Qualities of memories for performed and imagined actions

When people imagine performing simple actions they can sometimes become confused about whether they actually performed the actions or only imagined doing so. In the present study participants performed, imagined, and heard groups of actions. During a second session participants imagined some of the earlier actions as well as some entirely new actions. On a later memory test participants sometimes falsely indicated that they had performed actions that they had only imagined and this tendency was a positive function of number of imaginings. We also found that true and false memories differed in terms of degree of perceptual detail, associated thoughts, emotions, contextual information, and kinesthetic detail. Differences between true and false memories were smaller when the action was imagined five times but were not entirely eliminated. These findings suggest that false memories produced in this paradigm can be both compelling and yet subtly different from true memories. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Creating nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions using an imagination inflation procedure

The current experiments examined the creation of nonbelieved true and false memories after imagining bizarre and familiar actions using the imagination inflation procedure (Goff & Roediger, 1998). In both experiments, participants took part in three sessions. In Session 1, participants had to perform or imagine simple familiar actions (e.g., “stir the water with the spoon”) and bizarre actions (e.g., “balance the spoon on your nose”). A day later, participants needed to imagine simple actions of which some were new actions, and some were old actions that appeared in the first session. After a week, the participants completed a recognition task. For those actions that were correctly or incorrectly remembered as having been performed, the participant was challenged that the action was not performed in order to evoke nonbelieved true and false memories. In general, we found that the imagination inflation procedure can successfully induce participants to produce nonbelieved memories. In Study 1, we successfully induced nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions, although in general nonbelieved memory rates were low. In Study 2, more participants formed nonbelieved memories for bizarre actions than for familiar actions. Also, we found that especially belief was more susceptible to revision when memories were challenged than recollection. In two experiments, we showed that nonbelieved memories can successfully be induced for both familiar and bizarre actions.     

Do people remember the temporal proximity of unrelated events?

In the present study, we tested the ability to remember the temporal proximity of two unrelated events that had happened within 7 days of one another. In three experiments, 1,909 participants judged whether pairs of news events, ranging in age from 1 month to about 6 years, had occurred within a week of each other and, if not, how far apart they had occurred. Some event pairs were related, and others were unrelated. For unrelated event pairs, same-week and separation judgments were very poor. Accuracy was much greater for both kinds of judgments when the events were related. Participants often guessed the separation of unrelated event pairs, whereas they frequently deduced the separation or remembered the proximity of related event pairs. For both types of pairs, the participants reported using the strength of the memories or the general period in which the events had occurred.     

Nonbelieved memories in middle-aged and older people

Previous studies have reported that young participants typically date events that they remember, but no longer believe they experienced, to the period of childhood. The present study investigated whether participants aged between 40 and 79 years dated events related to relinquished memories to the period of childhood, as do younger people, or whether they dated such events to a period later in life. The study also compared believed and nonbelieved memories with respect to memory perspective (1st vs 3rd person perspective). Results indicated that the majority of middle-aged and older people dated nonbelieved memories to the period of childhood (median age = 8 years). No correlation was found between the participants’ current age and their age at the time the nonbelieved event occurred. In addition, results showed that believed memories were more likely to be retrieved from a 1st person perspective than were nonbelieved memories.     

Defending and reducing belief in memories: An experimental laboratory analogue

When receiving disconfirmatory social feedback about recollected events, people sometimes defend and sometimes reduce their belief that the event genuinely occurred. To improve estimates of the rates of memory defense and reduction, and of the magnitude of the change in belief in occurrence that results, in the present studies we examined the effect of disconfirmatory social challenges made to correctly recalled memories for actions performed in the lab. Adult participants performed, imagined, or heard action statements and imagined some of the initial actions multiple times. One week later, they completed a source-monitoring test and rated the actions on belief in their occurrence, recollection, visual detail, vividness, and reexperiencing. Four of the correctly recalled performed actions were challenged either prior to making the ratings during the test (Study 1, N = 44) or after making initial ratings after completing the test, following which the ratings were taken again (Study 2, N = 85). Across both studies, challenges were associated with lower belief-in-occurrence and recollection ratings on average than for control items, and belief in occurrence was affected to a greater extent than recollective features. Challenges that occurred during the test produced more instances of defense, whereas challenges that occurred after the test produced more instances of reduction. A closer analysis showed that some participants always defended, some always reduced, and some both defended and reduced belief. Responses to the first challenge positively predicted the responses to subsequent challenges. In addition, the procedure in Study 2 produced a variety of types of nonbelieved memories.     

