Child witnesses' metamemory realism

This study investigated the degree of realism in the confidence judgments of 11 to 12-year-olds (41 girls and 40 boys) of their answers to questions relating to a short film clip showing a kidnapping event. Four different confidence scales were used: a numeric scale, a picture scale, a line scale and a written scale. The results demonstrated that the children showed a high level of overconfidence in their memories. However, no significant differences between the four confidence scales were found. Weak gender differences were found in that the girls were slightly, but significantly, better calibrated than the boys. In addition, although both boys and girls overestimated the total number of memory questions they had answered correctly, the boys gave higher estimates compared with the girls. In brief, the results indicate that, at least in the context investigated, 11-12 year-old children's confidence in and estimations of their own event memory show poor realism (overconfidence and overestimation). A comparison with previous research on adults indicates that 11 to 12-year-old children show noticeably poorer realism.     

Lineup administrator influences on eyewitness identification and eyewitness confidence

Lineup administrators were trained to respond to witnesses in such a way as to redirect them from making non-identifications or foil identification responses toward making identifications of the suspect. Compared to a no-influence control condition, suspect identification rates in the influence condition increased substantially and proportionally for guilty and innocent suspects. Administrators steered witnesses more specifically toward the suspect when the suspect was guilty than when the suspect was innocent. Post-identification confidence for correct identifications of the guilty suspect did not differ significantly across the influence and no-influence groups. However, post-identification confidence for false identifications of the innocent suspect was significantly lower for the influence group than for the no-influence group because witnesses who were influenced to make false identifications tended to be those who were less confident prior to the lineup, and also because those witnesses became less confident from pre- to post-identification.     

The role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect

Previous research using the Gudjonnson suggestibility scale has suggested a role for self-esteem in suggestibility, with participants low in self-esteem being more suggestible than participants high in self-esteem. Four experiments are presented examining the role of self-esteem in the misinformation effect and whether enhanced suggestibility effects in participants low in self-esteem reflect genuine memory impairment. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants completed a standard recognition test. In Experiment 2 participants completed the modified recognition test. In Experiment 3 participants completed a free recall test. In Experiments 1 and 4 participants low in self-esteem demonstrated greater misinformation effects than participants high in self-esteem. In Experiment 3 a 3-day retention interval was employed with the modified test and no differences were found between the two groups on the reporting of the new item. The findings suggest that participants low in self-esteem are particularly sensitive to demand characteristics and post-event suggestion but do not suffer from genuine memory impairment.     

Memory conformity affects inaccurate memories more than accurate memories

After controlling for initial confidence, inaccurate memories were shown to be more easily distorted than accurate memories. In two experiments groups of participants viewed 50 stimuli and were then presented with these stimuli plus 50 fillers. During this test phase participants reported their confidence that each stimulus was originally shown. This was followed by computer-generated responses from a bogus participant. After being exposed to this response participants again rated the confidence of their memory. The computer-generated responses systematically distorted participants’ responses. Memory distortion depended on initial memory confidence, with uncertain memories being more malleable than confident memories. This effect was moderated by whether the participant's memory was initially accurate or inaccurate. Inaccurate memories were more malleable than accurate memories. The data were consistent with a model describing two types of memory (i.e., recollective and non-recollective memories), which differ in how susceptible these memories are to memory distortion.     

Searching for the sequential line-up advantage: A distinctiveness explanation

Signal Detection models as well as the Two-High-Threshold model (2HTM) have been used successfully as measurement models in recognition tasks to disentangle memory performance and response biases. A popular method in recognition memory is to elicit confidence judgements about the presumed old/new status of an item, allowing for the easy construction of ROCs. Since the 2HTM assumes fewer latent memory states than response options are available in confidence ratings, the 2HTM has to be extended by a mapping function which models individual rating scale usage. Unpublished data from 2 experiments in Bröder and Schütz (2009) validate the core memory parameters of the model, and 3 new experiments show that the response mapping parameters are selectively affected by manipulations intended to affect rating scale use, and this is independent of overall old/new bias. Comparisons with SDT show that both models behave similarly, a case that highlights the notion that both modelling approaches can be valuable (and complementary) elements in a researcher's toolbox.     

Not too ‘shy’ to help catch a thief: Recall memory of shy versus non-shy witnesses

Witness shyness was examined to determine its impact on recall accuracy in two experiments. It was hypothesized that shyness would facilitate witness accuracy, under some conditions. In Experiment 1, witnesses were asked to respond to directed recall questions probing crime event and culprit details. Non-shy and shy witnesses produced comparable accuracy rates when describing the culprit. In contrast, non-shy witnesses were more accurate when describing crime environment details than shy witnesses. In Experiment 2, arousal was manipulated and a free recall approach was used to assess recall accuracy. Under low arousal, shy witnesses were more accurate at describing the culprit than non-shy witnesses, whereas, non-shy witnesses were more accurate at describing crime details than shy witnesses. Under high arousal, differences in accuracy were not observed across shy and non-shy witnesses.     

The effects of confederate influence and confidence on the accuracy of crime judgements

Building on recent work which has investigated social influences on memory and remembering, the present experiment examined the effects of social pressure and confederate confidence on the accuracy and confidence of eyewitnesses. Sixty undergraduate participants watched a video of a staged mugging and then answered questions about the video out loud in the presence of either one or three confederates who had also watched the film with them. Unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always gave incorrect responses to four out of the eight questions. Participants and confederates were also asked to give confidence scores out loud for each of their answers. Again, unbeknownst to the participant, the confederate(s) always expressed either high or low confidence scores for the incorrect information, depending on condition. Participants gave fewer correct answers, and were less confident, in the presence of three, as opposed to one, confederates. Participants were also more confident, yet no more accurate, when the confederate(s) gave high, as opposed to low, confidence scores. Thus the presumed independence of evidence given by multiple witnesses cannot be safely assumed.     

How do ordered questions bias eyewitnesses?

ABSTRACT

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149–160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601–608. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people’s need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, “Need for Cognition,” (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311–318. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.