negation of mental illness. Because PCT is concerned with psychological, rather than physiological, constructions of problems in living, it is not compatible with the biological model associated with Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) diagnostic categories. Rather, it is in keeping with the views of Szasz. Kelly's and Szasz's writings are used to support this view. Kelly's transitive diagnosis approach to “mental illness”, wherein diagnosis and therapy are construed as process oriented as opposed to category driven, is described as an alternative to the biological model. A contextualist approach (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980) is also discussed. These approaches not only empower clients and allow them to assert responsibility and control over their lives, but also provide an alternative system to the one rejected by Szasz.     

The politics of mental illness

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so‐called mind‐body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti‐biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind‐brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ‘represent’ anything, that brains do not ‘read’ or ‘transform’ representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal‐directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self‐organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end‐state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined.     

The detection of malingered mental illness

Clinical approaches to the detection of malingering are examined from the perspectives of both the general practitioner and forensic examiner. Specific strategies for identifying malingering patients is presented with particular attention to psychoses and post-traumatic stress disorders.