Effect of memory perspective on retrospective causal attributions

Two studies examined whether people's retrospective causal attributions might be mediated by the visual perspective from which events are recalled. In Study 1, pairs of Ss participated in "get-acquainted" conversations and made a series of attribution ratings for their performance. They returned 3 weeks later to rerate their performance on the same attribution scales and to indicate the perspective from which they remembered their earlier conversation. Ss reported either "observer" memories in which they could "see" themselves from the outside or "field" memories in which their field of view matched that of the original situation. Study 2 was identical to Study 1 with the exception that Ss' memory perspectives were manipulated via verbal instructions. In both experiments, conversations that were recalled from an observer's perspective were attributed more dispositionally. These results suggest that the different perspectives from which events can be recalled function much like the divergent visual perspectives available to actors and observers in immediate, everyday experience. Discussion of these results focuses on how they further understanding of the contradictory findings reported in the literature on temporal shifts in attributions.     

The development of metamemory monitoring during retrieval: the case of memory strength and memory absence

This research examined the development of the ability to monitor memory strength and memory absence at retrieval. In two experiments, 7-year-olds, 10-year-olds, and adults enacted and imagined enacting a series of bizarre and common actions. Two weeks later, they completed a memory test in which they were asked to determine whether each action had been enacted, had been imagined, or was novel and to provide a confidence judgment for each response. Results showed that participants across age groups successfully monitored differences in strength between memories for enacted actions and memories for imagined actions. However, compared with 10-year-olds and adults, 7-year-olds exhibited deficits in monitoring of differences in memory strength among imagined actions as well as deficits in monitoring memory absence. Results underscore metamemory developments that have important implications for memory accuracy.     

The retrieval of self-defining memories is associated with the activation of specific working selves

This article presents two studies that investigated the impact of the retrieval of self-defining memories on individuals' sense of self. Participants recalled positive and/or negative self-defining memories, rated memory characteristics and completed measures focusing on different self-aspects. Study 1 found that participants reported higher state self-esteem after recalling a positive memory than after recalling a negative one. They also reported lower negative self-consistency and higher state self-concept clarity and positive self-consistency, but this result became non-significant after controlling for state self-esteem. Study 2 found that participants reported higher state self-esteem, a marginally higher proportion of recreation/exploration, goals and a marginally lower proportion of achievement goals after recalling a positive memory than after recalling a negative one. They also reported a higher proportion of self-cognitions referring to emotional states after recalling memories from which they had not abstracted meaning than after recalling memories from which they had done this. These findings suggest that the retrieval of vivid, emotional and highly self-relevant memories may be accompanied by the activation of specific self-representations or working selves. They also suggest that the experience of memory-related intrusive images may temporarily influence individuals' sense of self. The implications of these findings for clinical practice are discussed.     

Source confusion influences the effectiveness of the autobiographical IAT

We examined the claim that the autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) can detect concealed memories. Subjects read action statements (e.g., “break the toothpick”) and either performed the action or completed math problems. They then imagined some of these actions and some new actions. Two weeks later, the subjects completed a memory test and then an aIAT in which they categorized true and false statements (e.g., “I am in front of the computer”) and whether they had or had not performed actions from Session 1. For half of the subjects, the nonperformed statements were actions that they saw but did not perform; for the remaining subjects, these statements were actions that they saw and imagined but did not perform. Our results showed that the aIAT can distinguish between true autobiographical events (performed actions) and false events (nonperformed actions), but that it is less effective, the more that subjects remember performing actions that they did not really perform. Thus, the diagnosticity of the aIAT may be limited.     

Developmental changes in memory source monitoring.

Previous research suggests that children are more likely than adults to confuse memories of actions they imagined themselves performing with memories of actions they actually performed (Realization Judgments), but are not more likely to confuse memories of actions they had imagined performing with memories of actions they saw another person perform (Reality Monitoring). We approach these findings in terms of a theory about the processes by which people identify the sources of their recollections (Source Monitoring). This approach suggests that children may be more likely than adults to confuse memories from different sources whenever the sources are highly similar to one another. Experiments 1 and 2 tested this hypothesis by manipulating the perceptual and semantic similarity of two sources of information and testing 4- and 6-year-old and adult subjects' recollection of the sources of particular pieces of information. Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis that children are more likely than adults to mistakenly identify memories of things they imagined another person doing as memories of things they witnessed that person doing. The findings indicate that (a) people are more likely to confuse memories from similar than dissimilar sources, (b) source monitoring improves during the preschool and childhood years, and (c) children may be especially vulnerable to the effects of source similarity.     

Suppression of emotional and nonemotional content in memory: effects of repetition on cognitive control

Two experiments utilized a think/no-think paradigm to examine whether cognitive control of memories differs depending on whether they contain information with negative or neutral emotional content. During a training phase, participants learned face-word pairs (Experiment 1) or face-picture pairs (Experiment 2). In a subsequent experimental phase, participants were shown faces and told to think of the items paired with some of the faces and to try not to think of the items paired with other faces. Finally, in a test phase, participants were again shown each face and asked to recall the item with which it had been paired previously. Results for both verbal (Experiment 1) and nonverbal (Experiment 2) items indicated that the facilitatory and inhibitory influences of cognitive control were larger for negative than neutral items.     

Forgetting having denied: The “amnesic” consequences of denial

The concept of denial has its roots in psychoanalysis. Denial has been assumed to be effective in blocking unwanted memories. In two experiments, we report that denial has unique consequences for remembering. In our two experiments, participants viewed a video of a theft, and half of the participants had to deny seeing certain details in the video, whereas the other half had to tell the truth. One day later, all participants were given either a source-monitoring recognition or a recall task. In these tasks, they were instructed to indicate (1) whether they could remember talking about certain details and (2) whether they could recollect seeing those details in the video. In both experiments, we found that denial made participants forget that they had talked about these details, while leaving memory for the video itself unaffected. This denial-induced forgetting was evident for both the source-monitoring recognition and recall tests. Furthermore, when we asked participants after the experiment whether they could still not remember talking about these details, those who had to deny were most likely to report that they had forgotten talking about the details. In contrast to a widely held belief, we show that denial does not impair memory for the experienced stimuli, but that it has a unique ability to undermine memory for what has been talked about.     

Group identification and historical memory

Differences in ingroup identification can influence the accessibility of historical memories. In Study 1, the authors examined individual differences in identity; in Study 2 they experimentally manipulated identity. In Study 1, high identifiers recalled fewer incidents of ingroup violence and hatred than did low identifiers. High and low identifiers did not differ in their recall of ingroup suffering. In Study 2, participants in the high-identity condition recalled fewer incidents of violence and hatred by members of their group than did those in the low-identity condition but a similar number of good deeds. Control participants recalled more positive than negative group actions; this bias was exaggerated in the high-identity condition and eliminated in the low-identity condition. The authors interpret the results as indicating the effects of social identity on individual-level memory processes, especially schema-consistent recall. They evaluate other explanations of the bias, including collective censorship of negative histories.     

Characteristics of personally important episodic memories,counterfactual thoughts,and future projections across age and culture

We have limited knowledge as to whether the phenomenological differences between episodic memories, counterfactuals, and future projections show the same pattern across age groups and diverse samples. Here we compared the characteristics of these mental events, reported by younger and older participants in a Turkish (Study 1) and in an American sample (Study 2). In both studies, memories contained more sensory-perceptual-spatial details, were easier to bring to mind, and more specific. Future projections were the most positive, whereas counterfactuals were the least emotionally intense. In Study 1, older participants rated the events more positively and experienced them with more perceptual detail, whereas younger participants reported the future to be more voluntarily rehearsed, important, and central. These age differences did not replicate in Study 2. Overall, phenomenological differences between the events are robust and replicate across diverse samples. However, age differences are more sensitive to cultural or individual differences.     

The norm of self-interest and its effects on social action

Four studies investigated whether people feel inhibited from engaging in social action incongruent with their apparent self-interest. Participants in Study 1 predicted that they would be evaluated negatively were they to take action on behalf of a cause in which they had no stake or in which they had a stake but held stake-incongruent attitudes. Participants in Study 2 reported both surprise and anger when a target person took action on behalf of a cause in which he or she had no stake or in which he or she held stake-incongruent attitudes. In Study 3, individuals felt more comfortable engaging in social action and expected others to respond more favorably toward their actions if the issue was described as more relevant to their own sex than to the opposite sex. In Study 4, the authors found that providing nonvested individuals with psychological standing rendered them as likely as vested individuals to undertake social action. The authors discuss the implications of these results for the relationship between vested interest, social action, and attitude-behavior consistency.     

Interpersonal consequences of forgiveness: Does forgiveness deter or encourage repeat offenses?

Benefits of forgiveness have been well documented, but past research has not directly addressed the crucial question of whether forgiveness deters or invites repeat transgressions. Our research indicates that expressing forgiveness typically discourages future offenses. In Study 1, participants playing a form of the prisoner’s dilemma game were more likely to repeat their transgressions against unforgiving victims than forgiving victims, especially when victims had no chance to retaliate. In response to a hypothetical scenario presented in Study 2, participants reported that they would be less likely to risk offending someone for a second time if that person had forgiven their first offense. In Study 3, participants’ autobiographical recollections of their prior transgressions revealed that receiving forgiveness predicted higher repentance motivation.     

Comparison of neural activity that leads to true memories,false memories,and forgetting: An fMRI study of the misinformation effect

False memories can occur when people are exposed to misinformation about a past event. Of interest here are the neural mechanisms of this type of memory failure. In the present study, participants viewed photographic vignettes of common activities during an original event phase (OEP), while we monitored their brain activity using fMRI. Later, in a misinformation phase, participants viewed sentences describing the studied photographs, some of which contained information conflicting with that depicted in the photographs. One day later, participants returned for a surprise item memory recognition test for the content of the photographs. Results showed reliable creation of false memories, in that participants reported information that had been presented in the verbal misinformation but not in the photographs. Several regions were more active during the OEP for later accurate memory than for forgetting, but they were also more active for later false memories, indicating that false memories in this paradigm are not simply caused by failure to encode the original event. There was greater activation in the ventral visual stream for subsequent true memories than for subsequent false memories, however, suggesting that differences in encoding may contribute to later susceptibility to misinformation.     

Visual imagery in autobiographical memory: The role of repeated retrieval in shifting perspective

Recent memories are generally recalled from a first-person perspective whereas older memories are often recalled from a third-person perspective. We investigated how repeated retrieval affects the availability of visual information, and whether it could explain the observed shift in perspective with time. In Experiment 1, participants performed mini-events and nominated memories of recent autobiographical events in response to cue words. Next, they described their memory for each event and rated its phenomenological characteristics. Over the following three weeks, they repeatedly retrieved half of the mini-event and cue-word memories. No instructions were given about how to retrieve the memories. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to adopt either a first- or third-person perspective during retrieval. One month later, participants retrieved all of the memories and again provided phenomenology ratings. When first-person visual details from the event were repeatedly retrieved, this information was retained better and the shift in perspective was slowed.